MCCONNON v COTTRILL

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

MCCONNON v COTTRILL

Judgment of Judge Lunn a Master of the Supreme Court

9 February 2005

REAL PROPERTY

Summons for possession under s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886 - whether jurisdiction of Supreme Court ousted by s 24(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 which gives the Tribunal under that Act exclusive jurisdiction to determine a matter which may be the subject of an application under that Act - dispute on affidavits as to whether defendant was under any obligation to pay rent which was necessary if the Act was to apply - held once issue of jurisdiction raised onus on plaintiff to establish necessary facts to show Supreme Court had jurisdiction - oral evidence required to resolve the factual issues on jurisdiction.

MCCONNON v COTTRILL
[2005] SASC 46

Civil

  1. JUDGE LUNN The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the subject property at Port Willunga. In these proceedings under Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 she seeks an order for possession of that property. In her initial affidavit sworn on 2 December 2004 she mere said that the defendant was in possession of the property, he was not paying any rent or the utilities accounts and he had failed to vacate the property after being requested to do so. The affidavit said nothing about how the defendant had come to be in possession of the property.

  2. At the initial hearing of the summons on 19 January 2005 the defendant appeared in person and handed up a notice of acting from a solicitor, who the defendant said was unable to attend on that hearing, and an affidavit of himself.  That affidavit alleged, inter alia, that in about June 2004 the defendant had entered into the property at the invitation of the plaintiff and he had paid her $750.00 by way of rent, but he had not paid any further rent because he alleged the plaintiff had refused to give him receipts for rent.  The affidavit disclosed that the parties had been in a recent de facto relationship.  Other matters were alleged in the affidavit but it is not necessary to go into them for present purposes.  I informed the plaintiff’s solicitor that an issue of jurisdiction was raised by the defendant’s affidavit as to whether the claim for possession was solely within the jurisdiction of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal.  I adjourned the summons until 1 February 2005 for argument.

  3. On 1 February 2005 Mr Heywood-Smith QC appeared for the plaintiff. There was no attendance by the defendant or his solicitor, although the defendant had been present when the adjourned hearing date was set and I had told him that he and his solicitor were required to attend on the adjourned hearing. The plaintiff’s counsel referred to a second affidavit of the plaintiff, which was sworn in answer to the defendant’s affidavit, which denied, inter alia, that the defendant had ever paid any rent to her. Mr Heywood-Smith QC sought that I…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 46
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McConnon v Cottrill involved a summons for possession of a property in Port Willunga, South Australia. The plaintiff, McConnon, sought possession of the property under s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886. The defendant, Cottrill, raised an issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contending that the court's authority was ousted by s 24(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995. This section grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Tribunal under that Act to determine matters that may be the subject of an application under the Act. The dispute centred on whether Cottrill was under any obligation to pay rent, which was necessary for the application of the Act.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the summons for possession. This hinged on determining whether the defendant was in occupation of the property under a Residential Tenancy Agreement, as defined by the Residential Tenancies Act 1995. The court had to ascertain if the defendant had an obligation to pay rent, a fact that could not be determined from the affidavits alone. The case law cited, including Rothmans Ltd v Saudi Airlines and NEC Information Systems Pty Ltd v Lockhart, emphasized that the court must be satisfied of its jurisdiction, especially where jurisdiction has been actively withdrawn and conferred on another tribunal.

The court concluded that the issue of jurisdiction required the resolution of factual disputes, specifically whether rent was payable and if any had been paid. The court found that the onus was on the plaintiff to establish that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Given the conflicting affidavits, the court determined that the factual issues could not be resolved without oral evidence. The court reserved its decision on the jurisdictional point and directed that further evidence be provided to clarify the facts concerning the payment of rent and any other relevant facts. The court also noted that if it found that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction, it would then consider the broader issues of whether a possession order should be made.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of McCornon v Cottrill involves a summons for possession of a property located at Port Willunga, filed by the plaintiff, McCornon, who is the registered proprietor of the property. McCornon seeks an order for possession from the Supreme Court of South Australia under section 192 of the Real Property Act 1886. The defendant, Cottrill, has been in possession of the property and is not paying rent or utility accounts. He has also failed to vacate the property after being requested to do so. The case raises an issue of jurisdiction as to whether the Supreme Court has the authority to hear the case or if the Residential Tenancies Tribunal, under section 24(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine matters that may be the subject of an application under that Act.

The defendant's affidavit alleges that in about June 2004, he entered into possession of the property at the invitation of the plaintiff and paid her $750.00 by way of rent. However, he did not pay any further rent because he alleged that the plaintiff refused to give him receipts for rent. The affidavit also discloses that the parties had been in a recent de facto relationship. McCornon's affidavit denies that the defendant had ever paid any rent to her. The primary issue here is whether rent was payable, which cannot be determined based on the affidavits alone.

The court acknowledges that the defendant has been occupying the property for the purpose of his residence, and if he entered into possession of the property under a Residential Tenancy Agreement, as defined in the RTA, and with an obligation to pay rent, the present application could be the subject of an application under sections 93 and 95 of the RTA. The court recognises that there is no direct authority on which party bears the onus to establish the facts necessary to determine whether a statutory exclusion of jurisdiction applies. However, the court decides that once the issue of jurisdiction is raised, it is necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that they have jurisdiction on the point. The court further decides that it needs to resolve the factual issues concerning rent and any other relevant facts on the balance of probabilities, which may require directing cross-examination on the affidavits.

The proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of South Australia with the plaintiff, McConnon, seeking an order for possession of a property at Port Willunga under section 192 of the Real Property Act 1886. The defendant, Cottrill, raised a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the Residential Tenancies Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter under section 24(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995. At the initial hearing on 19 January 2005, the defendant, appearing in person, submitted an affidavit alleging that he had entered into a residential tenancy agreement with the plaintiff and had paid rent, though he had stopped paying rent after the plaintiff allegedly refused to provide rent receipts. The defendant’s affidavit also disclosed a recent de facto relationship with the plaintiff. Following this, the matter was adjourned to 1 February 2005 for argument on the issue of jurisdiction. On the adjourned date, the plaintiff’s counsel, Mr Heywood-Smith QC, sought an immediate ruling on the summons. However, the judge indicated the necessity to first address the jurisdictional issue, particularly whether section 24(1)(a) of the RTA precluded the court from proceeding with the summons. The judge reserved the decision on whether the court had jurisdiction, emphasising that the factual dispute over whether rent was payable needed to be resolved to determine if the Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ("RTA") confer exclusive jurisdiction to the Residential Tenancies Tribunal, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear the summons for possession under s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886?
2. Was there a Residential Tenancy Agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, which required the defendant to pay rent, thereby making the matter subject to the jurisdiction of the RTA?
3. If the matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the RTA, what is the onus on the plaintiff to establish that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the summons for possession?
4. Can the Supreme Court consider affidavits that have not been formally read in court when determining jurisdictional issues?
5. What is the appropriate procedure for the Supreme Court to follow in resolving factual disputes regarding jurisdiction when the matter involves statutory exclusions of jurisdiction?

Held
1. The court held that the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ("RTA") confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Residential Tenancies Tribunal, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear the summons for possession under s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886.
2. The court found that there was no clear evidence to establish the existence of a Residential Tenancy Agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, which required the defendant to pay rent, thereby making the matter subject to the jurisdiction of the RTA.
3. The court held that if the matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the RTA, the onus is on the plaintiff to establish that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the summons for possession.
4. The court ruled that the Supreme Court can consider affidavits that have not been formally read in court when determining jurisdictional issues.
5. The court held that the appropriate procedure for the Supreme Court to follow in resolving factual disputes regarding jurisdiction when the matter involves statutory exclusions of jurisdiction is to direct cross-examination on the affidavits, but to avoid it becoming a "fishing" expedition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by acknowledging that the primary issue was whether the defendant had entered into a Residential Tenancy Agreement with the plaintiff, which required the defendant to pay rent. The Residential Tenancies Act 1995 ("RTA") provides that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter that may be the subject of an application under the RTA. This jurisdiction is explicitly stated in s 24(1)(a) of the RTA. If the defendant had indeed entered into a Residential Tenancy Agreement, the matter would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTA, and the Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction over the summons for possession under s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886.

The court noted that the definition of a "Residential Tenancy Agreement" in s 31 of the RTA includes an agreement to occupy premises for the purpose of residence. It was undisputed that the defendant had been occupying the property for residential purposes. The key issue, therefore, was whether rent was payable under the agreement. The defendant claimed that he had paid rent, while the plaintiff denied this. This was a factual dispute that could not be resolved based on the affidavits alone.

The court examined the principle that where jurisdiction is actively withdrawn from a court and conferred on another tribunal, the court must disclaim jurisdiction, even if the parties wish the court to try the action. This principle was established in Rothmans Ltd v Saudi Airlines [1981] 1QB 368 and affirmed in NEC Information Systems Pty Ltd v Lockhart (1991) 22 NSWLR 518. The court concluded that s 21(a) of the RTA clearly ousted the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine "any matter that may be the subject of an application under the RTA."

The court considered the onus of proof regarding jurisdictional facts. While the plaintiff's counsel argued that the onus was on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction, the court found no direct authority on the matter. However, it reasoned that in proceedings where jurisdiction was contested, the court must be satisfied of its jurisdiction. The court concluded that in this case, since the jurisdictional issue involved a disputed fact (whether rent was payable), the plaintiff had the burden of establishing the necessary facts to show that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it should disregard the defendant's affidavit because it had not been formally read in court. The court held that in summary jurisdiction proceedings, it was permissible to consider any material on the court file that raised the issue of jurisdiction. The overriding duty of the court was to ensure it did not act contrary to statute, and any material raising the jurisdictional issue placed an evidentiary onus on the party seeking relief to satisfy the court of its jurisdiction.

Finally, the court outlined the appropriate procedure for resolving factual disputes regarding jurisdiction. The court would need to direct cross-examination on the affidavits, but it would avoid allowing the proceedings to turn into a "fishing expedition" on the wider disputes between the parties. If the court determined that it had jurisdiction, it would then consider whether a possession order should be made as sought by the plaintiff.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over a summons for possession if the matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal under the RTA, and it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the necessary jurisdictional facts. The court may consider affidavits that have not been formally read in court when determining jurisdictional issues, and it should resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction through directed cross-examination rather than allowing the proceedings to become a "fishing expedition."