McAvoy v Adani Mining Pty Ltd
[2014] QLC 32
•20 October 2014 [Ex tempore]
LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: McAvoy & Anor v Adani Mining Pty Ltd & Ors
[2014] QLC 32PARTIES: Jah’shua McAvoy and Coedie McAvoy
(applicants)v Adani Mining Pty Ltd
(first respondent)and
Land Services of Coast and Country Inc.
(second respondent)and
Conservation Action Trust
(third respondent)and
Chief Executive, Department of Environment and Heritage Protection
(statutory party)FILE NO: EPA446-14 DIVISION: General Division PROCEEDING: Application for inclusion as objector and/or party to proceedings DELIVERED ON: 20 October 2014 [Ex tempore] DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD ON: 20 October 2014 HEARD AT: Brisbane ACTING PRESIDENT: PA Smith ORDERS: 1. Mr Coedie McAvoy’s application is dismissed.
2. Mr Jah’shua McAvoy’s application to be made an objector under the Mineral Resources Act 1989 and the Environmental Protection Act 1994 is dismissed.
3. Mr Jah’shua McAvoy’s application to be made a party pursuant to s 186(d) of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 is allowed.
4. Costs reserved.
CATCHWORDS: Parties to proceedings – objections – time in which objections to be lodged – duly made objections
Jurisdiction of Land Court – court is a creature of statute – cannot exercise power to enhance jurisdiction
Party to environmental objections – matter of discretion – factors to be taken into accountMineral Resources Act 1989
Environmental Protection Act 1994
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999
Land Court Rules 2000ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Quandomooka Lands Council Aboriginal Corporation (2002) 1 QdR 347
DeLacey v Juunyjuwarra People [2004] QCA 297
Gregcarbil Pty Ltd v Backus & Ors (2011) 32 QLCR 211
Henry v ERO Georgetown Gold Operations Pty Ltd [2014] QLC 21
Lee v Kokstad Mining Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 248APPEARANCES: Mr LS Reidy, for the applicant
Mr P Ambrose QC and Mr M Johnson, instructed by McCullough Robertson, for the first respondent
Mr S Holt SC, instructed by the Environmental Defenders Office of Queensland, for the second respondent
Mr RA Quirk, instructed by Environmental Justice Australia, for the third respondent
Ms K Harbert, for the fourth respondent
Background
I have before me an application made by Jah’shua McAvoy and Coedie McAvoy in which they seek the following orders:
“1. An order that Jah’Shua McAvoy and Coedie McAvoy be parties to the following proceedings in the Court as Objectors: MRA428-14 & EPA429-14 (MLA 70441); MRA430-14 & EPA431-14 (MLA 70505); MRA432-14 & EPA433-14 (MLA 70506).
2. A declaration that Jah’Shua McAvoy and Coedie McAvoy be parties to the following proceedings in the Court as Objectors: MRA428-14 & EPA429-14 (MLA 70441); MRA430-14 & EPA431-14 (MLA 70505); MRA432-14 & EPA433-14 (MLA 70506).
3. The applicants be joined to the following proceedings in the Court: MRA428-14 & EPA429-14 (MLA 70441); MRA430-14 & EPA431-14 (MLA 70505); MRA432-14 & EPA433-14 (MLA 70506).
4. Such further or other orders as to the Court seem fit.”
I have had the benefit earlier today of detailed oral submissions, as well as written submissions, by a number of highly-skilled Counsel. In the short period of time that I have had to consider this matter since the close of submissions some two hours ago, I can but repeat the observations made by Davies JA in ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Quandamooka Lands Council Aboriginal Corporation,[1] where he made the following comments:[2]
“Relevant provisions of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 are poorly drafted and by no means clear in their meaning. This is particularly unfortunate when jurisdictional expedition, simplicity and in formality of procedure should be important aims.”
[1](2002) 1 Qd.R 347.
[2]Ibid at [2], 349.
I note, of course, that the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (MRA) has gone through substantial amendment and green tape reduction since those comments were made. However, after hearing all of the detail of this matter today, I would simply add to Justice Davies’ comments that the same can be said for the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (EP Act), as well as the MRA, in the way in which these two pieces of legislation are meant to work cohesively together, but, in my view, do anything but. In those circumstances, I can well understand how Mr Jah’shua McAvoy, in particular, finds himself in the predicament that he finds himself in these proceedings.
