Masson v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Masson v State of Queensland [2019] QCA 80

PARTIES:

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JENNIFER LEANNE MASSON
(appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8805 of 2018
SC No 306 of 2005

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Miscellaneous Application – Civil

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Cairns – [2018] QSC 162 (Henry J)

DELIVERED ON:

10 May 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13 November 2018

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Orders made on 23 July 2018 and 8 August 2018 set aside.

3.   That within 28 days of this judgment the parties are to file and exchange written submissions, not to exceed eight pages, as to the amount for which the appellant should be given judgment and as to the costs of the appeal and in the trial division.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – STANDARD OF CARE – GENERALLY – where the appellant suffered a severe asthma attack – where the appellant was unconscious, had a low respiratory rate but had high blood pressure and a high pulse rate – where an ambulance officer treated the appellant initially by the intravenous administration of the drug salbutamol and then 20 minutes later by the intravenous administration of the drug adrenaline – where the appellant suffered hypoxic brain damage and later died as a result of the asthma attack – where the ambulance officer’s manual instructed the officer to “consider adrenaline”, not salbutamol – where the ambulance officer administered salbutamol in amounts in excess of the manual’s guidance – whether the ambulance officer considered the administration of adrenaline – whether the ambulance officer departed from the manual – whether there is a responsible body of medical opinion in favour of the administration of salbutamol over adrenaline where a person in imminent arrest has high blood pressure and a high heart rate – whether it is consistent with the exercise of reasonable care and skill for an ambulance officer to depart from the guidance of their manual

Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley [2006] NSWCA 102, cited

COUNSEL:

D Campbell SC, with A Katsikalis, for the appellant
P V Ambrose QC, with C Fitzpatrick and S Noble, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

RMB Lawyers for the appellant
Crown Law for the respondent

  1. FRASER JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of McMurdo JA and the orders proposed by his Honour.

  2. McMURDO JA:  In 2002, Jennifer Masson suffered a severe asthma attack at a friend’s house in Cairns.  An ambulance was called which arrived a few minutes later.  Ambulance officers treated her immediately, including by the intravenous administration of the drug salbutamol.  About 20 minutes later, when she was being transported to a hospital, the officers administered the drug adrenaline.  She was soon at the hospital where she received further doses of adrenaline.  Asthma is a disease characterised by inflammation and constriction of the bronchial passages, causing difficulty…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Masson v State of Queensland involved the appellant, Ms Masson, who suffered a severe asthma attack leading to her death due to hypoxic brain damage. The primary issue was whether the ambulance officer, Mr Peters, breached his duty of care by administering salbutamol instead of adrenaline, despite the ambulance manual's instruction to consider adrenaline. The court had to determine whether the officer's actions constituted negligence and whether it was consistent with reasonable care and skill to depart from the manual's guidance.

The legal issues addressed included whether the ambulance officer considered the administration of adrenaline, whether the officer departed from the manual's guidance, and whether there is a responsible body of medical opinion that supports the administration of salbutamol over adrenaline for a patient in imminent arrest with high blood pressure and a high heart rate. The court also considered whether it was consistent with the exercise of reasonable care and skill for an ambulance officer to depart from the guidance of their manual.

The court found that Mr Peters did consider the administration of adrenaline, and his decision to administer salbutamol instead was reasonable given the patient's tachycardia and hypertension. The court held that the standard of care expected from an ambulance officer in the field is not as high as that expected from a medical practitioner or an emergency physician in a hospital setting. The decision to administer salbutamol, despite the manual's guidance to consider adrenaline, was deemed reasonable given the risks involved. The court concluded that the treatment administered did not fall below the standard of care, and the claim for negligence failed.

The court's decision was grounded in the recognition that ambulance officers are not specialists in emergency medicine and their primary role is to stabilize the patient and ensure timely transfer to a hospital. The evidence and medical opinion presented showed that the administration of salbutamol in this context was a reasonable response to the known risks, and the officer's actions did not constitute negligence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Orders made on 23 July 2018 and 8 August 2018 set aside.

