McLaren v Telegraph News Group Pty Ltd and Fairfax Community Newspapers Pty Ltd
[1996] IRCA 483
•10 October 1996
DECISION NO: 483/96
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI96/1657
B E T W E E N:
JOHN BENNETT McLAREN
Applicant
A N D:
TELEGRAPH NEWS GROUP PTY LTD
First Respondent
FAIRFAX COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS PTY LTD
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
10 OCTOBER 1996 RITTER JR
INTRODUCTION
Mr McLaren has made an application pursuant to section 170EA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (C'th) ("the Act") seeking a remedy in relation to the alleged unlawful termination of his employment. The application was filed with the Australian Industrial Relations Commission ("AIRC") on 14 May 1996. It named "Telegraph News Group" as the employer. At the point on the application where an applicant is to give a brief summary of the reasons given for termination, was written: "Company sold. New employer, Fairfax Community Newspapers, did not require my services." The application proceeded before the Australian Industrial Relations Commission until, on 29 May 1996, Commissioner Eames certified, in accordance with subsection 170ED(1) of the Act, that the Commission had been unable to settle the matter by conciliation within a reasonable period and that the parties had not elected to have the matter dealt with by consent arbitration.
The matter was then referred to the Industrial Relations Court of Australia. After the application was so referred, Judicial Registrar Ryan ordered that Fairfax Community Newspapers Pty Ltd be joined as a second respondent.
The reason for this was that Mr McLaren was, in circumstances to be later explained, unclear as to who his employer was on the date of the termination of his employment, being 2 May 1996.
The matter was part-heard before me on 25 and 26 July 1996. The case had to be adjourned in unusual circumstances, which are set out in a judgment which I delivered on 2 September 1996. The effect of that judgment was that, subject to the consent of each of the parties to the evidence that had been given to date standing as evidence in a recommenced hearing, the hearing be recommenced before me on a date to be fixed.
At a telephone directions hearing before me on 14 September 1996, each of the parties indicated their consent to this occurring.
Accordingly, the application came before me again on 2 October 1996. On that date, the evidence and submissions were completed.
Mr McLaren not only claimed a remedy in relation to his allegedly unlawful termination but also sought damages for alleged breaches by Telegraph News Group Pty Ltd ('TGN") of his employment contract. The Court was able to hear these claims in its associated jurisdiction under section 430 of the Act.
Mr McLaren was first employed by TGN on 22 May 1995. He was employed as a general manager, with responsibilities for the production of two community newspapers which were produced by TGN, the Telegraph - Bacchus Marsh, Melton, Ballen edition, and the Telegraph - Macedon edition.
There was no dispute that Mr McLaren's employment ceased on 2 May 1996. The termination of Mr McLaren's employment followed the sale of the newspapers from TGN to Fairfax Community Newspapers Pty Ltd ("FCN") on 1 May 1996. The termination of Mr McLaren's employment was effected by Mr Neil Collyer, the general manager of FCN.
Due to this, Mr McLaren was unsure whether he had an employment relationship with FCN that FCN were terminating, or whether he was simply being informed by FCN that his employment relationship with TNG had been terminated.
The claims that Mr McLaren made for breach of contract were all against TNG. These were for removal expenses to Gisbourne, failure to pay salary for two days near Christmas, 1995 and for expenses associated with Mr McLaren's hiring and use of a motor vehicle.
Mr McLaren represented himself. FCN were represented by Ms Soccio from the Printing Industries Association of Australia. TNG were represented by Mr Raschke, a solicitor.
Mr McLaren gave evidence in support of his case, and called his wife, Mrs McLaren. FCN called Mr Collyer to give evidence. TNG called Mr Des Anderson and Mr David Flecknoe, as witnesses. Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe were the directors and shareholders of TNG at the relevant time.
UNLAWFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
The basis upon which Mr McLaren could argue that his employment was unlawfully terminated has changed since the date of the filing of his application. This is because, on 4 September 1996, the High Court declared that section 170DE(2) of the Act was unconstitutional and invalid. (See State of Victoria & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia, High Court of Australia, unreported, 4 September, 1996.) Section 170DE(2) had provided that a reason for termination of employment was not valid if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the employee's capacity and conduct, and the operational requirements of the employer, the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
In the circumstances of this case, this meant that the alleged unlawful termination of employment was restricted to section 170DE(1) which provides that an employer must not terminate an employee's employment unless there is a valid reason/s connected with the employee's capacity or conduct, or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.
