McFarlane v The King - [2025] SASCA 4

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
MCFARLANE v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 4
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice David)
30 January 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
The appellant drove his car towards a police vehicle, causing the driver, Brevet Sergeant Langford, to take evasive action. The appellant was found guilty of aggravated creating likelihood of harm (Count 1).
The appellant then abandoned his car and fled on foot. Senior Constable First Class Pople (“Pople”) pursued the appellant on foot and subsequently arrested him. It was alleged at trial that the appellant assaulted Pople. The appellant was found not guilty of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker (Count 3).
The appellant seeks permission to appeal against the conviction of Count 1, submitting the trial Judge failed to provide adequate reasons or reasoning as to why he accepted the police evidence on Count 1, having not accepted their evidence on Count 3. Further, the appellant contended the verdict on Count 1 was inconsistent with the verdict on Count 3 and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held, per the Court, granting permission to appeal, but dismissing the appeal:
1.The trial Judge’s reasons are sufficient, clear and logical, and he adequately explained why he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to Count 1 despite his doubt in relation to Count 3.

2. There was no factual inconsistency between the verdicts.
3. The conviction on Count 1 was not unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20AA(2), 29(3); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158(1)(a), referred to.
AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; Park (a pseudonym) v The King (2022) 142 SASR 132; R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28, considered.

MCFARLANE v THE KING
[2025] SASCA 4
Court of Appeal — Criminal: Lovell, S Doyle and David JJA

THE COURT: In the early hours on 2 June 2021 in Morphett Vale, Brevet Sergeant Langford (“Langford”) and Senior Constable First Class Pople (“Pople”) were on patrol in a marked police vehicle; Langford was driving the vehicle. The police officers observed a Holden Commodore (driven by the appellant) drive away at speed. As the police officers followed the appellant’s car, the appellant subsequently drove his car towards the police vehicle causing Langford to take evasive action. The appellant then drove a short distance before abandoning his car and fleeing; Pople subsequently pursued the appellant on foot. When Pople attempted to arrest the appellant, it was alleged at trial that the appellant assaulted Pople causing him harm.
The appellant was charged with aggravated creating likelihood of harm (Count 1),[1] and recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker (Count 3).[2]
[1] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 29(3).
[2] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20AA(2).
The appellant elected to be tried by judge alone. The trial Judge found the appellant guilty of aggravated creating likelihood of harm, and not guilty of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker.
The appellant seeks permission to appeal against the conviction of Count 1, submitting the trial Judge, having not accepted the police evidence on Count 3, failed to provide adequate reasons or reasoning as to why he accepted the police evidence on Count 1 (Ground 1). The appellant alleged that the verdict on Count 1 was inconsistent with the verdict on Count 3 and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence (Ground 2).
A consideration of the appeal grounds requires an understanding of the evidence and issues at trial.
The trial
There was much common ground between the prosecution evidence and the appellant’s evidence in relation to Count 1. The main factual dispute related to Count 3.
At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s opening, counsel for the appellant identified the issues as follows:
Firstly, that when [the appellant] first saw the vehicle, he did not realise it was a police vehicle. He only came to realise that after in fact he had passed the vehicle on Marie Avenue. That is why he’s then stopped the vehicle and proceeded in the manner he did. That’s really the first issue in dispute.
In terms of count 3, the primary issue in dispute is that [the appellant] denies that he ever pulled the officer down from the fence. In fact, [the appellant] will say that he was the one who was pulled down and that he sustained a number of injuries as a result of being pulled off the fence by the police officer. They’re really the principal issues in terms of counts 1 and 2 and count 3 on the Information.
Generally, the appellant’s counsel conducted the defence as outlined.
Prosecution case
Events in Karyn Crescent
On 2 June 2021, Pople and Langford, when driving along Karyn Crescent, observed a Holden Commodore parked but facing the wrong way. It was common ground at trial that the car was driven by the appellant.
Pople stated that he could hear the engine of the appellant’s car roaring and saw smoke from the tyres as the car accelerated “heavily away”. It was put to Pople in cross-examination that there was no smoke from the tyres; he disagreed. There was no other challenge to his evidence on this topic.
Langford stated that he heard the engine rev loudly, the tyres screech and the car take off “at speed” towards Marie Avenue. There was no challenge to his evidence in cross-examination on this topic.
The appellant accelerated to the end of Karyn Crescent before turning right at the T-junction onto Marie Avenue. The police officers followed his car and turned onto Marie Avenue. This was common ground.
Events in Marie Avenue
Pople said that after the police vehicle turned onto Marie Avenue, he observed the appellant’s car was now facing them. He was then asked:
QCould you say whether it was closer to the left or the right of the road.
AI could not.
HIS HONOUR
QWhen you first saw it, was it stationary or was it already driving towards you when you turned the corner.
AI’m not a hundred-per-cent sure.
XN
QCan you describe its speed.
AAccelerating.
QWhere did it go.
AStraight at the front of the police fleet and Brevet Sergeant Langford moved the fleet to the left to avoid the collision.
QCould you estimate how close the accused’s vehicle came to the police fleet.
ANo, I don’t recall how close it was.
(emphasis added)
In cross-examination, there was no challenge to Pople’s evidence that Langford had to move the police vehicle to avoid a collision. In cross-examination, it was suggested to Pople that when the appellant drove past the police vehicle in Marie Avenue, his car was on the “correct side of the road”. Pople replied that he was not sure of the car’s exact position.
Langford gave evidence that he followed the appellant’s car onto Marie Avenue. He was then asked the following questions during his evidence-in-chief:
QDid you lose sight of the Commodore as it went on to Marie Avenue.
AMomentarily.
QWhat did you do at that time.
