SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Marshall v Minister of Education [2004] QSC 135
PARTIES:
FARRON VANCE MARSHALL
(Plaintiff)
v
MINISTER FOR EDUCATION OF QUEENSLAND
(First defendant)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(Second defendant)FILE NO/S:
38 of 1996
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court, Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
6 May 2004
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
9 December 2003
JUDGE:
Jones J
ORDER:
1. The period of limitation in respect of the plaintiff’s claim for damages for personal injury arising from treatment whilst the plaintiff was a patient of The Mount Isa Base Hospital between 29 August 1990 and 2 November 1990, is extended for one year to 16 October 2004.
2. That the applicant have leave to file a further Amended Statement of Claim in terms of the draft Exhibit “Q” to the affidavit of Glenn Roy Moffatt filed 19 November 2003.
3. That the costs of and incidental to the application be costs in the cause.CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR - EXTENSION OF PERIOD - CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – Where applicant was injured when he slipped and fell on a concrete sporting court - Where applicant underwent a series of operations due to further medical complications - application to extend limitation period under s.31(2) Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) - whether material facts were within plaintiff's knowledge prior to expiration of limitation period - discussion of "material fact" within meaning of Limitation of Actions Act
Limitation of Actions Act 1974
Clarke v Harpier Acoustics Pty Ltd Unreported BC 9102958 – 20 Sep 1991 distinguished
Dick v The University of Queensland (2000) 2 QdR 476/485 cited
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234/256 applied
Draney v Barry (1999) QCA 491 cited
Eustace v State of Queensland (1999) QCA 502 distinguished
Ford Excavations Pty Ltd v do Carmo [1981] 2 NSWLR 253 applied
Neilson v Peters Ship Repair Ltd (1983) 2 QdR 419 capplied
Pizer v Ansett Australia Limited (1998) QCA 298 distinguished
Randel v Brisbane City Council (1984) 2 QdR 276 applied
Thomas v State of Queensland (2001) QCA 336 considered
COUNSEL:
Mr D K Dorney QC for the plaintiff
Mr M E Eliadis for the first defendant
No appearance by or on behalf of the second defendant
SOLICITORS:
V R Moffat & Associates for the plaintiff
Crown Solicitors for the first defendant
On 29 August 1990 the plaintiff was injured when he slipped whilst playing on a concrete multi-purpose sporting court at the Kakadoom State High School at Mount Isa. He was at the time 13 ½ years old having been born on 11 December 1976.
The plaintiff suffered an injury to his upper right leg namely a slipped femoral capital epiphysis. He was treated at the Mount Isa General Hospital where he was hospitalised and then later underwent an open reduction and an initial fixation of the epiphysis. Complications occurred resulting in the need for further treatment. X-rays taken on 22 July…
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- Case
- [2004] QSC 135
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant had not been aware of the full extent of his injuries and the causal link between those injuries and the fall until after the limitation period had expired. The court held that the applicant had not been aware of the full extent of the injuries or the causal link between the injuries and the fall until after the limitation period had expired. The court also found that the applicant had not been negligent in failing to discover the full extent of his injuries and that the extension of the limitation period was warranted. The court further held that the applicant had taken reasonable steps to investigate the cause of his injuries and that the extension of the limitation period was in the interests of justice. The court granted the application and extended the limitation period for one year to 16 October 2004.
The court also granted the applicant leave to file a further Amended Statement of Claim in terms of the draft Exhibit “Q” to the affidavit of Glenn Roy Moffatt filed on 19 November 2003. The court further ordered that the costs of and incidental to the application be costs in the cause. This decision provides guidance on the interpretation of the term "material fact" within the meaning of the Limitation of Actions Act and the circumstances in which an extension of the limitation period may be granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The period of limitation in respect of the plaintiff’s claim for damages for personal injury arising from treatment whilst the plaintiff was a patient of The Mount Isa Base Hospital between 29 August 1990 and 2 November 1990, is extended for one year to 16 October 2004.
2. That the applicant have leave to file a further Amended Statement of Claim in terms of the draft Exhibit “Q” to the affidavit of Glenn Roy Moffatt filed 19 November 2003.
3. That the costs of and incidental to the application be costs in the cause.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr. Marshall applied to the court for an extension of the limitation period under section 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). This application was made on the basis that material facts concerning his injuries and their connection to the initial accident were not known to him until after the standard limitation period had expired. The application was heard in the context of the court's jurisdiction to extend limitation periods under the Act. The application was supported by affidavits and evidence outlining the nature of Mr. Marshall's injuries, the progression of his health issues, and the timeline of his awareness of the full extent of his injuries.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the material facts concerning the applicant's injuries and their connection to the initial accident were within the applicant's knowledge prior to the expiration of the limitation period.
2. Whether the applicant's cause of action in respect of his personal injuries arose when he first slipped and fell or when the additional complications and health issues became known to him.
3. What constitutes a "material fact" within the meaning of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) and whether the applicant's situation falls within the scope of the Act's provisions for extending limitation periods.
Held
1. The court held that the material facts concerning the applicant's injuries and their connection to the initial accident were not within the applicant's knowledge prior to the expiration of the limitation period. Consequently, the limitation period was extended under s.31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
2. The court held that the applicant's cause of action in respect of his personal injuries arose when he first slipped and fell, not when the additional complications and health issues became known to him.
3. The court held that the applicant's situation falls within the scope of the Act's provisions for extending limitation periods, as the material facts concerning his injuries and their connection to the initial accident were not within his knowledge prior to the expiration of the limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the material facts concerning the applicant's injuries and their connection to the initial accident were within the applicant's knowledge prior to the expiration of the limitation period. It was established that the applicant did not have knowledge of the full extent of his injuries and the complications arising from the initial accident until after the limitation period had expired. Therefore, the court found that the limitation period should be extended under s.31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
The court then considered when the applicant's cause of action in respect of his personal injuries arose. It was held that the cause of action arose when the applicant first slipped and fell, not when the additional complications and health issues became known to him. This decision aligns with the principle that the limitation period begins to run from the date of the initial tortious act, regardless of when the full extent of the injury becomes apparent.
Lastly, the court addressed what constitutes a "material fact" within the meaning of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). It was determined that a material fact is one that would influence a reasonable person in deciding whether to institute proceedings. In this case, the applicant's lack of knowledge concerning the full extent of his injuries and the complications arising from the initial accident qualified as a material fact, warranting an extension of the limitation period. The court's decision follows the principle that the limitation period should not run while a party is unaware of material facts that would prompt them to bring a claim.