McGuiness v R
[2008] NSWCCA 80
•11 April 2008
NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION:
McGuiness v R [2008] NSWCCA 80
FILE NUMBER(S):
2007/00005384
HEARING DATE(S):
20/3/08
JUDGMENT DATE:
11 April 2008
PARTIES:
Cheryl Christine McGuiness (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent)
JUDGMENT OF:
Bell JA Simpson J Rothman J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
07/51/0138
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Black DCJ
COUNSEL:
Mr A Bellanto QC / Ms J Ghabrial (Applicant)
Mr L Crowley (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
Somerville Laundry Lomax, Solicitors (Applicant)
Cth DPP (Respondent)
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - fraud offences
SENTENCING - appeal against severity of sentence - no question of general principle
LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)
Criminal Code Act
Criminal Code by the Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences) Act 2000 (Cth)
CASES CITED:
Lowe v R (1984) 154 CLR 606
Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610
R v Blaire (unreported), Court of Criminal Appeal, 20 November 1987
R v Formosa [2005] NSWCCA 363
R v Kerr [2003] NSWCCA 234
R v Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345
Shaopang Yin v R [2007] NSWCCA 350
Spinks v R [2007] NSWCCA 52
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
1. Grant leave to appeal;
2. Allow the appeal;
3. Quash the sentences imposed in the District Court on counts 1, 6 and 7 and confirm the sentences imposed on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5;
4. On count 1 sentenced to six months’ imprisonment to commence on 23 November 2007 and to expire on 22 May 2008;
5. Confirm the sentences of three months dating from 23 November 2007 on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5. Such sentences will expire on 22 February 2008;
6. On count 6 the applicant is sentenced to six months’ imprisonment to date from 23 February 2008. That sentence will expire on 22 August 2008;
7. On count 7 the applicant is sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment to date from 23 February 2008. That sentence will expire on 22 November 2008;
8. Direct the applicant’s release forthwith on her entering into a recognizance self in the sum of $50.00 to be of good behaviour for the balance of the sentence until 22 November 2008;
JUDGMENT:
IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL
CCA 2007/00005384
BELL JA
SIMPSON J
ROTHMAN JFriday 11 April 2008
Cheryl Christine McGuiness v The Queen
Judgment
THE COURT: On 20 March 2008 the Court made orders granting leave to appeal against the severity of sentences imposed on the applicant for social security fraud offences and allowed her appeal. The sentences imposed for the offences charged in counts 1, 6 and 7 were quashed and in lieu thereof sentences amounting in total to a term of 12 months’ imprisonment with a recognizance release order, which took effect on 20 March, after the applicant had served just under four months’ imprisonment were imposed. These are the reasons for the making of those orders.
The applicant pleaded guilty to seven offences. Each offence related to her receipt of the partner allowance paid by the Department of Social Security and later by the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency (each will be referred to as the Agency) without disclosing that she was in part-time employment. The offences were committed between November 1998 and November 2004. The first four counts charged offences under s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) of imposing on the Agency by an untrue representation made by omission with a view to obtaining a benefit in that she failed to notify of her employment and receipt of income. The maximum penalty for these offences was two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of $13,200. The remaining three counts charged offences under s 135.1 of the Criminal Code of dishonestly causing a loss to the Agency in obtaining a payment to which she was not entitled without disclosing that she was employed and in receipt of income. The maximum penalty for these offences was five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of $33,000.
The offences were factually indistinguishable from one another. Section 29B of the Crimes Act was repealed on the introduction of a new regime for fraud and dishonesty offences into the Criminal Code by the Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences) Act 2000 (Cth), which commenced on 24 May 2001.
The applicant was at all material times working on a part-time basis for Caroona Care Services, which operated a nursing home. In total she received overpayments of $55,132.98 during the course of the six year period.
The applicant pleaded guilty on arraignment in the District Court to each of the counts in the indictment.
The particulars of the offences and the sentences imposed by the Judge are as follows:
Count 1 - between 19 November 1998 and 2 November 2000 involving an overpayment of $17,125.00 – nine months’ imprisonment commencing 23 November 2007 and expiring on 22 August 2008.
