DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Manning v CSR Limited [2008] QDC 36
PARTIES:
DANIEL PAUL MANNING (Applicant)
AND
CSR LIMITED (ABN 90 000 001 276) (Respondent)
FILE NOS:
258/07
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Maroochydore District Court
DELIVERED ON:
7.3.08
DELIVERED AT:
Maroochydore
HEARING DATE:
29.2.08
JUDGE:
Judge J.M. Robertson
ORDER:
Application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
Limitation of Actions- whether specialist’s opinion that knee injury was permanent and/or change of employment were facts of a material and decisive nature.
Legislation:
Limitation of Actions Act 1974
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003Cases Considered:
[1] Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Limited [1988] 2 Qd R 325.
Pizer v Ansett Australia Limited QCA 29
[2] Taggart v The Workers Compensation Board of Queensland [1985] 2 Qd R 19
[3] Greenhalgh v Bacas Training Limited & Ors [2007] QCA 327
[4]
COUNSEL:
Mr. de Plater for the applicant
Mr. Morton for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Shultz Toomey O’Brien Lawyers for the applicant
CLS Lawyers for the respondent[1] The applicant, Mr. Daniel Manning suffered an injury to his knee at work on 29 September 2004. He was then employed by the respondent CSR Limited at its PGH Brickworks plant at Cooroy. His knee struck the engine cowling of a forklift that he was using to collect bricks from a drying kiln at about 9pm. The knee swelled immediately and he was unable to complete his shift. By the next day, he was in severe pain and unable to attend work.
[2] Mr. Manning now applies pursuant to s.31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 to extend the limitation period until 8 December 2007. By reason of s.11 of that Act the limitation period expired on 29.9.2007.
[3] Mr. Manning did not consult a solicitor about his claim until October 2007, that is after the expiration of the limitation period.
[4] His claim is governed by the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 which was in force at the time of his accident. On 19.11.07 Judge Dodds granted leave to the applicant pursuant to s.298 of that Act to commence proceedings notwithstanding non-compliance with the Act, which leave was with the consent of the respondent subject to a number of conditions, one of which was the making of this application.
[5] To succeed with this application Mr. Manning must satisfy me “ that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within his means of knowledge … until a date after the commencement of the year preceding the expiration of the limitation period, and that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a limitation defence”: s.31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
[6] As to the “right of action” requirement, Mr. Morton concedes on behalf of the respondent that there is such evidence.
[7] In Pizer v Ansett Australia Limited QCA 29 [at 16] Thomas JA stated the correct approach as follows:
“If a reasonable (person) knowing what the plaintiff must have known, and…
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- Manning v CSR Limited [2008] QDC 36
- Case
- [2008] QDC 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the claimant's knee injury being deemed permanent by a specialist and the subsequent change in employment were events that would trigger the limitation period under the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court had to consider whether these events constituted facts of a material and decisive nature under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, which would affect the period within which a claim could be brought. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether these events should have been considered by the claimant at the time they occurred to determine the start of the limitation period.
The Queensland Court of Appeal reviewed the relevant legislation and considered previous cases such as Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Limited, Taggart v The Workers Compensation Board of Queensland, and Pizer v Ansett Australia Limited. The court found that neither the specialist's opinion on the permanency of the injury nor the change in employment were facts of a material and decisive nature that would trigger the limitation period. The court concluded that the claimant had sufficient information at the time of the injury and subsequent employment change to initiate a claim within the statutory period. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
The court's decision was based on the understanding that the claimant was already aware of the injury and its potential consequences at the time of the events in question. The court held that these events did not constitute new or unforeseen facts that would materially alter the limitation period. Therefore, the limitation period began to run from the date of the initial injury, and the application to extend the limitation period was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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