Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board [2023] FCA 666
File number(s):
NSD 1348 of 2021
Judgment of:
THAWLEY J
Date of judgment:
21 June 2023
Catchwords:
HUMAN RIGHTS – application for leave pursuant to s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – where complaint of discrimination was terminated by the Australian Human Rights Commission – whether claims of unlawful discrimination are reasonably arguable and not fanciful – leave refused
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THAWLEY J:
Daniel Makowski contends he was discriminated against on the ground of disability by the Legal Profession Admission Board (the LPAB). Mr Makowski lodged a complaint against the LPAB with the Australian Human Rights Commission. His complaint was terminated by the Commission. He now wishes to obtain relief against the LPAB in this Court, alleging contraventions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act). Mr Makowski requires leave to commence these proceedings: s 46PO(3A) of theAustralian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act).
Mr Makowski relies on two affidavits sworn by him. The LPAB opposed the orders sought, relying on an affidavit affirmed by its Executive Officer, Christopher Banks. All affidavits were taken as read. Both parties have filed written submissions. The matter was initially listed for an oral hearing on 15 June 2023. Following clarification from the parties about their preferences in this respect, the parties agreed that the application should be determined on the papers.
For…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The matter of Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board involved the applicant, Mr Makowski, who sought leave to commence proceedings against the Legal Profession Admission Board (LPAB) for alleged unlawful discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). The complaint was lodged with the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and subsequently terminated, prompting Mr Makowski to seek judicial review of this decision. The core issue before the court was whether Mr Makowski's claims of unlawful discrimination were reasonably arguable and not fanciful, thus warranting the grant of leave to commence proceedings. The court had to determine if the AHRC's decision to terminate the complaint was justified.
The court found that the AHRC's decision to terminate the complaint was reasonable. It noted that Mr Makowski's claim of direct discrimination failed as it was unclear how his disability was a factor in the LPAB's decisions to deny his requests to sit subjects out of order. Furthermore, the court held that Mr Makowski had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between his disability and the requirement to complete the course as per the Progression Rule. Regarding indirect discrimination, the court observed that Mr Makowski did not adequately explain how his disability prevented him from complying with the course progression rules. Additionally, the court considered the significant delay in lodging the complaint and noted that Mr Makowski could have pursued his complaint concurrently with other legal proceedings. The court concluded that the claims of discrimination were not reasonably arguable, and therefore, leave to commence proceedings should be refused.
Accordingly, the court refused leave to make an application under section 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) and dismissed the originating application. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to make an application to this Court under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) be refused.
2. The originating application be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
For the reasons that follow, leave to commence proceedings should be refused.BACKGROUND The LPAB is a corporation constituted under s 19(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW). It administers a Diploma in Law course which provides a pathway to entry into the legal profession. Eligibility to sit the course exams (and therefore subjects) are governed by the NSW Admission Board Rules 2015, which include:•Students must generally complete exams in the order specified in the Rules until they have completed at least 11 subjects: r 59(1);•Students may generally undertake only two exams in any one session until they have completed at least eight subjects: r 59(3); and•Students will be excluded from taking further exams if, among other things, they fail to sit an exam in at least two subjects in any two successive sessions: r 64. Each of the rules above may be relaxed in circumstances that are “sufficiently special”: r 59(4). In the case of the first two rules above (Progression Rules), the power is conferred on the LPAB Examinations Committee or its delegate: rr 27J(3), 59(4). Students may apply for Special Exam Arrangements, supported by medical evidence, in order to accommodate a disability, illness or other circumstance that may affect the student’s performance in an examination. The LPAB registered Mr Makowski as a student on 30 August 2017. On two occasions Mr Makowski applied for, and was granted, Special Exam Arrangements. His first application, lodged on 22 January 2018, contained a form completed by Dr John Pak which stated that Mr Makowski was diagnosed with “Anxiety/Depression”. The form stated: Anxiety can cause him to become easily stressed and it also makes it difficult to maintain concentration, especially if and when he sleeps poorly. …When and if possible, it will help him to sit the exams in late afternoons and evening time. This will allow him to have less anxiousness in the evening before and let him sleep better by avoiding the fear of waking up late and having to rush to the exam. On 4 February 2018, Mr Makowski lodged his second application form filled out by Dr Pak who stated that he had seen Mr Makowski once in the past 12 months and that he was undergoing “no regular treatment”. The form included: He finds himself becoming anxious when he had to share the same space with a large number of people.