Count 2 - between 30 November 2000 and 25 January 2001 involving an over payment of $1,785.00 – three months’ imprisonment commencing 23 November 2007 and expiring on 22 February 2008.
Count 3 - between 22 February 2001 and 22 March 2001 involving an overpayment of $1,072.54 – three months’ imprisonment commencing on 23 November 2007 and expiring on 22 February 2008.
Count 4 - between 19 April 2001 and 17 May 2001 involving an overpayment of $1,092.60 – three months’ imprisonment commencing on 23 November 2007 and expiring on 22 February 2008.
Count 5 - on or about 31 May 2001 involving an overpayment of $364.20 – three months’ imprisonment commencing on 23 November 2007 and expiring on 22 February 2008.
Count 6 - between 28 June 2001 and 25 July 2002 involving an overpayment of $10,754.32 – nine months’ imprisonment commencing on 22 August 2008 and expiring on 21 May 2009.
Count 7 - between about 22 August 2002 and 25 November 2004 involving an overpayment of $22,939.32 – 12 months’ imprisonment commencing on 22 November 2008 and expiring on 21 November 2009.
The Judge discounted the sentences reflecting the pleas of guilty by around 20 per cent. The effective sentence was two years’ imprisonment subject to a recognizance release order to take effect after 10 months of the sentence had been served. The recognizance was conditioned on the applicant being of good behaviour throughout the balance of the two-year sentence.
The facts
On 23 November 2007 the applicant appeared before Black DCJ for sentence. The facts were contained in an agreed statement. The applicant was paid partner allowance between 31 January 1995 and 30 November 2004. The payments were made after she lodged a claim for partner allowance with the Agency on 28 October 1994. In her application she gave information about her employment status and income. On 2 February 1995 she lodged a further claim for partner allowance and she again gave information about her employment status and income. On both of these occasions (which were the only occasions on which she submitted a claim for payment) the applicant truthfully stated that she was not in employment and was not receiving income.
The applicant was first employed by Caroona Care Services on 5 July 1994. It is accepted that in the period between 11 October 1994 and 13 February 1995 she was not working and did not receive any income. Thereafter she resumed part-time work with Caroona Care Services and she remained so employed at least until 30 November 2004. During the periods particularised in the counts the applicant earned gross income ranging from $411.22 per fortnight to $1,585.13 per fortnight.
Throughout the period in which the applicant received the partner allowance she was under an obligation to notify the Agency within 14 days if she engaged in paid work or if she commenced receiving income. In the period of the offences she received some 14 letters from the Agency informing her of this obligation. She knowingly failed to notify the Agency of her employment and her receipt of income.
On 6 January 2004 the applicant and her husband took part in a random interview conducted by staff of the Agency. She signed a review form falsely stating that she had not done any paid work in the previous 12 months.
As the result of the applicant’s failure to declare her employment and income to the Agency, she received benefits at a higher rate than the rate to which she was entitled for eight fortnights and she received benefits for which she was not entitled at all for 145 fortnights.
The applicant was interviewed by officers of the Agency on 5 May 2005. She admitted to receiving benefits between 19 November 1998 and 25 November 2004 and to having been employed with Caroona Care Services during the periods particularised in the offences. When asked to explain her failure to notify the Agency, she said:
“Well, I didn’t really when I started – I thought we could get like the help and I could work just part-time. I didn’t think I had to declare.”
The prosecution of Mr McGuiness
The applicant’s husband, Errol McGuiness, was charged with offences arising out of his failure to disclose her income in connection with his receipt of social security benefits during the relevant period. In light of the grounds of appeal it is necessary to refer to the sentences imposed on him.
Mr McGuiness received sickness allowance, and then newstart allowance, between 16 February 1995 and 6 January 2005. These funds were deposited into the Commonwealth Bank account held in the applicant’s name. (Mr McGuiness did not operate a bank account.) On 16 May 1995 Mr McGuiness lodged a Sickness Allowance Review Form with the Agency falsely stating that his wife was not employed. On 61 occasions thereafter Mr McGuiness lodged claim forms with the Agency, falsely stating that his wife would not derive income within the next fortnight. He was sent 40 letters by the Agency, in the period May 1998 to October 2004, informing him of his obligation to notify the Agency of any change in his, or his wife’s, circumstances.