It is appropriate to detail in short measure the facts which give rise to the application. They are principally not in dispute. Adani, the company seeking the grant of three mining leases and an environmental authority for the development of a significant mine in Central Queensland, has proceeded through the application stages of the MRA and the EP Act and had reached the point of public notification. That public notification occurred, and, in simple terms, the last day for making objections under the MRA or submissions under the EP Act was 17 June 2014. Objections were received by the objectors currently before the Court, and submissions also received from both parties, within the prescribed time, and there was no issue at all with those current objectors. However, the objection made by Mr Jah’shua McAvoy was received by the relevant administering officer at 9.45 pm on 17 June.
The core question, then, becomes simply this: can the objections and submissions received by Mr McAvoy be considered as duly-made submissions and objections under the relevant legislation, or have they been made out of time?
The legislation needs to be considered in some detail in this regard. Firstly, s 268(3) of the MRA, provides as follows:
“(3)The Land Court shall not entertain an objection to an application or any ground thereof or any evidence in relation to any ground if the objection or ground is not contained in an objection that has been duly lodged in respect of the application.”
The key part of that quote above is that the objection must be duly lodged. The Courts have provided a number of decisions as to what is meant by duly lodged, and I refer particularly to the authorities of ACI, Lee v Kokstad Mining Pty Ltd[3] and DeLacey v Juunyjuwarra People.[4] There is great danger to be had to this Court, or, indeed, its predecessors – the Land and Resources Tribunal or the Warden’s Court – in the manner in which it considers questions relating to the time for a duly-made objection, and this was emphasised in Lee, in particular, by Justice of Appeal Jerrard at paragraph 16 where he said as follows.
“ [16] This Court held in De Lacey v. Juunyjuwarra People and Anor [2004] QCA 297 that the LRT was a statutory tribunal having only the jurisdiction conferred on it by statute; and that it had fallen into error in that particular case in likening itself to a superior court of general jurisdiction. While s. 54 of the LRT Act provides that the LRT is a court of record, it is not established as a superior court of record. In Jackson v. Sterling Industries Limited (1987) 162 C.L.R. 612 at 618, Wilson and Dawson JJ. wrote that:
‘Ordinarily, a superior court of record is a court of general jurisdiction which means that, even if there are limits to its jurisdiction, it will be presumed to have acted within it. That is a presumption which is denied to inferior courts and is denied to a federal court such as the Federal Court.’”
[3][2007] QCA 248.
[4][2004] QCA 297.
It is certainly the case that this Court is not one that exercises general jurisdiction, but is rather properly characterised as a creation of statute and can only exercise the jurisdiction referred upon it by the relevant statutes. It is very important that the Court never exceed its jurisdiction by attempting to expand its jurisdiction, even though it is a Court that operates with all of the powers of the Supreme Court. Having the powers of the Supreme Court is not apt to give the Court jurisdiction where it does not otherwise have it.
The problem confronting me is multi-levelled and has been approached on a number of different bases. Following, firstly, through the legislative structure of the MRA, s 386O provides as follows:
386OPlace or way for making applications, giving, filing, forwarding or lodging documents or making submissions
(1)This section applies to any of the following under this Act—
(a) the making of an application;
(b) the giving of a document to the Minister or chief executive;
(c) the filing, forwarding or lodging of a document;
(d) the making of a submission.
(2)The application, document or submission may be made, given, filed or lodged only—
(a) at the following place (the required place)—
(i)the office of the department provided for under the relevant approved form for that purpose;
(ii)if the relevant approved form does not make provision as mentioned in subparagraph (i) or if there is no relevant approved form—the office of the department notified on the department’s website; or
(b) in the way prescribed under a regulation.
(3)Without limiting subsection (2)(b), the way prescribed under a regulation may include to make, give, file or lodge the application, document or submission at another place.
(4)The document may be forwarded only to the required place or in the way prescribed under a regulation. (5) Without limiting subsection (4), the way prescribed under a regulation may include to forward the document to another place.
(5)Without limiting subsection (4), the way prescribed under a regulation may include to forward the document to another place.