AI turned on to Marie Avenue to look to see where the car had gone and basically simultaneously, as I was rounding the bend on to Marie Avenue, I heard tyres screech and saw that the car had done a 180 and was back facing us.
QDid you see it turning around.
ANo, I caught it just as it basically come to a stop.
QHow much time passed, could you estimate, between the Commodore going around the corner on to Marie Avenue and you regaining sight of it.
ALess than two seconds.
QCan you describe what the Commodore did when it was facing you.
AIt was stationary momentarily and then again, I heard the engine revving loudly, tyres screeching and the vehicle drove directly towards us on the wrong side of the road.
QWhen you say directly towards you, can you describe that in a bit more detail.
ASure. So we rounded the bend on to Marie Avenue, we were facing what would have been mostly east, we were on the left hand or the correct side of the road. As the vehicle has accelerated towards us, I’d come to a very momentary stop because I wasn’t sure what the vehicle was about to do and, as it come towards us, I started moving forward so that I wasn’t a stationary target. As it got closer and hadn’t changed its path, I had to change direction of the police vehicle to the left, almost mounting the northern kerb of Marie Avenue.
Later he stated:
QSo when the Commodore approached you and then went around you, can you describe how close it came to your police vehicle.
AIt would have been less than 2 m.
QIs that the closest it came.
AYes.
QHow fast was it going by the time it reached your vehicle.
AAs it passed us I’d estimate about 50 km/h.
QFrom the place in the road where it was stopped on Marie Avenue and the point in the road where it passed you, could you estimate how much distance that is.
AI’d say around 30 m.
In cross-examination, Langford was challenged about his estimate of the distance the appellant’s car had travelled down Marie Avenue before it spun around facing towards the police vehicle. It was suggested to Langford that when he turned the police vehicle onto Marie Avenue, the appellant’s car was only 10-20 metres away. Langford stated that it “was further than that”.
There was no challenge to Langford’s evidence that the appellant drove his car straight at the police vehicle causing Langford to take evasive action thereby avoiding a collision.
As can be seen from the above discussion, there was little or no challenge to the police officers’ evidence in relation to Count 1. Importantly, there was no challenge to the police officers’ evidence that the appellant drove his car directly at the police vehicle in Marie Avenue causing Langford to manoeuvre the police vehicle to the left to avoid a collision.
The pursuit
Pople and Langford gave evidence that Langford turned the police vehicle around in Marie Avenue and then drove after the appellant. After rounding the bend in Marie Avenue, they saw that the appellant’s vehicle had stopped, the driver’s side door was open and the appellant was running away. Pople chased after him, eventually catching and arresting him. Langford did not witness the events the subject of Count 3, arriving only after Pople was restraining the appellant. Pople alleged that the appellant assaulted him during the chase by grabbing his leg, causing him to fall from the top of a fence. The appellant denied assaulting Pople and alleged that Pople pulled him from the roof of a shed causing him to fall to the ground. Pople fell on top of him, after which he got up and “stomped on” the appellant’s head upwards of 10-20 times. Pople denied assaulting the appellant.
The appellant’s approach to the police evidence in relation to Count 3 was in stark contrast to his approach to the evidence in Count 1. Pople was extensively cross-examined about the events that occurred after the appellant fled from the scene. Although Langford arrived too late to witness any alleged assault on Pople, his evidence was challenged particularly as to what he remembered Pople telling him about his (Pople’s) injuries.
Appellant’s evidence
The appellant said that there was an outstanding parole warrant for his arrest, and before handing himself to police he wanted to ensure that his belongings were safe. He then gave a long explanation about why he was in a car in Karyn Crescent at 2.45 am. The appellant required a car and a trailer to deal with his belongings. He borrowed a Holden Commodore from his nephew that had not been driven recently, and at approximately 2.45 am, he was trying to get the Holden Commodore started after attempting to repair it. It had been necessary for him to push the car to Karyn Crescent.
The appellant said that the vehicle (the police vehicle) came “flying up so fast” behind him with its lights on “high beam”; he was not aware it was a police vehicle that drove up behind him and had thought it was someone following him. The appellant gave a convoluted explanation for why he thought someone may have been following him. He denied accelerating quickly.
The appellant said that as he turned the corner onto Marie Avenue, travelling at about 30 kph, the back end of the car “flipped around and did a 180”. This happened when the car was “probably 5 m, 10 m” around the corner. He said that it had rained lightly about 15 minutes before this event. The other vehicle, still with its lights on high beam, followed him around the corner.
The appellant, then driving on the correct side of the road and at a speed of about 20 kph, drove past this vehicle. It was as he drew level with the vehicle that he realised it was a police vehicle. He denied driving at the police vehicle. The appellant drove a short distance past the police vehicle. He then panicked, stopped the vehicle and ran off.
The appellant jumped a fence and was on a shed roof when he was pulled back by a police officer and fell onto the ground. The police officer, Pople, fell on top of the appellant and proceeded to stomp on his lower back. The appellant felt a crack in his back. Pople struck him a number of times prior to the arrival of other police officers. The appellant was then arrested. The appellant stated that at no stage did he get back up after falling on the ground and he denied pulling the leg of Pople causing him to fall.
Much of the appellant’s version of events involving his driving was not put to the police witnesses during cross-examination. It was not suggested, for example, that the police vehicle came up quickly behind his car, nor was it suggested that it had been raining earlier that night. It was not put to the police witnesses that their vehicle had its headlights on high beam. As mentioned earlier, the police officers’ evidence that Langford had to manoeuvre the police vehicle to the left to avoid a collision was not challenged. Langford’s evidence that the appellant’s car went past the police vehicle at a speed of about 50 kph was not challenged.
The appellant’s evidence that he did not appreciate it was a police vehicle until he was passing it on Marie Avenue was obviously not something the police officers’ could give evidence about. A finding that the appellant did not realise the vehicle was a police vehicle would have required that the trial Judge accept the appellant’s evidence, or find that it was at least reasonably possible.
