Martens v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martens v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FCA 207

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — Application for judicial review of a decision of the Cth Executive not to refer matter to an appellate court — Division of portfolio responsibilities between two Ministers — Effect of division — Where two Ministers appointed to administer under a governing Commonwealth statute where relevant State Act only refers to the State Attorney-General — Whether Minister for Home Affairs empowered to refer a decision to an appellant court pursuant to s 672A Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) as applied by s 68 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) — Whether decision reviewable under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) — held decision reviewable — Whether Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations — Held Minister for Home Affairs empowered to make decision but failed to take relevant considerations into account — Decision set aside

CRIMINAL LAW — Appeal — New trial and inquiry after conviction — Pardon, commutation of penalty, on petition for pardon and inquiry after conviction — Whether decision not to refer case to an appellate court was amenable to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) — Nature of test to apply in deciding whether or not to refer case to an appellate court— Held correct test not applied

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION —Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 68 —Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) — application of Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 672A to federal offenders by virtue of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – s 15A Acts Interpretation Act 1901 – relevance of constitutionally permissible Commonwealth public administration practice to determination of which officer of the Commonwealth able to exercise powers conferred in State Law made applicable by s 68 Judiciary Act – held practice relevant

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Constitution — Power of Governor-General to appoint officers to administer departments of state of Commonwealth – effect of this practice in relation to identification of which officer able to exercise powers in State law applied by s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15A, 19A
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(2), 13
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 50BA
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 9(7)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 2, 68, 68(1), 68(2)

Commonwealth Constitution ss 61, 62, 64, 65
Constitution of Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 36(2)
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) ss 31(2), 38, 38(2)

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 1, 18, 672A
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 584
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 369

Attorney-General (Cth) v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582 cited
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1989-1990) 170 CLR 1 cited
Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All E R 560 cited
Condren; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) v R [1991] 1 Qd R 574 considered
Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 considered
Eastman v Attorney-General (ACT) (2007) 210 FLR 440 considered
Eastman v Australian Capital Territory

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 207
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Martens v Commonwealth of Australia involves the applicant, Martens, challenging the Minister's decision to refuse his application to refer his case to the Court of Appeal for the purposes of seeking a pardon. The applicant argues that the Minister's decision was unlawful as it failed to take into account relevant considerations and was an improper exercise of power. The court was required to determine whether the Minister was empowered to make the decision and whether the Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations in making the decision. The court held that the Minister was empowered to make the decision and that the Minister's decision was not an improper exercise of power as it did not fail to take into account relevant considerations.

The court's reasoning was based on the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and authorities concerning the exercise of discretion in the context of pardons. The court found that the Minister was empowered to make the decision as the statutory provisions did not exclude the Minister from acting as a "Crown Law Officer" and the choice of the Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions in the definition of the term "Crown Law Officer" represented the Crown's First Law Officer and the senior independent officer holder charged with responsibility for prosecutions. The court also found that the Minister's decision was not an improper exercise of power as the statutory provisions did not specify any criteria as relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power for which that section provides. The court held that the scope of the discretion was unconfined save insofar as the subject matter, scope and purpose of the section dictated otherwise.

The final orders of the court were that the Minister's decision to refuse to refer the case to the Court of Appeal be set aside, the matter be remitted to the Minister for further consideration according to law, and the respondents pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed. The court's decision provides guidance on the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning the exercise of discretion in the context of pardons and the role of the Minister in making decisions regarding pardons.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Second Respondent’s decision of 4 September 2008 to refuse to refer a case to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 672A(a) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) as applied by s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent for further consideration according to law.

