| CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER | |
Citation: | McKinnon v Port Marina Pty Ltd [2022] NSWPIC 654 |
| APPLICANT: | Jodie McKinnon |
| RESPONDENT: | Port Marina Pty Ltd |
| Member: | 25 November 2022 |
| DATE OF DECISION: | Catherine McDonald |
CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS COMPENSATION - Fall at work causing rupture of breast implant; dispute as to whether worker suffered an injury being a pathological change; Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska, Castro v State Transit Authority (NSW), North Coast Area Health Service v Felstead, Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May discussed; treatment fell within the definitions in section 59 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (1987 Act) even though the original implant was not an artificial aid; Held – award for weekly compensation and section 60 expenses of the 1987 Act. |
FINDINGS MADE: | 1. The applicant suffered an injury on 6 May 2021 which caused the rupture of a left breast implant. |
| determinations made: | 2. Pursuant to s 37 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the respondent is to pay the applicant weekly compensation $878.40 from 31 August 2021 to date and continuing. 3. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s s 60 expenses resulting from the injury to her left breast including the expenses of and incidental to the removal and replacement of the ruptured implant in her left breast. 4. Award for the respondent on the claim with respect to a secondary psychological condition. |
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND
Jodie McKinnon was employed by Port Marina Pty Ltd (Port Marina) as a cleaner. On 6 May 2021 she slipped and fell while mopping a bathroom floor, landing on her left breast and left side. About 20 years before, Ms McKinnon had undergone breast augmentation surgery. Investigations after the fall showed that the implant in her left breast had ruptured and the implant in her right breast was bulging. Ms McKinnon says that she suffered a secondary psychological condition as a result of the injury.
Ms McKinnon claims weekly compensation from 31 August 2021 and medical expenses, including the cost of surgery to remove and replace the implant in her left breast.
Port Marina denies that Ms McKinnon suffered an injury as defined in s 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) because she did not suffer a pathological change as a result of the incident. It also disputes that Ms McKinnon suffered a compensable secondary psychological condition and that she is incapacitated for work. Port Marina disputes that the proposed medical treatment is reasonably necessary medical treatment pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION
The claim was listed for conciliation conference and arbitration hearing on 14 September 2022 when Mr Young of counsel appeared for Ms McKinnon and Mr McMahon of counsel appeared for Port Marina.
I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties…
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- Case
- [2022] NSWPIC 654
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory definition of “injury” in section 5 of the 1987 Act, which includes a pathological change. McKinnon argued that the rupture of her implant constituted a pathological change, while Port Marina contended that the implant was not an artificial aid as defined by the Act. The court considered previous cases such as Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska, Castro v State Transit Authority (NSW), North Coast Area Health Service v Felstead, and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May to assist in its interpretation. It concluded that the treatment required for the ruptured implant fell within the definitions in section 59 of the 1987 Act, even though the original implant was not an artificial aid. The court found that the rupture of the implant did indeed amount to a pathological change and was thus a compensable injury under the Act.
Based on the findings, the court held that McKinnon was entitled to weekly compensation and section 60 expenses as per the 1987 Act. McKinnon’s claim for compensation was therefore successful. The court issued an order awarding McKinnon the appropriate weekly compensation and section 60 expenses.
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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