As stated earlier, Mr McLaren was initially confused as to whether the employer who terminated his employment was FCN or TNG.
As the evidence emerged, however, it became clear that FCN had, at no time, employed Mr McLaren. During closing submissions Mr McLaren accepted this. Therefore, the claim for unlawful termination of employment against FCN must be dismissed.
With respect to TNG, it submitted that the valid reason for the termination of Mr McLaren's employment was to do with the operational requirements of TNG, to use the language of section 170DE(1). Specifically, TNG sold the newspapers, which Mr McLaren managed the production of, to FCN. After this occurred, TNG had no need to employ Mr McLaren or any other employees. There are no other assets or business of TNG which could support employees. As at the final date of hearing, there were no employees at all employed by TNG.
Therefore, there was a valid reason for the termination of employment of Mr McLaren. This was because, from 1 May 1996, TNG had no business which could employ Mr McLaren.
Accordingly, Mr McLaren's claim against TNG for unlawful termination of employment must also be dismissed.
This is not to say that I do not have considerable sympathy for Mr McLaren. There is no doubt that he worked extremely hard for TNG. As he put it in his evidence, he put his heart and soul into being the manager of the newspapers. The business constituted by the production of the newspapers was not profitable for TNG. During the course of Mr McLaren's management, the profitability lessened. This was not suggested by anyone to be a reflection of Mr McLaren's management skills, but a reflection of things like increased costs, competition from FCN and others, and the depressed economies of the relevant areas, making it less likely that businesses would seek advertising space.
I accept Mr McLaren's evidence that he was not aware of the sale of the newspapers until 1 May 1996. Indeed, Mr Anderson, who negotiated the sale to FCN, said that he deliberately kept the details of the sale close to his chest. Although discussions had taken place over some time, it was only on 1 May 1996 that the deal could be confirmed, due to FCN having to negotiate a clearance to buy the newspapers through the Foreign Investment Review Board. After this clearance was given, the sale of the newspapers occurred extremely quickly.
Mr McLaren did not hear of the sale of the newspapers until 1 May 1996. He was then told that his employment future would be discussed on 2 May 1996. He said that he realised on 1 May 1996 that he would not be employed by FCN, the new owner of the newspapers. This was because he had publicly been disparaging of FCN and their practices in, as he understood it, trying to undercut the advertising rates of the TNG newspapers (I should mention that Mr Collyer disputed the practice occurred, and this is an issue I need not determine).
Mr McLaren was spoken to by Mr Collyer on 2 May 1996, and the termination of his employment then advised. This was done in a businesslike and cordial fashion by Mr Collyer and it seems there was no animosity between Mr Collyer and Mr McLaren. Mr Collyer told Mr McLaren there was no position available for him at FCN. Mr Collyer explained to the Court that FCN had an existing management structure which could incorporate the management of the newly purchased newspapers and therefore they had no need to employ Mr McLaren. I accept this, and also Mr Collyer's evidence that he personally had nothing against Mr McLaren.
However, neither Mr Flecknoe nor Mr Anderson spoke to Mr McLaren about the termination of his employment. Whilst it is understandable that for commercial reasons Mr Anderson may have wanted to keep details of the potential sale close to his chest until it was finally agreed to, there seems to have been no good reason why Mr Anderson could not have spoken to Mr McLaren about the termination of his employment after Mr Collyer had spoken to him. I accept Mr Anderson's evidence that the people from FCN had indicated that they would prefer to speak to the staff of TNG. However, when this was done, there was no reason why Mr Anderson could not have spoken to Mr McLaren. To have done so would have been at least courteous, professional and humane, and may have spared Mr McLaren some of the anguish that the termination of his employment has no doubt caused.
If the High Court had not ruled section 170DE(2) invalid, I would have had to consider whether the termination of Mr McLaren's employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In cases of redundancy, this would have included a consideration of whether there should have been greater consultation or warning given to Mr McLaren by TNG, of his impending unemployment.
