McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   McKAY -v- COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS [No 2] [2010] WASC 153

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   14 & 15 JUNE 2010

DELIVERED          :   24 JUNE 2010

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1558 of 2007

BETWEEN:   RODERICK DOUGLAS McKAY

KATHLEEN GLENYS McKAY
Plaintiffs

AND

COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS
First Defendant

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Evidence - Hearsay - Statutory exceptions - Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 79C - Whether completed survey responses are business records of the business conducting the survey - Whether survey responses are statements made by qualified persons - Whether report outlining results of survey is a business record - Whether a report whose author is deceased should be rejected under s 79C(6)

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 79C, s 79C(1), s 79C(2a), s 79C(6)

Result:

Rulings given on objections

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiffs:     Mr M J McCusker QC, Mr T Houweling & Ms J P See

First Defendant            :     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward

Second Defendant        :     Mr K M Pettit SC & Ms F B Seaward

Solicitors:

Plaintiffs:     Cornerstone Legal

First Defendant            :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second Defendant        :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542

Atra v Farmers & Graziers Co‑op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281

Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62

Cavill v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 108

Chino Pty Ltd v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 768; (2006) 153 LGERA 136

Coffman v The Queen [2010] WASCA 54

Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133

Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560

McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [2009] WASC 353

Mouritz v Hegedus (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 990188A, 19 April 1999)

Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158

RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 152

Shmee Pty Ltd v Bresham Investments Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 291

Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 18 FCR 285

Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277

Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647

BEECH J: 

Introduction

  1. On 14 and 15 June 2010 I heard numerous objections to evidence by both parties.  With two exceptions, I made rulings with oral reasons in the course of the hearings.  I do not propose to say more about those rulings.

  2. I reserved my decision in relation to two rulings, both of which raise issues involving s 79C of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).

  3. The first relates to the evidence of Ms Marion Thompson. It raises issues of admissibility under s 79C(1) and (2a) of the Evidence Act.

  4. The second relates to the report of Emeritus Professor Whipple, who…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads [No 2], the plaintiff, McKay, brought proceedings against the Commissioner of Main Roads, seeking compensation for land taken for roadworks. The dispute involved the admissibility of certain documentary evidence, including completed survey responses and a report outlining the results of a survey, under the provisions of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), specifically section 79C. The key legal issues the court had to determine were whether the completed survey responses constituted business records of the business conducting the survey, whether they were statements made by qualified persons, and whether a report whose author was deceased should be rejected under section 79C(6). The court also needed to consider the admissibility of evidence that was post-taking and whether it could be used to rebut conclusions based on pre-taking information.

The court found that the completed survey responses were indeed business records of the business conducting the survey, as they met the criteria under section 79C(2a) of the Evidence Act. These records were considered genuine and were found to be admissible as evidence. The court also concluded that the survey responses were statements made by qualified persons, satisfying the requirements of section 79C(1) and (2). However, regarding the report whose author was deceased, the court held that such a report should not be rejected outright under section 79C(6) but should be assessed on its merits to determine its admissibility. The court further ruled that evidence considered post-taking could not be used to rebut conclusions based on pre-taking information, thereby upholding the objection to certain parts of the evidence presented by the defendant.