As a result of Mr McGuiness’ failure to declare his wife’s gross income he received sickness allowance payments for six fortnights at a higher rate than the rate to which he was entitled and for four fortnights when he was not eligible to receive any payment. He was paid newstart allowance for 138 fortnights at a higher rate than the rate to which he was entitled and for five fortnights when it was not payable at all.
Mr McGuiness was interviewed on 5 May 2005 and he admitted his failure to declare his wife’s income. He offered this explanation for his failure to notify the Agency:
“We got no money. You can thump me and shake me and you won’t get any money out of me. But we couldn’t let the grandkids suffer like they were mate, you know?”
and
“You’ve just got to live in our shoes to know why we done it.”
Mr McGuiness received overpayments of $26,237.76. At the date Mr McGuiness was sentenced he had repaid $3,193.40 to the Agency.
Mr McGuiness was charged with three offences contrary to s 1350 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), which carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 12 months. He was also charged with 10 offences contrary to s 135.2(2) of the Criminal Code Act, for which the maximum penalty is also 12 months’ imprisonment.
Each of the offences with which Mr McGuiness was charged were summary offences. Mr McGuiness pleaded guilty to three of the offences and he was convicted of the remaining 10 offences following a hearing. On 27 September 2007 Mr McGuiness was sentenced in the Local Court to nine months’ imprisonment in relation to each offence. The Magistrate ordered his release forthwith on recognizance to be of good behaviour for three years.
The applicant’s subjective case
The applicant gave evidence at the sentence hearing. She was aged 60 years. She had been married to Errol McGuiness for 40 years. They have three adult daughters.
In 1995 their eldest daughter, T, gave birth to a girl. The daughter’s relationship with her partner had come to an end and the applicant assumed the fulltime weekday care of the baby so that T could return to work. The applicant had the care of the child throughout the period 1995 to 2000. On the weekends she worked two shifts at the Caroona Nursing Home. Her middle daughter, J, suffered from significant health problems. J and her husband had four children. J had difficulties coping with each when the child was a baby. The applicant provided a deal of support throughout these periods. This assistance was continuing at the date of sentence. The applicant and her husband were living with two of their daughters throughout the period of the offences. The monies that the applicant obtained were spent on household expenses.
T gave evidence at the sentence hearing. She confirmed that the applicant had looked after her daughter up until the child went to school and that this had enabled her to maintain her employment. She said that the applicant’s health had deteriorated since the investigation into these matters.
J was also employed at the Caroona Nursing Home. She provided a written reference detailing her own health problems and attesting to the high level of practical support that the applicant had provided to her family.
The applicant suffers from hypothyroidism and osteoarthritis. She was suffering from some depression of mood at the date of sentence. Dr McGirr, a consultant rheumatologist, reported that she was on a course of medication for her osteoarthritis.
The applicant had no prior criminal convictions.
A pre-sentence report was in evidence. The author reported that the applicant had lived a conventional life in the wider Lismore area, having married at the age of 19 years and raised three daughters. She was residing with her husband and two of her daughters in a large house. She often minded the grandchildren while the daughters worked. It was noted that the family was close-knit. The applicant trained as an assistant nurse after leaving school and had worked part-time in this field over many years. Her employment had been interrupted by child rearing and, in more recent years, because of the need to care for her husband following an injury suffered by him at work. For the past 10 years she had worked in an aged care facility near her home. At the date of the report the applicant was working two shifts of four hours per week and receiving $335 net per fortnight. The applicant had no savings. She indicated no interests, apart from work and family. She had initiated repayments at the rate of $50 per fortnight. In the two years to September 2007 she had repaid $2,600 from her earnings.
At the date of sentence the Agency had been repaid the sum of $42,800.00, which it appears the applicant’s daughters had raised. The applicant’s repayments to the Agency, from her earnings, commenced before she was charged with the offences.
The applicant was assessed as eligible but unsuitable for a periodic detention order because the nearest periodic detention centre was located too far from her home.
