Mayger v Community Accommodation and Respite Inc (No.2)
[2017] FCCA 470
•21 March 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MAYGER v COMMUNITY ACCOMMODATION & RESPITE INC (No.2) | [2017] FCCA 470 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – McKenzie Friend – Application for person to appear as lay advocate by extension of principle of McKenzie Friend. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth), ss.15 & 44 |
| Cases cited: Mayger v Community Accommodation & Respite Inc ta CARA [2016] FCCA 2151 Santos v The State of Western Australia (No.2) [2013] WASCA 39 |
| Applicant: | MERILYN ANN MAYGER |
| Respondent: | COMMUNITY ACCOMMODATION & RESPITE INC T/A CARA |
| File Number: | ADG 475 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Heffernan |
| Hearing date: | 16 November 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 November 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 21 March 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In person with the assistance from Mr Mayger |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr S McGrath |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Cowell Clarke Commercial Lawyers |
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
The applicant’s Initiating Application in this matter is to be referred for legal assistance pursuant to r.12.02(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
ORDERS
The application for an order that Mr Mark Mayger be granted a right of audience to represent the applicant in this matter is dismissed.
There be no order as to costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 475 of 2015
| MERILYN ANN MAYGER |
Applicant
And
| COMMUNITY ACCOMMODATION & RESPITE INC T/A CARA |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by Mrs Merilyn Mayger for an order that her husband, Mr Mark Mayger, be given a right of audience to appear as a lay advocate in these proceedings by extension of the concept of a McKenzie Friend. The applicant is unrepresented because she is not able to afford legal representation and has not been able to secure Pro Bono assistance from a legal practitioner.
In an earlier ruling, I gave leave for Mr Mayger to act as a McKenzie Friend for his wife.[1] I indicated on that occasion that I would hear the parties as to the extent to which Mr Mayger should be permitted to participate in the conduct of the proceedings. It is Mrs Mayger’s wish that her husband be permitted to speak on her behalf, in effect, conducting the proceedings for her as a lay advocate, rather than performing the role of a McKenzie Friend in the more restricted and accepted sense.
[1] Mayger v Community Accommodation & Respite Inc t/a CARA [2016] FCCA 2151.
It is not necessary for me to repeat the observations made in my earlier decision about the limitations that s.44 of the Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth) (‘the FCC Act’) places on the right of audience in this Court. I have found that it is within the jurisdiction of this Court to permit a person to appear as a McKenzie Friend and I have made such an order. The usual role of a McKenzie Friend is limited to providing support to an unrepresented party, perhaps sitting with them at the bar table assisting them to make notes, providing suggestions to that person, and in essence providing a sounding board with respect to forensic or tactical decisions that need to be made. Traditionally the concept has not extended to acting as an advocate or representative.[2]
[2] Santos v The State of Western Australia (No. 2) [2013] WASCA 39 at [10].
In my earlier decision I referred to authority that dealt with the policy reasons behind courts having taken a cautious approach to permitting a person to act as a McKenzie Friend and why the courts have been reluctant to permit persons assisting in such a capacity to speak on behalf of a litigant in open court. I will not repeat those principles at length here, they are well established.[3]
[3] See for example, Cristovao v Registrar Caporale [2012] FCA 1329; Collins v The Department of Finance and Deregulation [2011] FMCA 240 at [40].
Whilst the general principle restricting the role of a McKenzie Friend is well established, there is authority to suggest that in appropriate circumstances a court may make an order permitting a person to make oral submissions in that role. In Nepal v The Minister for Immigration & Border Protection[4] Edelman J referred to the decision of Santos v The State of Western Australia (No.2) and made the observation that he doubted whether there was such an absolute prohibition on assistance by a McKenzie Friend making oral submissions as stated in that case. Having considered a number of decisions relevant to whether such a prohibition existed, his Honour stressed the need for great caution in considering this question. He emphasised some of the considerations which have been identified by courts relating to the question of whether or not a McKenzie Friend should be permitted at all, namely the fact that the lay person is not regulated, they have not been trained in the ethical duties of lawyers, and there is an inherent risk that a non-lawyer representative may do more harm to a party than good.[5] These considerations must still apply even where, as in this case, the McKenzie Friend is closely related to the applicant, is capable of addressing the Court in a respectful manner and it seems without question, has the best interests of the applicant at heart.
