Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 868

Appeal from: Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 217
File number: VID 308 of 2016
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – appellant, an Albanian citizen, applied for a partner visa under the family violence provisions of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – Migration Review Tribunal not satisfied appellant suffered family violence and referred claims to independent expert for assessment – whether independent expert failed to consider correct test for relevant family violence
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migrations Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Coulton and Others v Holcombe and Others [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority [2015] FCAFC 7; 227 FCR 95

IYER v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929; 192 ALR 71

Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 217

Metwally v University of Wollongong [No 2] [1985] HCA 28; 60 ALR 68

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

MZYPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 1

O’Brien and Others v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; 150 CLR 310

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; 180 CLR 491

Date of hearing: 1 August 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: Erskine Rodan & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: L Brown
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to costs.

ORDERS

VID 308 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MARK MARTINAJ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to amend the notice of appeal in the terms set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 26 July 2016.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.Unless a party notifies in writing the Court by 4:00pm on Wednesday 3 August 2016, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KENNY J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (as it was then) (Tribunal): see Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 868
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Martinaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, an Albanian citizen, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal). The appellant had applied for a partner visa under the family violence provisions of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), but the Tribunal found that the appellant had not suffered family violence, and accordingly, dismissed the application for the visa. The appellant challenged this decision on the basis that the independent expert who assessed his application for family violence did not apply the correct test when assessing his claims. The central issue before the court was whether the independent expert applied the correct test in assessing the appellant's claims of family violence.

