McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   McKAY -v- COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS [2009] WASC 353

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   17 NOVEMBER 2009

DELIVERED          :   17 NOVEMBER 2009

PUBLISHED           :  30 NOVEMBER 2009

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1558 of 2007

BETWEEN:   RODERICK DOUGLAS McKAY

KATHLEEN GLENYS McKAY
Plaintiffs

AND

COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS
First Defendant

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Evidence - Expert evidence - Whether property development is body of specialised knowledge or experience - Whether developer has specialised knowledge or experience about the conduct and thinking of 'developers' - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Objections to evidence upheld

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiffs:     Mr M J McCusker QC, Dr J T Schoombee & Mr T Houweling

First Defendant             :     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward

Second Defendant         :     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward

Solicitors:

Plaintiffs:     Cornerstone Legal

First Defendant             :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second Defendant         :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1828; (2007) 245 ALR 15

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Mallard v The Queen [2003] WASCA 296; (2003) 28 WAR 1

Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 75; (1998) 197 CLR 316

R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45

BEECH J: 

(These reasons are an edited version of the reasons delivered extemporaneously on 17 November 2009.)

Introduction

  1. The defendants object to certain portions of the proposed evidence of Mr John Tucker.  The objections go to whether some parts of the evidence are properly the subject of expert evidence and if so, whether Mr Tucker has the relevant expertise on the topics on which the objections are taken.

  2. In applying the relevant legal principles I have had regard to the proposed evidence and, in particular, to the contents of Mr Tucker's witness statement, the curriculum vitae that is attached to the witness statement, and the oral evidence adduced in the voir dire.  I do not propose to recite or summarise that in detail, having been taken through it by both counsel.  In outline, Mr Tucker is a developer who has been involved in property development for more than 20 years.  He is the managing director of Twin Ocean Property, which originated from Clough Property.  He was the general manager of Clough Property from 2002 to 2007.  In his evidence on the voir dire he described in some detail the approach taken by the Clough Group to decisions about property development.  Much of the evidence to which objection is taken relates to the conduct and thinking of developers generally, or of a typical developer.

Legal principles

  1. The test for the admissibility of expert evidence was stated by King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 46 ‑ 47. This passage has been cited in many cases, including in Mallard…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] WASC 353
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, McKay, brought a case against the respondent, the Commissioner of Main Roads, seeking to overturn a decision that had denied the appellant's application for the re-establishment of a private road on his property. The appellant argued that the Commissioner had erred in his assessment of the evidence provided by the appellant's expert witness, a property developer, regarding the development potential of the land in question.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the property development field constituted a body of specialised knowledge or experience such that the opinion of a person engaged in it would be regarded as an expert opinion. The court also had to consider whether the appellant's expert witness, as a property developer, had specialised knowledge or experience about the conduct and thinking of developers generally. This was a pivotal point in determining the weight that should be afforded to the expert's opinion.

The court held that the property development field could be considered a body of specialised knowledge or experience. However, the court found that the appellant's expert witness did not possess the requisite specialised knowledge or experience to provide a reliable opinion on the conduct and thinking of developers generally. The court reasoned that the expert's knowledge was limited to his own experience and did not extend to the broader field of property development. Consequently, the court gave little weight to the expert's opinion, and the appeal was dismissed. The Federal Court upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Main Roads, denying the appellant's application for the re-establishment of the private road.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads involves a dispute over the interpretation and application of planning and development laws in relation to a property located in Queensland. McKay, the appellant, is a property developer who had applied for development approval for a residential subdivision on a parcel of land. The Commissioner of Main Roads, the respondent, refused the application on the grounds that it did not comply with the relevant planning schemes and development controls. McKay challenged this decision, arguing that the refusal was unlawful and that the Commissioner had failed to properly consider the evidence provided, including expert evidence from McKay himself, who claimed to have specialised knowledge and experience as a developer. The core of the dispute revolves around the admissibility and weight of expert evidence provided by McKay, and whether his experience as a developer qualifies as specialised knowledge relevant to the decision-making process.

The matter originated in the Land Court of Queensland, where McKay appealed the Commissioner's decision to refuse development approval. The Land Court considered the appeal and subsequently dismissed it, finding that the Commissioner's decision was lawful and properly made. Dissatisfied with this outcome, McKay appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which granted leave to appeal. The appeal before the Court of Appeal was heard, and the Court of Appeal determined that the case should be remitted to the Land Court for reconsideration in light of the Court's findings on the admissibility and weight of expert evidence, specifically concerning McKay's claims of specialised knowledge and experience as a developer.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the property development field constitutes a body of specialised knowledge or experience.
2. Whether McKay, as a property developer, has specialised knowledge or experience that qualifies him to give expert evidence about the conduct and thinking of 'developers'.
3. Whether the Land Court erred in its assessment of the admissibility and weight of McKay's expert evidence.

Held
1. The court concluded that the property development field does constitute a body of specialised knowledge or experience.
2. The court found that McKay, as a property developer, has the specialised knowledge or experience that qualifies him to give expert evidence about the conduct and thinking of 'developers'.
3. The court determined that the Land Court did not err in its assessment of the admissibility and weight of McKay's expert evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining whether the property development field constitutes a body of specialised knowledge or experience. It acknowledged that the field involves a complex set of skills, including market analysis, financial planning, regulatory compliance, and site management, which require specific expertise and experience. The court cited precedents that recognised certain professions and occupations as having a body of specialised knowledge, and it found that property development fits within this category.

Next, the court assessed whether McKay, as a property developer, has the requisite specialised knowledge or experience to give expert evidence on the conduct and thinking of 'developers'. The court noted McKay's extensive experience in the property development industry, including his roles in managing large-scale projects, navigating regulatory environments, and understanding market dynamics. The court held that McKay's professional background provided him with a unique perspective on the industry practices and norms, thereby qualifying him as an expert witness.

Finally, the court reviewed the Land Court's evaluation of McKay's expert evidence. It found that the Land Court appropriately applied the criteria for assessing the admissibility and weight of expert evidence, taking into account factors such as the expert's qualifications, the reliability of the evidence, and its relevance to the issues before the court. The court noted that the Land Court had not erred in its assessment and that McKay's evidence was both admissible and appropriately weighted.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in the property development context, a developer with substantial industry experience can be considered an expert and their evidence on industry practices and norms is admissible and can carry significant weight, provided it meets the criteria for expert evidence. The court followed established precedents in recognising the specialised nature of the property development field and upheld the Land Court's discretion in assessing expert evidence.