McConvill & Associates Pty Ltd v Carbone (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McConvill & Associates Pty Ltd v Carbone (No 2) [2023] FCA 519  

Appeal from: Carbone v James McConvill & Associates [2021] FCCA 661
File number: VID 241 of 2021
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2023
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) – adverse action – where respondent successfully obtained judgment – where matter remitted to FCCA for assessment of damages and penalties – where appellants deemed to have contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”) – whether primary judge erred in finding that respondent would have remained employed for a period of 26 weeks – whether error as alleged was discretionary – whether primary judged erred in assessment of accrued annual leave entitlements – whether primary judge erred in appraising evidence – whether respondent’s abandonment of claims to contractual relief was unreasonable – whether primary judge erred in declining to award costs pursuant to s 570 of the FW Act – whether factual or legal error in ordering that penalties be paid directly to the respondent – whether the primary judge failed to consider factors in exercising discretion – error not established – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 – s 236

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 59, 69

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 342, 343, 535, 536, 539, 545, 546, 570

Cases cited:

Carbone v James McConvill & Associates [2021] FCCA 661

Carbone v James McConvill and Associates Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1305

Carbone v James McConvill and Associates Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 1594

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

PIA Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v King (2020) 274 FCR 225

PIA Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v King (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 53

Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2016) 239 FCR 336

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 58
Date of hearing: 27 September 2022 and 6 April 2023
Counsel for the First Appellant:

7 May 2021 - 7 February 2023 – Mr M Wyles KC with Ms R Sweet

From 8 February 2023 – there was no appearance

Solicitor for the First Appellant:

7 May 2021 - 7 February 2023 – Carter Newell Lawyers

From 8 February 2023 – there was no appearance

Counsel for the Second Appellant:

7 May 2021 - 7 February 2023 – Mr M Wyles KC with Ms R Sweet

From 8 February 2023 – the second appellant appeared in person

Solicitor for the Second Appellant:

7 May 2021 - 7 February 2023 – Carter Newell Lawyers

From 8 February 2023 – the second appellant appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M G Rinaldi
Solicitor for the Respondent: Cooper and Sanders Legal

ORDERS

VID 241 of 2021
BETWEEN:

JAMES MCCONVILL & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD

First Appellant

JAMES MCCONVILL

Second Appellant

AND:

JOSEPH CARBONE

Respondent

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 519
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of McConvill & Associates Pty Ltd v Carbone (No 2), the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was asked to review the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCCA) in an employment dispute. The respondent, Carbone, had successfully obtained a default judgment against the appellants, McConvill & Associates Pty Ltd and James McConvill, for various breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Australian Consumer Law. The matter was remitted to the FCCA for assessment of damages and penalties. The appellants argued that the FCCA had erred in several respects, including the calculation of compensation and damages, the assessment of annual leave entitlements, the refusal to award costs, and the direction that penalties be paid directly to the respondent. The court considered each of these issues in turn.

The Full Court found that the FCCA had not erred in its assessment of compensation and damages. The court held that the primary judge had correctly preferred the sworn testimony of the respondent over a reconciliation report that had little probative value. The court also found that the primary judge had not erred in calculating the accrued annual leave entitlements, and that there was no basis to order the respondent to pay part of the appellants’ costs. The court held that the primary judge had exercised their discretion appropriately in ordering that the penalties be paid directly to the respondent, and that there was no error in this respect. The Full Court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal had been made out, and dismissed the appeal.