[4] [2015] FCA 366.
[5] Nepal op cit at [15].
Counsel for the respondent has not objected to date to Mr Mayger speaking on behalf of his wife in procedural hearings, including this application. That concession has been a pragmatic concession to progressing the early procedural stages of this matter. The respondent has always reserved its position with respect to whether firstly, Mr Mayger had any right of appearance under the FCC Act, whether he should be entitled to be a McKenzie Friend (both of which issues have now been determined), and ultimately if he was so entitled, what his role should be. That concession has been of assistance to this Court because from the outset Mrs Mayger’s position has been that she does not regard herself as emotionally or psychologically well enough to conduct these proceedings and speak on her own behalf.
In order to advance this application, the applicant filed an affidavit setting out her reasons for seeking to have her husband speak on her behalf, and annexing a report from a psychologist, Mr Brennan. An affidavit of Mr Brennan was later filed annexing his report. He was cross-examined by counsel for the respondent.
I will deal now with both the matters raised in Mrs Mayger’s affidavit and the evidence of the psychologist.
Affidavit of Mrs Mayger
In her affidavit of 10 November 2016, Mrs Mayger says that she feels unable to represent herself in court because she has experienced shame, anger, confusion, feelings of betrayal, and that she has been a target of bullying by her former employer. She believes that these matters have taken a toll on her psychological health and refers to symptoms she experienced whilst she was still employed with the respondent. She says that her husband has been able to marshal the relevant information required to present her case to this Court, but that from her point of view, events “still tend to blur and overlap”. She believes that this is because the emotional impact of this dispute has prevented her from having a clear understanding of time lines and the significance of some details. In other words, she feels confused. The net effect of this is that she says she has difficulty supressing her anger when present in court and she believes that this would interfere with her ability to run her own case. These matters compound the fact that she is not familiar with court procedure, lacks confidence, and does not understand all of the terminology and concepts that are used. She does not believe that she will be able to properly cross-examine witnesses. She tells the Court that she is currently on medication for anxiety and depression. She is committed to pursuing these proceedings and believes that with the assistance of her husband, she will be able to do so. Her husband has frequently made the submission on her behalf that if he is not permitted to represent her as a lay advocate, she is likely to discontinue her claim. Mrs Mayger’s affidavit is at least consistent with that submission.
Report and cross-examination of Mr Brennan
The applicant filed an affidavit from Mr Brennan dated 2 November 2016, which annexed an undated letter to this Court which purports to be a psychological report. Counsel for the respondent objected to my receiving that report on the basis that it did not comply with the Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth) (‘FCC Rules’). He submits that the letter from Mr Brennan cannot properly be regarded as an independent report because it is more in the nature of a letter of support. For the sake of consistency in these reasons, I shall refer to that document as a report. In counsel’s submission, the report is clearly not impartial.
Mr McGrath’s submission is correct, in that the report does go well beyond a description of the applicant’s psychological health and proffering a diagnosis. At one point Mr Brennan departs from describing Mrs Maygar’s psychological health and provides an endorsement for Mr Mayger as a potential lay advocate. This is apparent in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report where Mr Brennan opines:
“Mr Mayger is known to me following several profession (sic) associations and is in my assessment has (sic) a temperament sensitive to and in recognition of, the solemnity of court procedure and this together with an emphatic sense of what presents as a lack of justice in the employer’s behaviour preceding and causative of Mrs Mayger dismissal, I would think any deficit he shows in court protocol would be overshadowed by these factors.
In my assessment Mrs Mayger is firmly apprised of the distress the court hearing can contribute to her diagnosed condition. However she is also a person of principle as is Mr Mayger and both support the sentiment expressed in the famous Edmund Burke quotation; “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing”. As such this couple is determined despite the emotional and financial cost to argue a case for fair deliberation and indeed recompense.”
