Marlu Transport Solutions Pty Ltd v Bishdun Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Marlu Transport Solutions Pty Ltd v Bishdun Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 118

File number: WAD 18 of 2025
Judgment of: MCDONALD J
Date of judgment: 24 February 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunction – applicant entered into agreements with first and fifth respondents for sale of business, issue of preference shares to fifth respondent, grant of security over assets of business, and company and personal guarantees – applicant defaulted on obligation to make payments to fifth respondent – applicant alleges respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct contrary to ss 18 and 21 of Australian Consumer Law – applicant alleges respondent misrepresented or concealed condition of business assets – applicant seeks to restrain first and fifth respondents from exercising contractual rights arising from applicant’s default pending determination of claims – interlocutory injunctions granted preventing first and fifth respondents from exercising certain rights
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 21, 236, 237, 243
Cases cited:

Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 2) (2017) 348 ALR 1; [2017] FCAFC 76

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46

Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618

Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (2018) 56 VR 557; [2018] VSC 246

Chopsonion Pty Ltd (Controllers Appointed) v Watts Meat Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 4

Ripani v Century Legend Pty Ltd (No 4) [2024] FCA 1211

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156

Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 729

Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Lend Lease Services Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 98

Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 632; [2014] FCAFC 59

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 116
Date of last submission: 13 February 2025
Date of hearing: 7 February 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms P A Honey
Solicitor for the Applicant: Murfett Legal
Counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Mr T Silvester
Solicitor for the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Cozens Johansen Lawyers

ORDERS

WAD 18 of 2025
BETWEEN:

MARLU TRANSPORT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ACN 668 701 488)

Applicant

AND:

BISHDUN PTY LTD (ACN 155 899 040)

First Respondent

MALCOLM DONALD BISHOP

Second Respondent

JOCELYN DUNNING (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCDONALD J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.The applicant has undertaken to the Court that it will pay to any party restrained or affected by the action ordered by the interlocutory injunction, such compensation as the Court may in its discretion consider in the circumstances to be just, such compensation to be assessed by the Court or in accordance with such directions as the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 118
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Marlu Transport Solutions Pty Ltd, the applicant, sought an interlocutory injunction against Bishdun Pty Ltd and others to prevent them from exercising certain rights arising from the applicant's default on contractual obligations. The applicant had entered into various agreements with the respondents, including the sale of its business, issuance of preference shares, and the grant of security over assets. The applicant alleged that the respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct, contrary to sections 18 and 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). Specifically, the applicant claimed that the respondents misrepresented or concealed the condition of the business assets, which were critical to the applicant's decision to purchase the business. The applicant sought to restrain the respondents from exercising specific contractual rights pending the determination of the substantive claims.

The legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had established a serious question to be tried and whether the applicant had demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial. The court considered whether the applicant's evidence, if accepted, could support a conclusion that the respondents had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct or unconscionable conduct under the ACL.

The court found that the applicant's claims raised a serious question to be tried. While the respondents' evidence could potentially provide a defence, it was not the court's role to conduct a mini-trial or determine which party's evidence would likely be accepted at trial on an application for interlocutory relief. The court concluded that the applicant had established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial. The applicant's evidence, if accepted, could support a finding that the respondents engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, and thus contravened section 18 of the ACL. Furthermore, the applicant's evidence, if accepted, could also establish that the respondents engaged in conduct that was unconscionable in connection with the acquisition of goods or services from the applicant, contravening section 21 of the ACL.

The court granted the applicant's application for interlocutory injunctive relief, restraining the first and fifth respondents from exercising certain rights arising from the applicant's default on contractual obligations. The court also ordered that the costs of the applicant's application for interlocutory injunctive relief be costs in the cause.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Until the final determination of this action, or until further order, each of the first respondent and the fifth respondent, by itself, its servants and agents and assignees, be restrained from:

(a) transferring Oz Base’s shares in the applicant to the fifth respondent pursuant to cl 3.5(b) and (c) of the Payment and Security Deed;

(b) selling the Collateral (as defined in cl 1.1 of the Specific Security Deed), pursuant to cl 7.2 of the Specific Security Deed;

(c) appointing an external controller of all or any part of the Collateral (as defined in cl 1.1 of the Specific Security Deed) or Oz Base;

(d) appointing a person or persons to be Controller, including an External Administrator (as defined in cl 1.1 of the General Security Deed), of all or any part of the Collateral (as defined in cl 1.1 of the General Security Deed) or the applicant’s income pursuant to cl 12.1(a)(i) of the General Security Deed or otherwise;

