MARSH and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: FIREARMS ACT 1973 (WA)

CITATION:   MARSH and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2018] WASAT 139

MEMBER:   DR B DE VILLIERS (MEMBER)

HEARD:   5 DECEMBER 2018

DELIVERED          :   14 JANUARY 2018

FILE NO/S:   CC 1527 of 2018

BETWEEN:   PAUL MARSH

Applicant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Respondent


Catchwords:

Requirements and effect of a policy - Is the policy consistent with the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) - Effect of policy in exercise of discretion - Balance of interests and proportionality when new conditions are imposed - Storage of handguns by repairers

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 No 76 (NSW), s 64(1), s 64(5)
Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 16(1)(e), s 21, s 21(1)(a), s 21(1)(b), s 32
Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA), s 11A(1), s 11A(2)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 50(2)(b)
Review of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(3), s 29(1), s 29(3), s 29(5)

Result:

The application is dismissed and the decision of the Commissioner of Police is affirmed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : In Person
Respondent : Mr T Pontre

Solicitors:

Applicant : N/A
Respondent : State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal [2012] NSWCA 19

Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1

Citipower v Regulator General [1999] VSC 348

Clive Elliott Jennings & Co Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2002) 122 LGERA 433

Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn [1926] HCA 6

Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police v Martin (GD) [2007] NSWADTAP 61

Coty (England) Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1957) 2 LGRA 117

Kakulas and City of Stirling [2013] WASAT 168

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Unreported, FCA, 11 December 1987)

Marshall v Town Planning Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 202

Municipal Council of Sydney and The Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208

R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27

Re Drake and Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634

Re Romato; Ex parte Mitchell James Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 286

Tah Land Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2009] WASC 196

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

  1. The Commissioner of Police (respondent) adopted a new policy entitled the Firearm Dealers, Repairers and Manufacturers:  Handgun Security Policy (the Policy) on 1 January 2018.  The Policy was adopted pursuant to the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (the Act) and the Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA) (the Regulations). The Policy provides, relevantly for purposes of this proceeding, more stringent requirements for securing the premises of businesses of repairers of handguns. The Policy does not affect repairers of rifles or long firearms and it does not affect the business of repairers of handguns that are not stored overnight.

  2. The rationale for the Policy according to the respondent is that the management of storage of handguns by repairers must mitigate risks to members of the public; that preventative action is…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASAT 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Marsh v Commissioner of Police, the applicant challenges the decision of the respondent to impose additional conditions on the storage of handguns by repairers. The dispute revolves around the interpretation and application of the Firearms Act 1996 (WA) and the extent to which a departmental policy influences the respondent's exercise of discretion. The Court was tasked with determining whether the policy in question could be classified as a legitimate policy under the Act and, if so, the weight it should be given in the exercise of discretion. Additionally, the Court had to consider the balance of interests and proportionality of the conditions imposed by the respondent.

The Court examined the definitions and characteristics of a policy, distinguishing between internal working documents and formal policies. It acknowledged the principle that while policies guide administrative discretion, they are not binding and must be balanced against the statutory framework and relevant facts. The Court highlighted that a policy's legitimacy depends on its intrinsic characteristics, not merely its designation. It also noted that the Act does not explicitly mandate the consideration of policies in the exercise of discretion. The Court further considered the difference between policies and regulations, affirming that regulations impose conditions on licenses, while policies provide guidance.

The Court concluded that the contested policy did not meet the criteria of a formal policy as it had not undergone a proper consultative process, was not adopted by the relevant Minister, and had not been tabled in Parliament. Therefore, it should not be given the same weight as a formal policy in the exercise of discretion. The Court emphasised the importance of adhering to policies for consistency and public interest, but also underscored the need for flexibility in administrative decision-making. The Court found that the respondent's decision to impose additional conditions was disproportionate and not adequately justified.