Mr Brennan’s report concludes with the following:
“In my clinical experience covert bullying and harassment is becoming a significantly more prominent workplace experience. It is also presents in my perception, that it’s subjective nature provides camouflage such that formal policy and procedures often fail to limit or prosecute its presence.(sic) Nevertheless, the human fallout is severe and somewhat resistant to treatment. I would like to see this couple get a fair and reasonable hearing for their case and in my considered opinion Mrs Mayger has clinical reason to withdraw from personal presentation and Mr Mayger appears well qualified against the norm, to attract special circumstances so to participate as a “McKenzie friend”. I humbly ask that you give your deepest consideration to this request on behalf of Mrs and Mr Mayger.”
In this Court, an expert’s duty to the Court and the form of an expert’s evidence is guided by the Federal Court Practice Direction guidelines for expert witnesses.[6] Pursuant to those guidelines, any expert retained by a party for the purpose of providing a report or giving evidence in a proceeding should be provided with copies of the Federal Court Practice Notes, Expert Evidence Practice Notes and the Harmonised Expert Witness Code of Conduct.[7] Every expert is expected to have read the Harmonised Code and agree to be bound by it and their written report should indicate this.[8]
[6] Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.15.07.
[7] Federal Court Practice Notes, Expert Evidence Practice Notes, at para 3.3(a).
[8] Federal Court Practice Notes, Expert Evidence Practice Notes, at para 5.
An expert must be independent. The purpose of receiving expert evidence is to provide the Court with an objective and impartial assessment of an issue.[9] An expert must not become an advocate for the cause of the party by whom they have been retained. An expert’s opinion evidence must also be confined to the matters that fall within the expert’s particular area of knowledge and study.[10] I am not satisfied that Mr Brennan has been demonstrated to have any expertise that could be properly brought to bear on the question of whether Mr Mayger would make a competent advocate in this Court on behalf of his wife. Further, Mr Brennan’s opinion extends to offering personal support and encouragement to the applicant and Mr Mayger in these proceedings. The overall effect of his report, whilst no doubt well meaning, was tendentious.
[9] Federal Court Practice Notes, Expert Evidence Practice Notes, at para 2.2.
[10] Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v The Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119.
Mr Brennan attended to give evidence and was cross-examined by counsel for the respondent. In response to some brief questioning from me before cross-examination commenced, he told the Court that he had a degree and a graduate diploma in psychology, two years of clinical experience as an intern, and thirty years clinical experience in private practice. About 10-15% of his clinical practice related to psychological issues in the workplace. He indicated that he adhered to the opinions expressed in his report. Under cross-examination, Mr Brennan told the Court that he had been given a copy of the applicant’s claim in this matter, but not any documents filed by the defence. He said that both the applicant and Mr Mayger attended at the first appointment with him[11] and his information about the events in the workplace came from both of them. On that occasion, he regarded himself as simply providing a clinical consultation to the applicant on referral from her general practitioner. He did not believe that at that time he had been asked for a report. The request came at about the time of the second consultation. At the second consultation[12], both parties were present. Mrs Mayger discussed the situation in her workplace in reasonable detail and was more able to speak about her distress. He concentrated during that consultation on her clinical symptoms and said that the question of providing a “legal letter” was not a priority for him. He described Mrs Mayger as having been the principle provider of information at that consultation with her husband prompting her on some occasions.
[11] The first consultation occurred on 14 September 2016.
[12] The second consultation occurred on 5 October 2016.
Mr Brennan believed that during his third consultation[13] he saw the applicant alone. The opinions he expressed as to her psychological health were based on the tests he conducted on her as detailed in his report. He acknowledged in cross-examination that his report could be regarded as a letter of support. He readily acknowledged that he had not read the rules or practice directions about expert evidence at the time of writing his report, but now having done so, his opinions had not altered. He said that he was not aware at the time he saw the applicant, that she had already been given permission by this Court to have her husband assist her in the role of a McKenzie Friend. He was not aware that the applicant’s earlier application for her husband to appear, pursuant to s.44 of the FCC Act, had been dismissed. He told the Court that Mr Mayger had been a client of his on a couple of occasions about 7 years ago. He did not regard himself as having a relationship with the applicant or her husband outside his professional role. He stated that his report was prepared entirely by himself and that neither the applicant or her husband had any input into the content or drafting of it.