(6)This section does not apply to the following—
(a) the making of an application to the Land Court or the tribunal;
(b) the lodging of any of the following—
(i)a notice of appeal to the Land Court under section 86(2)(a), 282(2)(a) or 318AAZO(1);
(ii)a notice under section 753;
(iii)a report under section 761;
(iv)a proposed initial development plan for a lease under section 758;
(c) the giving of a report to the Minister under section 141(1)(e) or 194(1)(e);
(d) the giving of a report or other document mentioned in section 318AAH(1)(f) under that section.
That section is, again, relatively straightforward, for it simply provides about the manner in which application documents and other related material must be made to those administering the MRA. Interestingly, it also provides that there may be regulations made as to the manner in which certain things under the MRA can occur. I have been referred specifically to regulation 94 and the manner in which that regulation operates. The regulation states as follows:
94Prescribed way for making applications etc.—Act, s 386O
(1) Subject to sections 28(2) and (3) and 95, for section 386O(2)(b) of the Act, the prescribed way for doing any of the following is electronically, using the online system on the department’s website—
(a)the making of an application;
(b)the giving of a document to the Minister or chief executive;
(c)the filing, forwarding or lodging of a document;
(d)the making of a submission.
(2) Also, the chief executive may, by notice given to the person making, giving, filing, forwarding or lodging a document mentioned in subsection (1), require the person to lodge a hard copy of the document at the place required under section 386O(2)(a) of the Act.
(3) A document mentioned in subsection (1) that is lodged electronically between 4.30p.m. on a working day and 8.30a.m. on the next working day (the later day) is taken to have been lodged at 8.30a.m. on the later day.
As can be seen from that quote, what the regulation tries to do is to make clear a timeline for the doing of actions with the administrative authority which have a flow-on effect by that regulation as to when an objection is duly made. In short, anything that is placed or provided to the administering authority after 4.30pm one business day is taken to have effect from the next business day.
I have received interesting submissions from the parties, particularly those represented by Mr Holt SC, as to the proper characterisation of the regulation and whether or not that regulation should be limited to the manner in which it applies; that is, it is submitted that the regulation relates to the way in which certain things are to be done. I find the submissions made in this regard not only of interest, but certainly ones which require a considerable amount of thought and consideration, but I will leave that consideration to one side at this moment.
Applying the decisions as set out in the Court of Appeal authorities, I am urged by Mr Ambrose QC to simply follow those authorities and rule that the objections are out of time and, therefore, there is nothing that this Court can do to make those objections anything but objections that are out of time.
I am also urged, however, to consider the provision of s 392 of the MRA, which relate to the question of substantial compliance. The point made by other objectors and by the applicants’ Counsel, Mr Reidy, is that this is a case where the objector can be clearly said to have substantially complied with what was required of him, because he did lodge the material on the last objection day, the only fault, if that, indeed, actually was a fault, being lodging after the time of the business hours of the receiving authority. I have reviewed in the time available the decisions from the Court of Appeal and can, unfortunately for Mr McAvoy, find nothing in those cases which show that s 392 is apt to apply to a case considering whether or not an application has been duly lodged.
I have no option but to find that it is a question of law as to whether or not an action has occurred within a required time, and, in that regard, I feel compelled, however reluctantly, to agree with the submissions made by Mr Ambrose QC that the operation of the regulation is such as to set a timeframe by which the material must be duly lodged, and, in this case, it was not duly lodged within that time, and so there is no opportunity for the Court to have regard to substantial compliance, no matter how tempting it may seem to the Court to apply that provision.
I must ensure I do not confuse the exercise of a power with the question of jurisdiction, and I believe that the authorities relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in this regard are conclusive.
I am also concerned that the applications seek an action to be done by this Court as to the proper work of an officer of the administering authority when the normal manner in which decisions of those type are considered is by way of judicial review. I make no formal finding in that regard, however, for the reasons which will become obvious from the balance of my decision.
It has also been urged upon me that I should consider the provision of rule 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) insofar as those rules relate to including, substituting or removing parties to proceedings before the Court. There is no question that rule 69 can be a valuable rule to be utilised by the Land Court in its proceedings. That rule, of course, is operative by manner of rule 4 of the Land Court Rules 2000 as it is a rule which is not otherwise stipulated for in the Land Court Rules, and so therefore is a rule that can be considered by this Court.