The Court ordered that the additional conditions imposed on the storage of handguns by repairers were to be reviewed and potentially revised to ensure they are proportionate and justified under the statutory framework. The respondent was directed to reconsider the policy in light of the Court's findings and to provide a detailed justification for any conditions imposed on firearm license holders.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the matter of Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal [2012] NSWCA 19 at [47] some support is found for the principle highlighted by the applicant. In this matter it was found that some internal departmental guidelines were not to be given the status of 'policies' since those documents were not adopted by the New South Wales Cabinet or any Minister and 'contains no statements as to how any discretion … should be exercised on the conclusion of such a review'. This approach reflects the observation in Citipower v Regulator General [1999] VSC 348 at [122] that there was no statement by the Governor in Council that what was purported to be a 'policy', was indeed a policy as envisaged by the relevant legislation. The respondent disagrees with the applicant and says that this is indeed a policy at law and should therefore be accorded appropriate weight to guide the exercise of discretion. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004, Macquarie University, Sydney) contains various definitions for 'policy' of which the most relevant for purposes of this proceeding is: 'a definite course of action adopted as expedient or from other considerations' and 'a course or line of action adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, political party, or the like'. The Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis, 2016 Butterworths) defines 'policy' as 'a social or political goal chosen by a government department, business or other organisation'. In Coty (England) Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1957) 2 LGRA 117 it was noted that not all proposals or working documents can be seen as a 'policy', but that future planning proposals and draft policies and other instruments may be taken into account when discretion is exercised, but the weight accorded to such non-policies will depend on the circumstances. In Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn [1926] HCA 6 at [10] Isaacs J explained how the administrative decision-maker may, when exercising a discretion, take into account 'if the Minster has such a policy' that ought to be considered. The Court acknowledged that there may be different categories of 'policies', for example some policies may be set at a departmental level whereas other policies are set at a political level. This is consistent with the observation in the matter of R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965]HCA27 (113CLR177) (Ipec­Air) at[202] that since policies can originate from different sources, for example political or departments, the weight attached by an administrative decision-maker to a particular policy may vary depending on its origin ­ be it political or departmental. The reason why it is important to properly categorise the origin of policies is that political policies are generally issued by a Minister or by Cabinet; the policy is open to scrutiny by Parliament; whereas administrative type policies generally do not have the same level of political endorsement or scrutiny. In this regard a department can be expected to adhere to the policies of the relevant Minister and give weight to a policy when a discretion is to be exercised (Ipec­Airat [87]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The principles of administrative review provide that decisions of an administrative nature can be reviewed, including when a policy is applied in the exercise of the discretion. In this sense a policy provides an important guide to the exercise of discretion, but it is not binding as in the case of delegated legislation. In this regard see Re Drake and Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs(No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 (Drake) in which Brennan J explains the benefits of consistency arising from a policy (at 640) and the public interest of a policy being a reference point for administrative decision-making. If a policy is therefore not adhered to, there must be a cogent reason for doing so in light of the potential benefits that may arise from a policy. A policy should however not be approached with inflexibility since the decision must ultimately be made on merit by taking into account the statutory framework, policy and all relevant facts. Whether a specific document is indeed a 'policy' depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the document, not merely that it is called a 'policy'. There is no mention in the Act of a 'policy' that can be adopted by the respondent or that the decision-maker should in the exercise of discretion take any policy into consideration. The Act refers to 'restrictions, limitation and conditions' (s 21) that may be imposed on a licence. The respondent may impose restrictions, limitations or conditions on a licence but there is no explicit reference to a general power to make and enforce a policy in regard to a category of licenses. Intrinsically, a government, minister and a department can make policies for purposes of proper public administration and there is no legal requirement for such a power to only exist when recognised in a statute. It is not disputed that the respondent may by way of regulation enact certain conditions in regard to different categories of firearms, but regulations are not to be confused with a policy. In some legislation, see for example the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 No 76 (NSW) (ADT Act), specific reference is made to the relevance of 'policy' in the exercise of discretion. Section 64(1) of the ADT Act requires the relevant Tribunal, in determining an application for a review of a 'reviewable decision', to give effect to 'any relevant Government policy' in force at the time the decision was made. 'Government policy' is defined as a policy adopted by the Cabinet or the Premier or any other Minister that is to be applied in the exercise of discretionary powers by 'administrators' (s 64(5) of the ADT Act). The applicant in the current proceeding takes issue with the characterisation of the Policy. The applicant says the Policy is not to be regarded as a policy since it has not been the subject of a proper consultative process; it has not been adopted by the relevant Minister; and it has not been tabled in Parliament. The applicant therefore concludes that the Policy the subject of this proceeding is, in law, not a policy but is rather an internal working document by the respondent and that commensurate weight should be given to it.