The court's final orders included the admission of the completed survey responses and the report as admissible evidence, subject to the court's satisfaction of their genuineness and relevance. The court also ruled that evidence considered post-taking could not be used to challenge conclusions based on pre-taking information, thereby limiting the scope of rebuttal based on subsequent data.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 79C(1), (2) and (2a) provide as follows: 79C.Documentary evidence, admissibility of(1)Subject to subsection (2), in any proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact or opinion would be admissible, any statement in a document and tending to establish the fact or opinion shall, on production of the document, be admissible as evidence of that fact or opinion if the statement -(a)was made by a qualified person; or(b)directly or indirectly reproduces or is derived from one or other or both of the following -(i)information in one or more statements, each made by a qualified person;(ii)information from one or more devices designed for, and used for the purpose of, recording, measuring, counting or identifying information, not being information based on a statement made by any person.(2)Where a statement referred to in subsection (1) is made by a qualified person or reproduces or is derived from information in a statement made by a qualified person, that person must be called as a witness unless -(a)he is dead;(b)he is unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend or give evidence as a witness;(c)he is out of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance;(d)all reasonable efforts to identify or find him have been made without success;(e)no party to the proceedings who would have the right to cross examine him requires him to be called as a witness;(f)having regard to the time which has elapsed since he made the statement and to all the circumstances, he cannot reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement;(g)having regard to all the circumstances of the case, undue delay, inconvenience or expense would be caused by calling him as a witness; or(h)he refuses to give evidence.(2a)Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), in any proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact or opinion would be admissible, any statement in a document and tending to establish the fact or opinion shall, on production of the document, be admissible as evidence of that fact or opinion if -(a)the statement is, or directly or indirectly reproduces, or is derived from, a business record; and(b)the court is satisfied that the business record is a genuine business record. Section 79C makes a statement in a document admissible notwithstanding, among other things, the rule against hearsay and the rule against secondary contents of documents: s 79C(3). The section provides two avenues of admissibility. The first avenue relates to documents generally (subsections (1) and (2)) and the second relates solely to business records (subsection (2a)): Beamish v The Queen [2005] WASCA 62 [152]. Section 79C renders statements in a document admissible, not (necessarily) the whole document: Cavill v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 108 [98]. Section 79C(2a) is not restricted to statements made by a qualified person or derived from such a statement. That is evident from the terms of the section. See also Beamish [157].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is, I think, necessary to repeat the context and basis of any receipt of Ms Thompson's evidence. The Land Release Report referred to in pars 35 and following was prepared and published in February 2007, seven months after the taking of the land in this case. Consequently, the plaintiffs object to the tender of the Land Release Report and to Ms Thompson's evidence about its contents. The defendants say that this evidence is admissible as one of the limited exceptions to the general rule against the receipt of evidence after the date of taking. The exception relied upon by the plaintiffs is described as the 'completion of a process underway at the time of taking' exception. The existence of that exception is said to be supported by the decision of Pain J in Chino Pty Ltd v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2006] NSWLEC 768; (2006) 153 LGERA 136 [66]. There may be room for doubt as to whether what is set out at that paragraph records a submission made to her Honour, rather than her Honour's reasoning. But that is a question for another occasion. As I have said, the parties have agreed that this (and considerable other evidence) should be received provisionally on the basis that objections on the ground that evidence is 'post‑taking' are to be resolved in the course of the court's reasons for decision after trial. As I have said, Ms Thompson expresses views based upon the Land Release Report about the supply of zoned land as at February 2007 or earlier. In the passages to which objection is taken on pages 37 and 38, Mr Haratsis seeks to rebut what Ms Thompson says by reference to a publication entitled 'Urban Growth Monitor' (UGM) released in July 2009. For example, while Ms Thompson expresses an opinion based upon 2006 consumption rates, Mr Haratsis points to significant increases in consumption since 2006. He then applies a rate from the UGM to Ms Thompson's analysis for a period after the date of taking. To my mind, as a matter of logic, one cannot use the information that became available only in 2009 to seek to rebut, in the way that Mr Haratsis has done, Ms Thompson's conclusions about the position as at February 2007. In their written submissions filed with leave after the hearing, the plaintiffs submit that:(1)some of the material in the UGM is information before the taking date, and some after the taking date;(2)only the latter category is objectionable;(3)the plaintiffs wish to supplement Mr Haratsis' evidence after a review of the UGM to clarify what reflects information before, as against after, the taking date; and(4)in the meantime, the evidence should be admitted provisionally. I accept the first two submissions, but not the last proposition. In my opinion, the evidence in its present form is inadmissible. The plaintiffs can seek leave to rely on supplementary evidence from Mr Haratsis about information available at the taking date if so advised and if the evidence is disclosed in a timely way. For those reasons, I uphold the objection to the last three sentences on page 37 and to page 38.