Lui v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lui v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCAFC 115

TAXATION – departure authorisation certificate – humanitarian grounds – whether applicant unable to give security within the meaning of s 14U(1)(b)(ii) Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)

Words and phrases: “unable”

Held: appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal dismissed.

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)

Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321; [2003] FCAFC 232
Bull v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 17 CLR 370
Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; [2006] FCAFC 27
IRG Technical Services Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 165 FCR 57; [2007] FCA 1867
Leeder v Mayor of the Town of Ballarat East [1908] VLR 214
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Nilant v Macchia (2000) 104 FCR 238; [2000] FCA 1528
Poletti v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 52 FCR 154
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
Puglisi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales Appeals Panel (2001) 52 NSWLR 350; [2001] NSWCA 298
Re Kevin Lui and Commissioner of Taxation [2009] AATA 626
Winter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 85 ATC 4654

KEVIN LUI v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

NSD 908 of 2009

STONE, EDMONDS AND JAGOT JJ
3 SEPTEMBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 908 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

KEVIN LUI
Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

STONE, EDMONDS AND JAGOT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 SEPTEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 908 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

KEVIN LUI
Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

STONE, EDMONDS AND JAGOT JJ

DATE:

3 SEPTEMBER 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

THE APPEAL

  1. The issue in this appeal is whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) erred in its construction of a provision of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) requiring the grant of a certificate permitting a person the subject of a departure prohibition order by reason of a tax debt to leave Australia on humanitarian grounds.

  2. The applicant, Kevin Lui, is the subject of a departure prohibition order by reason of his tax debt (estimated at about $23 million).  He sought a departure authorisation certificate permitting him to leave Australia to go to Hong Kong where his former wife…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lui v Commissioner of Taxation, the primary issue was the correct interpretation of section 14U(1)(b)(ii) of the Taxation Administration Act, specifically regarding the conditions under which a person could be considered unable to give security to the Commissioner's satisfaction. The applicant, Mr. Lui, argued for a particular construction of this section, contending that it should be viewed as a beneficial or remedial provision. The Commissioner, however, opposed this interpretation, asserting that the provision should be strictly construed in light of the statutory regime's purpose to minimise the risk of non-recovery.

The court was required to determine whether the provision should be interpreted as allowing access to its potentially ameliorative effects based solely on a taxpayer's lack of knowledge about what security would satisfy the Commissioner, or whether it required a more stringent condition of actual incapacity to provide such security. The court closely examined the language of the provision, the purpose of the statutory regime, and the competing interpretations presented by both parties. It concluded that the statutory language and the overarching purpose of the regime pointed towards a strict interpretation that limited access to the ameliorative provisions to cases where the taxpayer genuinely could not provide satisfactory security.

The court found that Mr. Lui's proposed construction of the precondition in section 14U(1)(b)(ii) was ambiguous and could potentially lead to circumvention of the statutory requirements. It held that the provision must be understood in context, where the legislature's intention was to prioritise the objective of securing the return of the person to Australia. As such, the court upheld the Commissioner's interpretation, dismissing Mr. Lui's appeal. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that Mr. Lui pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE, EDMONDS AND JAGOT JJ
According to the Commissioner it is incorrect to characterise s 14U(1)(b)(ii) as a beneficial or remedial provision. The potentially ameliorating effect of the provision is only available after the precondition (“if the person is unable to give such security…”) is satisfied. Nilant v Macchia, Puglisi and IRG Technical Services do not assist Mr Lui. The provision must be considered in context having regard to its purpose. The statutory regime is strict. It has the purpose the AAT identified at [25] of its reasons for decision, namely minimising the risk of non-recovery. In that context, it is unsurprising that the legislature has limited access to the ameliorating provisions to cases where the taxpayer does not have the means to provide security to the Commissioner’s satisfaction. All this shows is that the legislature ranked the objective of obtaining security for the return of the person to Australia highly. Mr Lui’s construction invites circumvention. Mr Lui’s submissions do not advance any clear alternative construction. It cannot be the case that the precondition is satisfied merely because Mr Lui did not know what security would satisfy the Commissioner. If that were so, a taxpayer could satisfy the precondition simply be refusing to give the Commissioner such information as might be necessary to decide what security would be satisfactory. The form of security offered by Mr Lui is immaterial. The issue in the appeal is one of statutory interpretation not the adequacy of the security. Conclusion At first consideration, it appears difficult to accept the Commissioner’s submission that Mr Lui’s submissions failed to identify a clear construction of s 14U(1)(b) of the Taxation Administration Act. After all, the AAT’s reasons identified two competing constructions of the precondition in s 14U(1)(b)(ii) (i.e. “…if the person is unable to give such security, the Commissioner is satisfied that…”) both of which the AAT said were open on the language of the provision, namely: - (i) a person has been unable to persuade the Commissioner to accept security of a certain kind or of a particular value (at [20]), or (ii) a person lacks capacity to give security satisfying the Commissioner (at [21]). But closer consideration discloses that it is difficult to articulate the precise meaning of the precondition on the construction which Mr Lui advances. For example, it could be said that the former construction (preferred by Mr Lui) asks whether the Commissioner has been given security to the Commissioner’s satisfaction. If not, the person has been unable to give such security. This, indeed, was the extent of Mr Lui’s submission to the AAT. The latter construction (preferred by the Commissioner) asks whether the person can give security to the Commissioner’s satisfaction. If not, the person has been unable to give such security. As explained below, the former construction tends to yield numerous ambiguities which the AAT recognised in its reasons at [26] in its references to both a refusal to give security and a failed negotiation about security. We return to this point at [34] and following.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE, EDMONDS AND JAGOT JJ