McFarlane v The King - [2025] SASCA 4

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
MCFARLANE v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 4
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice David)
30 January 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
The appellant drove his car towards a police vehicle, causing the driver, Brevet Sergeant Langford, to take evasive action. The appellant was found guilty of aggravated creating likelihood of harm (Count 1).
The appellant then abandoned his car and fled on foot. Senior Constable First Class Pople (“Pople”) pursued the appellant on foot and subsequently arrested him. It was alleged at trial that the appellant assaulted Pople. The appellant was found not guilty of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker (Count 3).
The appellant seeks permission to appeal against the conviction of Count 1, submitting the trial Judge failed to provide adequate reasons or reasoning as to why he accepted the police evidence on Count 1, having not accepted their evidence on Count 3. Further, the appellant contended the verdict on Count 1 was inconsistent with the verdict on Count 3 and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held, per the Court, granting permission to appeal, but dismissing the appeal:
1.The trial Judge’s reasons are sufficient, clear and logical, and he adequately explained why he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to Count 1 despite his doubt in relation to Count 3.

2. There was no factual inconsistency between the verdicts.
3. The conviction on Count 1 was not unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20AA(2), 29(3); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158(1)(a), referred to.
AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; Park (a pseudonym) v The King (2022) 142 SASR 132; R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28, considered.

MCFARLANE v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 4
Court of Appeal — Criminal: Lovell, S Doyle and David JJA

THE COURT: In the early hours on 2 June 2021 in Morphett Vale, Brevet Sergeant Langford (“Langford”) and Senior Constable First Class Pople (“Pople”) were on patrol in a marked police vehicle; Langford was driving the vehicle. The police officers observed a Holden Commodore (driven by the appellant) drive away at speed. As the police officers followed the appellant’s car, the appellant subsequently drove his car towards the police vehicle causing Langford to take evasive action. The appellant then drove a short distance before abandoning his car and fleeing; Pople subsequently pursued the appellant on foot. When Pople attempted to arrest the appellant, it was alleged…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading McFarlane v The King

Details

AGLC: McFarlane v The King [2025] SASCA 4
Case: [2025] SASCA 4
Decision Date: 30 January 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal by the appellant against his conviction for offences arising from two separate incidents. The appeal was heard by Lovell, S Doyle, and David JJ of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The dispute centred on the appellant's contention that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for the verdict, particularly in relation to the findings of guilt for Count 1, and that the judge's reasoning was inadequate to support the ultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The legal issues before the appellate court included whether the trial judge had failed to give adequate or sufficient reasons for the findings of guilt concerning Count 1. The appellant argued that the judge's findings regarding the credibility and reliability of police witnesses in relation to Count 3 were directly relevant to their evidence concerning Count 1. Furthermore, the appellant contended that his own credibility and reliability were not divisible between the two counts, given the temporal and physical connection between the incidents, and that the trial judge was therefore obliged to explain how he reached conflicting conclusions.

