Lui (Junior) v The Islander Industries Board
[2008] FMCA 207
•19 March 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LUI (JUNIOR) v THE ISLANDER INDUSTRIES BOARD | [2008] FMCA 207 |
| BANKRUPTCY – Bankruptcy notice – setting aside – importance of keeping records – evidence of compromise. |
| Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.40(1)(g) Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 (Qld) |
| Corner v Shew (1838) 150 ER 1179 Re Bankruptcy Notice [1934] Ch 421 CA Walton v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (1994) 49 FCR 406 H. Ray v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FMCA 1892; Scook v Sims Construction Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 306; Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212; Joosse v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245 Guss v Johnstone (2000) 74 ALJR 884 |
| Applicant: | GETANO LUI (JUNIOR) |
| Respondent: | THE ISLANDER INDUSTRIES BOARD |
| File Number: | BRG855 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Coates FM |
| Hearing date: | 30 October 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 30 October 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Cairns |
| Delivered on: | 19 March 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr D Morzone |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Miller Harris Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr J Sheridan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Marino Moller Lawyers |
ORDERS
Time is extended for 28 days for the applicant to comply with bankruptcy notice No Q1276 of 2006 or file and serve initiating process of a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand and/or an estoppel in relation to the said notice.
The matter be adjourned for determination on 15 April 2008.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG855 of 2006
| GETANO LUI (JUNIOR) |
Applicant
And
| THE ISLANDER INDUSTRIES BOARD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This application to set aside a bankruptcy notice under s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 underlines the importance of keeping records of business dealings.
History
On 22 April 2001 the respondent, the Islander Board of Industry and Service in the Torres Strait, known as IBIS, obtained judgment against the applicant, Getano Lui (Jnr) in the sum of $91,115.07 (including $1,189.60 costs and $15,364.98 interest).
Mr Lui did not file a defence to the claim and so judgment was obtained by default.
Mr Lui was a former member of the respondent IBIS.
The claim in the District Court of Queensland upon which the default judgment was based alleged that the applicant owed IBIS $74,560.49 under credit agreements between the parties, with interest and costs.
The statement of claim set out credit in two amounts.
The first amount was lent to the applicant as a board member in a personal debtor’s account in amounts totalling $21,861.70.
The second amount was for the funeral expenses of applicant’s late father, Getano Lui Senior totalling $52,698.79.
Those two amounts totalled $74,560.49 and the interest and costs made up the full amount of $91,115.07 which was awarded as the judgment debt.
On 13 October 2006 the bankruptcy notice relied on by the respondent, numbered Q1276/2006, was served on the applicant, stating the amount owed under the judgment debt was $35,069.04.
The schedule attached to the notice, reproduced as follows, identifies the amount allegedly owed.
Column 1
Column 2
1.
Amount of judgment or order
$91,115.07
plus
2.
Legal costs if ordered to be paid and a specific amount was not included in the judgment or order (see Note 1 below)
$N/A
plus
3.
If claimed in this bankruptcy notice, interest accrued since the date of judgment or order (see Note 2 below)
$N/A
4.
Subtotal
$91,115.07
less
5.
Payments made and/or credits allowed since date of judgment or order
$56,046.03
6.
Total debt owing
$35,069.04
Applicant’s case
The burden of proof showing why the bankruptcy notice should be set aside falls to the applicant.
The respondent met the requirements of s.40(1)(g) whereby it obtained a judgment order which was not stayed and so served the bankruptcy notice.
When the applicant does not comply with a notice, he has to satisfy the Court pursuant to the section that:
a)He has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand;
b)Equal to or exceeding the judgment debt; and
c)The counter-claim, set-off or cross demand could not have been set up in the proceeding in which judgment was given.
The applicant presented a multi-faceted attack on the bankruptcy notice.
He pleaded he had not committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of s.40(1)(g) of the Act in that:
a)He had a cross demand in the form of a compromise of the debt; and/or
b)He had a cross demand in the form of a condition precedent attaching to a compromise which was not met; and/or
c)The respondent was estopped from pursuing him; and/or
d)The funeral expenses were a debt of the estate and so the notice ought be set aside.
Debt of estate
Before dealing with the main claims, Mr Morzone for the applicant submitted that liability for funeral expenses are recoverable from the deceased’s personal representative, who can be reimbursed from the estate. He refers to a very old case, Corner v Shew (1838) 150 ER 1179 at 1182. The submissions do not differ from statements in Lee’s Manual of Queensland Succession Law.