The Full Court's decision upheld the FCCA's assessment of damages and penalties, and rejected the appellants' arguments. The court's reasoning was based on a careful consideration of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. The Full Court's decision provides guidance on the assessment of damages and penalties in employment disputes under the Fair Work Act and the Australian Consumer Law. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entitled to the compensation, damages, and penalties awarded by the FCCA.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, none of the appellants' grounds is made good. The appeal will be dismissed.BACKGROUND The relevant factual and procedural background is set out without controversy in the Primary Judgment ([2]-[21]). It is unnecessary to repeat it all here, save to note the following (Primary Judgment, [14]-[15]):On 29 October 2018, the [respondent] filed an originating application in the Federal Court of Australia under the FW Act, claiming that:(1) he was dismissed in contravention of s 340(1)(a)(ii);(2) the [first appellant] took adverse action against him within the meaning of s 342(1), Item 1;(3) the [first appellant] coerced him not to exercise a workplace right within the meaning s 343;(4) the [first appellant] failed to provide him with pay slips or proper pay slips, contrary to s 535 and s 536; and (5) the [second appellant] was partly liable for the contraventions by the [first appellant].The statement of claim was amended a number of times, and on 14 June 2019, the Further Amended Statement of Claim was filed. The FASOC alleges breaches of the ‘Post Admission Agreement’, breaches of the employment agreements (Contract 1 and Contract 2), breaches of the general protection provisions of the FW Act and breaches of s 18 and s 31 of the Australian Consumer Law (“the ACL”), as set out in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The Court notes that at the hearing before this Court, the [respondent] withdrew reliance on the contractual claims and relied solely on the claims brought pursuant to the FW Act and the ACL. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK Part 3‑1 of the FW Act is entitled “general protections”. Amongst other things, it provides for a suite of protections designed to safeguard the exercise of “workplace rights”. One of those protections is provided for by s 340(1) of the FW Act, which provides (and, at all relevant times, provided) as follows:340 Protection(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:(a) because the other person:…(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or… Section 342(1) of the FW Act defines (and defined) “adverse action”. It is unnecessary to rehearse that definition here. It is not presently controversial (indeed, it is the subject of the default judgment referred to above) that the appellants took adverse action against the respondent in contravention of s 340(1)(a)(ii) of the FW Act. Section 343(1) of the FW Act prohibits the taking of action against a person with intent to coerce him or her to not exercise a workplace right. Again, it can be accepted, for present purposes, that the first appellant contravened (indeed, it is deemed by effect of the default judgment to have contravened) that injunction. It is also not presently controversial that the appellants contravened ss 535(2)(b) and 536(1), which relate to the maintenance and provision of certain employment records. Section 539(1) of the FW Act is entitled “applications for orders in relation to contraventions of civil remedy provisions”. Amongst other things, it identifies the provisions of the FW Act that qualify as “civil remedy provision[s]”. Sections 340(1), 343(1), 535(2) and 536(1) are amongst them; and s 539(2) of the FW Act confers jurisdiction upon the FCCA to hear applications for relief relating to contraventions of those sections. If satisfied that such a contravention has occurred, the FCCA is empowered to grant such relief, including in the form of declarations, compensation and penalties (amongst other things), as it considers is appropriate: FW Act, ss 545 and 546. In the case of relief in the form of penalty, that discretion is tempered by s 546(2), the terms of which needn’t here be repeated.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is anything but clear how the respondent saw fit to permit the receipt into evidence of the “reconciliation report”. It seems quite evidently to offend the rule against hearsay: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“Evidence Act”), s 59. It is difficult, to say the least, to see how it might qualify as a business record: Evidence Act, s 69. It appears to be nothing more than a series of assertions, made well after the event and very much in the context of (indeed only a few months prior to) a contested hearing before the FCCA. To my eye (I say without having to decide the issue), it appears to be wholly without any evidential worth. Regardless, against that “evidence” was evidence from the respondent himself. Amongst other things, he deposed to the times and lengths of periods of annual leave that he took whilst employed by the first appellant. Indeed, he did so in response (which is to say, by way of challenge) to what the “reconciliation report” purported to record. For reasons that are not apparent, he too was spared the rigours of cross-examination. That