McAllister v Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

McAllister v Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland [2018] QIRC 120

PARTIES:  

McAllister, Maricon Cruz
(Applicant)

v

Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland
(Respondent)

CASE NO:

AD/2018/46

PROCEEDING:

Application for orders

DELIVERED ON:

20 September 2018

HEARING DATE: 

21 August 2018

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

O'Connor DP

Brisbane

ORDER:

1.     Application dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION – APPLICATION FOR ORDERS
PROTECTING COMPLAINANT'S INTERESTS – whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission has power to prohibit the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner from lapsing a complaint – where applicant alleges there is a real risk of actual or apprehended bias – statutory interpretation

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 144,
s 164A, s 168, s 169, s 174B

Dillon v Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland [1998] QADT 21

Finn v Minister for Education [1995] QADT4

Hastie v Ryan [2003] QADT 17

Ivory v Griffith University [1996] QADT 15

Jones v State of Queensland [2010] QCAT 700

K v N School [1995] QADT 16

McIntyre v Hastings Deering(Australia) Ltd [2012] QCAT 438

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & Ors; ex parte Hardiman & Ors (1980) 144 CLR 13

Transport Workers Union of Australia, Boss & Wood v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd [2006] QADT 10

APPEARANCES:

Ms K Gothard, of counsel, instructed by Worker Law, for the applicant

Ms J Ball of the respondent

Reasons for Decision

  1. This matter concerns whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the Tribunal) has power to prohibit the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner from lapsing a complaint. The effect of a lapse is to permanently end the complaint without a hearing on the merits. 

  2. On 8 February 2018, Ms Maricon Cruz McAllister (the applicant/complainant) filed a complaint about her employer and two colleagues with the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland (the respondent). The complaint was assessed as indicating alleged contraventions of Anti-Discimrination Act 1991 (Qld) (the Act), namely race discrimination in work;[1] and, an unlawful request for information.[2] The complaint was accepted by the respondent and the parties were notified.

    [1] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 15.

    [2] Ibid s 124.

  3. A conciliation conference, held on 11 April 2018, proved unsuccessful. Afterwards, Ms McAllister made a formal complaint regarding the conduct of the conciliator (Mr Hongoh) and requested that the matter be referred to this Commission.[3]

    [3] Ibid s 164A.

  4. On 30 May 2018 Ms Julie Ball, Principal Lawyer of the ADCQ, wrote to the parties in accordance with s 168 detailing that she was of the reasonable opinion that the complaint was misconceived or lacking in substance. As Principal Lawyer, Ms Ball had the delegated authority under s 244 to exercise the powers, duties and functions under s 168. Section 168 provides that the complainant has 28 days to satisfy the Commissioner that the complaint is not misconceived or lacking in substance otherwise the complaint will lapse.

  5. Pursuant to s 144, the applicant now seeks the following order from this Commission:

    (a)the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner or any delegate be prohibited from lapsing Complaint BNE34138, by the Applicant against Ms Renee Shahjahan, Mr Royce Cleaver and Stay Centro…

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Details
Case
[2018] QIRC 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McAllister v Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland was heard by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. The applicant, McAllister, sought to prevent the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland (ADCQ) from lapsing a complaint under section 168 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). McAllister alleged a real risk of actual or apprehended bias in the process and argued that the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission had the power to prohibit the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner from lapsing the complaint. The central issue was whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission had the authority to prevent the ADCQ from lapsing a complaint, and if so, whether this could be exercised to protect the interests of the complainant.

The Commission examined the statutory provisions and determined that section 168, which allows the Commissioner to lapse complaints deemed frivolous, trivial, or lacking in substance, does not permit the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to review or prevent the lapsing of such complaints. The Court noted that section 174B, which outlines the Tribunal's powers, explicitly grants a right of review only when the Commissioner believes the complainant has lost interest in continuing with the complaint. As the Commissioner had not yet made a decision in this instance, the Tribunal was deemed to have no power to intervene. The Court further clarified that the power to review is limited to specific circumstances, indicating a clear legislative intent to restrict such powers to cases where the Commissioner forms a reasonable opinion about the complainant's disinterest.

In conclusion, the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission dismissed McAllister's application, ruling that it lacked the jurisdiction to prevent the ADCQ from lapsing the complaint. The Court's reasoning hinged on the statutory interpretation of sections 168 and 174B, underscoring the limited scope of the Tribunal's review powers. The final order was that the application be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Submissions (a) through (e) will be dealt with in turn below, and thereafter the various uncategorised submissions made the applicant. (a) Section 168, "summary judgment", and apprehension of bias The applicant submits that a lapse under s 168 will, in this matter, effectively preclude any further conduct relating to Ms McAllister's complaint. Putting s 144 and its operation to one side, a lapse under s 168 ends proceedings and precludes same-fact proceedings from arising after the lapse. That prohibition extends beyond the ADCQ to applications made by dismissed workers for industrial relief sought from this Tribunal after the complaint to the ADCQ is accepted.[5] However, industrial relief can be sought from this Tribunal, in tandem with the filing of an ADCQ complaint, by a dismissed worker if the industrial relief is sought prior to the complaint being accepted.[6] [5] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 153. [6] Ibid s 154 Section 168 enables the Commissioner to filter complaints from the system which are frivolous, trivial, vexatious, misconceived, or lacking in substance. The likening of s 168 as effecting a "summary judgment" is a mischaracterisation given that it is more akin to a "show cause" process as it gives the complainant an opportunity to show why the complaint should not be lapsed. Given the nature of s 168, the applicant contends that the complaint should not be lapsed because there are factual matters in dispute. In furtherance of this particular submission the applicant also indicated that the Commissioner, in acting to lapse the matter, has acted partially by deciding the "factual version of the events by preferring the statement of the Respondents to that of the [applicant]." If that is the case, and there was no evidence produced to support that view, then it is properly a matter for judicial review, once the Commissioner has made a decision, and not this Tribunal. Section 174B(a)(ii), which sets out the functions of this Tribunal, provides an explicit right of review of the decision of the Commissioner to lapse a matter if the Commissioner is of the reasonable opinion that the complainant has lost interest in continuing with a complaint. The Commissioner relies on that explicit power to highlight the absence of a similar provision to allow a review of a decision to lapse a complaint under s 168. Indeed, there are many other functions of the Commissioner that are not reviewable by the Tribunal.[7][7] Ibid ss 134(1)(c), 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 145, 156, s 160, s 163, s 168A, 171, 172. The respondent's submission, while correct, does not go the issue of whether this Tribunal may make a s 144 order to prevent the lapsing of the complaint. I accept that there is no power for this Tribunal to review a decision under s 168. However, in this matter, the Commissioner has yet to make a decision. Section 174B only confers power on the Tribunal to review decisions of the Commissioner made under s 169 and, in my view, this shows a clear intent by Parliament to limit the review powers to circumstances where the Commissioner is of the reasonable opinion that a complainant has lost interest in continuing with a complaint.[8][8] Ibid s 169(1).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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