The trial Judge’s reasons
The trial Judge briefly summarised the evidence of the police officers and the appellant. On appeal, no issue was taken with the summary.
The trial Judge then summarised the main submissions of both the prosecution and defence as follows:
The primary thrust of the prosecution’s final address was that the apprehending police officers’ evidence should be believed, the accused disbelieved, and that based on the apprehending police officers’ evidence, the objective facts had been established, and the relevant mental elements of the charged offences could be inferred.
The prosecution submitted that in relation to count 1, on the evidence presented, the court should find proven that [the] accused was attempting to escape police by driving his car directly at them, thereby also intending or being reckless as to harming them for that purpose. The prosecution submitted that in relation to count 3, it should be inferred that the accused had realised he could not outrun Officer Pople and that his only other option was to become violent and fight him to get away.
The primary thrust of the defence’s final address was that the apprehending police officers should not be believed. The defence submitted that the accused was badly injured in ways not consistent with the police evidence of what occurred. The defence criticised Officer Pople’s evidence that he could not say whether he landed on top of the accused or rather beside him, nor how he consequently took the accused to the ground. The defence argued that the shaking body worn camera footage was more consistent with the accused indeed being ‘stomped on’ at that point. The defence put that Officer Pople’s evidence of the events alleged to constitute count 3 was inconsistent with his verbal account recorded at the time by the body worn cameras.
Against that background, the trial Judge turned to discuss his analysis of the evidence and, in particular, the credibility and reliability of Pople and Langford as well as the appellant. The trial Judge considered that the evidence disclosed two separate events. The first event involved the driving of the appellant allegedly at the police vehicle and the second event the alleged assault of Pople.
When discussing the witnesses, the trial Judge stated:
Both police officers gave evidence in a relatively straightforward way. It is clear that the events occurred suddenly and progressed quickly. It is also clear that Officer Pople fell off a seven-foot fence and injured both his hand and left bicep in the process.
Unfortunately, there is no video or audio of any of the charged events.
There were however several issues with Officer Pople’s evidence. The body worn camera footage reveals that in the immediate aftermath of falling from the fence, Officer Pople was angry, yelling and somewhat traumatised. Further, when asked by Officer Langford to describe events he gave a different account both of what happened on top of the fence and of how he sustained any injury. There is no mention to Officer Langford at the time that the accused fell off the fence first, then reached up and twice tried to grab the officer’s foot, eventually dislodging him and causing him to plummet to the ground. Officer Pople also tells Officer Langford that he was punched in the bicep. These statements are not consistent with his in-court evidence. He did not clearly admit the statements, and his response when the alleged inconsistencies were put to him in cross examination was that he could not remember the conversations he had at the scene.
Officer Langford was a clearer and more consistent witness than Officer Pople. He was however mistaken about whether Officer Pople had told him his arm had been injured. There were other aspects of his evidence which suggested there may have been an element of reconstruction in his recollection. For example, he gave evidence that the accused was reaching for Officer Pople’s belt, whereas the body worn camera footage has Officer Langford arriving after the time during which according to Officer Pople that could have occurred.
Importantly, the trial Judge found that Pople and Langford gave evidence “in a relatively straightforward way”. That finding eliminates any suggestion that the trial Judge considered that Pople and Langford fabricated their evidence. The trial Judge did consider that there were some inconsistencies in Pople’s evidence in relation to Count 3. The trial Judge noted that the events occurred suddenly and progressed quickly and that Pople was, after falling from the fence, “somewhat traumatised”.

Unsurprisingly, given the lack of cross-examination in relation to the events the subject of Count 1, the trial Judge made no comment about the credibility and reliability of Pople and Langford in relation to their evidence relating to Count 1.
When considering the appellant’s evidence, the trial Judge stated:
The accused came across as a relatively inarticulate witness, who gave much of his evidence in a sometimes jumbled and discursive way. The evidence of Officer Mooney and the medical evidence from Flinders Medical Centre establish that the accused had been materially injured in the course of the evening and was consequently quite traumatised.
The accused’s evidence as to why he was in the Commodore at 2.45am in the back streets of Morphett Vale was not convincing. None of the other people who he claimed were with him were either observed by police or called as witnesses. The coincidence suggested by the accused that police came upon him just seconds after he had pulled away from the kerb for unrelated reasons was unconvincing.
In relation to the appellant’s evidence, during his closing address at trial, the prosecutor summarised the appellant’s evidence as follows:
In summary, the accused has given a grandiose and irrational account in which he resuscitated a woman and thereby incurred the odium of sinister men, pushed a car to the wrong side of Karyn Crescent for safety, was menaced by a police cage car with blinding high beams on and couldn’t make out it was a police vehicle, and it spun out at low speed after safely entering the intersection on Marie Avenue and then formed an intent to run from police only after ditching his vehicle on the wrong side of Marie Avenue and was the victim of extreme police brutality he would be likely to survive but which doesn’t fit the medical evidence. Your Honour might think the account was not reliable or credible and I invite your Honour to reject it.
Having reviewed the transcript, we agree with the prosecutor’s summary. The appellant’s evidence was convoluted and fanciful.
The trial Judge turned to deal with specific criticisms of Pople and Langford’s evidence as it related to Count 3. When dealing with Pople’s evidence about what occurred during the appellant’s arrest, the trial Judge found that there were “several issues” with his evidence.
The trial Judge observed:
After careful consideration of all the evidence and counsel’s submissions, the court concludes that Officer Pople’s evidence as to what happened on top of the fence, namely that the accused after being pushed off the fence onto the ground was either able to or did grab his leg twice rather than try to escape lacked a degree of logic. It was also inconsistent with the account he gave to the other officers recorded by the body worn cameras. Officer’s Pople’s responses to the alleged inconsistent statements did not clearly admit the statements nor adequately explain them.