Issues relevant to such matters were discussed in numerous cases of this Court, including my judgments in Walsh v Wayne Motors (1996) 65 IR 76 and Powers v ANI Engineering Pty Ltd, 1996, IRCA 391/96, 22 August 1996. In Walsh, I quoted from the decision of von Doussa J, in Sinclair v Anthony Smith & Associates Pty Ltd, unreported, IRCA 665/95, 1 December 1995, where his Honour said at pages 7 and 8, albeit in the context of an award :
"The requirement for consultation is in the award not only to permit the possibility of arriving at some arrangement of the workplace which has lesser consequences than dismissal, but also to allow time for the employees to deal with the emotional, family and domestic stresses that are likely to descent upon them when their employment is brought to an end. The importance of these non-workplace personal factors cannot be underestimated, and finds expression in the reasons of various tribunals that have had to consider clauses of this type. To put it into colloquial terms, it is desirable, as the award recognises, that employees whose security of employment is about to be shattered, be let down gently. If they are forewarned and counselled, they are more likely to be able to accommodate to their new situation, to adjust themselves to the search for other work, and the like.
Moreover, it is generally recognised that if an employee is in work and is given time off to go and look for other work, the prospects of finding employment are somewhat better than if the person concerned is required to seek work as an unemployed person on social security.
The failure to consult is a significant matter in this case. In my view, it was also significant that no forewarning was given, and significant also that no counselling was provided. Those are matters that should have been attended to, to render the dismissal in the circumstances of this case reasonable and fair."
This part of his Honour's judgment succinctly sets out some of the human problems that arise when somebody is made redundant, and how this can be avoided. Mr Anderson took no steps to avoid the emotional difficulties that being made redundant would have caused Mr McLaren; and, whilst the Court can grant Mr McLaren no remedy in respect of this, as I say, I have sympathy for him. It seemed to me that Mr Anderson had no regard to these factors. Perhaps that is a product of the hardheaded business world in which he moves but it is unnecessary and unwise to speculate on this, in particular as Mr Anderson said he made efforts to try to secure employment for as many of the employees of TNG as he could, by discussions with FCN, prior to the finalisation of the sale agreement.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
As stated earlier, Mr McLaren made a number of claims based on alleged breaches of his contract by TNG.
Firstly, Mr McLaren claimed two days salary. He said that he worked for two days near Christmas, 1995, and that he was not paid for this. This was not seriously contested by the first respondent. I will order that Mr McLaren be paid $269.23, worked out on the basis of $35,000 per annum, divided by 52 weeks, being $673.08, and two-fifths of that amount being $269.23.
In order to succeed in the other claims, it is necessary for Mr McLaren to prove that there was an express or implied term of the employment contract which covered the particular issue, that TNG has breached the term, and that it was appropriate to award Mr McLaren damages for the breach.
With respect to the removal expenses of Mr McLaren to Gisbourne, I do not accept that there is any merit in this claim. I have no doubt that Mr McLaren moved to Gisbourne, in part, because he thought he could perform his job better if he lived there.
However, I do not accept that the payment for Mr McLaren's removal expenses, in moving to Gisbourne, were either expressly or impliedly agreed to by TNG. Mr McLaren did not contend that this had been specifically agreed to by Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe. Therefore, if the claim were to succeed, it would have to be on the basis that there was an implied term of the contract of employment that the employer would pay for Mr McLaren's expenses in relocating to Gisbourne. I do not accept that there was such an implied term.
The ordinary criteria for determining whether a term should be implied into a contract are that:
(a)the term is reasonable and equitable;
(b) it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract;
(c) it is so obvious that it goes without saying;
(d) it is capable of clear expression; and
(e) it does not contradict any express term of the contract.
These requirements were initially set out by the Privy Council in BP Refinery Proprietary Limited v Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20 at 26. They have subsequently been approved by members of the High Court in a number of cases, including Codalpha Construction Proprietary Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 404, and also Hospital Products Limited v United Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 65, 117 and 121.
Having regard to these criteria, I do not accept that it was necessary, for Mr McLaren's employment contract to be performed, or obvious that he would relocate and that the employer would pay for this.
With respect to the claim for motor vehicle expenses, Mr McLaren claimed the costs of hiring a motor vehicle and petrol expenses.
