SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Masson v State of Queensland [2019] QCA 80
PARTIES:
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JENNIFER LEANNE MASSON
(appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 8805 of 2018
SC No 306 of 2005DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Miscellaneous Application – Civil
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns – [2018] QSC 162 (Henry J)
DELIVERED ON:
10 May 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
13 November 2018
JUDGES:
Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Orders made on 23 July 2018 and 8 August 2018 set aside.
3. That within 28 days of this judgment the parties are to file and exchange written submissions, not to exceed eight pages, as to the amount for which the appellant should be given judgment and as to the costs of the appeal and in the trial division.
CATCHWORDS:
TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – STANDARD OF CARE – GENERALLY – where the appellant suffered a severe asthma attack – where the appellant was unconscious, had a low respiratory rate but had high blood pressure and a high pulse rate – where an ambulance officer treated the appellant initially by the intravenous administration of the drug salbutamol and then 20 minutes later by the intravenous administration of the drug adrenaline – where the appellant suffered hypoxic brain damage and later died as a result of the asthma attack – where the ambulance officer’s manual instructed the officer to “consider adrenaline”, not salbutamol – where the ambulance officer administered salbutamol in amounts in excess of the manual’s guidance – whether the ambulance officer considered the administration of adrenaline – whether the ambulance officer departed from the manual – whether there is a responsible body of medical opinion in favour of the administration of salbutamol over adrenaline where a person in imminent arrest has high blood pressure and a high heart rate – whether it is consistent with the exercise of reasonable care and skill for an ambulance officer to depart from the guidance of their manual
Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley [2006] NSWCA 102, cited
COUNSEL:
D Campbell SC, with A Katsikalis, for the appellant
P V Ambrose QC, with C Fitzpatrick and S Noble, for the respondentSOLICITORS:
RMB Lawyers for the appellant
Crown Law for the respondent
FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of McMurdo JA and the orders proposed by his Honour.
McMURDO JA: In 2002, Jennifer Masson suffered a severe asthma attack at a friend’s house in Cairns. An ambulance was called which arrived a few minutes later. Ambulance officers treated her immediately, including by the intravenous administration of the drug salbutamol. About 20 minutes later, when she was being transported to a hospital, the officers administered the drug adrenaline. She was soon at the hospital where she received further doses of adrenaline. Asthma is a disease characterised by inflammation and constriction of the bronchial passages, causing difficulty…
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- Case
- [2019] QCA 80
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues addressed included whether the ambulance officer considered the administration of adrenaline, whether the officer departed from the manual's guidance, and whether there is a responsible body of medical opinion that supports the administration of salbutamol over adrenaline for a patient in imminent arrest with high blood pressure and a high heart rate. The court also considered whether it was consistent with the exercise of reasonable care and skill for an ambulance officer to depart from the guidance of their manual.
The court found that Mr Peters did consider the administration of adrenaline, and his decision to administer salbutamol instead was reasonable given the patient's tachycardia and hypertension. The court held that the standard of care expected from an ambulance officer in the field is not as high as that expected from a medical practitioner or an emergency physician in a hospital setting. The decision to administer salbutamol, despite the manual's guidance to consider adrenaline, was deemed reasonable given the risks involved. The court concluded that the treatment administered did not fall below the standard of care, and the claim for negligence failed.
The court's decision was grounded in the recognition that ambulance officers are not specialists in emergency medicine and their primary role is to stabilize the patient and ensure timely transfer to a hospital. The evidence and medical opinion presented showed that the administration of salbutamol in this context was a reasonable response to the known risks, and the officer's actions did not constitute negligence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Orders made on 23 July 2018 and 8 August 2018 set aside.
3. That within 28 days of this judgment the parties are to file and exchange written submissions, not to exceed eight pages, as to the amount for which the appellant should be given judgment and as to the costs of the appeal and in the trial division.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was submitted that the appellant’s argument confused the issues of breach and causation. The judge had accepted that, had adrenaline been applied from the outset, the injury to Ms Masson would have been avoided, but did so with the benefit of a knowledge of the facts and circumstances of previous incidents in which adrenaline had been successfully administered to her. On the question of breach, those facts and circumstances were unknown to the ambulance officers.Consideration The standard of care The trial judge said this about the standard of care to be expected of the ambulance officers, with which I respectfully agree:“[29] [The pleadings] reflect the standard of care to be observed by a person with some special skill or competence, as ambulance officers have, namely, ‘that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to have that special skill’ [Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487]. It is well established that standard is not determined solely or primarily by reference to the practice followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession. Nonetheless, as was observed in CGU Insurance Ltd v Porterhouse (2008) 235 CLR 103, 122:“Evidence of a particular practice or standard of conduct, whether laid down by a professional body or sanctioned by common usage, may be relevant to establishing a standard of care in a case of professional negligence…”This heralds the significance of QAS guidelines and the common approach of skilled ambulance officers in respect of the administration of adrenaline for asthma.[30]Importantly the standard of care under consideration here is not as high as that expected of a medical practitioner or an emergency physician in the hospital setting. It is that expected of an ambulance officer, operating in the field, in an emergency.”(Emphasis added.) At the end of that passage, the trial judge cited the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley,[87] where Basten JA (with whom Tobias and McColl JJA agreed) said:“[29] Ambulance officers are not medical practitioners, let alone specialists in emergency medicine. Their training is by no means insignificant, but it does not equip them with the theoretical knowledge which would permit a fine evaluation of alternative treatments. In a case such as the present, their two functions were to stablilize the condition of a patient, so far as their skills and resources permitted, and to ensure his speedy transfer to an available hospital …[30]Perhaps surprisingly, and not including the treating medical practitioners, each party at trial called five medical specialists, whose evidence was directed mainly to the question as to what was accepted medical and pharmacological practice in relation to the administration of adrenaline in 1998. Without objection, experts in emergency medicine discussed their own practices in well-equipped teaching hospitals, with far less attention being given to the position of ambulance officers and the nature and purpose of the protocols which governed their conduct.”[87][2006] NSWCA 102.