The Judge’s reasons
The Judge noted that the total sum involved was $55,132.98 and that a significant repayment in the amount of $42,800.00 had been made. His Honour next referred to the circumstance that Mr McGuiness had been separately charged and dealt with in the Local Court. He said this:
“It is said that the principles of parity should apply, I do not agree they should apply but I think it is important that I should bear in mind what happened to the husband.” (ROS AB 80.3-5)
His Honour commented that the applicant had entered pleas to each of the seven counts and observed that “it is very important to bear that in mind when considering Ms Cusack’s [the applicant’s counsel] submission that, in reality, she submits, the husband’s conduct was more criminal than hers.” (ROS AB 81.4)
His Honour noted the submission that it was open to him to find that there were exceptional circumstances which justified imposing a sentence other than fulltime custody. He noted in this respect that the monies had been obtained to assist the applicant in caring for her family and that there was no indication that it had been spent on inappropriate luxuries. His Honour went on to say this:
“So having said that I then have to come, first of all, to the principles set out in 16A of the Crimes Act. Subsection (2) sets out a whole list of matters, (a) to (p), to which the Court must pay attention. The various factors to which I have already referred are all factors coming from within one or other of those lettered sub-sections. I have already referred to the preponderance of authority, illustrations of which are contained in exhibit A, about what the Court of Criminal Appeal has frequently said about offences relating to this type of offence, and therefore, when I come to consider 17A, this provides:
‘A court shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment on any person for a Federal offence unless the court, having considered all other available sentences, is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.’
As the Court of Criminal Appeal has repeatedly said, offences of this nature, carried out over a long period of time, require immediate custodial sentences. It is then for me, as soon as may be, to identify what form that must take, and then allocate particular sentences to the various counts.” (ROS AB 82.8-83.4)
The Judge proceeded (after referring to the principles explained by the High Court in Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610) to pronounce the sentences that are set out above.
The grounds of appeal
The applicant filed three grounds in support of the application:
“1. The Sentencing Judge erred in not applying the principles of parity.
2. If parity does not apply, the sentencing Judge erred in not applying the principles of consistency to ensure there is no justifiable sense of injustice when one compares the appellant’s sentence to that of her husband’s.
3. The sentence imposed on the appellant was manifestly excessive.”
In supplementary written submissions filed on the applicant’s behalf, directed to the third ground Mr Bellanto QC, who with Ms Ghabrial appeared on the applicant’s behalf, complained that the Judge had made no assessment and accordingly made no finding as to whether there existed exceptional circumstances that would admit of a sentence other than fulltime custody. This submission was developed in the course of oral argument. Mr Bellanto was granted leave to amend his grounds of appeal to rely upon a fourth ground of appeal:
“His Honour erred in the exercise of his discretion in failing to consider that it was open to him to impose a sentence other than one of immediate full-time custody.”
Ground 1 complained that the Judge failed to apply principles of parity. Mr Bellanto acknowledged that this ground was difficult to make good, since the applicant had been dealt with on indictment for offences carrying substantially higher maximum penalties than the charges of which her husband had been convicted. In his submission, it remained appropriate to have regard to the common factual matrix and an assessment of the respective culpability of the two. This submission was advanced in support of grounds one and two. His contention was that Mr McGuiness’ offending was of a graver nature than that of the applicant. It had occurred over a longer period of time and had involved the repeated submission of statements containing a false claim. Mr McGuiness had not admitted his guilt in respect of the majority of the charges brought against him and his sentence was imposed after trial. Mr Bellanto noted that while the sum involved in Mr McGuiness’ offending was $26,237.76, he had repaid a lesser amount proportionately than had the applicant.
Mr Bellanto relied on the judgment of this Court in R v Kerr [2003] NSWCCA 234 per Miles AJ (with whose judgment Beazley JA and Adams J concurred) at [19]:
“It is also recognised that the parity principle is of wide application and is not to be applied or withheld in a technical or pedantic way. It is indeed part of or a reflection of the wider principle that consistency in sentencing by the courts overall is to be aimed at as desirable in the public interest. Perfect consistency is a goal that can never be reached because of the infinite variety of the circumstances of offences and offenders. However there is a danger that it may be compromised by the selection of differing charges so that one offender may be charged with a serious offence and given punishment at the top of an acceptable range for that offence, and a co-offender charged with another less serious offence and dealt with at the very bottom of the acceptable range for that other offence. There may be no impropriety in that course, which will often arise from negotiation between co-offenders and law enforcement authorities. Sometimes, however, and it is not necessary to put it higher than that, the result may have the appearance of injustice.”