Mr McLaren's argument on this issue was as follows. He said that when he was first employed by Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe, the negotiated package was a salary of $35,000 per annum, a fully serviced or maintained company car, and a share of profits, should there be any.
It was common ground that TNG had only one company car. Before Mr McLaren's employment, this was being used by Ms Carol Job, the previous general manager. Ms Job had worked at the newspapers for a considerable period of time and at one time was a part-proprietor of the newspapers. It seems clear, on all accounts, that prior to Mr McLaren commencing his employment with TNG, a decision was made that Ms Job did not have a future with TNG
Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe said in evidence that it was agreed with Mr McLaren that once Ms Job left, he would have the benefit of the company car.
Mr McLaren's evidence was different. He said that it was specifically agreed that Ms Job's employment would be terminated, prior to Mr McLaren commencing his employment. Therefore, he could have the use of the company car from day one.
As it turned out, Ms Job's employment was not terminated prior to Mr McLaren's commencement. Ms Job remained in the employment of TNG for about 14 weeks from Mr McLaren's commencement. Therefore, Mr McLaren took it upon himself to hire motor vehicles for this period of time. Mr McLaren said in evidence that as general manager, he took it upon himself that he had to have a car, so he hired a car, the cheapest available, and for the minimum time available, which was usually four days per week. Mr McLaren submitted records in respect of the hire arrangements.
In answer to a question that I asked Mr McLaren, he confirmed that his records showed the total of the hire charges be paid until the car used by Ms Job was available, plus the petrol expenses that Mr McLaren incurred.
Mr McLaren submitted no hire or petrol expenses to Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe during the course of his employment.
Mr McLaren defended this on the basis of saying that he knew that the newspapers were losing money, and did not want to put these claims in until he had "turned the paper around". He said that when the paper was making a profit again, he would have submitted the expenses.
It seems clear that Mr McLaren's enthusiasm for what he was trying to achieve blinded him against the necessity to keep Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe aware of the potential expenses that the business was incurring. As the business was losing money, it was obviously important for Mr Flecknoe and Mr Anderson to be aware of any potential expenses. Therefore, it was extremely remiss of Mr McLaren not to inform Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe of the car expenses. However, I accept that this was done out of Mr McLaren's misguided sense of loyalty to the cause of trying to increase the profitability of the newspapers.
Mr McLaren's claim for the hire and petrol expenses involves a number of components, as follows:-
It was a term of the contract of employment that Mr McLaren be provided with a fully serviced company car.
The first respondent breached this term of Mr McLaren's employment by failing to provide him with a company car, until Ms Job left the employment of the first respondent.
Mr McLaren is entitled, as damages, to the amount of petrol expenses and hire fees that he incurred.
The first point was disputed by Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe. As stated earlier, they claimed that what was agreed was that Mr McLaren would have the company car only when Ms Job's employment was terminated and that it was up to Mr McLaren, as general manager, to effect the termination of her employment. Mr Anderson stressed that he could not say with any precision as to when Ms Job's employment would be terminated because he had to make sure that any termination of her employment did not breach the Industrial Relations Act.
Mr Flecknoe, in his evidence, made it clear that there was only one company car and that Mr McLaren would not be entitled to the use of this until Ms Job left the employment of the first respondent.
Whilst, in general, I thought that Mr Flecknoe gave his evidence in a careful and convincing manner, on this point I prefer the evidence of Mr McLaren. I think Mr McLaren was given an assurance by Mr Anderson, at least, that he would be provided with a company car from day one. In this regard, Mr McLaren's evidence was supported by that of Mrs McLaren. She gave evidence that she met with her husband and Mr Anderson at a computer swap-meet, where Mr Anderson was working, on a morning prior to Mr McLaren commencing with the first respondent. Mrs McLaren said that she and her husband sat with Mr Anderson and that her husband and Mr Anderson discussed matters relating to Mr McLaren's employment. Mrs McLaren said that she heard Mr Anderson inform Mr McLaren that he would ensure that Ms Job was not employed with the respondent, prior to Mr McLaren's commencement because, to have Ms Job employed there at the time would have been unfair to Mr McLaren. Mrs McLaren could recall Ms Job being spoken about in non-complimentary terms by Mr Anderson that morning. Although vague in some respects, I accept Mrs McLaren's evidence about what Mr Anderson said regarding the termination of Ms Job's employment.