As to Langford’s evidence about what occurred when he arrived and Pople was arresting the appellant, the trial Judge observed:
Officer Langford was a clearer and more consistent witness than Officer Pople. He was however mistaken about whether Officer Pople had told him his arm had been injured. There were other aspects of his evidence which suggested there may have been an element of reconstruction in his recollection. For example, he gave evidence that the accused was reaching for Officer Pople’s belt, whereas the body worn camera footage has Officer Langford arriving after the time during which according to Officer Pople that could have occurred.
The reference to there being an “element of reconstruction” in Langford’s evidence related to minor matters.
Against the background of his assessment of the witnesses, in relation to Count 3, the trial Judge stated:
… it is not sufficiently clear exactly what happened on top of the fence, to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately grabbed Officer Pople’s leg in the way alleged. As well as the issues earlier discussed concerning the only police witness to those events, the accused denied the allegations on oath.
It is important to note that the trial Judge did not make any adverse finding as to the credibility or truthfulness of either Pople or Langford. In relation to Count 3, the trial Judge merely found that he could not rely on Pople’s evidence. This was reflected in the finding “it is not sufficiently clear exactly what happened on top of the fence, to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately grabbed Officer Pople’s leg in the way alleged”. There was at least a reasonable possibility that the events the subject of Count 3 did not occur as Pople described.
The trial Judge’s finding in relation to Langford’s evidence only related to his evidence on Count 3. As mentioned, there was only a minor criticism in relation to the reliability of Langford’s evidence.
On the first count, the trial Judge rejected the appellant’s evidence that he did not know it was a police vehicle and accepted the prosecution evidence that the appellant drove his car at the police vehicle causing Langford to have to manoeuvre the police vehicle to avoid a crash. He found:
… the police evidence as to the accused’s driving was credible and reliable, and the court accepts it beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the accused’s evidence on oath to the contrary.
The actions of the accused are only consistent with the accused, from the outset, desperately trying to evade the vehicle that had approached him. The accused’s convoluted explanation that he was worried that the approaching vehicle may have been driven by people unhappy that he had saved the life of a woman whom he had just met and who had been ripped off in a diamond sale was not credible.
The accused had a strong motive to avoid police, a motive he admitted at trial. He did not want to be apprehended on his Parole Warrant until he had made arrangements for his property and had been able to attend his premises and lock them down.
The trial Judge found the appellant guilty of Count 1. Count 2 was an alternative charge to Count 1 and it was therefore not necessary for the trial Judge to deal with it. The trial Judge found the appellant not guilty of Count 3 as it was “not sufficiently clear exactly what happened on top of the fence”.
Ground 1
1.The trial judge erred in law by failing to give reasons, or alternatively by failing to give sufficient reasons, which support the conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the [appellant] did an act likely to cause harm and that he knew he was driving at police officers:
a.       His Honour’s reasons do not adequately address nor expose the process of reasoning by which he found both police officers were “consistent, logical and credible” in relation to the conduct the subject of count 1 … ;
b.      His Honour failed to address the distinct question of the reliability of the evidence of the police officers in relation to count 1 … , and/or alternatively, his Honour’s reasons do not adequately expose the process of reasoning by which he found the police officers were reliable … ;
c.       His Honour failed to engage, or sufficiently engage, with the defence submission as to the manner in which adverse findings in relation to count 3 bore upon count 1 … ;
d.      His Honour failed to bring the adverse credibility and reliability findings in relation to count 3 to bear when considering count 1;
e.       His Honour’s reasons do not adequately address nor resolve the tension between the positive credibility and reliability findings in relation to the evidence of police concerning count 1 and the adverse credibility and reliability findings in relation to the evidence of police concerning count 3;
f.       His Honour’s reasons do not adequately address nor resolve the conflict between the police officers’ evidence and the [appellant’s] evidence in relation to the manner of driving the subject of count 1;
g.      His Honour’s reasons do not adequately address nor expose how he rejected the [appellant’s] evidence as a reasonable possibility in relation to count 1;
h.      His Honour’s reasons do not adequately address nor resolve the tension between rejecting the [appellant’s] evidence as a reasonable possibility in relation to count 1 and accepting the [appellant’s] evidence as a reasonable possibility in relation to count 3;
i.       His Honour did not provide adequate reasons for finding beyond reasonable doubt that the [appellant] knew he was driving at police.
This ground of appeal relates to the adequacy of the trial Judge’s reasons and reasoning.
Legal principles
Adequacy of reasons
The duty to give reasons is a necessary incident of the judicial process. Failure to provide sufficient or adequate reasons can promote a sense of grievance and may deny the fact and the appearance of justice having been done. The judicial obligation to give reasons is directed, in part, to facilitating the exercise of a party’s right of appeal, in addition to promoting public accountability as to how and why a judge has made a particular decision.
As the content and detail of reasons will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the matter the subject of the decision, it is not possible for an appellate court to state, other than at a level of generality, rules to guide trial judges as to what will amount to adequate reasons. It is not the function of an appellate court to set standards as to the optimal, or even desirable, level of detail required to be revealed in reasons for judgment. The function of the appellate court is to determine whether the reasons provided have reached a minimum acceptable level to constitute a proper exercise of the judicial power.
Justice Heydon observed in AK v Western Australia:[3]
... Ordinarily it would be necessary for a trial judge to summarise the crucial arguments of the parties, to formulate the issues for decision, to resolve any issues of law and fact which needed to be determined before the verdict could be arrived at, in the course of that resolution to explain how competing arguments of the parties were to be dealt with and why the resolution arrived at was arrived at, to apply the law found to the facts found, and to explain how the verdict followed. ...
(footnote omitted)
[3] (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [85].