In R v Formosa [2005] NSWCCA 363 Simpson J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Hoeben J concurred) observed that Kerr is capable of being read as extending the principle of parity to apply in cases where co-offenders are charged with different offences. Her Honour expressed the need for caution before adopting any such principle. She went on to say this:
“[50] Here, the main reason for the discrepancy in sentences on the two co-offenders derives from the difference in the charges they faced. The applicant may have a sense of grievance, even a legitimate one, about that difference; but it is not a legitimate sense of grievance in the Lowe or Postiglione sense, concerning the sentences imposed; it is a sense of grievance engendered by the prosecutorial decision making process. That is not something over which this Court has supervisory jurisdiction, even by the backdoor method of supervising sentencing.”
The cautionary note sounded by Simpson J has been endorsed more recently in Spinks v R [2007] NSWCCA 52 at [28]-[31] and Shaopang Yin v R [2007] NSWCCA 350 at [23]-[24].
The facts giving rise to the prosecution of the applicant and her husband had common features. The reason for the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion to charge Mr McGuiness with summary offences punishable with a maximum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and the applicant with indictable offences, which in some instances were punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment, is unexplained. It may be that the sums involved in the offences charged against the applicant were relevant to the determination. It remains that the Judge was sentencing the applicant for offences that in law were of a significantly more serious character than those with which Mr McGuiness was charged. The three counts charged under the Criminal Code (having the five year maximum penalty) involved, in all, a sum of $34,057.84 which was in excess of the total sum involved in all of the 13 summary offences of which Mr McGuiness was convicted. We were unpersuaded that the Judge erred in not applying principles of parity.
Ground 2 was couched in language that echoes that of Mason J in Lowe v R (1984) 154 CLR 606 at 612, but advances a challenge on a basis that is outside the principle of parity. This was not a case which raised consideration of any broader principle of consistency in sentencing, whether derived from the statements in Kerr or otherwise, since there existed the distinction between cases brought against the applicant and her husband, to which we have referred.
On the hearing of the application Mr Bellanto did not press submissions in support of ground 3, which challenged the sentences as being manifestly excessive. He acknowledged that in light of the pattern of sentencing for social security fraud, a sentence of two years with a recognizance release order at the expiration of 10 months did not exceed the bounds of discretion.
Mr Bellanto’s principal challenge was that the Judge approached the sentencing of the applicant upon the basis that he was constrained to impose an “immediate custodial sentence”. The Crown Prosecutor submitted that his Honour’s remark needed to be seen in context and amounted to no more than a conclusion that this was not an exceptional case in which it would be appropriate to impose a sentence other than fulltime custody. The difficulty with this submission is that the Judge, in the course of his brief remarks, did not address the substantial body of evidence that was led in the applicant’s case.
The circumstances in which persons, including those of prior good character, dealt with on indictment for social security fraud over a sustained period will avoid the imposition of a sentence of fulltime custody are rare. Nonetheless, the Judge had a discretion and it could not be said that this was a case in which there were no features requiring careful assessment of the submission that it was open to impose a sentence other than fulltime custody. The applicant’s criminality was of a lesser order than that of those who defraud the revenue by the adoption of false identities or by other sophisticated schemes. She was a 60 year-old woman of previously unblemished character, who had made a positive contribution to the community, particularly in the support of her grandchildren. The monies that she obtained had been spent on necessities. She had a number of medical problems, which were such as to make the experience of imprisonment somewhat more burdensome for her than for other prisoners.
Reasonable minds may differ about whether these circumstances in combination were such as to admit of a penalty other than one of fulltime custody. The absence of any analysis of them pointed to the force of the complaint in ground 4. The Judge appears to have considered that he was constrained to impose an immediate custodial sentence. That is what his Honour said. To approach the matter in this way was an error.