The court considered the principles regarding inadequate reasons for a decision, drawing on High Court authority which states that reasons are not inadequate merely for failing to address irrelevant disputes or for omitting minute explanations. However, reasons can be inadequate if a significant factual or evidential dispute, necessary for the final conclusion, is not explained. The court noted that a failure to give adequate reasons constitutes an error of law, requiring the appeal to be allowed unless there is no substantial miscarriage of justice. The appellant's primary submission was that the trial judge did not adequately explain how his findings on Count 3 impacted his rejection of the appellant's evidence on Count 1, leading to a potential inconsistency in reasoning.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant’s approach to the police evidence in relation to Count 3 was in stark contrast to his approach to the evidence in Count 1. Pople was extensively cross-examined about the events that occurred after the appellant fled from the scene. Although Langford arrived too late to witness any alleged assault on Pople, his evidence was challenged particularly as to what he remembered Pople telling him about his (Pople’s) injuries. Appellant’s evidence The appellant said that there was an outstanding parole warrant for his arrest, and before handing himself to police he wanted to ensure that his belongings were safe. He then gave a long explanation about why he was in a car in Karyn Crescent at 2.45 am. The appellant required a car and a trailer to deal with his belongings. He borrowed a Holden Commodore from his nephew that had not been driven recently, and at approximately 2.45 am, he was trying to get the Holden Commodore started after attempting to repair it. It had been necessary for him to push the car to Karyn Crescent. The appellant said that the vehicle (the police vehicle) came “flying up so fast” behind him with its lights on “high beam”; he was not aware it was a police vehicle that drove up behind him and had thought it was someone following him. The appellant gave a convoluted explanation for why he thought someone may have been following him. He denied accelerating quickly. The appellant said that as he turned the corner onto Marie Avenue, travelling at about 30 kph, the back end of the car “flipped around and did a 180”. This happened when the car was “probably 5 m, 10 m” around the corner. He said that it had rained lightly about 15 minutes before this event. The other vehicle, still with its lights on high beam, followed him around the corner. The appellant, then driving on the correct side of the road and at a speed of about 20 kph, drove past this vehicle. It was as he drew level with the vehicle that he realised it was a police vehicle. He denied driving at the police vehicle. The appellant drove a short distance past the police vehicle. He then panicked, stopped the vehicle and ran off. The appellant jumped a fence and was on a shed roof when he was pulled back by a police officer and fell onto the ground. The police officer, Pople, fell on top of the appellant and proceeded to stomp on his lower back. The appellant felt a crack in his back. Pople struck him a number of times prior to the arrival of other police officers. The appellant was then arrested. The appellant stated that at no stage did he get back up after falling on the ground and he denied pulling the leg of Pople causing him to fall. Much of the appellant’s version of events involving his driving was not put to the police witnesses during cross-examination. It was not suggested, for example, that the police vehicle came up quickly behind his car, nor was it suggested that it had been raining earlier that night. It was not put to the police witnesses that their vehicle had its headlights on high beam. As mentioned earlier, the police officers’ evidence that Langford had to manoeuvre the police vehicle to the left to avoid a collision was not challenged. Langford’s evidence that the appellant’s car went past the police vehicle at a speed of about 50 kph was not challenged.

Decision

Reasons for decision

When considering a complaint of inadequate reasons on appeal, the majority of the High Court in DL v The Queen explained:[7] … Not every failure to resolve a dispute will render reasons for decision inadequate to justify a verdict. At one extreme, reasons for decision will not be inadequate merely because they fail to address an irrelevant dispute or one which is peripheral to the real issues. Nor will they be inadequate merely because they fail to undertake “a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process that leads to the judge’s conclusion.” At the other extreme, reasons will often be inadequate if the trial judge fails to explain his or her conclusion on a significant factual or evidential dispute that is a necessary step to the final conclusion. In between these extremes, the adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they were relied upon by counsel, their bearing upon the elements of the offence, and their significance to the course of the trial.(citations omitted; emphasis added)[7] DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ). The failure to give adequate reasons constitutes an error of law. Where such an error is found, the appeal must be allowed unless the Court is of the view that there is no substantial miscarriage of justice.Inadequate reasoning A submission of inadequate reasoning is a complaint that the reasons and intermediate findings of fact do not support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is, a judge’s reasoning, although apparent, does not rationally support the ultimate finding of fact and therefore the verdict.[8] A submission of inadequate reasons, on the other hand, is a complaint that it is not possible to discern how the judge rationally arrived at their determinative conclusions.[8] JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48 at [205] (Lovell J, Peek and Bampton JJ agreeing); R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28 at [177] (Kourakis CJ). There is an understandable tendency to slip from a complaint that reasons are inadequate to a complaint that the judge’s reasoning, although apparent, does not rationally support their ultimate finding of fact and therefore the verdict. The difference between an allegation of inadequate reasons and inadequate reasoning can be, in some cases, difficult to discern.[9] Sometimes inadequate reasoning can result from a failure to resolve, or adequately resolve, an issue leaving the reasoning unsound.[9] Park (a pseudonym) v The King (2022) 142 SASR 132 at [41].Appellant’s submissions The appellant contended that the trial Judge failed to give reasons, or alternatively, failed to give sufficient reasons, to support the findings of guilt for Count 1. The appellant submitted that the findings regarding the credibility and reliability of each police officer in the context of Count 3 were directly relevant to their evidence of Count 1. The appellant further submitted the appellant’s credibility and reliability was not inherently divisible, particularly considering the temporal and physical nexus between the two charged incidents. It was therefore necessary for the trial Judge to explain how he arrived at conflicting and otherwise inconsistent conclusions. The trial Judge did not consider the extent to which his findings regarding Count 3 impacted upon his ability to reject the appellant’s evidence regarding Count 1.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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