I applied that rule in the decision of Henry v ERO Georgetown Gold Operations Pty Ltd[5] when I added extra parties to a proceeding currently before the Court, but that matter related to questions as to further determination of compensation. Importantly, it was not a case that related to the hearing of objections, and I think that distinction is very important. In short, in my view, rule 69, to the extent to which it applies before this Court, applies with respect to what could colloquially be referred to as normal proceedings before this Court but not to proceedings by way of hearing of objections before this Court.
[5][2014] QLC 21.
For the reasons that I have rather disjointedly set out, it is my view that the application made by Mr Jah’shua McAvoy must fail under the MRA. As the application for Mr Jah’shua McAvoy must fail under the MRA, it follows that the application for Mr Coedie McAvoy, who did not lodge a duly made objection within the time provided or at all under the MRA, must also fail.
I should also add that there is a further requirement under the MRA that an objector who lodges an objection must also serve the mining applicant with a copy of the objection, and it is apparent from the various affidavits before me that no such service of the objection ever occurred either within time or out of time, and that is another factor that, if it were a case of me exercising discretion, I should take into account under the MRA.
I now turn to what I will refer to as the bizarre circumstances that exist under the EPA. I say bizarre in a moot sense because I well appreciate that the legislature is seeking through its substantial amendments to the MRA and the EP Act to get a uniform process operating for the assistance of mining applicants, I am sure, at paramount level, to progress matters through their application process. However, the rights of objectors must certainly also be remembered whenever this unification process is being undertaken between two disparate pieces of legislation, and I fear that perhaps too much attention has been given by the legislature to the actions and activities of mining applicants and perhaps not enough thought in a unified sense to a cohesive piece of legislation under the EP Act designed in a way to uniformly and seamlessly fit within the MRA for objectors.
I say this in light of the submissions made orally today by the legal representative for the statutory party under the EP Act, Ms Harbert, where she conceded the differences in the legislative scheme under the EP Act compared to the MRA with respect to submissions and objections. That scheme is apt to cause confusion for objectors and interested persons alike, let alone additional cost and legal advice demands for mining lease applicants. Interestingly, Ms Harbert did not refer me specifically in her written submissions to s 154 of the EP Act. Before I refer specifically to that section, I will explain the broader scheme of the EP Act.
The EP Act relevantly provides:
160Right to make submission
An entity may, within the submission period, make a submission to the administering authority about the application.
161Acceptance of submission
(1)The administering authority must accept a submission if it—
(a) is written or made electronically; and
(b) states the name and address of each submitter; and
(c) is made to the administering authority; and
(d) is received on or before the last day of the submission period; and
(e) states the grounds of the submission and the facts and circumstances relied on in support of the grounds.
(2)A submission that complies with subsection (1) is a properly made submission.
(3)The authority may accept a written submission even if it is not a properly made submission.
…
170Deciding standard application
(1)This section applies for a standard application.
(2)The administering authority must decide—
(a) that the application be approved subject to the standard conditions for the relevant activity or authority; or
(b) if the application is for a mining activity relating to a mining lease and a properly made submission is made for the application—that the applicant be issued an environmental authority on conditions that are different to the standard conditions for the activity or authority.
(3)However, the administering authority may only make a decision under subsection (2)(b) if the properly made submission relates to the subject of the standard condition to be changed.
…
182Submitter may give objection notice
(1)This section applies if the administering authority decides to approve the application or makes a decision under section 170(2)(b).
(2)A submitter may, by written notice (the objection notice) to the administering authority, request that its submission be taken to be an objection to the application.
A submitter, for an application, means an entity who makes a properly made submission about the application: see the definition in Schedule 4 to the EP Act. To be a “properly made submission” it must be received on or before the last day of the submission period. The “submission period” for an application for a mining activity must end on the last objection day under the MRA for the application (s 154 EPA). As noted above, that was 17 June 2014.
Whilst the administering authority pursuant to s 161(3) of the EPA may accept a written submission even though it is not a properly made submission it would appear that only a submitter who has made a properly made submission about the EA Application may request the submission be taken to be an objection to the EA Application pursuant to s 182 of the EPA. It follows that whilst the administering authority may make an administrative decision to receive a written submission even though it is not a properly made submission it does not follow that the author of that submission is entitled to be an objector. It is a pity that s 182(2) is not written in a more helpful fashion to make it abundantly clear that it is referring to ‘properly made submissions’.