[13] The third consultation occurred on 19 October 2016.
Mr Brennan acknowledged that the applicant appeared to be capable of expressing herself in circumstances where she felt reasonably comfortable.
I conclude that the report is admissible for the limited purpose of establishing that he consulted with Mrs Mayger as a clinician on three occasions on referral from her general practitioner. That report is admissible for the purpose of his diagnosis that Mrs Mayger has been suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood of medium to severe intensity. That disorder is chronic, the most prominent symptom being an extreme loss of confidence which causes emotional breakdown when confronted with negative judgements and accusatory examination.
In my view, cross-examination of Mr Brennan established that a likely cause for the inappropriate aspects of his report was the somewhat casual and unfocused nature of the request made of him to provide it.
Consideration
I reject the respondent’s submission that the power of this Court to permit representation is “exhaustively” defined by s.44 of the FCC Act. Section 44 of the FCC Act states that a party to proceedings is not ‘entitled’ to be represented by another person unless the conditions in that section are satisfied. It does not state that a person is prohibited from being represented by another person unless the stipulated conditions are satisfied. The respondent’s submission ignores s.15 of the FCC Act which says:
“The Federal Circuit Court of Australia has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to:
(a)make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia thinks appropriate; and
(b)issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia thinks appropriate.”
That section closely reflects s.23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) (‘FC Act’) which says:
“The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate.”
Section 23 of the FC Act has been held to give that court power to permit lay advocates to appear in proceedings before it. Melaleuca of Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Duck [2005] FCA 1481, referring to s.23, held that it conferred a power that was wide but not unlimited. The Court observed that it had an inherent power to control its own procedures. Having referred to both the FC Act and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), the Court observed:
“… A barrister or solicitor has a statutory right of audience in the Court. While it is apparent that the ordinary and preferred course is that a party appear in person or by a solicitor or barrister, neither the Act nor the Rules nor the Judiciary Act proscribe or preclude an appearance by a person on behalf of another person, with the leave of the Court. A court has an inherent right in regulating its own proceedings to allow a person, not being a party or a party’s lawyer, to conduct a case on behalf of a party where it is desirable to do so in the interests of the administration of justice (Halsbury’s Laws of Australia). However, such an application would not be granted as a matter of course.”[14]
[14] Melaleuca at [10].
The Court in Melaleuca referred to an English decision of D v S (Rights of audience)[15] which held that the discretion to grant a right of audience to unqualified individuals should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.[16]
[15] D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724 at 725B-726G.
[16] Melaleuca at [11].
In Melaleuca, the Court also referred to a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Damjanovic v Maley (2002) 55 NSWLR 149 which identified a number of principles relevant to an application for a lay advocate to be given a right of audience:
a)The complexity of the case;
b)The genuine difficulties of the unrepresented party;
c)The unavailability of disciplinary measures and a duty to the court owed by lay advocates;
d)Protection of the client and the opponent; and
e)The interests of justice, which must be regarded as a guiding principle in the exercise of the discretion. This encompasses the principle that the public has an interest in the effect of efficient and expeditious disposal of litigation in the courts.
This Court has in the past granted a right of audience to lay advocates in some circumstances. Some examples are: Wollongong City Council v Falamaki [2009] FMCA 1204 (a creditors petition hearing in which the Court permitted a lay advocate to appear for a limited procedural purpose); ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Shortland [2012] FMCA 868 (another creditors petition in a matter where the ex-husband of a respondent was permitted to appear as a lay advocate); and Elhamid v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No.2) [2012] FMCA 740 (a matter in which a lay advocate was permitted to appear in a migration matter). The power of the Court to make such an order was implicitly recognised in Coombe v Bonney [2015] FCCA 916 (where the judge refused to give a right of audience to the applicant’s sister, but entertained the application and did not appear to doubt that such a power existed), and WZASU v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 2109 (where the judge refused an application of a right of audience for a lay advocate and noted that it must be the exception rather than the rule that a non-lawyer be permitted to appear on behalf of a party).
