JULIE MCEWAN (appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION (first respondent) ANTHONY RAINS (second respondent) COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (third respondent) ROMAN MICAIRAN (fourth respondent) KATIE LUKIN (fifth respondent) JESSICA WILLIAMS (sixth respondent) ROBERTA DEVEREAUX (seventh respondent) DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (eighth respondent) EMILY MCGREGOR (ninth respondent) THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (tenth respondent)
2. The appellant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – CASE MANAGEMENT – GENERALLY – where the decision concerned practice and procedure in an interlocutory context – where the trial dates had been vacated – where the appellant previously unsuccessfully sought to amend a statement of claim without leave – where the appellant wrongly relied on r 378 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to support the filing of amended pleadings without leave – where the exercise of judicial discretion called for a particular exercise of appellate restraint – whether the appellant required leave of the court to amend her pleadings under r 470 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)
The appellant appeared on her own behalf M McKechnie, with K Boomer, for the Commonwealth respondents D M Favell for the State respondents
SOLICITORS:
The appellant appeared on her own behalf Australian Government Solicitor for the Commonwealth respondents Crown Law for the State respondents
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Gotterson AJA and with the orders proposed by his Honour.
BODDICE JA: I agree with Gotterson AJA.
GOTTERSON AJA: The appellant, Julie McEwan, commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 21 January 2022 for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office against 10 defendants, the first seven of which are Commonwealth Government entities or their employees, and the remaining three are State Government related. They are the respondents to this appeal. On 3 November 2022, the proceedings were placed on the Supervised Case List for Self-Represented Litigants (“SRL”).
Justice Freeburn who has managed the proceedings towards trial, has described the background to the appellant’s claims in the following terms:[1]
“A broad collection of entities, called Brisbane Angels, had an interest in providing funds for start-up investment projects, with a particular focus in biotechnology. The Brisbane Angels decided to invest $185,000 in a weight loss project operated by Ms McEwan (and entities associated with her). That project was called the Carbstarver project. Ms McEwan says she reconciled her…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the matter of McEwan v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant sought to challenge the decision of Justice Freeburn to refuse leave to amend her pleadings and to file and serve a particular affidavit. The appeal was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The central issue for the court was whether Justice Freeburn's decision to deny the appellant's request to amend her pleadings and to file and serve an affidavit was correct. The court had to consider whether the appellant needed leave to amend her pleadings under r 470 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), and if the refusal to allow the filing and serving of the affidavit was justified.
The court found that the decision of Justice Freeburn was correct. It determined that the appellant was required to obtain leave to amend her pleadings under r 470 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Furthermore, the court upheld the refusal to allow the filing and serving of the affidavit, finding it to be irrelevant, containing matters the appellant could not testify to, and including submissions rather than evidence. The court held that these characteristics justified the refusal of leave to file and serve the affidavit. The court concluded that the appellant had failed to establish any error of legal principle in Justice Freeburn's decision, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In these circumstances, the Inconsistency Grounds also, are not viable grounds of appeal.Evidence Grounds Grounds 2.7 and 2.8 in the amended notice of appeal both concern the affidavit sworn by the appellant on 23 August 2024. That affidavit arose in the following circumstances. To progress the proceeding towards trial, Justice Freeburn directed the parties to file and serve trial affidavits. In response to that direction, on 27 November 2023, the appellant filed an affidavit that she had sworn by way of evidence in chief. Since filing and serving that affidavit, the appellant had unsuccessfully sought to rely on some 25 further affidavits by way of evidence in chief and some further consolidated affidavits.[31] In particular, leave had been refused in respect of a further affidavit sworn by the appellant as evidence in chief containing 584 paragraphs over 81 pages of text.[32][31]Ibid [130], [131].[32]Ibid [135]. It was in these circumstances that the appellant sought leave to file and serve the affidavit she had sworn on 23 August 2024. It will be recalled that it is 66 pages in length and, with exhibits, slightly less than 1000 pages long. Justice Freeburn identified three characteristics in the affidavit which, in his Honour’s view, justified refusal of leave to file and serve it. First, it contains irrelevant matters. Secondly, it deals with matters as to which the appellant could not give evidence. Thirdly, it includes submissions.