FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lusty v CRA20 [2020] FCA 1737
File number: NSD 653 of 2020 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 3 December 2020 Catchwords: CONTEMPT OF COURT – sentencing – contempt of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission – contempt punishable as contempt of Federal Court – respondent in contempt by refusing to answer questions in examination – where respondent pleaded guilty – where respondent did not subsequently purge contempts despite opportunities to do so – where summons no longer extant - fixed term of imprisonment imposed Legislation: Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 7, 7C, 20, 21, 22, 28, 30, 34A, 34B, 46B
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Special Operation Authorisation and Determination (High Risk and Emerging Drugs No. 4) 2018
Criminal Code (Cth) Part 9.1, Division 400
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Part 42
Cases cited: Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425
Anderson v BYF19 [2019] FCA 1959
Anderson v DKH18 [2018] FCA 1571
Anderson v DKH18 (No 2) [2019] FCA 1352
Anderson v GPY18 [2019] FCA 954
Anderson v XLVII [2015] FCA 19
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4pc.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949; (2002) 121 FCR 24
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jutsen (No 6) [2012] FCA 809
Corruption and Crime Commission v Allbeury et al (No 2) [2011] WASC 26; (2011) 205 A Crim R 386
Hannaford v HH [2010] FCA 1214; (2010) 205 A Crim R 366
Hannaford v HH (No 2) [2012] FCA 560; (2012) 203 FCR 501
Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520
Hughes v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2004] FCAFC 319; (2004) 247 FCR 277
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83; (2006) 149 FCR 494
The Queen v Pham [2015] HCA 39; (2015) 256 CLR 550
Vaysman v Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc [2011] FCAFC 17; (2011) 276 ALR 596
Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116
Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584
Wood v Galea [1995] NSWSC 100; (1995) 79 A Crim R 567
Wood v Staunton (No 5) (1996) 86 A Crim R 183
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings Number of paragraphs: 62 Date of last submissions: 23 November 2020 Date of hearing: 9 November 2020 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr C Hutchins of Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D McMahon Solicitor for the Respondent: Murphy’s Lawyers Inc ORDERS
NSD 653 of 2020 BETWEEN: DAVID LUSTY, AN EXAMINER APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 46B OF THE AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION ACT 2002 (CTH)
Applicant
AND: CRA20
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM…
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- AGLC
- Lusty v CRA20 [2020] FCA 1737
- Case
- [2020] FCA 1737
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine an appropriate sentence for the respondent's contempt, considering factors such as the seriousness of the offence, the respondent's deliberate and repeated refusal to answer questions, and the impact of his conduct on the ongoing investigation. The court also needed to assess the mitigating factor of the respondent's claimed fear for his safety, which was deemed insufficient to warrant significant weight in sentencing.
The court imposed a fixed term of imprisonment of eight months for the respondent, noting that this sentence would be reconsidered if the respondent chose to purge his contempt. The court highlighted the importance of the ACIC's examination process in obtaining information relevant to their functions and the necessity of general deterrence in such cases. The court also emphasised that generalised fears of retribution do not constitute a valid reason for refusing to provide information, as it would impede the exercise of powers to investigate criminal activities.
The court ordered the respondent to be imprisoned for eight months, with the custodial period running from 3 December 2020 to 2 August 2021. A warrant for the respondent's committal to prison was to be issued, and the parties were at liberty to apply if the respondent chose to purge his contempt. Additionally, the respondent was to pay the applicant's costs of the application if not agreed upon. The orders previously made prohibiting the publication of the respondent's name and suppressing access to the court file were to continue.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent is to be imprisoned for a period of 8 months.
2. The custodial period of 8 months imprisonment is to date from 3 December 2020 to 2 August 2021.
3. A warrant for the respondent’s committal to prison be issued and with a copy of these Orders, be provided to Corrective Services NSW.
4. The parties be at liberty to apply in the event that the respondent purges his contempt.
5. The orders previously made prohibiting the publication of the respondent’s name, and suppressing access to the court file are to continue.
6. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application to be assessed if not agreed.
7. There be liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In GPY18 at [29] Banks-Smith J provided an analysis of some of the sentences imposed for the offence of contempt, including for the refusal or failure to answer questions, which reflects the breadth of the sentencing options.Consideration The respondent’s contempt was deliberate. The respondent was repeatedly informed of the consequences of his refusal to answer the questions and given every opportunity to speak to his counsel to obtain legal advice and to consider that legal advice. In the context of the statutory scheme, this offence of contempt is properly characterised as serious: see for example: DKH18 at [18]-[24]. As I observed in BYF19 at [54], the respondent’s approach in refusing to answer questions undercuts the effectiveness of the scheme which authorises these compulsory examinations. The examination processes would be hamstrung if all witnesses adopted the approach that the respondent has taken. The investigations of which the examination was a part, are of significant importance to the protection of the broader community. The serious impact on the community of illicit drug use and supply, and associated crime is uncontentious. General deterrence must necessarily play a prominent role in any such sentence. The special intelligence operation is ongoing and the applicant deposed that a delay in the continuation of the examination has already impacted adversely on the ACIC’s ability to obtain and analyse current intelligence relating to the special operation. The respondent took issue with the evidence presented by the applicant, which resulted in leave being granted to the applicant to file additional material. I will return to this topic below. That said, I am satisfied that the respondent’s conduct frustrated and impeded the examination and, in turn, the progress of the ACIC investigation. The respondent has chosen not to purge his contempt despite subsequently being given repeated opportunities to do so. In the context of declining to give any reason for the refusal to answer the questions, when asked by the applicant if he had any fears or concerns, the respondent said “Just for my safety, that’s it”, but when invited to elaborate on that by the applicant, he declined to do so. It is also apparent from the transcript of the examination that his counsel informed the applicant that that was the respondent’s instructions to him, and that it also related to the safety of his family. It is well established that fear of retribution will rarely be given mitigatory weight: GPY18 at [31] citing R v Drever [2010] SASCFC 27 at [24] and Allbeury at [42]-[43]; Hannaford (No. 2) at [33]; BFY19 at [58]-[61]. This is because the exercise of such powers as possessed by the ACIC to facilitate the investigation of matters of this nature would be significantly impeded if mitigating weight were to be given to an assertion of fear of retribution as a reason for refusing to provide information. This fear expressed was no more than a generalised fear. There is no evidence of any specific threat having been made to either the respondent or his family. That was so at the time of the questioning and continues to be the case at the time of sentence. It is based on what is really seen to be inherent in being involved with criminal activity of the type being investigated: BFY19 at [63]. As was the case in GPY18 and Hannaford (No 2) and BFY19, the respondent offers no more than a generalised fear which, in the assessment of mitigation, cannot be given any real weight.