As is apparent from those provisions of the EP Act, it can be seen that there is nothing within those direct provisions, save for section 154, that set out a time for the filing of the objections or refers to the business hours of the EP administering authority, nor is there a regulation that mirrors the regulation as set out under the MRA. Section 154 is key in this regard. I must agree with Mr Ambrose QC and his submissions that s 154 operates as a bridge between the EP Act and the MRA. What that section sets out is as follows:
154Submission period for application—mining activities
The submission period for an application for a mining activity must end on—
(a)if there is only 1 relevant mining tenure application—the last objection day under the Mineral Resources Act for the application; or
(b)if there is more than 1 relevant mining tenure application—the later of the last objection days under the Mineral Resources Act for the applications.
Note—
For the last objection day under the Mineral Resources Act, see section 252A (Issue of certificate of public notice) of that Act.
Applying technical law to this problem, I feel compelled to apply the literal words of s 154 and determine that that does pick up the regulation under the MRA, but I do this with a great deal of hesitancy. Firstly, as I have already indicated, many of the submissions made against this provisions are ones which I feel have more weight than I am perhaps giving them credit for in this decision, and I do not wish to show disrespect to any of the counsel for the objectors or applicant in that regard because I have given them as much thought as I can in the time available and they would probably have taken up 10 or 20 pages in a written decision if I had had the time to deal with that.
I am also concerned that despite the efforts of Mr Ambrose QC to show that the time limit for objections closing at 4.30 pm is, as he has put it, made very clear by various forms and activities of government, I do not believe that really to be the case at all when a fully objective view is taken of the facts. The objection form itself, even though it does refer to business hours, gives no hint or indication on its own face that 4.30 pm is the critical closing time for the last day of an objection, particularly where same is lodged electronically. It would need very, very little amendment for that objection form to make that clear. In the way it is worded at the moment it clearly can lead parties into error. It is true that the website for the MRA agency does give the very clear warning, and for that I am in complete agreement with Mr Ambrose QC, but another very important step that occurs in this process is the public notification of the mining lease application and the environmental authority, which is the very document which causes people such as the McAvoy brothers to become involved in the proceedings.
Given that the administering authority has turned to the electronic lodgement of documents and given that the normal understanding of people is that an electronic lodgement that is to occur on a lodgement day normally includes that lodgement day closing at midnight on that day, it is very remiss that the public notification document does not specify a time of 4.30 as the closing day for lodgements of both submissions and objections under the MRA/EP Act in that public notification advertisement, if that indeed is the intention that Parliament has in this matter.
I direct the Registrar of the Land Court to bring these parts of this decision (paras [29] and [30]) to the relevant Minister’s attention so that perhaps something can be done to make the position clearer for the members of the public in legislation which it should not be necessary for one to have a law degree and the benefit of highly skilled senior counsel to be able to understand what is needed for the simple lodgement of an objection.
I now turn to the final piece of the jigsaw puzzle in this matter, and that again highlights the differences between the MRA and the EP Act, and that is s 186 of the EP Act, which provides as follows:
186Parties to Land Court proceedings
The parties to the Land Court proceeding are as follows—
(a)the administering authority;
(b)the applicant;
(c)any objector for the application;
(d)anyone else decided by the Land Court.
I considered a provision which mirrored this provision (being then s 219(4) of the EP Act) in my decision in Gregcarbil Pty Ltd v Backus & Ors.[6] Interestingly, s 186 as currently framed, like the legislation under consideration in Gregcarbil, allows the Land Court to determine that the parties to a proceeding under the EP Act include “anyone else decided by the Land Court”.
[6](2011) 32 QLCR 211.
This is clearly a matter of discretion, and there are a number of factors that must be taken into account in determining whether or not that discretion should be exercised in this matter. I have been cautioned by Mr Ambrose QC not to fall into error in exercising this discretion by confusing issues arising under the late lodgement of the objection processes and submission processes under the MRA and the EP Act with the exercise of a discretion under s 186 and I will attempt to not do so, but I do see, in a jurisdiction which is to operate without legal technicality and with a view to reaching equitable and just and quick outcomes, that it is very difficult in the current circumstances for me to completely divorce the two.
In short, Mr Jah’shua McAvoy says that he is a person who has an interest in the proceedings. The objection that he lodged, as I found, late with the administering authority, should be referred to and I note in particular the opening paragraph of his grounds for objection contained in CM3 to the affidavit of Coedie McAvoy, which is in the following terms:
“As a direct descendant of the Jagalingou people and the traditional owners of the proposed Carmichael Coal Mine, I submit, that the development of this mine will cause disastrous environmental harm of my sacred country, its character and resilience.”