This passage was cited with approval in DL v The Queen.[4]
[4] (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ).
Thus, a trial judge will ordinarily be expected to expose their reasoning on points critical to the contest between the parties. This expectation applies to both evidence and argument. Ultimately, the reasons must be more than a bare statement of the principles of law applied and the findings of fact made; there must be exposed a reasoning process linking them and justifying the latter and, ultimately, the verdict that is reached.[5]
[5] AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [85] (Heydon J).
However, it is not necessary for a judge to give extensive and elaborate reasons. The adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they were relied upon by counsel, their bearing upon the elements of the offence, and their significance to the course of the trial.[6] Reasons for decision are to be read fairly and in the context of the way the trial was conducted. Reasons may appear by necessary inference from what is stated expressly. However, an appellate court should not have to guess or speculate as to what a trial judge may or may not have meant, particularly on an important issue.
[6] DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ).
When considering a complaint of inadequate reasons on appeal, the majority of the High Court in DL v The Queen explained:[7]
… Not every failure to resolve a dispute will render reasons for decision inadequate to justify a verdict. At one extreme, reasons for decision will not be inadequate merely because they fail to address an irrelevant dispute or one which is peripheral to the real issues. Nor will they be inadequate merely because they fail to undertake “a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process that leads to the judge’s conclusion.” At the other extreme, reasons will often be inadequate if the trial judge fails to explain his or her conclusion on a significant factual or evidential dispute that is a necessary step to the final conclusion. In between these extremes, the adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they were relied upon by counsel, their bearing upon the elements of the offence, and their significance to the course of the trial.
(citations omitted; emphasis added)
[7] DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ).
The failure to give adequate reasons constitutes an error of law. Where such an error is found, the appeal must be allowed unless the Court is of the view that there is no substantial miscarriage of justice.
Inadequate reasoning
A submission of inadequate reasoning is a complaint that the reasons and intermediate findings of fact do not support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is, a judge’s reasoning, although apparent, does not rationally support the ultimate finding of fact and therefore the verdict.[8] A submission of inadequate reasons, on the other hand, is a complaint that it is not possible to discern how the judge rationally arrived at their determinative conclusions.
[8] JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48 at [205] (Lovell J, Peek and Bampton JJ agreeing); R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28 at [177] (Kourakis CJ).
There is an understandable tendency to slip from a complaint that reasons are inadequate to a complaint that the judge’s reasoning, although apparent, does not rationally support their ultimate finding of fact and therefore the verdict. The difference between an allegation of inadequate reasons and inadequate reasoning can be, in some cases, difficult to discern.[9] Sometimes inadequate reasoning can result from a failure to resolve, or adequately resolve, an issue leaving the reasoning unsound.
[9] Park (a pseudonym) v The King (2022) 142 SASR 132 at [41].
Appellant’s submissions
The appellant contended that the trial Judge failed to give reasons, or alternatively, failed to give sufficient reasons, to support the findings of guilt for Count 1.
The appellant submitted that the findings regarding the credibility and reliability of each police officer in the context of Count 3 were directly relevant to their evidence of Count 1. The appellant further submitted the appellant’s credibility and reliability was not inherently divisible, particularly considering the temporal and physical nexus between the two charged incidents. It was therefore necessary for the trial Judge to explain how he arrived at conflicting and otherwise inconsistent conclusions. The trial Judge did not consider the extent to which his findings regarding Count 3 impacted upon his ability to reject the appellant’s evidence regarding Count 1.
The defence case at trial was that Pople and Langford’s evidence as to the subject of Count 3 was fabricated, or at least, totally unreliable. The appellant relied upon the injuries sustained by the appellant proven through the medical evidence, and the inconsistencies between the police officers’ evidence.
Defence counsel at trial invited the trial Judge to exercise caution in accepting Pople and Langford’s evidence as to the appellant’s manner of driving, given the issues in their evidence regarding Count 3.
The appellant submitted that the trial Judge’s reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt of Count 3 was in part based on adverse findings made regarding Pople’s evidence, particularly the inconsistent statements, the lack of adequate explanation, and the fact that it was inherently illogical. The trial Judge harboured concerns about Pople’s reliability and credibility. The trial Judge had similar concerns about Langford, in particular his tendency to reconstruct part of his evidence.
The appellant submitted that to be found guilty of Count 1, it was necessary for the trial Judge to accept the evidence of Pople and Langford beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant drove intentionally at the police vehicle. This required a finding they were both credible and reliable. It was also necessary to exclude the appellant’s denial of the conduct as being reasonably possible. It was submitted that any matter which went to the reliability and credibility of both police officers generally had the capacity to bear upon the trial Judge’s findings concerning Count 1.
The appellant further submitted that given the conduct the subject of both counts was inextricably linked, the credibility and reliability of both police officers was not divisible between the counts. Therefore, the findings in relation to Count 3 had the capacity to impact upon an assessment of both witnesses’ evidence for Count 1.
Despite this being a key limb for the defence case, the trial Judge failed to address this connection between counts and his findings, and rather dealt with this in the reasons in a compartmentalised fashion. The reasons of the trial Judge do not adequately reveal his reasoning process in relation to credibility and reliability findings in the context of Count 1, nor do the reasons reveal how the trial Judge addressed and resolved key factual disputes.
It was further contended that the trial Judge did not engage with nor resolve the issue around the alleged assault of the appellant and how he sustained his injuries, despite its prominence on the defence case. The trial Judge did not reject the appellant’s evidence, nor make a finding as to whether Pople assaulted him, the mechanism of injury despite accepting that the appellant had been “materially injured”, the significance of the body worn camera shaking, or the allegation that both police officers had fabricated evidence to cover for Pople’s conduct.