The court held that the independent expert had considered and rejected the appellant's claim that he had suffered family violence. The court found that the independent expert's opinion was based on her assessment of the appellant's claims, which demonstrated that she had considered the relevant factors in making her decision. The court also found that the independent expert had considered whether the appellant had suffered "relevant family violence," which was a defined term in the Regulations. The court held that the independent expert's opinion was valid, and that the Tribunal had lawfully completed the task under the Regulations.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, unless a party notified in writing the Court by a specified time indicating opposition to this order as to costs. The court granted leave to amend the notice of appeal in the terms set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 26 July 2016.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to amend the notice of appeal in the terms set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 26 July 2016.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. Unless a party notifies in writing the Court by 4:00pm on Wednesday 3 August 2016, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Regulation 1.23(14) provided:(14)For subregulation (13), the violence, or part of the violence, that led to the independent expert having the opinion that the alleged victim has suffered relevant family violence must have occurred while the married relationship or de facto relationship existed between the alleged perpetrator and the spouse or de facto partner of the alleged perpetrator.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal relevantly found that the appellant and his sponsor were in a relationship that had ceased and that a non-judicially determined claim of family violence had been made: Tribunal reasons at [13] and [23]. The Tribunal, at [34], was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the appellant had suffered relevant family violence for the purposes of the r 1.23 and, in accordance with r 1.23(10)(c)(i), referred the appellant’s claim to an independent expert for an opinion. The independent expert interviewed the appellant on 5 November 2013 and subsequently gave her opinion in a report and opinion dated 18 December 2013. This opinion was that the appellant had not suffered relevant family violence. On 23 April 2014, the independent expert subsequently provided a further report after meeting again with the appellant, informing the Tribunal that the independent expert’s opinion had not changed. It is unnecessary to canvass the submissions that were made by the appellant's representative challenging the independent expert's first and further reports. The history of the case before the Tribunal is not relevant to the challenge that the appellant now seeks to make to the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal concluded, in its decision at [54]-[56]:54.The Tribunal is satisfied that the opinion of 18 December 2013, confirmed by the advice of 23 April 2014 that the opinion had not changed, is authorised by the Regulations, in that it is provided by an independent expert who is a person suitably qualified to make the assessment. The independent expert is an employee of a Gazetted organisation, LSC Psychology, the organisation specified by the Minister in IMMI 13/023, for the purpose, and the opinion was properly made. 55.Under r. 1.23 the Tribunal is required to take as correct an independent expert’s opinion, properly made. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is not taken to have suffered family violence committed by the sponsor for r. 1.22. 56.Given the above conclusion that the claim of family violence has not been established, the applicant does not meet the requirements of cl. 820.221(3) for the grant of the visa. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant meets any of the alternative sub criteria. As the applicant does not meet an essential criterion for the visa, the Tribunal must affirm the decision under review.APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS The appellant’s central submission is that it should be inferred from the reasons for the opinion given by the independent expert dated 18 December 2013 that that independent expert did not apply the correct test in assessing whether the appellant had suffered relevant family violence. The appellant submitted that the statutory criteria required the independent expert to ask whether the appellant had suffered “relevant family violence” a defined term meaning “conduct, whether actual or threatened, towards [the appellant] that causes [the appellant] to reasonably fear for, or to be reasonably apprehensive about, his or her own wellbeing or safety”. The appellant submitted that if he established that the independent expert did not apply the correct test, then it would follow that there had not been a lawful “opinion of an independent expert” within the meaning of r 1.23(10)(c)(i). This was said to follow from the reasoning in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476. The appellant submitted that “in the absence of such a lawful opinion, the Tribunal had not lawfully completed the task under r 1.23(10)(c)(ii), and had not lawfully concluded the review insofar as it raises a claim that the [appellant] suffered family violence”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the alternative, the respondent submitted that, even if the appellant’s interpretation of "relevant family violence" were accepted, the independent expert clearly considered and rejected the appellant’s claim that he suffered relevant family violence. The respondent contended that statements in the independent expert’s report demonstrated that the independent expert considered "whether the feelings that the appellant claimed to have after the relationship concluded could have been as a result of family violence but rejected that as the case". As a consequence, so the respondent submitted, even if the appellant’s interpretation of "relevant family violence" were correct, the independent expert did not fall into error in the formation and expression of her opinion, which was valid for the purpose of r 1.23(10).CONSIDERATION The independent expert’s opinion that the appellant had not suffered relevant family violence (as defined in r 1.21(1) of the Regulations) was explained principally in her opinion of 18 December 2013. The independent expert provided the Tribunal with her assessment in a relevantly completed Family Violence Referral Form M52. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the discussion that appeared under the title "Reasons, referring to evidence this assessment is based upon" in the box headed "Independent expert's opinion" should be understood as the reasons that the independent expert relied on for her opinion that the appellant "did not meet the criteria of family violence as defined in r. 1.21(1)". The first respondent did not take issue with this approach. There were also other parts of the assessment to which counsel for the appellant drew the Court's attention, which he said threw some light on what appeared under the "Reasons" heading. It is, however, unnecessary to refer to what appears elsewhere in the assessment completed by the independent expert because that does not materially affect the Court’s understanding of the expert's opinion, as discussed below. Counsel for the appellant also made it clear that he did not rely on anything that occurred at the second meeting with the expert. The following are the passages under the heading "Reasons", which were chiefly relied on by the parties:[The appellant] was unable to identify a specific date as to when the alleged family violence in the form of emotional or financial abuse commenced, believing that the relationship was flawed from the outset. ... He lacked insight during the relationship, claiming that he only now perceives [his sponsor's] behaviour as abusive, which is concerning given that a victim of abuse would likely recognise that they were experiencing fear or apprehension during the relationship and likely would have felt powerless to control or change the circumstances. There is no evidence or information to suggest that this was the case for [the appellant].Throughout the course of the relationship, [the appellant] did not perceive [the sponsor's] behaviour as problematic and it was only after he travelled to Albania in March 2011 and realised that [she] wanted to end the relationship that he began to perceive her as deceptive. As such, it is extremely difficult to believe that [the appellant] was victim of family violence, where he would have experienced apprehension or fear for his well being or safety as a direct result of [his sponsor's] behaviour. This is further highlighted as he did not experience her as abusive, controlling or manipulative during the numerous examples he now provides while involved in the relationship.[The appellant] disclosed information he believed to be family violence in the form of threatening behaviour, jealousy and financial control. There was insufficient information in this regard. It appears that his means of coping was through avoidance, poor communication, and the assumption that his partner should be aware of the impact of her behaviour on him. ... [The appellant] demonstrated seemingly poor attitudes, with his lowered sense of self being related to gender expectations ... . When he met [his sponsor], she apparently asserted control over finances and this left him feeling vulnerable to her although he was aware of this from the outset of the relationship and made a conscious choice to pursue [her] and travel to Australia. He did not seek to challenge her and accepted her support, and only in hindsight does he now perceive this as her controlling him, likely a result of visa circumstances versus being a victim of family violence.It is understandable that an individual can develop insight retrospectively, although if he experienced a genuine sense of victimisation, he would have likely recognised this at some point in the relationship, even if he did not seek to appropriately confront or deal with the problems. Furthermore, [the appellant] stated that he made attempts to reconcile his relationship, even after [his sponsor] enquired about withdrawing her sponsorship of him while he was in Albania. He was motivated to rekindle the relationship, maintaining contact with [his sponsor] for several months even after the relationship ended. This further highlights that he was not fearful or apprehensive for his well-being or safety as a result of [his sponsor's] behaviour, but rather motivated to remain in the relationship where he perceived a future with her, despite feeling angry and devastated that she sought to end the relationship without consulting him. It was only after [his sponsor] refused to reconcile their differences that he began to interpret her behaviour and his experiences with the relationship as abusive. To this end, it is my opinion that [the appellant] does not meet the specific criteria of family violence as defined in Regulation 1.21(1) of the Migration Regulations (1994).