…He should be allowed to have the exam either alone or with plentiful space around him so as to ameliorate anxiety/stress. The LPAB made arrangements for Mr Makowski to sit his exams at a different time to other students and in a separate room away from other exam venues. In Term 2 of 2018, Mr Makowski failed the subject “04 Contracts”. He then made a “Student Course Application” (SCA), applying for a relaxation of the Progression Rules such that he could undertake three subjects the following term: 04 Contracts; 05 Real Property and 06 Australian Constitutional Law (ACL) (SCA #1). The application was granted.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 6 August 2019, the Board affirmed the SCA #3 Officer Decision (Appeal Decision). The Board reviewed the SCA #3 Officer Decision on both procedural grounds and on its merits. This included a consideration of Mr Makowski’s reliance on his disabilities as a ground for the grant of the application to sit subjects out of order. The Board’s reasons included:23.… While Mr Makowski’s disability provides a proper basis for special arrangements for sitting examinations alone or with plenty of space around him, the Board is not satisfied that Mr Makowski’s disability provides a justification for the relaxation of rules 53 and 59 so as to enable him to sit subjects in the order he seeks. It follows that for the purposes of rules 13(1) and 59(4) the Board does not regard the circumstances as sufficiently special to relax rules 53 and 59. On 16 September 2019, Mr Makowski requested a review of the SCA #2 Committee Decision. The Board affirmed this decision on 1 October 2019. On 15 October 2019, Mr Makowski made a fourth SCA for relaxation of the Progression Rules. On 18 October 2019, Mr Makowski was notified that he was excluded from the Diploma of law course due to failing to sit at least two exams in two successive sessions, pursuant to the exclusion rule set out in [4] above. Mr Makowski sought judicial review of the SCA #2 Committee Decision and the SCA #3 Officer Decision in the NSW Supreme Court. That proceeding was dismissed: Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 443. He then sought leave to appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which was dismissed: Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board [2020] NSWCA 305. Mr Makowski subsequently sought special leave to the High Court of Australia, which was refused: Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board [2021] HCASL 36. On 28 March 2021, Mr Makowski lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging that the LPAB had engaged in unlawful discrimination under the DD Act, namely in its handling of SCA #2 and SCA #3. The complaint referred to the SCA #2 Officer Decision, SCA #2 Committee Decision and SCA #3 Officer Decision. On 10 November 2021, the Commission terminated Mr Makowski’s complaint pursuant to s 46PH(1)(c) of the AHRC Act which provides:Termination of complaintDiscretionary termination of complaint(1) The President may terminate a complaint on any of the following grounds:…(c)the President is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that an inquiry, or the continuation of an inquiry, into the complaint is not warranted; … Mr Makowski was provided with a notice of termination which annexed the Commission’s reasons for the termination. These reasons included:…Apparent merit of the complaint …Claim of direct discriminationIt is understood that the subject matter of your complaint to the Commission relates to:•LPAB’s decision(s) on the SCA #2 (as affirmed by [the SCA #2 Committee Decision], the Appeal Decision and the Review Decision), and •LPAB’s decision not to process the SCA #3 [SCA #3 Officer Decision].From the information provided to the Commission, it appears that your disability was not a relevant factor in the [SCA #2 Officer Decision] or [the SCA #2 Committee Decision]. As you note in your correspondence to LPAB on 22 July 2019, SCA #2 “did not contain the justification of [your] disability”. As such, it is unclear how you were treated less favourably in these decisions because of your disability.Based on the information before the Commission, it appears that your disability was first raised as a ground for the request to study subjects out-of-order in SCA #3. While SCA #3 refers to your disability, LPAB submits that no explanation was provided as to how your disability impacts on your ability to sit the Course in the prescribed order and no supporting medical information was provided for the request. As such, the LPAB concludes in the Appeal Decision that the information provided by you about your disability was not accepted as a satisfactory justification for the relaxation of the Progression Rule.I do not consider that the information before me supports that LPAB’s decisions with respect of your applications to sit subjects out of order were made because of your disabilities.I also do not consider that LPAB being aware of your disabilities, in and of itself supports your claim that LPAB’s refusal to relax the Progression Rule amounts to disability discrimination. I note that no medical information appears to have been provided to support how relaxation of the Progression Rule was an adjustment you required to accommodate your disabilities. In particular, there does not appear to be any information to support how your disabilities prevented you from studying subjects in a different order. This is in contrast to the medical information from Dr Pak which identified adjustments you required (and which were provided by LPAB) to address your anxiety with respect of examinations.It is also unclear how the [SCA #3 Officer Decision] not to progress the SCA #3 could amount to direct disability discrimination. It appears that the reason the LPAB decided not to process this application is because the Examination Committee had already considered the same request in SCA #2. In the letter to you regarding the [SCA #3 Officer Decision], you were informed that you could appeal the [SCA #2 Committee Decision] to the LPAB.I also note, from the Appeal Decision, that LPAB did consider SCA #3 on its merits and found that the information provided did not form satisfactory justification for the approval of the request.Claim of indirect disability discrimination In relation to a possible claim of indirect disability discrimination, it appears that the requirement or condition imposed by LPAB was that you complete the Course as per the Progression Rule.From the information provided to the Commission, you do not appear to have provided explanation of a causal