Although Mrs McLaren could not recall whether there was any discussion about a motor vehicle on the day in question, her evidence supports her husband's claim as to the promised timing of Ms Job's departure from TNG.
In my opinion, therefore, in not providing Mr McLaren with a fully serviced company car from day one, TNG was in breach of the contract of employment.
The next issue to consider is what damages flow from this. It was obviously clear to Mr McLaren, from when he commenced employment with TNG, that Ms Job had not left their employment and that she was still using the company car. Therefore, in so far as this constituted a breach of his employment contract, Mr McLaren was aware of this from day one.
A person who suffers damages arising out of a breach of contract is under a duty to mitigate their loss; that is, to take reasonable steps to minimise the amount of economic loss that they suffer, as a result of the breach of contract.
I do not think that Mr McLaren took all such steps to minimise his loss. To have done this, he ought to have at least communicated to Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe that he was going to hire a car and hold TNG responsible for the hire charges, to give an opportunity to TNG to suggest or come up with some alternative arrangement. In addition, it is clear that Mr McLaren took no steps to try to share the company car with Ms Job so as to minimise hire charges in this way. Although I accept Mr McLaren's evidence that Ms Job was rather possessive of the car, Mr McLaren did not raise the issue with her, or Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe, as he ought to have, if he was trying to reasonably minimise the loss to TNG, arising out of the breach of contract.
In addition, it is also clear that, to some extent, Mr McLaren acquiesced to the breach of contract by not raising it with Mr Anderson or Mr Flecknoe, and not taking it upon himself to either resolve the issue with Ms Job or to terminate her employment, lawfully, as had been planned. Indeed, at one point in his evidence, Mr McLaren said that after he commenced employment with TNG and was aware that Ms Job was still employed there, "I sat down and analysed what was the situation. She worked on a publication called Astron News, and she was probably two-thirds of the way through selling the next edition, and she had total knowledge and records of it, and so on. I knew that if she was made redundant or left, we would literally have to fold the publication up on the spot and lose all that revenue, so I said to [Mr Anderson]: 'Look, I think we should keep her until' - because he was determined to get rid of her, and I said: 'I think we should keep her until we put Astron News to bed', which we did. When it was done, she was made redundant and that's when I was given the company car."
Therefore, it can be seen that Ms Job's continued employment with TNG was at least partly as a result of the actions of Mr McLaren. Given that, and given that he knew that he could only have the company car when Ms Job left, it is a little difficult to suggest that TNG should be responsible for all of the hire fees, in the interim, especially when the directors did not know of the hire fees being incurred.
Having said that, it is somewhat difficult to assess what damages would have been suffered by Mr McLaren if he had brought the breach to the attention of Mr Anderson and Mr Flecknoe early on, or had resolved the car issue with Ms Job, or the issue of Ms Job's employment. It may be that if he had raised the issue, the actual expenses incurred by him prior to some arrangement having been made would be minimal. This is most difficult to assess.
Mr McLaren submitted documents which indicated his motor vehicle expenses, including hire fees, to the date on which he obtained the motor vehicle from Ms Job after she left the employment of TNG. This indicated an amount of $3,420.65, for this total period of about five months. The figures included both hire and petrol costs. Mr McLaren also tendered the receipts which supported these figures.
With respect to the petrol expense, in my opinion Mr McLaren ought to be reimbursed for all of these expenses. This is because I accept that it was part of his contract of employment that his petrol expenses would be paid, from day one. I do not find that this claim is affected by the fact that he hired a motor vehicle. He would have incurred these petrol expenses, whether or not he was using a hire vehicle or the company car. Although he did not submit this claim during the currency of his employment, this does not affect the validity of the claim.
From a consideration of the receipts, the total petrol expenses of Mr McLaren are $1,498.79.