3. The Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LOGAN J
I accept therefore that the decision made by the Minister is one to which the ADJR Act applies and that consequently this court has jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision to refuse to refer the case to the Court of Appeal. In so doing, it is unnecessary to decide and I refrain from expressing any view as to whether, were the Minister desirous of having the benefit of the opinion of the Court of Appeal on a point arising in the application for a pardon (for which s 672A(b) of the Queensland Criminal Code prima facie provides) a need to read s 68 of the Judiciary Act subject to the Constitution (s 15A Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)) (Acts Interpretation Act) would prevent the application of that part of the provision to a person who sought a pardon in respect of a federal offence. A concern would be whether that application would be prevented by the prohibition, arising from the interpretation of Chapter III of the Constitution favoured in Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, against the furnishing of advisory opinions in the exercise of judicial power in federal jurisdiction. That is a subject which may only arise, if at all, in the event not only that the present decision were set aside but the Minister (assuming he is the relevant Commonwealth Minister of State) were disposed to act under s 672A(b), rather than s 672A(a), of the Queensland Criminal Code. The request made by the Applicant in his application and the way it was dealt with by the Minister suggest that it was both intended to be and was treated as one made under s 672A(a) only.Was the Minister empowered to make the decision? The Applicant’s argument in respect of this issue was succinct but none the worse for that. There were officers of the Commonwealth whose title corresponded exactly with those State officers named in the definition of “Crown Law Officer” for the purposes of s 672A of the Queensland Criminal Code. That being so, it was submitted that there was no warrant for applying this provision, pursuant to s 68 of the Judiciary Act, “so as [it is] applicable”, to enlarge its application so as to embrace the Minister. To the contrary, it was submitted that, having regard to the sensitivity which might attend the pardoning of a person convicted after a jury verdict and subsequent unsuccessful appeal, the choice in the definition of the Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions may not have been coincidental representing as it did the Crown’s First Law Officer on the one hand and the senior independent officer holder charged with responsibility for prosecutions. The Respondent’s argument was rather more elaborate. Its starting point was Ch II of the Constitution. Section 62 of the Constitution makes provision for a Federal Executive Council. In turn, s 64 of the Constitution provides for the appointment of members of the Federal Executive Council as Ministers, “the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”, “to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish”. Section 65 then materially provides that those Ministers of State “shall hold such offices … as the Governor-General directs”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LOGAN J

For these reasons, I conclude that it was lawfully possible for the Minister to decide whether or not to refer the case to the Court of Appeal for the purposes of s 68 of the Judiciary Act in its application of s 672A of the Queensland Criminal Code.Failure to take a relevant consideration into account? For the purposes of the particular improper exercise of power error ground specified in s 5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act, where a statute confers on an official a discretionary power to make a decision, a consideration will be a “relevant consideration” in relation to the making of that decision if it is one which by that statute the official is bound to take into account either expressly or by necessary implication from its subject matter, scope and purpose: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985-1986) 162 CLR 1 at 39-40. The Applicant submitted that s 672A did not authorise the Minister to act as a “gatekeeper”, second guessing what the Court of Appeal might make of fresh evidence. The submission allowed that the Minister might refuse to refer an application which was obviously frivolous but that it did not authorise the ignoring, as was submitted had occurred, of the evidence submitted with the application to the Minister. The Respondents submitted that s 672A of the Queensland Criminal Code does not expressly specify any criteria as relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power for which that section provides, such that the scope of the discretion was unconfined save insofar as the subject matter, scope and purpose of the section dictated otherwise. So much may be accepted but it rather begs the question as to what is dictated by the subject matter, scope and purpose of s 672A? To answer this question it is necessary to consider in some detail authorities concerning s 672A and its analogues. In Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125 (Mallard’s Case) at [4] Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ observed of the Western Australian equivalent of s 672A:[4]Provision for the referral of petitions for clemency to the courts owes its modern origin to public adverse reaction to the excessive imposition of capital punishment in the nineteenth and earlier centuries. As the capital statutes were repealed so as to apply the death penalty to fewer offences, appeals for pardons to the Crown tended to be made in cases of asserted miscarriages of justice, despite the anomaly to which a successful petition might give rise, that a person who has in fact come to be considered to have been wrongly convicted or innocent, is pardoned, and not acquitted of the crime. The importance of this avenue of recourse to justice, effectively controlled by the Executive, declined, after the introduction of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 (UK) to establish the Court of Criminal Appeal, although no attempt was made to abolish it. It proved fortunate that this was so because there was, initially at least, a judicial reluctance to allow appeals in criminal cases, occasioned in part no doubt by the sanctity accorded, and usually desirably so, to the verdict of a jury, and less desirably, to the legal conservatism of some of the judiciary of the day.