Marko v Fegan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Marko v Fegan [2000] FCA 1016

INDUSTRIAL LAW – construction of rules of an organisation – whether officer is to take office upon election when there is a holding over of office of the predecessor – whether rules contravene s 199(1)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) when they operate to enable the holding over of office beyond four years

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 199(1)(a), 209, 215, 215(1)(b)(i), 218 and 255
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 133(1)(db)

Allshorn v Stapleton (1984) 4 FCR 236 - applied
McClure v Mitchell (1974) 24 FLR 115 - cited
Hansch v Transport Union Workers of Australia [2000] FCA 473 - cited

MARKO v FEGAN AND ORS
V 455 of 2000

JUDGE:         MERKEL J
PLACE:         MELBOURNE
DATE:           2 AUGUST 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 455 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

ZORA MARKO
APPLICANT

AND:

PAULINE FEGAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROB McCUBBIN
SECOND RESPONDENT

VERONICA FAHEY
THIRD RESPONDENT

MARIA GORGAL
FOURTH RESPONDENT

NADA VUJASIN
FIFTH RESPONDENT

DAVID BRAY
SIXTH RESPONDENT

SONIA McCORMACK
SEVENETH RESPONDENT

PETER ELLISON
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

DENISE GREGOR
NINTH RESPONDENT

JOANNE BORCI
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT:

1.   Declares that under the Rules of the Health Services Union of Australia the applicant is to take office as the Branch Secretary of the Victoria No 1 Branch of the Union as from the completion of the Annual General Meeting of the Branch due to be held in September 2000.

2.   Directs that within 7 days the parties file and exchange Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 455 of 2000

BETWEEN:

ZORA MARKO
APPLICANT

AND:

PAULINE FEGAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROB McCUBBIN
SECOND RESPONDENT

VERONICA FAHEY
THIRD RESPONDENT

MARIA GORGAL
FOURTH RESPONDENT

NADA VUJASIN
FIFTH RESPONDENT

DAVID BRAY
SIXTH RESPONDENT

SONIA McCORMACK
SEVENETH RESPONDENT

PETER ELLISON
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

DENISE GREGOR
NINTH RESPONDENT

JOANNE BORCI
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE:

2 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The Court has two applications before it. The first is an application pursuant to s 218 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”) for an inquiry relating to an election. The second is an application for orders, pursuant to s 209 of the Act, that the Rules of the Health Services Union of Australia (“the Union”) be performed and observed.

  2. Both applications arise out of the election of the applicant, on 14 June 2000, as Branch Secretary of the Victoria No 1 Branch of the Union.  There is no dispute about the validity of the election but the parties are in dispute as to the date upon which the applicant is to take office as Branch Secretary under the Rules of the Union.  That issue is governed by r 52(b) which…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1016
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Marko v Fegan, the applicant sought interim relief to take office immediately. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Rule 52(b) concerning the timing of the applicant's tenure as Branch Secretary. The court was tasked with determining the proper interpretation of Rule 52(b) in the context of the applicant's election and subsequent resignations and appointments within the union's branch.

The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation of Rule 52(b) of the union's rules, which pertains to the timing of when the Branch Secretary should take office following an election. The applicant argued for an immediate commencement of office upon her election, while the opposing party contended that office should commence at the completion of the Annual General Meeting in September. The court had to examine the plain and ordinary meaning of Rule 52(b) in light of the union's rules and the sequence of events leading to the applicant's election.

The court concluded that the proper interpretation of Rule 52(b) dictated that the applicant's tenure as Branch Secretary should commence at the completion of the Annual General Meeting in September 2000. The court found that the applicant's interpretation, which called for an immediate commencement of office, did not align with the plain language of the rule. The court's decision was based on the established electoral process outlined in Rule 52, which mandates that elections commence in June and conclude by August to enable reporting at the September Annual General Meeting.