I conclude that I have discretion to permit a party to be represented by a lay advocate. I turn to the more difficult question of whether I should grant a right of audience to Mr Mayger in this case.
As I have previously noted, Mr Mayger has presented in Court on all occasions in a respectful manner. I make that observation because I think it likely that if granted a right of audience, he would not deliberately conduct himself in a way that obstructed, prolonged, or frustrated proceedings. However, his lack of training as an advocate, in terms of matters of pleading, legal principles, and the presentation of a case, is significant and apparent. I intend no personal criticism of him when I observe that in the conduct of the proceedings to date, he has very much been learning on the run. For that reason, I am of the view that the assistance that he could provide to the Court and to the applicant as an advocate above and beyond that which he could provide by performing the role of a McKenzie Friend would be minimal. I have considered the matters identified in Damjanovic’s case and discuss them below:
a)The complexity of the case
This matter may involve relatively complex issues on the facts and require cross-examination of a number of witnesses called by the respondent. It may be of some legal complexity. I am not satisfied that Mr Mayger would bring a significant degree of forensic skill or analysis to bear if he were to be granted a right of audience.
b)Genuine difficulties of the unrepresented party
I accept that the applicant has had over the past 12 months or so, difficulties of the type she has described and reported on by Mr Brennan. Her ability to speak for herself in Court has not been tested, as her husband has on all occasions addressed me on her behalf. I accept that it is likely, that if she were to represent herself, she would be most anxious and experience problems addressing the Court. It is likely that she would have significant problems with cross-examining witnesses. Having made that observation, Mrs Mayger would still be likely to experience all of the functional problems described by Mr Brennan when giving evidence in chief, and more markedly when being cross-examined with or without the assistance of a lay advocate. The adversarial trial process would inevitably involve a degree of allegation, counter-allegation and possibly a robust testing of her evidence in cross-examination. A trial is an environment that will likely cause her significant anxiety, even if her husband appeared for her as a lay advocate. He would not be permitted to question her during evidence in chief in a way that suggested the answers to her and would not be able to prevent her from answering to proper cross-examination by the respondent. It is unlikely that Mr Mayger will have the knowledge or forensic judgment to know when a question asked in cross-examination is objectionable.
c)Protection of the client and opponent, the unavailability of disciplinary measures and the absence of a duty to the Court
Mr Mayger has no accreditation as an advocate, is not insured and because he is not an officer of the Court, does not owe the same duties to the Court as an admitted legal practitioner. There would be no disciplinary procedures available in the event that he conducted himself in an inappropriate or unethical manner. Whilst it is apparent that he and the applicant have a close married relationship, he does not owe the applicant the same duty as would a barrister or solicitor. Further, he is not bound by the same ethical considerations as a barrister or solicitor when dealing with the respondent. It is also possible that Mr Mayger has himself been emotionally affected indirectly by the alleged actions of the respondent towards his wife. I think it unlikely that he would at all times be capable of standing in the shoes of an advocate and conduct himself and order his thinking in an objective and dispassionate manner. An ability to do so is one of the most important professional attributes of an advocate and has a direct bearing on their ability to effectively represent a client. In his submissions to date, it seems apparent that he shares his wife’s deep sense of grievance. That is understandable from his perspective, but I cannot discount as a remote possibility that if he were to be given a right of audience, the applicant’s grievance would become his own.
d)The interests of justice
The guiding principle in the exercise of judicial discretion is the public interest in the attainment of the ends of justice.[17] That public interest encompasses matters relevant to both the interests of the applicant and the respondent. As observed in Damjanovic’s case, “the public has an interest in the effective, efficient and expeditious disposal of litigation in the courts. As a general rule this can best be achieved by parties employing qualified lawyers”.[18] I accept that I should be extremely cautious in granting a right of audience to a lay advocate and that in practice it will very much be the exception rather than the rule that it will be permitted. There is a difference between the nature of the hearings identified at paragraph 25 above, and the applicant’s request in this matter that her husband be permitted to represent her at trial. The matters where a lay advocate were permitted to appear were all short hearings. Conversely, this is a matter where the trial could reasonably be anticipated to run over a period of 2 to 3 days, and possibly longer. That of itself is a relevant consideration.