Although it is put by Mr Ambrose QC that the objection by Mr Jah’shua McAvoy is principally an objection to the mining lease under the MRA, by its very terms, in my view, the objection is stated to be one seeking to stop what is seen as disastrous environmental harm and so can therefore be properly characterised as a complaint also under the EP Act, if not even more so than one under the MRA. I have no hesitation in finding that, on the filed material, Mr Jah’shua McAvoy has indicated great concern of environmental harm that could possibly be caused by the applicant’s proposed mine.
I then have to consider whether or not, as his objection has been filed late, it is appropriate to allow him nevertheless to be included as a party to these proceedings. To me, it is not relevant that there are native title procedures and cultural heritage procedures otherwise occurring in this matter. That is a matter of Queensland and Commonwealth law and there are processes and procedures which must be followed in accordance with native title law and cultural heritage law. That argument, when looked at properly, takes the question nowhere further.
All persons who have an interest in a mining activity, in the way which the legislation is currently drafted as operative before me, have rights to be considered, to be included as parties to environmental procedures under s 186. The legislature did not go further in saying what criteria should or should not be taken into account when determining whether or not someone should be made a party. In my view, the position of Mr Jashua McAvoy is perhaps stronger than that of Mr Crowther in the Gregcarbil case because Mr Crowther, when it is looked at fairly, had an opportunity, as a normal member of the public and as somebody who at that stage was, I expect, seeking to purchase a property, to have been an objector to those proceedings even though at that stage he was not actually the owner. Mr McAvoy, on the other hand, is a member of an indigenous group who claims through traditional custom and heritage traditional ownership and customary law of the land subject to the application and has sought to have his view heard as part of a process of objection under the EP Act, but for what I find to be highly technical reasons as to the interpretation of the appropriate procedures under that Act, he has not been allowed to do so. It would be, in my view, reading down s 186 to the extent that would make it otherwise virtually inoperable to deny Mr McAvoy in these proceedings a place as a party to these proceedings.
I consider that he has shown his desire by attending through another party at the very first time this matter was mentioned and through the very fast filing of material in support of his application and by lodging his objection material on the 24 clock day in which objections were to be made, even if not by 4.30pm that day, assuming I am correct that that is what the legislation technically requires. He has shown himself to be a traditional owner who cares for and is interested in the traditional country of his people and therefore is a person who I believe the legislation specifically took into account to be considered as an appropriate party to these proceedings.
It has been pressed upon me that I should also include Mr Coedie McAvoy as a party to these proceedings due to the fact that Mr Jah’shua McAvoy is often not in the area of the Court and is out doing cultural heritage work even as we speak. Mr Coedie McAvoy, as I have indicated, has not provided any objection; has not stated in any formal sense what his objections are; and his nexus is principally one to assist the Court by assisting his brother in the exercise of their traditional obligations to country.
I believe that Mr Coedie McAvoy’s rights in that regard can be fully and comprehensively met as an agent for Jah’shua McAvoy and so, as agent of Jah’shua McAvoy, undertake on Jah’shua McAvoy’s behalf whatever actions are needed or required whenever Jah’shua McAvoy is absent. It is not appropriate for him to be a party in the current circumstances due to his lack of involvement in the proceedings generally, apart from the last week and a half.
Accordingly, the orders of the Court will be as follows: the application is dismissed as regards Mr Coedie McAvoy; the application is also dismissed as regards Jah’shua McAvoy for making him an objector under the MRA and the EP Act; but the application is allowed for making Jah’shua McAvoy a party pursuant to s 186(d) of the EP Act.
Orders
1.Mr Coedie McAvoy’s application is dmissed.
2.Mr Jah’shua McAvoy’s application to be made an objector under the Mineral Resources Act 1989 and the Environmental Protection Act 1994 is dismissed.
3.Mr Jah’shua McAvoy’s application to be made a party pursuant to s 186(d) of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 is allowed.
4.Costs reserved.
Directions
The Registrar of the Land Court is directed to bring the contents of paragraphs [29] – [30] to the attention of the Ministers responsible for the Mineral Resources Act 1989 and the Environmental Protection Act 1994.
PA SMITH
ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT
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