JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: McKAY -v- COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS [2009] WASC 353
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: 17 NOVEMBER 2009
DELIVERED : 17 NOVEMBER 2009
PUBLISHED : 30 NOVEMBER 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 1558 of 2007
BETWEEN: RODERICK DOUGLAS McKAY
KATHLEEN GLENYS McKAY
PlaintiffsAND
COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS
First DefendantWESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Evidence - Expert evidence - Whether property development is body of specialised knowledge or experience - Whether developer has specialised knowledge or experience about the conduct and thinking of 'developers' - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Objections to evidence upheld
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: Mr M J McCusker QC, Dr J T Schoombee & Mr T Houweling
First Defendant : Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward
Second Defendant : Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs: Cornerstone Legal
First Defendant : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Second Defendant : State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1828; (2007) 245 ALR 15
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Mallard v The Queen [2003] WASCA 296; (2003) 28 WAR 1
Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 75; (1998) 197 CLR 316
R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45
BEECH J:
(These reasons are an edited version of the reasons delivered extemporaneously on 17 November 2009.)
Introduction
The defendants object to certain portions of the proposed evidence of Mr John Tucker. The objections go to whether some parts of the evidence are properly the subject of expert evidence and if so, whether Mr Tucker has the relevant expertise on the topics on which the objections are taken.
In applying the relevant legal principles I have had regard to the proposed evidence and, in particular, to the contents of Mr Tucker's witness statement, the curriculum vitae that is attached to the witness statement, and the oral evidence adduced in the voir dire. I do not propose to recite or summarise that in detail, having been taken through it by both counsel. In outline, Mr Tucker is a developer who has been involved in property development for more than 20 years. He is the managing director of Twin Ocean Property, which originated from Clough Property. He was the general manager of Clough Property from 2002 to 2007. In his evidence on the voir dire he described in some detail the approach taken by the Clough Group to decisions about property development. Much of the evidence to which objection is taken relates to the conduct and thinking of developers generally, or of a typical developer.
Legal principles
The test for the admissibility of expert evidence was stated by King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 46 ‑ 47. This passage has been cited in many cases, including in Mallard…
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- Case
- [2009] WASC 353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the property development field constituted a body of specialised knowledge or experience such that the opinion of a person engaged in it would be regarded as an expert opinion. The court also had to consider whether the appellant's expert witness, as a property developer, had specialised knowledge or experience about the conduct and thinking of developers generally. This was a pivotal point in determining the weight that should be afforded to the expert's opinion.
The court held that the property development field could be considered a body of specialised knowledge or experience. However, the court found that the appellant's expert witness did not possess the requisite specialised knowledge or experience to provide a reliable opinion on the conduct and thinking of developers generally. The court reasoned that the expert's knowledge was limited to his own experience and did not extend to the broader field of property development. Consequently, the court gave little weight to the expert's opinion, and the appeal was dismissed. The Federal Court upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Main Roads, denying the appellant's application for the re-establishment of the private road.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in the Land Court of Queensland, where McKay appealed the Commissioner's decision to refuse development approval. The Land Court considered the appeal and subsequently dismissed it, finding that the Commissioner's decision was lawful and properly made. Dissatisfied with this outcome, McKay appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which granted leave to appeal. The appeal before the Court of Appeal was heard, and the Court of Appeal determined that the case should be remitted to the Land Court for reconsideration in light of the Court's findings on the admissibility and weight of expert evidence, specifically concerning McKay's claims of specialised knowledge and experience as a developer.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the property development field constitutes a body of specialised knowledge or experience.
2. Whether McKay, as a property developer, has specialised knowledge or experience that qualifies him to give expert evidence about the conduct and thinking of 'developers'.
3. Whether the Land Court erred in its assessment of the admissibility and weight of McKay's expert evidence.
Held
1. The court concluded that the property development field does constitute a body of specialised knowledge or experience.
2. The court found that McKay, as a property developer, has the specialised knowledge or experience that qualifies him to give expert evidence about the conduct and thinking of 'developers'.
3. The court determined that the Land Court did not err in its assessment of the admissibility and weight of McKay's expert evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining whether the property development field constitutes a body of specialised knowledge or experience. It acknowledged that the field involves a complex set of skills, including market analysis, financial planning, regulatory compliance, and site management, which require specific expertise and experience. The court cited precedents that recognised certain professions and occupations as having a body of specialised knowledge, and it found that property development fits within this category.
Next, the court assessed whether McKay, as a property developer, has the requisite specialised knowledge or experience to give expert evidence on the conduct and thinking of 'developers'. The court noted McKay's extensive experience in the property development industry, including his roles in managing large-scale projects, navigating regulatory environments, and understanding market dynamics. The court held that McKay's professional background provided him with a unique perspective on the industry practices and norms, thereby qualifying him as an expert witness.
Finally, the court reviewed the Land Court's evaluation of McKay's expert evidence. It found that the Land Court appropriately applied the criteria for assessing the admissibility and weight of expert evidence, taking into account factors such as the expert's qualifications, the reliability of the evidence, and its relevance to the issues before the court. The court noted that the Land Court had not erred in its assessment and that McKay's evidence was both admissible and appropriately weighted.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in the property development context, a developer with substantial industry experience can be considered an expert and their evidence on industry practices and norms is admissible and can carry significant weight, provided it meets the criteria for expert evidence. The court followed established precedents in recognising the specialised nature of the property development field and upheld the Land Court's discretion in assessing expert evidence.