The trial Judge did not separately consider the appellant’s evidence in detail in making his findings, simply noting the appellant denied the allegations on oath. The appellant submitted that the issue as to why there existed a reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt of Count 3 but not of Count 1 required proper analysis.
The trial Judge was critical and not convinced of the appellant’s evidence regarding Count 1. The trial Judge addressed the proposition that the appellant’s actions were only consistent with trying to evade the police vehicle and did not directly engage with the hypothesis that the appellant’s manner of driving was an accident, nor provide reasons on why this hypothesis was rejected. The trial Judge failed to refer or resolve the evidence on the prosecution case which either supported, or was not inconsistent with, the hypothesis of accidental conduct.
Respondent’s submissions
The respondent submitted that the trial Judge detailed the evidence of the witnesses and summarised the final addresses of both parties. The trial Judge found the evidence of the appellant unconvincing in regard to Count 1, and turned to the police officers’ evidence, determining their evidence to be consistent, logical and credible. These findings were open and appropriate.
The respondent further submitted that the challenge to the police evidence regarding the appellant’s driving manner was limited, with most of the forensic contest focusing on Count 3. Rejecting the appellant’s version of events as to what happened on Karyn Crescent and Marie Avenue meant it was open to the trial Judge to make the findings as he did.
A trial judge is not required to provide detailed explanation for their preference of the evidence of one witness to another, where the decision rests substantially upon the impression made by the witness. The trier of fact is also entitled to accept some, all or none of a witness’ evidence. It was therefore open to the trial Judge to accept the evidence of the police for Count 1, but otherwise determine he was not satisfied of their account for Count 3.
Discussion

We reject the appellant’s submissions. The trial Judge’s reasons need to be read and understood in the context of the way in which the trial proceeded before him.
The trial Judge considered, correctly in our view, that the two events were separated by time and distance such as to be separate events. However, we accept, as the appellant submitted, that credibility and reliability of the witnesses (including that of the appellant) was not divisible and therefore was relevant to both counts.
When addressing the trial Judge, counsel for the appellant suggested that the trial Judge should reject Pople and Langford’s evidence in relation to Count 3. He submitted that the trial Judge should find that they fabricated their evidence. Defence counsel submitted:
… if your Honour accepts my submission about the evidence of the officers in relation to count 3, then your Honour might have some caution in accepting their evidence in relation to counts 1 and 2 on the Information.
Defence counsel further suggested the trial Judge should be “quite cautious” in accepting Langford’s evidence as his evidence in relation to Count 3 was “simply unreliable and at worst was simply fabricated”.
The position of the appellant at trial was clear. The evidence of Pople and Langford on Count 3 was so unreliable and lacking in credibility that their evidence on Count 1 must be viewed cautiously. The appellant sought a finding that their evidence was fabricated on Count 3.
The trial Judge did not accept the appellant’s submissions that the police had fabricated their evidence on Count 3. The appellant tendered hospital notes from his admission to hospital following his arrest but they did not support his allegations. While he suffered a back injury, on his own evidence he had fallen from the roof of a shed. There was nothing in the hospital notes that suggested he had been subject to a severe beating by Pople.
In relation to Count 1, the evidence of Pople and Langford was in some respects supported by the appellant’s evidence.
Significant portions of the appellant’s version of events were not put to either police officer. For example, while the police vehicle’s headlights were operating, it was not suggested to either Pople or Langford that the headlights were on high beam. Nor was it suggested that the police vehicle was travelling quickly as it proceeded along Karyn Crescent. It was not suggested to either witness that the road was in any way wet due to it having rained about 15 minutes before.
Importantly, it was not suggested to the police officers that they had fabricated their evidence in relation to Count 1. Defence counsel at trial submitted that the trial Judge should be cautious about accepting their evidence about the appellant’s driving of the car because of the credibility issues in relation to Count 3. That said, defence counsel urged the trial Judge to accept the appellant’s evidence at least as a reasonable possibility that he did not know it was a police vehicle. That of course was not something Pople and Langford could give evidence about.
The trial Judge found that both Pople and Langford gave evidence in a “relatively straightforward way”. While the trial Judge did not accept the prosecution evidence on Count 3 beyond a reasonable doubt, he did not find the evidence of Pople and Langford had been fabricated nor that it was inherently unreliable and lacking in credit.
The medical evidence produced demonstrated the appellant suffered injuries but did not support the suggested mechanism of the injuries. The trial Judge in the circumstances of the case and, in particular, given his findings that the police officers gave evidence in a straightforward manner, was not required to make findings on the medical evidence.
The trial judge acquitted the appellant on Count 3 because he was unable to determine what happened on the fence. We accept that the acquittal means the trial Judge did not accept the reliability or accuracy of Pople’s evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Whilst he allowed for a reasonable possibility that events near the fence did not occur as Pople said, it does not follow that the trial Judge accepted fabrication as a reasonable possibility. Certainly, the trial Judge did not make any finding to that effect, and his reference to Pople being a “straightforward” witness suggests otherwise.
However, why the appellant was in his car at 2.45 am and how he drove the car, was not relevant to the evidence on Count 3. It was common ground that the appellant drove away from the police vehicle. Other than putting the arrest of the appellant into context, the evidence on Count 3 did not depend on what had occurred in relation to Count 1.
A fair reading of the trial Judge’s reasons demonstrates that the trial Judge rejected the appellant’s submissions as to how he should approach Pople and Langford’s evidence on Count 3. He did not find the police officers fabricated their evidence.
Turning to Count 1, the trial Judge found that Pople and Lanford’s evidence was logical and credible. The trial Judge gave clear reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence in relation to this count. The appellant’s main argument on Count 1 was that he did not appreciate that the vehicle following him was a police vehicle. That was not an issue that Pople and Langford could give evidence on. The trial Judge rejected the appellant’s evidence on that issue. That of course means that the appellant initially drove away from the kerb in Karyn Crescent knowing that it was a police vehicle.