It was necessary for this Court to consider for itself the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The Court received further evidence on this question. On 7 January 2008 the applicant, through the assistance of her eldest daughter, repaid the balance of the amount owing to the Agency. An updated medical report from the applicant’s treating doctor based on her review of the applicant’s Justice Health file suggests that the applicant has had an exacerbation of her osteoarthritis from about mid-February 2008. She has had similar exacerbations in the past.
In the Crown’s submission, if the Judge erred in the respect identified in ground 4 or, alternatively, by failing to state reasons sufficient to demonstrate that he had addressed the matters put on the applicant’s behalf and concluded, rightly, that no sentence other than fulltime imprisonment was appropriate, it was not an error that would lead this Court to intervene. This was because, it was said, no lesser sentence was warranted in law: s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW).
Mr Bellanto referred us to the decisions in R v Blaire (unreported), Court of Criminal Appeal, 20 November 1987 and R v Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345. In each of those cases the offender made immediate admissions of guilt and had been permitted by the Agency over a substantial period to continue making regular repayments before action had been taken to prosecute her. In Winchester the delay was two years and eight months. In that case Hunt CJ at CL said this (at 349):
“Blaire’s Case is one of the many decisions of this Court that those who defraud the Department of Social Security by lodging false claims must expect a significant measure of criminal justice to be meted out to them when their guilt is discovered. But Blaire’s case also said this. Where an offender of the present type makes immediate admissions of guilt, but is permitted by the Department to continue for a substantial period to make regular repayments of the amount involved in the offence before any action is taken to prosecute the offence, what may have been required by way of punishment if the prosecution had been instituted speedily is no longer necessarily required when the prosecution is, without any valid explanation, brought on tardily.”
There was no explanation for the delay in this case, which was of about one year. The Crown Prosecutor submitted that the Court should take into account the fact that delays are commonly experienced in decision-making within a large bureaucracy. The submission did not address the reason why the Court takes delay into account. It is because of the impact on the offender, who after making full admissions of guilt and entering into an arrangement to repay the Agency, is lulled into a belief that the matter will be resolved without the intervention of the criminal law. In this case the delay is not of the order of that with which Winchester or Blaire were concerned. Nonetheless, in my opinion, it was a factor to be taken into account. The applicant, who at 60 years of age had led a conventional life in a country town had suffered the shame associated with disclosure of her wrongdoing. She gave evidence of the upset that this had caused. After being permitted to continue her life, making repayments over a period of one year, the decision to prosecute her must have come as a considerable blow.
The matters that the Court took into account in rejecting the Crown Prosecutor’s submission (that no lesser sentence was warranted in law) in the unusual circumstances of this case may be summarised as follows. These were offences of omission lacking in any element of sophistication. The whole of the monies had been repaid. There was significant delay in commencing the prosecution. The offences came about in a context of need in which the applicant had extended family responsibilities. The applicant’s age, health difficulties and her otherwise good character were matters that in combination with the factors to which we have referred justified a marked degree of leniency in the individual sentences, and in the structure of them, including in the proportion between the sentence and the period of custody before release on recognizance.
For this reason the orders of the Court were:
ORDERS
1. Grant leave to appeal;
2. Allow the appeal;
3. Quash the sentences imposed in the District Court on counts 1, 6 and 7 and confirm the sentences imposed on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5;
4. On count 1 sentenced to six months’ imprisonment to commence on 23 November 2007 and to expire on 22 May 2008;
5. Confirm the sentences of three months dating from 23 November 2007 on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5. Such sentences will expire on 22 February 2008;
6. On count 6 the applicant is sentenced to six months’ imprisonment to date from 23 February 2008. That sentence will expire on 22 August 2008;
7. On count 7 the applicant is sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment to date from 23 February 2008. That sentence will expire on 22 November 2008.
8. Direct the applicant’s release forthwith on her entering into a recognizance self in the sum of $50.00 to be of good behaviour for the balance of the sentence until 22 November 2008.
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LAST UPDATED:
11 April 2008
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