Marrapodi v Traynor - [2011] WASC 72

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION: MARRAPODI -v- TRAYNOR [2011] WASC 72

CORAM: EM HEENAN J

HEARD: 14 MARCH 2011

DELIVERED : 14 MARCH 2011

PUBLISHED : 21 MARCH 2011

FILE NO/S: SJA 1116 of 2010

BETWEEN: DOMENICO MARRAPODI
Appellant
AND
KIM JOHN TRAYNOR
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :MAGISTRATE B A LANE
File No  :PE 7995 of 2010

Catchwords:

Appeal - Dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm - Admission to attending police officer - Voluntary and admissible - No reason to exclude admission in exercise of discretion

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr J R Noble
Respondent: Ms M Greenshields

Solicitors:

Appellant: Jeremy Noble
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54
R v Swaffield and Pavic (1998) 192 CLR 159
R v Williams (1992) 8 WAR 265

EM HEENAN J: This is an appeal by leave from a decision of her Honour Magistrate B A Lane given in the Magistrates Court at Perth on 8 October 2010 convicting and sentencing the appellant Domenico Marrapodi of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm.
By appeal notice filed on 4 November 2010 Mr Marrapodi sought leave to appeal against that conviction on four grounds, and against the sentence imposed on one ground. Jenkins J granted leave to appeal on all grounds on 7 January 2011.
However, at this hearing of the appeal on 14 March 2011, the appellant through his counsel chose to pursue only one ground of appeal against his conviction, namely that the learned magistrate erred in law in ruling that admissions made by him at the scene of the accident shortly after the collision were admissible in circumstances where it was contended that they were unreliable and that it was unfair to the appellant to rely on them. The appeal against sentence was not pursued. At the end of that hearing I dismissed the appeal and, before delivering brief oral reasons for that decision, indicated that I would publish more detailed reasons in due course. Those reasons are as follows.
On 12 May 2009 at 4.30 pm there was a collision near the corner of Drake Street and Union Street in Bayswater. This was between a Ford Econovan being driven north-west in Drake Street by Mr Marrapodi and a Honda motorcycle being ridden in the opposite direction, south‑east, in Drake Street by Mr Kerr.
The corner of Drake Street and Union Street is a T‑junction. Drake Street is the through road. Union Street branches to the north‑east. It is a short street. There is no corresponding street or way on the south-west side of that T‑junction. Indeed, on the south‑west side there is a continuous park adjacent to the Hillcrest Primary School location.
The allegation by the prosecution, ultimately accepted by the learned magistrate, was that Mr Marrapodi, driving north‑west, intended to turn right into Union Street where he lives, and…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Marrapodi v Traynor

Details

AGLC: Marrapodi v Traynor [2011] WASC 72
Case: [2011] WASC 72
Decision Date: 21 MARCH 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Marrapodi v Traynor involved the appellant, Marrapodi, who was convicted of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm. The respondent, Traynor, was the victim of the incident. The matter was heard in the Court of Appeal. The appellant contested the admissibility of his admission to attending police officers that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the incident. The court was required to determine whether the admission was voluntary and admissible, and whether the trial judge exercised his discretion appropriately in admitting the evidence.

The court examined the principles surrounding the admissibility of admissions and the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. It considered the circumstances under which the admission was made and whether it was voluntary. The court found that the admission was voluntary, as it was made freely and without any inducement, threat, or promise. The court also considered whether there was any reason to exclude the admission in the exercise of discretion. The court found that there was no such reason and that the trial judge had exercised his discretion appropriately in admitting the evidence.

In light of the above, the court held that the admission was properly admitted and was properly considered by the jury in reaching their verdict. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The court further noted that the trial judge had exercised his discretion appropriately in admitting the evidence and that there were no grounds for the court to interfere with the trial judge's decision.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, the conviction be upheld, and the appellant be remanded into custody to serve the sentence imposed by the trial judge. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that admissions are voluntary and appropriately considered by the jury in reaching their verdict. The court also highlighted the need for trial judges to exercise their discretion appropriately in admitting evidence, particularly where admissions are concerned.

Orders