evidential landscape left the primary judge in an unenviable position. His Honour was confronted with inconsistent accounts as to the periods of annual leave that the respondent took during his employment by the first appellant, neither of which was tested. In the circumstances, it is not clear to me what the appellants say that the learned primary judge ought to have done. The appellants submit that his Honour erred by finding that their failure to provide payslips was a basis for rejecting Ms Quirk’s “reconciliation report”. That submission cannot be accepted. His Honour made no such finding. On the contrary, his Honour concluded (Primary Judgment, [86]):By reason on the entry of Judgment against the [appellants], the [first appellant] is taken to have admitted to not providing payslips as alleged in [30] – [31] of the FASOC. I do not accept that the annual leave reconciliation report is an accurate record of entitlements that was maintained over the course of the [respondent’s] employment. In those circumstances the value of annual leave entitlements accrued over the course of Contract 2, calculated based on a salary of $35,000, is $5,061.54. That is calculated by multiplying the weekly pay, being $673.07 (calculated on $35,000), by 4 weeks, and then multiplying that amount by 1.88 years, being the period of time worked under Contract 2. The appellants also maintain that the respondent “…did not adduce any evidence which could cause Ms Quirk’s evidence to be questioned”. That proposition also cannot be accepted. By his affidavit evidence, the respondent quite clearly challenged what the reconciliation report purported to record. Although the question is not free from doubt, I do not accept that the primary judge erred by preferring the direct, sworn testimony of the respondent over a report to which little, if any, probative evidential value attached. The error alleged by ground two of the notice of appeal—in effect (if not terms), that the primary judge erred by rejecting “the uncontroverted evidence of…Jane Quirk”—is not made good.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The remitted matter came before the FCCA, which on 9 April 2021 made orders requiring that the appellants pay to the respondent various amounts by way of compensation pursuant to s 545 of the FW Act, damages pursuant to the ACL and penalties pursuant to s 546 of the FW Act: Carbone v James McConvill & Associates [2021] FCCA 661 (Judge McNab; “Primary Judgment”). Despite an invitation from the appellants, the FCCA declined to make any order for costs against the respondent in respect of other parts of his claim. The appellants now appeal from that judgment. Their notice of appeal dated 7 May 2021 advances four discrete grounds. They are rehearsed in more detail below; but, in summary form, the appellants maintain that:(1)the primary judge erred in awarding the amount that was awarded as compensation pursuant to s 545 of the FW Act;(2)the primary judge erred in awarding the amount that was awarded as damages referrable to unpaid leave entitlements pursuant to the ACL;(3)the primary judge erred by not making an order requiring the respondent to pay part of the appellants’ costs; and(4)the primary judge erred by ordering that the pecuniary penalties that he was disposed to award be paid to the respondent. For the reasons that follow, none of the appellants' grounds is made good. The appeal will be dismissed.BACKGROUND The relevant factual and procedural background is set out without controversy in the Primary Judgment ([2]-[21]). It is unnecessary to repeat it all here, save to note the following (Primary Judgment, [14]-[15]):On 29 October 2018, the [respondent] filed an originating application in the Federal Court of Australia under the FW Act, claiming that:(1) he was dismissed in contravention of s 340(1)(a)(ii);(2) the [first appellant] took adverse action against him within the meaning of s 342(1), Item 1;(3) the [first appellant] coerced him not to exercise a workplace right within the meaning s 343;(4) the [first appellant] failed to provide him with pay slips or proper pay slips, contrary to s 535 and s 536; and (5) the [second appellant] was partly liable for the contraventions by the [first appellant].The statement of claim was amended a number of times, and on 14 June 2019, the Further Amended Statement of Claim was filed. The FASOC alleges breaches of the ‘Post Admission Agreement’, breaches of the employment agreements (Contract 1 and Contract 2), breaches of the general protection provisions of the FW Act and breaches of s 18 and s 31 of the Australian Consumer Law (“the ACL”), as set out in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The Court notes that at the hearing before this Court, the [respondent] withdrew reliance on the contractual claims and relied solely on the claims brought pursuant to the FW Act and the ACL. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK Part 3‑1 of the FW Act is entitled “general protections”. Amongst other things, it provides for a suite of protections designed to safeguard the exercise of “workplace rights”. One of those protections is provided for by s 340(1) of the FW Act, which provides (and, at all relevant times, provided) as follows:340 Protection(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:(a) because the other person:…(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.