PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE - LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
Application for production of legal advice on the ground that legal professional privilege has been waived.
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision by the second respondent refusing an application to use certain significant environment benefit credits to offset $62,214.97 otherwise required to be paid into the Native Vegetation Fund. One of the grounds of review is that the applicant was denied procedural fairness.
After hearing submissions on behalf of the applicant, the second respondent sought legal advice from the Crown Solicitor’s Office before making a decision. After receipt of legal advice, the second respondent made the impugned decision.
The applicant contends that the second respondent waived legal professional privilege in the legal advice by disclosure in the judicial review action of a communication sent to members of the second respondent attaching the advice or by pleading the legal advice into issue by certain paragraphs of its response to the statement of facts issues and contentions.
Held:
1The second respondent did not disclose the content, gist or substance of the legal advice and there has been no disclosure waiver (at [35]).
2The second respondent did not by the statement of facts issues and contentions raise as an issue the content, gist or substance of the legal advice and there has been no issue waiver (at [47]).
BLUE J: This is an application for production of legal advice on the ground that legal professional privilege has been waived.
The applicant Dean Lukin seeks judicial review of a decision (the Decision) by the second respondent, the Native Vegetation Council, on 16 February 2022 refusing an application by Mr Lukin to use certain Significant Environment Benefit (SEB) credits to offset $62,214.97 otherwise required to be paid into the Native Vegetation Fund (the Fund). There are several grounds of review. One of the grounds of review is that Mr Lukin was denied procedural fairness in relation to the decision.
Mr Lukin by his senior counsel, Mr Abbott QC (as he then was), made oral submissions at a meeting of the Council on 9 February 2022. Following the departure of Mr Lukin and Mr Abbott…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The judicial review proceeding in Lukin v State of South Australia involved Mr Lukin challenging the Council's refusal to allow him to offset native vegetation credits against a clearance permit for a residential development at Port Lincoln. Mr Lukin argued that the Council waived legal professional privilege in relation to certain legal advice by disclosing it in the proceedings or by pleading it into issue. The central legal issue was whether the Council's actions amounted to a waiver of legal professional privilege in the legal advice provided. The court considered whether the Council's disclosure or pleading of the legal advice was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality, which the privilege was intended to protect.
The court examined whether the Council's actions amounted to an express or implied waiver of legal professional privilege. It found that Mr Lukin did not establish an issue waiver, meaning the privilege was not waived by the Council's disclosure or pleading of the legal advice. The court concluded that there was no inconsistency between the Council's conduct and the maintenance of the confidentiality of the communications, and thus, no waiver of privilege occurred. The court dismissed Mr Lukin’s application for production of the legal advice and directed the parties to address the issue of costs.
In conclusion, the court held that the Council's actions did not amount to a waiver of legal professional privilege in the legal advice, and therefore, the privilege remained intact. Mr Lukin's application for production of the legal advice was dismissed, and the court reserved the issue of costs for further consideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Lukin accepts that prima facie the Request and the Legal Advice are protected by legal professional privilege. He contends that the Council waived legal professional privilege in the legal advice by disclosure in the action of the Basecamp communication attaching the advice or by pleading the legal advice into issue by two subparagraphs of its response to the statement of facts issues and contentions.Background Mr Lukin is associated with Port Lincoln Proper Pty Ltd (PPP). PPP is engaged in the development of a residential subdivision on land at Port Lincoln (the Subdivision). Stage 3 of the Subdivision received development approval. Stage 3 is itself divided into four stages, including Stage 3A, which comprises 13 residential allotments and associated infrastructure including a public reserve. In August 2018 Mr Lukin lodged an application with the Department under subsection 28(1) of the Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA) (the Act) for consent to clear native vegetation off the land the subject of Stage 3A. Mr Lukin stated that his preference was to offset SEB credits against the clearance; in the meantime he offered to provide a bank guarantee for $62,214.97; and he sought approval of the clearance on the basis of the bank guarantee but on the further basis that he would have one year to agree on an offset of SEB credits in lieu of the bank guarantee being called. In September 2018 the Council approved the application subject to 10 conditions. Conditions 3 to 5 stipulated that the SEB requirement of 102.34 SEB points was to be delivered by an SEB offset on a site yet to be identified to the satisfaction of the Council within one year of the decision date; in the interim security by way of bank guarantee for $62,214.97 was to be provided; and, if the proposed SEB offset were accept by the Council, the bank guarantee would be returned. Mr Lukin provided the bank guarantee