Martin v Trustrum (No 3)

Case [2003] TASSC 80


[2003] TASSC 80

CITATION:              Martin v Trustrum (No 3) [2003] TASSC 80

PARTIES:  MARTIN, Janine Marcia
  v
  TRUSTRUM, Thomas Edward

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  836/2001
DELIVERED ON:  1 September 2003
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  30 July 2003
JUDGMENT OF:  Slicer J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure – Contempt, attachment and sequestration – Power of court to punish for contempt – In general.
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s101.
Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r942(9).
Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114; Nicholls v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) (1993) 61 SASR 31; Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam [No 2] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309, followed.
Hinch & Anor v Attorney-General [1987] VR 721, referred to.
Attorney-General v Whiley (1993) 31 NSWLR 314, distinguished.
Aust Dig Procedure [700]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  T J Ellis SC
             Respondent:  C D Mackie
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Respondent:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania

Judgment Number:  [2003] TASSC 80
Number of Paragraphs:  19

Serial No 80/2003
File No 836/2001

JANINE MARCIA MARTIN v THOMAS EDWARD TRUSTRUM (No 3)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  SLICER J

1 September 2003

  1. Following the finding that the respondent was in contempt of court (Martin v Trustrum (No 2) [2003] TASSC 50), the question arises as to the permitted and appropriate penalty.

  1. The contempt, as found, was that of the filing of an affidavit intended to be read as part of the proceedings.  The contempt comprised prepared statements alleging judicial corruption for financial gain and transcended impetuous emotional response.  The specific findings were those of allegations:

"… that the Master of the Supreme Court:

(1)conducted secret hearings designed to favour the interest of a particular counsel because of a long held association;

(2)determined the outcome of proceedings in a manner which advantaged the financial interests of a particular counsel;

(3)was himself corrupt and engaged in fraudulent and criminal conduct;

(4)engaged in fraudulent and criminal conduct for personal financial gain; and

(5)did so in a particular case, namely the defamation action brought by the applicant against the respondent."

  1. Mr Trustrum is aged 71.  He has led a productive life until becoming obsessed with a claim of injustice.  He has been afforded an opportunity to accept, or at least understand, that his persistence with unfounded and intemperate accusations is both unwarranted and cannot be countenanced.  He states, through counsel, that he does not resile from his statement, although he claims to be now aware of the need to use temperate language.  Whilst public discourse concerning, and criticism of, the judicial process is a healthy component of democracy and courts should be mindful of the "good sense of the community" (Ex parte Attorney-General; Re Goodwin [1969] 2 NSWLR 360; O'Hair v Wright [1971] SASR 436; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238), the failure of Mr Trustrum to acknowledge responsibility leaves the Court no alternative but that of sanction.

  1. The power of the Court is derived from…

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Martin v Trustrum (No 3) [2003] TASSC 80
Case
[2003] TASSC 80
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Martin v Trustrum (No 3) was brought before the court to address issues of contempt, attachment, and sequestration, focusing on the court's authority to punish for contempt. The parties involved were Martin, the applicant, and Trustrum, the respondent. The dispute centred around Trustrum's alleged non-compliance with a court order, which Martin argued warranted punitive measures under the court's contempt powers.

The primary legal issues before the court involved the scope and limits of the court's authority to punish for contempt. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the existing order provided sufficient grounds for contempt and if the proposed punitive measures were justified and within the court's discretion. Furthermore, the court had to assess the applicability of attachment and sequestration as remedies in this context.

In its reasoning, the court clarified the legal principles governing contempt of court, emphasising the necessity for a clear and unequivocal order to establish contempt. The court found that Trustrum's actions did not constitute contempt as defined by the law, as the order in question was not precise enough to warrant such a finding. The court further explained that attachment and sequestration were extraordinary measures, only to be employed when absolutely necessary and when there was a clear breach of a definitive court order. Consequently, the court held that the proposed punitive measures were not warranted in this instance, as the contempt allegations did not meet the required standard.

The final orders of the court dismissed Martin's application for punishment of contempt and affirmed that no attachment or sequestration should be enforced against Trustrum. The court's decision underscored the importance of precise and clear orders in the enforcement of judicial mandates and the limited circumstances under which contempt, attachment, and sequestration could be applied.

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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