Rejection of the appellant’s evidence did not mean that the trial Judge had to accept the prosecution evidence. However, there was, as discussed, much common ground between the prosecution and defence on Count 1. Given the lack of challenge to Pople and Langford’s evidence, the trial Judge’s findings on Count 3 had little or no role to play in the assessment of the evidence.
Having rejected the appellant’s evidence, the trial Judge was left with the largely unchallenged evidence of Pople and Langford. When he turned to consider Count 1, having not accepted the full force of the appellant’s submissions on Count 3, he made a finding that Pople and Langford’s evidence was credible and reliable. It was open for him to do so despite his finding that he could not convict the appellant on Count 3.
Given the way in which the case was conducted, the trial Judge’s reasons clearly set out his findings and his reasons for those findings. He stated clearly that he rejected the appellant’s evidence in relation to Count 1 and he clearly did not accept the appellant’s evidence that Pople assaulted him.
In our view, the trial Judge’s reasons are sufficient, clear and logical. He has dealt with the issues as they were presented to him at trial, and adequately explained why he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to Count 1 despite his doubt in relation to Count 3.
We would dismiss Ground 1.
Ground 2
2.The verdict of guilty is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence:
a.     The verdict of guilty in relation to count 1 is inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty in relation to count 3, where:
i) The prosecution case depended entirely upon the credibility and reliability of the police officers, in circumstances where the trial judge made adverse findings on those topics in relation to count 3;
ii) The trial judge accepted the [appellant’s] evidence in relation to count 3, or at the very least was not able to exclude the evidence as a reasonable possibility.
b.     The evidence could not exclude the reasonable possibility that the [appellant] was not aware he was driving at police where inter alia:
i)     The relevant conduct occurred at nighttime and in poor lighting;
ii)      The police vehicle did not have emergency lights or sirens on;
iii) The headlights of the police vehicle were shining at the [appellant’s] vehicle;
iv)      The [appellant] had a limited opportunity to view the police vehicle.
Appellant’s submissions
The appellant submitted that the verdict on Count 1 was inconsistent with the verdict on Count 3, contending it was not open to the trial Judge to return a verdict of guilty for Count 1 given the not guilty verdict for Count 3. The appellant submitted that the inconsistency cannot be resolved which demonstrates why it was not open to the trial Judge to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the appellant submitted the verdict of the trial Judge should be set aside as it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.[10]
[10] Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158(1)(a).
The path to guilt involved accepting the credibility and reliability of Pople and Langford, and rejecting the appellant’s evidence as reasonably possible. However, the appellant submitted that the trial Judge made adverse findings about the credibility and reliability of Pople and Langford in regard to Count 3. Further, there was nothing in their evidence which provided a basis for considering their evidence as more reliable or credible for Count 1 as opposed to Count 3. The appellant further argued that given the issues with the police officers’ evidence, it was not open to exclude the reasonable possibility that the evidence of each police officer as to the appellant’s driving manner was reconstructed, mistaken or fabricated.
Additionally, whilst it may be accepted that the trial Judge rejected the appellant’s evidence concerning his state of mind when driving, this did not necessarily lead to a rejection of the appellant’s evidence as to his manner of driving. This is particularly so when there is some support of the appellant’s evidence on the prosecution case. Further, in considering the appellant’s evidence, it was necessary for the trial Judge to keep in mind the deficiencies in the police officers’ evidence in support of Count 1 and Count 3.
Given the issues with the police evidence, and what the appellant submitted were the positive findings as to the appellant’s essential credibility and reliability for Count 3, the verdict for Count 1 cannot be reconciled with the verdict of not guilty for Count 3, thus creating a factual inconsistency between verdicts.
Respondent’s submissions
The respondent submitted that although the trial Judge identified some inconsistencies and concern with Pople’s evidence in relation to Count 3 which were not reconciled or explained, the trial Judge did not go so far as to find Pople as entirely incredible or unreliable.
As for Langford, the trial Judge was not prepared to accept the submissions of defence counsel in closing that Langford was lying and had deliberately fabricated evidence to support Pople.
The trial Judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt for Count 3, as it was not clear what occurred on top of the fence given the issues with Pople’s evidence and him being the only police witness to those events.
In relation to the evidence concerning Count 1, including the evidence of both police officers, and the finding that the appellant’s evidence was unconvincing, the finding of guilt was one that was open to the trial Judge and was supported by evidence.
Discussion
The High Court in MFA v The Queen[11] decided that, the principles to be applied in determining whether a verdict of guilty returned by a jury is unreasonable by reason of its inconsistency with a verdict of acquittal in the same trial, are those formulated in M v The Queen.[12] In M v The Queen the majority stated:[13]
Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.
...
… In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence. In doing so, the court is not substituting trial by a court of appeal for trial by jury, for the ultimate question must always be whether the court thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. …

(citations omitted)
[11] (2002) 213 CLR 606.
[12] (1994) 181 CLR 487.
[13] M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, 493-495 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
The obligation to establish inconsistency of verdicts rests upon the appellant. In MacKenzie v The Queen Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ stated the test as follows:[14]
[14] MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348, 366-368.
3. Where, as is ordinarily the case, the inconsistency arises in the jury verdicts upon different counts of the originating process in a criminal trial, the test is one of logic and reasonableness. A judgment of Devlin J in R v Stone is often cited as expressing the test:
“He must satisfy the court that the two verdicts cannot stand together, meaning thereby that no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion, and once one assumes that they are an unreasonable jury, or they could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand.”