With respect to the car hire fees, I think it reasonable to allow Mr McLaren damages in the amount of four weeks' car hire charges. In assessing this amount, I have taken the view that it was reasonable in the short term for Mr McLaren to hire a motor vehicle to travel to work and travel around as was required by his position. I think that the duration of four weeks is a reasonable length of time for Mr McLaren to have sorted out the problem with TNG, that Ms Job continuing to use the car presented. Hiring a car for longer than this period did not represent reasonable mitigation of Mr McLaren's loss. From my consideration of the car hire receipts, it seems that an average daily cost for the hire of a motor vehicle was about $35 per day. I will therefore award damages in the sum of 20 days at $35, equalling $700.
I will order that the amounts to be paid to Mr McLaren be paid to him within 14 days.
COSTS
As set out in my judgment on 2 September 1996, Mr McLaren made a claim for costs. During the course of the hearing on 2 October 1996, Mr McLaren expressly indicated that he did not proceed with this claim. He indicated that the claim for costs was made if the hearing had to be aborted before me and recommenced before another Judicial Registrar because of the issue that arose on 26 July 1996, as set out in my earlier judgment.
As part of her closing submissions, Ms Soccio made a submission for costs on behalf of FCN. This claim was made by a notice of motion. The claim was on the basis that, by continuing with the action against FCN, Mr McLaren had caused FCN to incur costs because of an unreasonable act. In such a case, the Court may order costs under section 170EHA of the Act.
However, I do not think it appropriate to make a costs order against Mr McLaren. Firstly, I have doubts about whether such an order should be made against somebody acting in person, when there is some uncertainty about who the employer was. However, I do not have to finally determine this. More important, however, is that FCN did not incur any costs arising out of their representation. Ms Soccio represented FCN. Ms Soccio is an employee of the Printing Industries Association of Australia. Ms Soccio advised me that there would be no additional charge to FCN arising out of the representation of FCN in the Court action. This is because FCN, by the payment of an annual fee, is entitled to have the Printing Industries Association represent them at hearings of this type.
When discussed with Ms Soccio, she also indicated that FCN had been put to the trouble and expense of locating and providing her with documents to support their defence of the application. However, I do not think it appropriate to make an order for costs for this. I have doubts as to whether such costs are included as "costs" for the purposes of section 170EHA. Section 170EHA(3) states that costs include all legal and professional costs, and disbursements and expenses of all witnesses. I have serious doubts as to whether the costs of FCN employees in providing documentation and instructions to Ms Soccio could satisfy this description. In any event, as a matter of discretion, I do not think it appropriate to make a costs order against Mr McLaren.
Therefore, the costs application of FCN will be dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding 17 pages are a true copy of the reasons for decision of Judicial Registrar Ritter.
Associate :
Dated : 10 October 1996
APPEARANCES
The Applicant appeared in person.
Counsel for the First Respondent Mr H Raschke
Solicitors for the First Respondent H Raschke & Associates
Representative for the Second Respondent: Ms C Soccio
Organisation for the Second Respondent: Printing Industries Association of Australia
Dates of Hearing : 25, 26 July 1996
2 October 1996
Date of Judgment : 10 October 1996
CATCHWORDS
INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - REDUNDANCY - costs
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (C'th) ss 170DE, 170EA, 170EHA
Powers v ANI Engineering Pty Ltd (1996) IRCA 391/96, 22 August 1996, unreported.
Sinclair v Anthony Smith & Associates Pty Ltd (1995) IRCA 665/95, 1 December 1995, unreported.
State of Victoria & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia, 4 September, 1996.
Walsh v Wayne Motors (1996) 65 IR 76.
MCLAREN V TELEGRAPH NEWS GROUP PTY LTD AND FAIRFAX COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS PTY LTD, VI 1657 OF 1996
Before: RITTER JR
Place: PERTH
Date: 10 OCTOBER 1996
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 1657 OF 1996
B E T W E E N:
JOHN BENNETT McLAREN
Applicant
A N D:
TELEGRAPH NEWS GROUP PTY LTD
First Respondent
FAIRFAX COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS PTY LTD
Second Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDERS
10 OCTOBER 1996 RITTER JR
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application under section 170EA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (C'th) against the first respondent and the second respondent is dismissed.
The applicant's claim for breach of contract against the first respondent is allowed, in part, and the first respondent is ordered to pay to the applicant the amount of $2,468.02 within 14 days of the date of this order.
The claims of the applicant and the second respondent for costs are both dismissed.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules
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