nexus between your disability and the request to do the course out-of-order.I note that your correspondence to LPAB dated 22 July 2019 titled “Review”, which you provided as part of your further submissions on 19 October 2021, states that “for evidence of my affliction I make reference to the grant of ‘special arrangements’ as a ‘reasonable adjustment’ the Board has afforded me in sitting all my examinations… as completed by my treating physician, Dr John Pak”. You also state in your written submission to the Commission dated 19 October 2021 that “by already having in possession the general evidence of [your] disability ([applications for Special Exam Arrangements]), the LPAB would, upon accepting the Nexus Petition, either relax the Progression Rule on that basis, or request more detailed particulars from Dr Pak so as to grant the relaxation”.However, it is very unclear from Dr Pak’s statements in [the applications for Special Exam Arrangements] or your correspondence to LPAB how you say you were unable to comply with the requirement to complete the Course as per the Progression Rule because of your disability.Additionally, in considering the [SCA #3 Officer Decision] not to process SCA #3, it appears that the requirement or condition imposed on you by LPAB is that you follow the process of appeal from a decision of the Examination Committee. It is very unclear how you say you were unable to comply with this requirement because of your disability.Length of time in lodging the complaint As noted above, your complaint relates to LPAB’s decision(s) on the SCA #2 (as affirmed by [the SCA #2 Committee Decision], the Appeal Decision and the Review Decision) and the [SCA #3 Officer Decision] not to progress the SCA #3. These decisions were made in the period 16 May 2019 to 8 October 2019.Your complaint to the Commission is dated 28 March 2021. Therefore, your complaint relates to alleged events that occurred at least 16 to 22 months prior to lodgement of your complaint with this Commission. This is a delay in bringing the complaint forward.I appreciate that the LPAB’s decisions being complained of have been the subject of a number of legal proceedings in the period 1 July 2019 to 4 March 2021. You state that you delayed filing the complaint with the Commission to avoid the “prejudice in the administration of justice”. However, while based on the same underlying conduct, the legal proceedings considered different legal issues to the complaint currently before the Commission.I appreciate that you say you are [an] “inexperienced and self-represented litigant” and that “[your] disability [was] a fact in issue in the legal proceedings”. However, I consider that, concurrent with the legal proceedings, you could have lodged, or sought assistance to lodge, your complaint of unlawful disability discrimination with this Commission closer to the time of the alleged events.…
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ultimately, the case must be sufficiently arguable to warrant the grant of leave when considered together with any other factors relevant to whether leave should be granted. If the case is “fanciful”, leave would ordinarily be refused. If the case is “reasonably arguable”, and there is no other factor tending against granting leave, then leave would ordinarily be granted. There may be cases which do not fit neatly into either description.CONSIDERATIONDirect discrimination In relation to direct discrimination, Mr Makowski must demonstrate that because of his disability, he was treated less favourably by the LPAB than a student with no disability in the same circumstances. This is an inquiry into the true basis or real reason for the relevant action: Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) [2003] HCA 62; 217 CLR 92 at [13] (Gleeson CJ), [166] (McHugh and Kirby JJ). Mr Makowski’s submissions on direct discrimination included the following:31. The Applicant’s claim under s 5 of the DD Act shows that the Respondent -(a)was cognizant from January 2018 that the Applicant was diagnosed with Anxiety and Depression in 2004, and that this “[]Confidential[]” information of the Applicant’s disability was approved again pursuant to a subsequent [special arrangements for examinations] for the Applicant to sit his examinations;(b)was authorised by the Applicant’s hand of 4 February 2019, “to clarify details of the [Applicant’s] condition as outlined in this form [(Anxiety and Depression)] for the purposes of making appropriate educational adjustments”; and(c)was informed of the Applicant’s “burden” justification for why he required the relaxation from under ss 53 and 59(1) of the [NSW Admissions Board Rules]. In relation to [1] of the originating application, the LPAB submitted that, although Mr Makowski had raised his disability as a reason for relaxing the Progression Rules by the time he made SCA #3, the basis for refusing to process SCA #3 was the LPAB Officer’s view that Mr Makowski had an appeal right from the SCA #2 Committee Decision. Mr Makowski’s submissions in reply about the nature of the SCA #3 Officer’s Decision included:8.For the Respondent to have represented to the Australian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) that the decision to refuse to process SCA #3 was “procedural” invites the not unreasonable proposition that the Respondent’s procedures are themselves deficient to the extent of being discriminatory. This is because in circumstances where SCA #3 contained the Applicant’s disability justification, SCA #3 was prevented from being assessed and thus denied the grant of a benefit which was being granted - as if - by default. Consequently, from its decision to refuse to process SCA #3, the Respondent subjected the Applicant to detriment in two (2) respects:(i) With the Applicant’s file … having become opened at the executive level, it is submitted that the Respondent was taken to be cognisant of the fact that the Applicant required the dispensation which SCA #3 sought, so as to avoid the detriment of not progressing in the course of studies. This is because the dispensation would have prevented r 64 of the [NSW Admissions Board Rules] to arise and exclude the Applicant from the course; and (ii) it would have prevented the Applicant from having to attempt to return to the course of studies by initiating lengthy and expensive legal proceedings.