Consequently, the court declared that the applicant would take office as Branch Secretary upon the completion of the Annual General Meeting in September 2000. The court also directed the parties to submit minutes of orders for any further actions needed to resolve the matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant applied for interim relief to enable her to take office forthwith. However, when it became clear that the primary issue in dispute between the parties related to the construction of r 52(b), I made directions for a final hearing of that issue.Background The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Ms Armstrong, the previous Branch Secretary, was elected during 1995 and took office as Branch Secretary after the Annual General Meeting in September 1995. On 12 February 1999, Ms Armstrong resigned. Ms Fegan was duly appointed to fill the casual vacancy for the unexpired portion of Ms Armstrong’s term of office, that is, until September 1999. On 21 June 2000 Ms Fegan resigned as Branch Secretary and Mr McCubbin was appointed as Branch Secretary to fill the casual vacancy created by Ms Fegan’s resignation. Section 200(3) of the Act provided that, in those circumstances, the appointments were to be treated as an election to office under the Rules. The Branch Secretary was the Chief Executive Officer of the Branch and, subject to the Rules, had charge of the general conduct, administration and business of the Branch (r 55). Rule 55 also stated that the Branch Secretary was required to call and attend all meetings of the Branch and Branch Committee, unless excused. Rule 52 provided that all officers of the Branch, which included the Branch Secretary (r 48), were to be elected in accordance with the provisions of that rule. The rule stated that the opening date for nominations was to be 1 June in the year of an election and the closing date was to be the last Friday in June at 5.00 pm (r 52(e)(i)). If more nominations were received than there were vacancies for a position then the closing of the ballot should have been not later than 15 August (r 52(e)(viii)). Finally, the Returning Officer was required to report the result of the election to the next Annual General Meeting of the Branch (r 52(e)(xvi)) which was required to be held in the month of September (r 61(b)). Thus, r 52 provides for an electoral process which is to commence in June and be completed in August so as to enable the report of the outcome of the election at the Annual General Meeting in September. The elected officers are then to take office from the completion of that meeting (r 52(b)). In the usual course the officers of the Branch, including the Branch Secretary, would then hold office for a period of four years commencing at the conclusion of the Annual General Meeting of the Branch in the year in which they are elected. The problems that have given rise to the present matter arose because the election of the Branch Secretary was not held during 1999 in accordance with the timetable provided for in r 52. As a result of a number of problems concerning the Electoral Roll of the Branch, proceedings were commenced in the Court for an order for an election inquiry. As a consequence, on 20 May 1999 the Returning Officer, acting pursuant to s 215(1)(b)(i) of the Act, advised the Branch Secretary that he had decided to postpone the election until the proceedings had been concluded. On 14 March 2000 the Court terminated the proceedings in so far as they were relevant to the election of the Branch Secretary. On 24 March 2000 nominations for the Branch Secretary were called for and on 26 April 2000 the nominations closed. The ballot for the election opened on 24 May 2000 and closed on 14 June 2000 when the applicant was declared elected.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the above reasons I am of the view that the applicant’s construction of r 52(b) should not be accepted and, on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the rule, the applicant is to take office from the completion of the Annual General Meeting of the Branch to be held in September 2000.Conclusion For the reasons set out above I have concluded that, under r 52(b), the applicant’s tenure of office as Branch Secretary is to commence from the completion of the Annual General Meeting of the Branch due to be held in September 2000 and not from the date of her election, being 14 June 2000. It must follow that the basis upon which the applicant has sought relief in the two proceedings has not been made out with the consequence that she is not entitled to the ultimate relief that she seeks in her proceedings under ss 209 and 218 of the Act. At the interlocutory stage the parties accepted that it was appropriate to bring the matters on for a final, rather than an interlocutory, hearing. Thus, the issue of whether a Rule to Show Cause should be issued and an order for an Election Inquiry should be made were to be resolved on a final, rather than an interim or interlocutory, basis. In the circumstances it seems appropriate that I grant declaratory relief concerning the construction of r 52(b) but otherwise direct the parties to bring in Minutes of Orders in respect of any further orders that might be appropriate to dispose of the matter. Accordingly, I propose to declare that, in the events that have occurred, upon the proper construction of r 52(b) of the Rules, the applicant is to take office as the Branch Secretary of the Victoria No 1 Branch of the Union as from the completion of the Annual General Meeting of the Branch to be held in September 2000.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established