Legal Research
Cases
Manning v Matsen

Manning v Matsen

Case [2015] NSWSC 1801 11 December 2015

Family Provision

Adequate Provision

Notational Estate

Relevant Property Transaction

Succession Law

No judgment structure available for this case.

Type to search within this case.

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: Manning v Matsen [2015] NSWSC 1801
Hearing dates: 15 December, 27 & 28 November 2014, 24 April 2015
Date of orders: 11 December 2015
Decision date: 11 December 2015
Jurisdiction: Equity
Before: Slattery J
Decision:
An order for family provision would be inutile because the estate has insufficient funds, and no order for notional estate is available.

Catchwords:
SUCCESSION – family provision – claim under Succession Act, Part 3.2 for provision out of deceased’s estate – plaintiff is daughter of deceased who died leaving a small estate in cash – deceased’s will makes no provision for the plaintiff – whether adequate provision has been made for the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life of the plaintiff – whether an order for provision should be made under Succession Act, Part 3.2 – where estate has insufficient available assets to order family provision – where deceased entered transaction three and half years before her death transferring an estate in remainder in her only real property to her son (the plaintiff’s only sibling) and his wife – the son and his wife still hold the property so transferred to them – whether the Court should under Succession Act, Part 3.3 designate the son’s interest in property as notional estate – valuation of reversion and life interest – what constitutes a relevant property transaction – whether transfer of life interest to remaindermen upon death is a relevant property transaction – when relevant property transaction takes effect – whether deceased’s failure to set aside deed constituted a relevant property transaction
WORDS & PHRASES – “relevant property transaction” – “full valuable consideration” – reasonable expectations in relation to property”
Legislation Cited: Adoption Information Act 1990
Real Property Act 1900, s 101
Succession Act 2006, ss 8, 57, 59, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 87
Cases Cited: Aboody v Ryan [2012] NSWCA 395; 17 BPR 32,359
Attorney-General v Boden [1912] 1 KB 539
Attorney-General v Earl of Sandwich [1922] 2 KB 500
Aubrey v Kain [2014] NSWSC 15
Drury v Smith [2012] NSWSC 1067
Evans v Levy [2011] NSWCA 125
Hogan v Hogan [2013] NSWSC 1405
John v John [2010] NSWSC 937
Kastrounis v Foundouradakis [2012] NSWSC 264
Phillips v James [2014] NSWCA 4; 85 NSWLR 619
Perpetual Trustee Co Limited v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Hordern’s case) (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 453; 92 WN (NSW) 163
Petschelt v Petschelt [2002] NSWSC 706
Ramsay v Schiller [2012] NSWSC 596
Re Marriott, deceased [1968] VR 260
Ryan v Aboody [2012] NSWSC 136
Singer v Berghouse (No. 2) (1994) 181 CLR 201
Wade v Harding (1997) 11 NSWLR 551
Wentworth v Wentworth [1992] NSWCA 268
Texts Cited: Macquarie Dictionary (online edition, 2015)
PJ Butt, Land law (6th ed 2010, Thomson Reuters)
C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (8th ed 2012, London, Sweet & Maxwell)
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Plaintiff: Sharon Lee Manning
Defendant: Wayne…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Manning v Matsen

Details

AGLC: Manning v Matsen [2015] NSWSC 1801
Case: [2015] NSWSC 1801
Decision Date: 11 December 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Manning v Matsen was a case heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the plaintiff, the daughter of the deceased, sought a claim under the Succession Act for provision out of her father's estate. The deceased left a small estate consisting primarily of cash and a life estate in real property, with the remainder interest held by the plaintiff's brother. The deceased's will made no provision for the plaintiff, who argued that she had not been adequately provided for in terms of her maintenance, education, and advancement in life. The court was tasked with determining whether an order for provision should be made and, if so, what amount would be appropriate.

The legal issues in the case included the definition and application of the term "relevant property transaction" under the Succession Act, the timing of such transactions, and whether the transfer of a life estate to the remaindermen constituted a relevant property transaction. The court also had to consider whether the deceased's failure to set aside the deed of transfer constituted a relevant property transaction and whether the son's interest in the property should be designated as a notional estate under the Act. Furthermore, the court needed to assess the valuation of the reversion and life interest in the property and determine whether the estate had sufficient available assets to order family provision.

The court found that the transfer of the life estate to the remaindermen upon the deceased's death did not constitute a relevant property transaction because it occurred after the death and therefore could not be considered in determining the adequacy of provision for the plaintiff. The court also determined that the deceased's failure to set aside the deed of transfer did not constitute a relevant property transaction. The court held that the son's interest in the property should not be designated as a notional estate because the property had not been transferred for full valuable consideration. The court valued the reversion and life interest in the property and concluded that the estate did not have sufficient available assets to order family provision for the plaintiff.

The court ordered that no provision be made out of the estate for the plaintiff, as the deceased had made adequate provision for her maintenance, education, and advancement in life through the transfer of the life estate in the real property to the plaintiff's brother. The court held that the deceased had acted reasonably in setting aside the life estate for the benefit of the plaintiff's brother, taking into account the reasonable expectations in relation to property and the overall circumstances of the estate.

Orders