NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT
CITATION: Lunn v Cardiff Coal Company (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 789
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Corporations List
FILE NUMBER(S): 5095/02
HEARING DATE{S): 13/08/03
JUDGMENT DATE: 29/08/2003
PARTIES:
William Herbert Lunn - Plaintiff
The Cardiff Coal Company - Defendant
JUDGMENT OF: Barrett J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Not Applicable
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): Not Applicable
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Not Applicable
COUNSEL:
Mr B.W. Rayment QC/Mr M.A. Ashurst - Plaintiff
SOLICITORS:
Hewitts Commercial Lawyers - Plaintiff
CATCHWORDS:
CORPORATIONS - winding up - joint stock company incorporated by statute - whether body to which Div 6 of Pt XII of Companies (New South Wales) Code applies - whether body having more than 5 members - ascertaining membership where most persons on register acknowledged or presumed dead - whether relevant Code provisions continue in force - whether winding up order is in respect of matter "arising before" 1 January 1991 - necessity for facts warranting winding up to exist both before 1 January 1991 and when order made - whether plaintiff has liability making him a contributory and therefore competent applicant
ACTS CITED:
Cardiff Coal Company's Incorporation Act of 1863
Companies (Application of Laws) Act 1981, ss.6, 11
Companies (New South Wales) Code, Div 6 of Pt XII, ss. 363, 366(2),469, 470, 471
Companies and Securities (Interpretation and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Application of Laws Act) 1981
Companies and Securities (Interpretation and Miscellaneous Provisions) (New South Wales) Code, s.9
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s.9
Corporations (Ancillary Provisions) Act 2001
Corporations (New South Wales) Act 1990, ss.84, 85
Corporations (Queensland) Act 1990 (Qld), s.42
Corporations (Victoria) Act 1990, s.42
Wills Probate and Administration Act 1898, s.61B(7)
DECISION:
Entitlement to winding up order pursuant to Companies (New South Wales) Code established
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST
BARRETT J
FRIDAY, 29 AUGUST 2003
5095/02 – WILLIAM HERBERT LUNN v THE CARDIFF COAL COMPANY (NO 3)
JUDGMENT
Background
This is the third attempt by Mr Lunn to obtain an order of this court that the Cardiff Coal Company be wound up. The previous attempts encountered jurisdictional problems. Two alternative propositions as to jurisdiction were advanced: first, that the Cardiff Coal Company is a “Part 5.7 body” as defined by s.9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and therefore susceptible to winding up by order of the court under s.583 of that Act; and, second, that this court, in the exercise of general equitable jurisdiction, has power to make an order for the winding up of the Cardiff Coal Company. I concluded that neither of these jurisdictional bases for the making of a winding up order had been established: see Lunn v Cardiff Coal Company (2002) 171 FLR 430 (20 December 2002) and Lunn v Cardiff Coal Company (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 25 (10 February 2003).
Mr Lunn now acknowledges, through Mr Rayment QC, who, leading Mr Ashhurst of counsel, appeared on the most recent occasion, that the court’s inherent jurisdiction cannot be the source of the relief…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWSC 789
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the Cardiff Coal Company was a body to which Division 6 of Part XII of the Code applied, whether it consisted of more than five members, and whether the petitioner had the necessary standing to make the winding-up application. These issues required the court to interpret the company's founding instruments and the relevant statutory provisions to ascertain the company's status and membership.
The court examined the Cardiff Coal Company's Incorporation Act of 1863 and the deed of settlement dated 1 October 1862. It concluded that the company was indeed a body corporate and politic. The court then considered whether the company consisted of more than five members as of the date of the application. The court held that the number of members had to be determined based on the register of members and the presumptions regarding the status of those listed. Furthermore, the court found that the relevant Code provisions continued in force, and the petitioner had the necessary standing to make the application as he was a contributory with a liability that made him a competent applicant.
The court ordered the winding up of the Cardiff Coal Company, confirming that the petitioner had standing to make the application and that the company was subject to the relevant statutory provisions.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question whether the Cardiff Coal Company is, in terms of s.470(1), “a body to which this Division applies” must be approached by reference to the company’s founding instruments. Section 1 of an Act of the Parliament of New South Wales 27 Victoria assented to on 30 December 1863 (which may be cited as the Cardiff Coal Company’s Incorporation Act of 1863) enacted as follows:“Such and so many persons as have already become or at any time or times hereafter shall and may in the manner provided by and subject to the rules regulations and provisions contained in the said deed of settlement become proprietors of shares of or in the capital for the time being of the said Company shall (subject nevertheless to the conditions regulations and provisions hereinafter contained) be one body politic and corporate in name and in deed by the name of the Cardiff Coal Company and by that name shall and may sue and be sued by any persons whether members of the said corporation or not and shall and may implead and be impleaded in all Courts whatsoever at law or in equity and may prefer lay and prosecute any indictment information and prosecution against any person whomsoever for any stealing embezzlement fraud forgery or other crime or offence and in all indictments informations and prosecutions it shall be lawful to state the money and goods effects bills notes securities or other property of the said Company to be the money goods effects bills notes securities or other property of the said corporation and to designate the said Company by its corporate name whenever for the purpose of any allegation of an intent to defraud or otherwise howsoever such designation shall be necessary and the said corporation shall have perpetual succession with a common seal which may be altered varied and changed from time to time at the pleasure of the said corporation.” The reference to “the said deed of settlement” is a reference to a deed of settlement dated 1 October 1862 referred to in the preamble to the Act. The reference to “the said Company” is a reference to the joint stock company referred to in the preamble as having been “established in the Colony of New South Wales under and subject to the rules regulations and provisions contained in” that deed of settlement. As to the first element of the question whether the Cardiff Coal Company is, in terms of s.470(1) of the Code, “a body to which this Division applies”, there can be no doubt that, because the Act of 1863 makes the proprietors for the time being and from time to time of shares in the capital of the joint stock company established by the deed of settlement “one body politic and corporate”, the body so created is “a … body (whether corporate or unincorporate)”. It remains, therefore, to consider whether the body “consists of more than 5 members”, that being a situation that must be found to exist as at the date of the application: Re Bolton Benefit Loan Society; Coop v Booth (1879) 12 ChD 679.