(e) appointing an observer of board meetings of the applicant pursuant to cl 4.9 of the Payment and Security Deed at which the conduct of or advice in relation to these proceedings is to be discussed or dealt with, unless any such appointment is made on the basis that the observer is not to be present at any meeting while the conduct of or advice in relation to these proceedings is being discussed or deal with;

(f) exercising any rights as Attorney pursuant to the Powers of Attorney granted under:

(i) cl 5.1 of the Payment and Security Deed;

(ii) cl 14 of the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity (Corporate);

(iii) cl 13 of the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity (Personal);

(iv) cl 21 of the General Security Deed; and

(v) cl 9.1 of the Specific Security Deed,

to cause or effect the Payments to be made;

(g) exercising any powers under cll 10.1, 10.2 or 10.4 of the General Security Deed to cause or effect the Payments to be made;

(h) exercising any powers to access, inspect, copy or receive information and documents of the applicant or Applicant Related Entities in relation to the conduct of these proceedings, including those protected by legal professional privilege, including but not limited to those powers under:

(i) cll 4.7, 4.8, 4.9(b) and 10.3 of the of the Payment and Security Deed; and

(ii) cll 5.2 and 5.3 of the General Security Deed;

(i) exercising the powers set out in:

(i) cl 11.5(a) of the General Security Deed;

(ii) cl 4.13(a)(ii) of the Payment and Security Deed;

(j) exercising any statutory, common law or equitable right or power, as exists at law or as set out or referred to in cl 4.13(d) of the Payment and Security Deed to:

(i) terminate the Asset Sale Agreement or Payment and Security Deed for repudiation based upon any failure by the applicant or Applicant Related Entities to make the Payments;

(ii) enforce any securities which may subsist as regards the assets of the applicant and Applicant Related Entities, including but not limited to any such securities which may fall outside the scope of the Personal Properties Security Act 2009 (Cth) such as equitable liens; or

(k) exercising powers to seize, retain, dispose of or sell collateral under the Personal Properties Security Act 2009 (Cth) with respect to the security interests granted by the applicant or the Applicant Related Entities to the fifth respondent pursuant to the Payment and Security Deed, the General Security Deed or the Specific Security Deed or otherwise.

2. Order 1 of the orders made on 7 February 2025 cease to have effect upon the making of these orders.

3. The costs of the applicant’s application for interlocutory injunctive relief be costs in the cause.

Definitions

In these orders:

(a) Asset Sale Agreement means the Asset Sale Agreement dated 26 April 2024 (as annexed at JJ-11 of the First Jean-Louis Affidavit).

(b) Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity (Companies) means the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity dated 26 April 2024 to which Oz Base, Marlu Health Pty Ltd, and Marlu Resources Group Pty Ltd are parties (as annexed at JJ-13 of the First Jean-Louis Affidavit).

(c) Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity (Personal) means the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity dated 26 April 2024 to which Saturn Manu Turnbull, and Alex Bruce McPhee are parties (as annexed at JJ-14 of the First Jean-Louis Affidavit).

(d) First Jean-Louis Affidavit means the Affidavit of Jacques-Benoit Jean-Louis dated 28 January 2025.

(e) General Security Deed means the General Security Deed dated April 2024 (as annexed at JJ-15 of the First Jean-Louis Affidavit).

(f) Oz Base means Oz Base Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 646 665 974) as trustee for Monaro Holdings Trust Fund (ABN 68 823 241 465).

(g) Payment and Security Deed means the Payment and Security Deed dated 26 April 2024 (as annexed at JJ-12 of the First Jean-Louis Affidavit).

(h) Payments means the Redemption Payments set out in Schedule 7 to the Asset Sale Agreement and/or the Deferred Payments as defined in cl. 1.1 and set out in Annexure A of the Payment and Security Deed.

(i) Specific Security Deed means the Security Deed for Security Interest Shares in Marlu Transport Solutions Pty Ltd dated April 2024 (as annexed at JJ-16 of the First Jean‑Louis Affidavit).

