FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 321
Citation: Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 321 Appeal from: Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 719 Parties: LIKUMBO MAKASA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 2065 of 2011 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 2 April 2012 Catchwords: IMMIGRATION – Visas – cancellation – on character grounds – whether ‘Direction (No. 41)—Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501’ cll 10.1(2) and 10.1.2(1) are directed to conduct which has been found to have occurred – whether cll 10.1(2) and 10.1.2(1) are also directed to conduct which is apprehended to have occurred – whether jurisdictional error – remittal, scope of Legislation: Constitution s 75(v)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 33, 44
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499(1), 500(1)(b), 501
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66C(3)Direction (No. 41)—Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 cll 10, 10.1, 10.1.2
Aronson M, Dyer B, Groves M, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed, Lawbook Co., 2009)
Bennion F, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (5th ed, LexisNexis, 2008)Cases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 cited
Bhullar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1337 cited
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited
Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 considered
Rosson v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390; [2011] FCA 194 followed
Shi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 123 ALD 46; [2011] FCA 935 followedDate of hearing: 16 March 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SA Beckett, Mr A Ahmad Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms NL Sharp Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2065 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: LIKUMBO MAKASA
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 APRIL 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to quash its decision of 18 October 2011.
2.Order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to determine Mr Makasa’s application under s 500(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as taxed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2065 of 2011
ON…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Makasa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] FCA 321
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to address whether the AAT's interpretation of the 'Direction (No. 41)—Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501' clauses 10.1(2) and 10.1.2(1) was correct. Specifically, the court examined whether these clauses were intended to be applied to conduct that had actually occurred, or whether they could also apply to conduct that was merely apprehended to occur. The court concluded that these clauses are designed to assess identified past conduct and not to evaluate conduct that is merely anticipated. The AAT had misapplied the criteria by considering apprehended conduct, which was identified as a jurisdictional error.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the AAT had not adhered to the correct legal principles in evaluating the risk posed by Mr Makasa to the Australian community. This misapplication led to an incorrect determination of the matter at hand. Consequently, the court issued a writ of certiorari to quash the AAT's decision and a writ of mandamus to direct the AAT to reassess Mr Makasa's application in accordance with the law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay Mr Makasa's costs.
The court's final orders mandated the AAT to reconsider Mr Makasa's visa application under the correct legal framework, ensuring that any future decision would be based on identified past conduct rather than apprehensions of future conduct. The Minister was also required to cover the costs incurred by Mr Makasa as a result of the legal proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to quash its decision of 18 October 2011.
2. Order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to determine Mr Makasa’s application under s 500(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as taxed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Direction sets out in cl 10 the ‘primary considerations’ which must be taken into account when making a visa cancellation decision. Clause 10.1 deals in detail with the topic of the protection of the Australian community. Clause 10.1(2) is but part of that overall structure. There is no doubt, as the Minister correctly submitted, that cl 10.1 is not an exhaustive statement of the matters which can be taken into account in assessing the protection of the community: Rosson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390 at 396 [19]; [2011] FCA 194 at [19]; Shi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 123 ALD 46 at 48 [9]; [2011] FCA 935 at [9]. But this does not mean that cl 10.1 authorises the assessment of a risk of harm divorced from findings of actual past conduct. The conduct referred to in cl 10.1.2 is the same conduct referred to in cl 10(1)(c) which provides (relevantly):In deciding whether to refuse to grant a person a visa or cancel a person’s visa, the following (the primary considerations) are to be considered:…(c)the length of time that the person has been ordinarily resident in Australia prior to engaging in criminal activity, or other relevant conduct; and[Emphasis in italics added.] Consequently, cl 10 assumes that its subject matter is identified past conduct. The non-exhaustive nature of clause 10.1(2) therefore operates not so as to permit an examination of matters ranging beyond identified past conduct but rather only so as to allow an assessment of that identified conduct from perspectives other than its seriousness and nature (subclause (a)) or the risk that it might be repeated (subclause (b)). For completeness it should be noted that the Tribunal considered its approach authorised by cl 10.1.2(1), which permits recourse to a person’s ‘previous general conduct’. Having noted, with respect correctly, that general conduct was not confined to proven criminal conduct, the Tribunal concluded that the concept would ‘include any apprehended harmful conduct in relation to which there is a rational and reasonable basis for apprehending a relevant degree of risk of the person’s causal involvement’ (at [120]). This, with respect, is not correct: cl 10.1 requires the identification of past conduct, not an impressionistic appraisal of that which may be reasonably apprehended to have happened. The process of reasonable apprehension is relevant but only once the past conduct is identified and only for the purpose of assessing the future harm to the community. The Tribunal therefore identified the wrong question and, in consequence, did not answer the correct question. This is a jurisdictional error in the hands of an administrative tribunal: Craig v South Australia at 179; Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Writs of certiorari and mandamus will, therefore, issue and the Minister must pay Mr Makasa’s costs as taxed or agreed. Mr Makasa also submitted that the Tribunal’s conclusions about the risk he posed to the community were not based on any probative material. It is not necessary to consider whether this is correct or not. Had it been necessary, however, my view would have been that the Tribunal was very careful and thorough in its treatment of the evidence and that the material before it was sufficient to answer the questions it posed for itself. The problem is that the incorrect questions were asked. Nor would I have accepted, had it arisen, Mr Makasa’s argument that the Tribunal, in discounting the degree of contact he had with his son, had overlooked the fact of his having been in gaol. The Tribunal was plainly cognisant of this fact.