3. That within 28 days of this judgment the parties are to file and exchange written submissions, not to exceed eight pages, as to the amount for which the appellant should be given judgment and as to the costs of the appeal and in the trial division.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That case was rejected by the trial judge in that, as I have discussed, he correctly interpreted the CPM and the evidence as requiring, in this case, the consideration of the use of adrenaline at the time when salbutamol was first applied.The evidence of Mr Peters Mr Peters was the senior officer and the determinative decision maker at the scene.[22] He gave oral evidence and two witness statements made by him, dated in February 2006 and July 2009, were also tendered.[22]Reasons [8]. In the first statement, he detailed the treatment which Ms Masson received at the scene and during her transportation to the hospital. Mr Peters’ statement in 2009 is more detailed and, significantly, described his consideration of the drug to be administered. After relating the measurement of Ms Masson’s heartrate, at 150 beats per minute, Mr Peters said this:“28.The QAS guidelines for the management of a patient with asthma, in July 2002, are set out in section A2-7 to A2-8 of the CPM … The management is determined having regard for the patient's clinical presentation and vital sign recordings and may include: high concentration oxygen therapy; intravenous Adrenalin if bradycardic (pulse rate less than 60 beats per minute) or absent pulses; nebulised and intravenous Salbutamol; and consideration for intravenous Hydrocortisone.29.In view of the fact that Ms Masson was tachycardiac, that is she had a heart rate that was greater than 100 beats per minute and peripheral pulse were palpable, intravenous Adrenaline was not permitted under the Asthma protocol. I therefore elected to administer intravenous Salbutmol [sic].” The 2009 statement also detailed Mr Peters’ consideration of the administration of adrenaline as follows:“36.At approximately 23:19, I noted that Ms Masson's became increasingly difficult to ventilate, her breath sounds were diminishing bi-laterally and her heart rate slowed from 136 beats per minute (which was the reading displayed on the cardiac monitor immediately prior to 23:19) to a bradycardia with a palpable carotid pulse. Her Glasgow Coma Score was 3 and the monitor was unable to record a blood pressure. I believed at this time Ms Masson was suffering a further episode of severe bronchospasm, due to the bi-lateral and progressive loss of breath sounds.37.As Ms Masson was bradycardic and hypotensive, she met the criteria for the administration of intravenous Adrenaline. I instructed Officer Stirling to prepare intravenous Adrenaline 1:10,000 x 300 mcgs (100mcg x 3) which were then administered under my authority at approximately 23:20. The Adrenaline was administered in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Adrenaline drug data sheet or B-6 of the CPM …” As to the first of those extracts, the unambiguous statement of Mr Peters was that the administration of adrenaline was not permitted by the CPM. In that respect, it might be inferred that the statement was the basis for the respondent’s pleading which I have described above at [21]. There is no reference in the statement (or the earlier statement) to a consideration of adrenaline as an alternative to salbutamol. Nor is there a reference to Ms Masson being in the category of “imminent arrest”. On the face of the statement, Mr Peters misunderstood the CPM, by thinking that Ms Masson’s tachycardia precluded the possible use of adrenaline. The same reasoning is evident from paragraph 37 of his 2009 statement, where Mr Peters said that it was only when Ms Masson became bradycardic that she met the criteria for the administration of adrenaline.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After discussing those two questions the judge discussed a third question, which was whether the non-administration of adrenaline at the time of the initial treatment was contrary to the CPM. The judge’s reasoning in that respect, including his consideration of the evidence of Mr Peters, has been discussed. In effect, his Honour answered the question in the negative, on the basis that the CPM did not require the administration of adrenaline, but only the consideration of whether it should be administered, and that Mr Peters did consider the matter.The judge’s conclusions about negligence Having addressed those three questions, his Honour set out his conclusions on whether negligence had been proved in these terms:“[150] The plaintiff’s complaint of an alleged failure to administer proper, adequate and timely treatment was in substance a complaint that during the initial treatment there was a failure to administer adrenaline, contrary to the asthma guideline and or contrary to the standards of ordinary skilled ambulance officers.[151]The asthma guideline did not require adrenaline to be administered. It prompted consideration of the administration of adrenaline. The administration of adrenaline was considered but rejected by reason of the concerning presence of tachycardia and hypertension. The presence of those conditions would have been regarded by a responsible body of opinion in the medical profession as supporting the view that Ms Masson’s high heart rate and high blood pressure, in the context of her overall condition, provided a medically sound basis to prefer the administration of salbutamol to the administration of adrenaline at the time of initial treatment. Opting to administer salbutamol in preference to adrenaline in those circumstances was a reasonable response to the known risks.[152]True it is, many doctors (perhaps less now than then) presented with Ms Masson’s condition in a hospital setting may have elected to administer adrenaline. However, it is important to bear in mind ambulance officers are not medical practitioners who are specialists in emergency medicine.[153]The urgent reality presenting itself on a suburban front lawn at night was that Ms Masson was certainly going to die if ambulance officers did not administer immediate treatment. In determining the pharmacological component of the broader treatment being administered they were presented with the dilemma that the administration of the drug ordinarily favoured for administration to a patient in extremis would, because of Ms Masson’s tachycardia and hypertension, carry a real risk of worsening her condition and hastening her death. As against this there was the option of administering a drug known to be effective for severe asthma which did not carry the same risk.[154]In a different but similar hypothetical case if adrenaline was administered and the patient soon suffered cardiac arrest and death, it can readily be imagined that the decision to administer adrenaline would in hindsight be characterised as having been too risky in light of the patient’s particular condition. The reality is that this was a decision which could properly have gone either way in light of the competing risks.[155]The treatment which was administered did not fall below the standard of care to be observed by ambulance officers and was not contrary to the QAS asthma guideline. No breach of the duty of care has been established and the claim must fail.”The argumentsThe appellant’s arguments