(j) Applicant Related Entities means Oz Base, Marlu Health Pty Ltd, Marlu Resources Group Pty Ltd, Saturn Manu Turnbull, and Alex Bruce McPhee.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The parties to the Company Guarantee are Oz Base, Marlu Health and Marlu Resources as “Guarantors”, Bishop Contracting as the “Creditor” and Marlu as the “Debtor”. The parties to the Personal Guarantee are Mr McPhee and Ms Turnbull as “Guarantors”, Bishop Contracting as the “Creditor” and Marlu as the “Debtor”. The central operative clause of each of the Company Guarantee and the Personal Guarantee is cl 3, which in each case is in the following terms:In consideration of the Creditor executing the Sale Agreement and Security Deed at the request of the Guarantors (which request is evidenced by the Guarantors’ execution of this Deed), the Guarantors, jointly and severally:(a) guarantee to the Creditor that due and punctual observances and performance of all of the covenants, terms and conditions to be observed and performed by the Debtor pursuant to the Sale Agreement and Security Deed;(b) guarantee to the Creditor the due and punctual payment by the Debtor to the Creditor of the Secured Monies; and(c) hereby indemnifies the Creditor and agrees to keep it indemnified from and against all loss, damage, costs and expenses suffered or incurred by the Creditor by reason of any breach or non-performance by the Debtor of any of the covenants, terms and conditions to be observed and performed by the Debtor pursuant to the Sale Agreement and Security Deed.Evidence On the application for interlocutory injunctive relief, Marlu relies upon affidavits of: (a)the Chief Financial Officer of Marlu, Jacques-Benoit Jean-Louis, dated 28 January 2025;(b)Mr Jean-Louis dated 30 January 2025;(c)Mr Jean-Louis dated 5 February 2025;(d)Mr Jean-Louis dated 6 February 2025;(e)the General Manager of Marlu, Christoffer Mattias Pettersson dated 30 January 2025;(f)Marlu’s solicitor, Jason Kristyan De Silva, dated 5 February 2025; (g)Marlu’s solicitor, Jennifer Woodford, dated 30 January 2025; (h)Ms Woodford dated 5 February 2025; and(i)Ms Woodford dated 6 February 2025. The respondents rely upon the affidavit of the second respondent, Mr Bishop, dated 5 February 2025. Mr Bishop is also the co-director, co-shareholder and secretary of each of Bishdun and Bishop Contracting.Serious question to be tried Principles Marlu does not claim that the Asset Sale Agreement is void and does not seek orders declaring the Agreements void. Rather, it contends that one or more of the respondents acted in contravention of the ACL, and the final relief it seeks would have the Court vary the terms of the Asset Sale Agreement and the Payment and Security Deed, so as to reduce the purchase price. If Marlu established a contravention of the ACL, the Court would be empowered to make such additional or other orders as it thought appropriate, in accordance with ss 237 and 241 of the ACL. Marlu contends that its application raises a serious question to be tried. Marlu is required to establish a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial. The strength of the case that must be established depends on the nature of the rights asserted by the applicant and the practical consequences that will flow from the granting of the injunctive relief sought: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at 81-2 [65], 83 [70].

Decision

Reasons for decision

While Mr Bishop’s evidence, if accepted at trial, is capable of providing a defence to the claims made by Marlu (and other arguments may also be available to Bishdun at trial), as noted above, it is not the role of the Court on an application for interlocutory relief to conduct a mini-trial or to determine which party’s evidence is likely to be accepted at trial.Conclusions as to serious question to be tried Marlu’s claim in the proceedings is based on ss 18 and 21 of the ACL. Section 18(1) provides that a person “must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive”. Section 21(1) of the ACL provides:A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person; or(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person;engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. It is unnecessary for present purposes to consider the provisions in ss 21 and 22 which bear on the meaning of “unconscionable” and the matters to which a court must have regard in determining whether a person has contravened s 21(1). A person breaches s 18 of the ACL if, in trade or commerce, they engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. The principles relevant to establishing a breach of s 18 were recently summarised by O’Sullivan J in Chopsonion Pty Ltd (Controllers Appointed) v Watts Meat Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 4 at [487]-[491]. Marlu seeks relief in accordance with ss 237 and 243 of the ACL, in addition to damages under s 236 of the ACL. Marlu’s evidence is that the condition and value of the operating assets were central to its decision to purchase the Nighthawk Transport business. Marlu contends that Bishdun knew that Marlu would rely upon the Second Slattery Valuation in relation to the value of the operating assets – noting that the Slattery valuation was expressly referred to in the Asset Sale Agreement as the basis for identifying the value of the operating assets, and consequently the purchase price – and that information provided by Bishdun to Slattery in connection with the preparation of the Second Slattery Valuation would be relied upon by Marlu. The evidence adduced by Marlu, if accepted, is capable of supporting a conclusion that Bishdun engaged in conduct that should be characterised as representing to Marlu – either directly or through conduct and representations made to Slattery – that the operating assets were in a reasonable condition and free from major unidentified defects that would have significantly impacted upon their value, except where those defects had been noted, and that (again, except where noted) any necessary repairs (at least to certain assets) would be completed before completion of the Asset Sale Agreement. The evidence adduced by Marlu, if accepted, is capable of establishing that at least some of the assets were not in a reasonable condition and that some were subject to substantial defects that adversely affected their value, and thus the overall valuation of the operating assets and the purchase price.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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