Madeleine Louise Sweeney bhnf Norma Bell v Thornton

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[2012] HCATrans 058

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S321 of 2011

B e t w e e n -

MADELEINE LOUISE SWEENEY BHNF NORMA BELL

Applicant

and

ANDREW JOHN THORNTON

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 2012, AT 11.44 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR B.M. TOOMEY, QC:   May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR E.G. ROMANIUK, for the applicant.  (instructed by Matthews Folbigg Pty Limited)

MR R.R. STITT, QC:   May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friends, MR D.M. WILSON and MS C.O. GLEESON, for the respondent.  (instructed by Hunt & Hunt Lawyers)

FRENCH CJ:   Thank you.  Yes, Mr Toomey.

MR TOOMEY:   May it please your Honours.  Your Honours, in the 109 years that this Court has been sitting it has not, so far as we are able to discover, dealt with any claim by a learner driver against the supervisor/instructor.

FRENCH CJ:   Did they have learner drivers 109 years ago?

MR TOOMEY:   They probably would have been teaching them how to drive Stanley Steamers, your Honour.  But there are, of course, the three well known cases.  There was the 1974 case of Chang v Chang, there was Cook v Cook in 1986 and there was Imbree v McNeilly in 2009.  This case raises the question of the duty owed by the instructor/supervisor to the learner.  It is, in our respectful submission, a point which has got to be determined.  It is true that the Court looked at the duties and distinctions between an instructor and a supervisor in Imbree v McNeilly but it was obiter because the duty concerned with there was the duty owed by the learner driver to the tutor.  This case raises fairly and squarely the duty of the instructor/tutor to the learner.

FRENCH CJ:   Was there a factual difference between the primary judge in the Court of Appeal in relation to the speed at which the applicant entered the bend?

MR TOOMEY:   Your Honour, there was no evidence as to the speed at which the applicant entered the bend.  The expert said there was no evidence on which any opinion could be given on that.  The primary judge and the Court of Appeal both found that the speed in the bend was 70.  We challenged the finding at first instance by notice of contention and we maintain that challenge in this Court.

FRENCH CJ:   So, as I understand it, the primary judge found that the speed of entry was not reasonable in the circumstance.  I think that was the conclusion, was it not?

MR TOOMEY:   Your Honour, I think it was not so much the speed of entry, but the speed at the time that the vehicle ‑ ‑ ‑

FRENCH CJ:   That the accident occurred.

MR TOOMEY:   ‑ ‑ ‑ lost adhesion was unreasonable.  Having made…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCATrans 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Madeleine Louise Sweeney, by her next friend Norma Bell, brought proceedings against Thornton. The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1988* (NSW) (the Act) in relation to a claim for damages arising from a motor accident. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant, as the driver of a vehicle involved in a single-vehicle accident, could recover damages for her injuries under the Act, notwithstanding that she was the sole occupant of the vehicle and the accident was caused by her own negligence. Specifically, the court had to determine if the definition of "motor accident" in section 3 of the Act encompassed an accident caused solely by the driver's own negligence, and if so, whether the driver could be considered an "injured person" within the meaning of the Act.

The High Court, comprising French CJ and Gummow J, considered the purpose and wording of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1988* (NSW). Their Honours noted that the Act was designed to provide compensation for persons injured in motor accidents. They concluded that the definition of "motor accident" in section 3 of the Act did not require the involvement of another vehicle or person, and that an accident caused by the sole negligence of the driver could still constitute a "motor accident" for the purposes of the Act. Furthermore, they held that the driver, being injured in such an accident, qualified as an "injured person" entitled to claim compensation under the scheme established by the Act.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the lower court.

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