and proceeded with the clearance. In May 2019 Mr Lukin, on behalf of Arno Bay Progress Association, lodged an application with the Department under section 25A of the Act for establishment of a native vegetation SEB in respect of the property at Arno Bay. In June 2019 the Council approved the application under section 25A of the Act to establish an SEB credit area providing 587.91 credit points and approved the assignment of those points under section 25B of the Act to Mr Lukin. In August 2019 Mr Lukin applied by email to the Department to use 102.34 SEB credit points from the Arno Bay property to offset the stage 3A clearance and fulfil condition 3 of the September 2018 approval. An officer of the Department replied stating that it was prepared to treat the email as a formal application to use the SEB credits to offset the money to be paid into the Fund. On 16 February 2022 the Council refused the August 2019 application. In March 2022 Mr Lukin instituted this judicial review proceeding.The evidence Mr Lukin tendered the minutes of the Council meeting on 9 February 2022. He also tendered various communications between Mr Abbott QC and the Department (including written submissions); minutes from the Department to the Council; and the September 2018 approval.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In March 2022 Mr Lukin instituted this judicial review proceeding.The evidence Mr Lukin tendered the minutes of the Council meeting on 9 February 2022. He also tendered various communications between Mr Abbott QC and the Department (including written submissions); minutes from the Department to the Council; and the September 2018 approval. Mr Lukin also tendered portions of an affidavit by Mr Schutz made on 22 April 2022 (FDN 8), an affidavit made by Mr Schutz on 29 July 2022 (FDN 15) and an affidavit made by Mr Schutz on 5 August 2022 (FDN 17). Mr Schutz also gave oral evidence.Disclosure waiver Legal professional privilege only arises in respect of confidential communications (or documents). Accordingly, if the client, being the party entitled to the privilege, subsequently discloses the privileged communication (or document) to the world or to external parties, there is an express waiver because the communication (or document) is no longer confidential. In some cases, express waiver can be limited to the parties to whom the communication (or document) is disclosed or limited to a particular purpose.[1] However, the question of limited waiver does not arise in the present case.[1] See for example Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66, (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [30] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ. If the client subsequently discloses something less than the entirety of the privileged communication (or document), such as the substance of legal advice without disclosing its precise content or the predominant part of the legal advice, there may be an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the entire communication (or document). This obviously involves questions of fact and degree. In Mann v Carnell[2] Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ said:At common law, a person who would otherwise be entitled to the benefit of legal professional privilege may waive the privilege. It has been observed that "waiver" is a vague term, used in many senses, and that it often requires further definition according to the context. Legal professional privilege exists to protect the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client. It is the client who is entitled to the benefit of such confidentiality, and who may relinquish that entitlement. It is inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality which effects a waiver of the privilege. Examples include disclosure by a client of the client's version of a communication with a lawyer, which entitles the lawyer to give his or her account of the communication, or the institution of proceedings for professional negligence against a lawyer, in which the lawyer's evidence as to advice given to the client will be received.Waiver may be express or implied. Disputes as to implied waiver usually arise from the need to decide whether particular conduct is inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect. When an affirmative answer is given to such a question, it is sometimes said that waiver is "imputed by operation of law". This means that the law recognises the inconsistency and determines its consequences, even though such consequences may not reflect the subjective intention of the party who has lost the privilege. Thus, in Benecke v National Australia Bank, the client was held to have waived privilege by giving evidence, in legal proceedings, concerning her instructions to a barrister in related proceedings, even though she apparently believed she could prevent the barrister from giving the barrister's version of those instructions. She did not subjectively intend to abandon the privilege. She may not even have turned her mind to the question. However, her intentional act was inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality of the communication. What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large.…… Disclosure by a client of confidential legal advice received by the client, which may be for the purpose of explaining or justifying the client's actions, or for some other purpose, will waive privilege if such disclosure is inconsistent with the confidentiality which the privilege serves to protect. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, considerations of fairness may be relevant to a determination of whether there is such inconsistency.[3] [2] (1999) 201 CLR 1.[3] At [28]-[29], [34]. (Footnotes omitted)
Decision
Reasons for decision
No issue waiver has been established.Conclusion I dismiss Mr Lukin’s oral application for production of the legal advice. I will hear the parties as to costs.