[33] Rather than supplementing evidence in chief that the appellant had already placed on the record, this affidavit was a means by which she, to adopt his Honour’s description, “seeks to essentially reconstruct, from scratch, her evidence in chief in its entirety, while also bringing in new matters that could be potential hotspots of dispute”.[34][33]Ibid [137].[34]Ibid [138]. Having regard to these features of the affidavit, the decision of Justice Freeburn to refuse leave to file and serve it is, with respect, both logical and sensible. It is unsurprising that the appellant has failed to identify any error of legal principle in the decision. These grounds of appeal must also fail. It, of course, remains open to the appellant to seek leave from Justice Freeburn to rely on further evidence in chief that is focused on specific factual matters and is in admissible form. The Prejudice Ground This ground contends that the decision of Justice Freeburn has caused injustice and is prejudicial. In substance, it is conclusionary in that it impliedly asserts that, by reason of the grounds which precede it, justice has not been accorded to the appellant and that she has thereby been prejudiced. However, in circumstances where the appellant has failed to establish any error of legal principle on his Honour’s part, the assertion of injustice cannot be sustained. Likewise, for prejudice. This is especially so where his Honour found that the disallowed amendments and further affidavit evidence did not advance the appellant’s case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 21 November 2024, the appellant filed a notice of appeal[8] and an amended notice of appeal on 16 January 2025.[9] The appellant filed a yet further amended notice of appeal on 17 March 2025. At the hearing of the appeal that day, she sought leave to amend her notice of appeal in accordance with the latter document. Leave was granted with the exception of a proposed paragraph 2.10.[10][8]AB, 1-5.[9]AB, 6-10.[10]Tr 1-4, ll7-10.The nature of the decision under appeal Before turning to the grounds of appeal, I note that the decision of Justice Freeburn concerned practice and procedure in an interlocutory context. Moreover, it was discretionary in nature. The principles relevant to appellate review of such a decision were summarised by Bond JA (with whom Fraser JA and Wilson J agreed) in Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd[11] as follows:[11][2021] QCA 198; (2021) 9 QR 141.“[11]The determination of appeals from an exercise of judicial discretion call for a particular exercise of appellate restraint. Thus, in order to persuade an appellate court to overturn an exercise of a discretionary judgment by a judicial officer, an appellant must demonstrate the kind of error identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–505, namely:(a) acting upon a wrong principle;(b) allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the exercise of the discretion;(c) mistaking the facts;(d) failing to take account some material consideration; or(e) reaching a result which, upon the facts is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer error, even if the Court cannot identify it precisely.[12]The determination of appeals from an exercise of judicial discretion in an interlocutory decision concerning questions of practice and procedure call for an even greater exercise of appellate restraint. Authority at the highest level,[12] approves the observations of Sir Frederick Jordan in In re the Will of F B Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 322-323 (footnotes omitted):‘… it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a Court of Appeal could regard itself as justified in interfering with the exercise of a discretion by a judge of first instance – only where he has misapplied the law, or his order is likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice: Evans v Bartlam. In this connection, however, I am of opinion that, as was pointed out by this Court in In re Ryan, there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal. But an appeal from an exercise of a so-called discretion which is determinative of legal rights stands in a somewhat different position. In this class of case, too, a Court of Appeal submits itself to self-imposed restraints, but restraints which, though strict, are somewhat less stringent than those adopted in matters of practice or procedure.’[13]In appeals from an exercise of judicial discretion in an interlocutory decision concerning questions of practice and procedure, although there is no absolute rule and each case must be considered in light of its own particular circumstances, generally an appellate court will not interfere unless, in addition to error of principle, the appellant demonstrates that the order will work a substantial injustice to one of the parties: see Just GI Pty Ltd v Pig Improvement Co Aust Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 48 at [14] per Williams JA (with whom Davies JA and Mullins J agreed) and Santos Limited v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd [2020] QCA 254 at [29].[14]The present appeal is an appeal from an exercise of judicial discretion in an interlocutory decision concerning questions of practice and procedure and calls for an exercise of appellate restraint in accordance with the above principles: Specialised Explosives Blasting & Training Pty Ltd v Huddy’s Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] 2 Qd R 85 at 99-100 [56] to [57] per Muir JA (with whom Holmes JA and Philippides J agreed); Robson v Robson [2010] QCA 330 at [19] per Muir JA (with whom Chesterman JA and Philippides J agreed); and Base 1 Projects Pty Ltd v Islamic College of Brisbane Ltd [2012] QCA 114 at [23] to [24] per Margaret Wilson AJA (with whom McMurdo P and Applegarth J agreed).”[12]Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170 at [177].