[17] Melalucca, op cit at [14] citing Demjanovic at [83].
[18] Ibid.
The merits of this application must also be considered in light of what a trial in this matter will actually involve. If I assume that Mr Mayger would competently represent the applicant as a lay advocate, what extra assistance could he provide to his wife over and above that encompassed by the usual role of a McKenzie Friend given the procedures of this Court?
The simplest way of looking at that question is to consider how the trial might proceed in the event that the applicant was self-represented. The Court has power under the FCC Rules to make orders appropriate to the circumstances to ensure that a trial runs smoothly. The FCC Rules of this Court are designed to help it conduct proceedings in a just, efficient and economical way.[19] They are aimed at allowing the Court to operate as informally as possible using streamlined processes.[20] With those principles in mind, it would not be necessary for the Court to hear an oral opening address. If the applicant wanted to outline her case with an opening statement, that could be reduced to writing and handed to the Court. The applicant could be assisted in the preparation of that document by her husband. Her evidence in chief could be reduced to a detailed affidavit that annexes any documents the applicant regards as relevant. Mr Mayger could assist her with the preparation of that affidavit. With respect to cross-examination of the applicant, the Court has a duty to prevent a witness from being asked questions which are improper or unfair. That would be the case irrespective of whether the applicant was represented or not. It would be possible for the applicant to reduce any questions or propositions she wished to put to witnesses called by the respondent to writing and those questions could simply be read out verbatim by the applicant, or if necessary, put to the witness in an appropriate way by the Court. Once again, that preparation would be a matter with which Mr Mayger could assist the applicant. A closing statement relevant to matters of both law and fact, could be prepared by the applicant with the assistance of her McKenzie Friend and provided to the Court.
[19] Rule 1.03(1) of the FCC Rules.
[20] Rule 1.03(2) of the FCC Rules.
If the applicant is uncertain as to how she might proceed from this point, given my ruling on this application, the FCC Rules provide a mechanism to clarify things for her. Pursuant to r.1.07 of the FCC Rules, it is open to the applicant to apply to the Court for the making of orders about the procedure to be adopted at trial if she “is in any doubt about the procedure”.
Procedural fairness dictates that in so far as it is possible, the applicant should not be in a worse off position in these proceedings simply because she is unable to afford a lawyer. One mechanism open to the Court is to refer the applicant to a lawyer for legal assistance by issuing a Referral Certificate.[21] An applicant has no right to apply for such a referral. In considering whether to make a referral, matters such as the means of the party, the capacity of the party to otherwise obtain legal assistance, and the nature and complexity of the proceedings are relevant. I am of the view that it is appropriate for the Court to issue a Referral Certificate in order for the applicant to obtain advice as to pleadings, cause of action, and whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of success in these proceedings. On completion of the certificate by the Court, the Registrar will then attempt to arrange for the provision of legal assistance in accordance with the Referral Certificate to a Pro Bono lawyer.[22]
[21] Rule 12.02 of the FCC Rules.
[22] Rule 12.02(4) of the FCC Rules.
Having considered all of the matters identified above, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate in this case to grant Mr Mayger a right of audience. I am not satisfied that to do so would better assist the Court by facilitating the expeditious disposal of this matter, or the applicant by the more effective presentation of her case, than if Mr Mayger were to perform the role of a McKenzie Friend in the more confined sense.
Accordingly, I make the orders to be found at the beginning of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Heffernan
Associate:
Date: 21 March 2017
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