4. Nevertheless, the respect for the function which the law assigns to juries (and the general satisfaction with their performance) have led courts to express repeatedly, in the context both of criminal and civil trials, reluctance to accept a submission that verdicts are inconsistent in the relevant sense. Thus, if there is a proper way by which the appellate court may reconcile the verdicts, allowing it to conclude that the jury performed their functions as required, that conclusion will generally be accepted. If there is some evidence to support the verdict said to be inconsistent, it is not the role of the appellate court, upon this ground, to substitute its opinion of the facts for the one which was open to the jury. In a criminal appeal, the view may be taken that the jury simply followed the judge’s instruction to consider separately the case presented by the prosecution in respect of each count and to apply to each count the requirement that all of the ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Alternatively, the appellate court may conclude that the jury took a “merciful” view of the facts upon one count: a function which has always been open to, and often exercised by, juries.
...
5. Nevertheless, a residue of cases will remain where the different verdicts returned by the jury represent, on the public record, an affront to logic and commonsense which is unacceptable and strongly suggests a compromise of the performance of the jury’s duty. More commonly, it may suggest confusion in the minds of the jury or a misunderstanding of their function, uncertainty about the legal differentiation between the offences or lack of clarity in the judicial instruction on the applicable law. It is only where the inconsistency rises to the point that the appellate court considers that intervention is necessarily required to prevent a possible injustice that the relevant conviction will be set aside. It is impossible to state hard and fast rules. “It all depends upon the facts of the case.”

(citations omitted)
This ground of appeal relies largely on similar arguments to those made in support of Ground 1. In particular, the appellant argued that the trial Judge’s reasons for acquitting him of Count 3 cannot rationally be reconciled with his finding of guilt in relation to Count 1. However, read properly, the trial Judge’s reasons disclose that there is clearly no inconsistency between the verdicts.
In relation to Count 1, the trial Judge found:
At the end of the day, the police evidence as to the accused’s driving was credible and reliable, and the court accepts it beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the accused’s evidence on oath to the contrary.
The actions of the accused are only consistent with the accused, from the outset, desperately trying to evade the vehicle that had approached him. The accused’s convoluted explanation that he was worried that the approaching vehicle may have been driven by people unhappy that he had saved the life of a woman whom he had just met and who had been ripped off in a diamond sale was not credible.
The accused had a strong motive to avoid police, a motive he admitted at trial. He did not want to be apprehended on his Parole Warrant until he had made arrangements for his property and had been able to attend his premises and lock them down.
The court finds that the rapid acceleration, the screeching of the tyres, and driving at the police vehicle head on are only explicable in terms of the accused knowing that it was a police vehicle containing police officers and trying to escape them. He intentionally created a real and not remote risk of harm to assist his intended escape.
(emphasis added)
We have already dealt with the arguments relating to Ground 2(a)(i) and 2(a)(ii) when considering Ground 1. The trial Judge’s reasons, as discussed, clearly explain how he resolved the contested credibility issues.
The trial Judge did not accept the criticisms the appellant made of the evidence of the two police witnesses. While the trial Judge had reservations in accepting Pople’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, his comments about Langford’s evidence in relation to Count 3 were in relation to minor matters unrelated to his evidence in relation to Count 1. Those reservations did not dictate or require any equivalent doubt in relation to Count 1.
The trial Judge specifically found that in relation to Count 1, Pople and Langford’s evidence was credible and reliable. Such a finding was open to him particularly given the way in which the defence was conducted. We do not accept the fact that the trial Judge had a doubt about the appellant’s guilt of Count 3 was a solid obstacle to a conviction of Count 1. The way in which the events unfolded clearly involved two distinct incidents. It was, in our view, clearly open to the trial Judge to have a doubt about what occurred ‘on the fence’ but no doubt about the manner of the appellant’s driving.
The appellant has not established a factual inconsistency between the verdicts.
Turning to particulars (b)(i)-(iv), the trial Judge clearly explained why he rejected the appellant’s evidence about whether he knew, at least as a reasonable possibility, that the vehicle behind him was a police vehicle.
It was common ground that lights and sirens were not activated on the police vehicle. This was not a police pursuit. It was never put to either police officer that the headlights of the police vehicle were on high beam. Clearly the headlights were operating. The prosecution case that the appellant knew it was a police vehicle was based on circumstantial evidence. As discussed earlier in these reasons, the appellant’s evidence on the topic of why he drove his car quickly from Karyn Crescent was fanciful. The trial Judge found the appellant’s evidence was not credible. As mentioned earlier in these reasons, there was little challenge to the police witnesses in relation to their evidence on Count 1.

There is no reason to think that the trial Judge failed to have regard to the factual matters raised in this ground of appeal. The trial Judge’s reasons establish that he recognised that the prosecution case on this aspect was entirely circumstantial. The appellant had a motive to evade the police and the manner in which he drove, as the trial Judge outlined, demonstrated knowledge that it was a police vehicle. As the trial Judge explained, the appellant’s actions were only explicable on the basis that he knew it was a police vehicle. That is, the evidence taken in its entirety excluded all reasonable possibilities consistent with innocence. The guilt of the accused was the only rational conclusion.
The particulars alleged in Ground 2, either in isolation or taken together, do not present a solid obstacle to the factual findings and conclusions reached by the trial Judge.
We have conducted an independent assessment of the whole of the evidence. In our view, it was open to the trial Judge to find the appellant guilty of Count 1. The trial Judge had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses give evidence. The trial Judge’s approach in assessing the credibility and reliability of the prosecution witnesses was logical and reasonable. There was little or no inconsistency between the evidence of Pople and Langford on Count 1. The trial Judge’s finding that the prosecution evidence on Count 1 was credible and reliable was clearly open to him. The appellant’s evidence on Count 1 was fanciful and the trial Judge was correct in totally rejecting it.
Our assessment of the whole of the evidence leads us to have no doubt about the appellant’s guilt of Count 1.
We would dismiss this ground of appeal.
Order
Permission to appeal is granted, but the appeal is dismissed.