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was submitted that the appellant’s argument confused the issues of breach and causation. The judge had accepted that, had adrenaline been applied from the outset, the injury to Ms Masson would have been avoided, but did so with the benefit of a knowledge of the facts and circumstances of previous incidents in which adrenaline had been successfully administered to her. On the question of breach, those facts and circumstances were unknown to the ambulance officers.Consideration The standard of care The trial judge said this about the standard of care to be expected of the ambulance officers, with which I respectfully agree:“[29] [The pleadings] reflect the standard of care to be observed by a person with some special skill or competence, as ambulance officers have, namely, ‘that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to have that special skill’ [Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487]. It is well established that standard is not determined solely or primarily by reference to the practice followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession. Nonetheless, as was observed in CGU Insurance Ltd v Porterhouse (2008) 235 CLR 103, 122:“Evidence of a particular practice or standard of conduct, whether laid down by a professional body or sanctioned by common usage, may be relevant to establishing a standard of care in a case of professional negligence…”This heralds the significance of QAS guidelines and the common approach of skilled ambulance officers in respect of the administration of adrenaline for asthma.[30]Importantly the standard of care under consideration here is not as high as that expected of a medical practitioner or an emergency physician in the hospital setting. It is that expected of an ambulance officer, operating in the field, in an emergency.”(Emphasis added.) At the end of that passage, the trial judge cited the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley,[87] where Basten JA (with whom Tobias and McColl JJA agreed) said:“[29] Ambulance officers are not medical practitioners, let alone specialists in emergency medicine. Their training is by no means insignificant, but it does not equip them with the theoretical knowledge which would permit a fine evaluation of alternative treatments. In a case such as the present, their two functions were to stablilize the condition of a patient, so far as their skills and resources permitted, and to ensure his speedy transfer to an available hospital …[30]Perhaps surprisingly, and not including the treating medical practitioners, each party at trial called five medical specialists, whose evidence was directed mainly to the question as to what was accepted medical and pharmacological practice in relation to the administration of adrenaline in 1998. Without objection, experts in emergency medicine discussed their own practices in well-equipped teaching hospitals, with far less attention being given to the position of ambulance officers and the nature and purpose of the protocols which governed their conduct.”[87][2006] NSWCA 102.