While the estate is ultimately responsible for such testamentary expenses, this case may fall outside succession law because there appears to have been a loan given for the funeral expenses and it is not clear that the loan was to the personal representative. The issue was not argued strongly.
Cross demand
While counter-claim and set-off are terms commonly encountered in bankruptcy proceedings, the concept of a cross demand is not.
Mr Morzone submitted that within the meaning of s.40(1)(g) a cross demand lies outside a counterclaim or a set-off.
In Re Bankruptcy Notice [1934] Ch 421 CA at 437-438, Lord Hanworth MR gave the history of the counter-claim created under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. He also stated:
“I turn …to what to my mind is the wider word ‘cross demand’. If a cross demand is only to be interpreted as meaning something which could have been introduced into the action by way of counter-claim, it adds nothing to the word ‘counter-claim’. ‘Cross demand’ seems to me to be a word introduced in order to give a wider ambit to the meaning of these claims, something that would not be described, certainly, as a set-off, something that could not have been brought in the action, something that still lies outside a counter-claim, but is of a nature which can be specified and which is of such a nature that it equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt”.
In Walton v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (1994) 49 FCR 406 at 408, the full court of the Federal Court stated:
“It was specifically held in Re Brink; ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 135 at 138-139 that ‘cross demand’ is not a technical term and it was made clear that the expression has a wide meaning, extending beyond what could be pleaded as a defence”.
The compromise
Of the compromise the applicant’s evidence was:
a)He agreed to pay $500.00 a fortnight until his personal debtor’s account of $21,861.70 was paid in full, and
b)He arranged for his relatives to pay the remainder of the judgment debt for the funeral expenses, in consideration of the respondent releasing him from that liability. The relatives were Kiwat Lui, Victor Lui, Clayford Lui, Danny Lui, Florence Thaitay, Francis Baragud, Anna Lui, Anna Baragud and Bethalia Lui (Snr).
The applicant’s case placed in focus the importance of keeping records by both parties but crucially for the respondent in opposing the application to set aside the notice.
Exhibit 1 was an undated handwritten letter by the applicant to the general manager of the respondent board stating:
“Dear Sir, I regret for any inconvenience caused and sincerely apologise for the lengthy delay in entering into a formal arrangement with the Board in regards to the settling of my Debtors Account. I was seeking to secure financial assistance from elsewhere. However, with the limited disposable income that is currently available to myself, I am prepared to make a maximum fortnightly payments of up to $500-00 on the varying circumstances of my family. I hope this will be acceptable to the Board. Thanking you in anticipation. Yours sincerely, G Lui”.
Exhibit 2 was a minute of the board meeting held on 22 May 2001, stating:
“Debt recovery:
resolved that IBIS’ solicitors be instructed to formalise the offer from the former chairman, Mr Getano Lui (Jnr) in respect of his personal debt, on the condition that Mr Lui makes some other acceptable arrangement in respect to the funeral expense account. Moved P. Toolis. Seconded T. Bill carried”.
On the wording of the exhibits, it has to be found as a fact that the parties were in negotiations about the judgment debt, very soon after judgment was given on 22 April 2001.
While the wording of exhibit 1 makes no reference to the funeral debt component of the judgment debt, the wording of the minute is important because broken into elements, it refers to:
i)Resolving;
ii)an offer by the applicant;
iii)in respect of his member’s debtors account;
iv)if with regard to the funeral costs;
v)some acceptable arrangement was made.
That seems to be either an offer by the respondent or an acceptance by the respondent of the offer from the applicant, the condition being that an acceptable arrangement being made for the funeral debt.
What flowed after 22 May 2001 when the minute was made according to the evidence was that the applicant proceeded to reimburse his personal debtor’s account and the respondent then stopped pursuing the applicant for the funeral debt – until the bankruptcy notice issued.
An inference could be drawn that:
a)the respondent stopped because it found an “acceptable arrangement in respect of the funeral expense account”; and
b)the intention of the parties in proceeding that way is evidenced from exhibits 1 and 2.
By December 2002 it was not disputed that the applicant had paid the sum of $21,861.70 for his personal debtor’s account.
That the board did not record the terms of the actual deal – and I am leaving open the question as to which party offered and which
accepted – is an issue for the respondent and the keeping of proper records.
The applicant said he arranged for his family members to pay the
debt – that is to compromise it - and the evidence is contained in a memorandum of understanding between the respondent board and those family members. The memorandum is exhibit RB4 attached to the affidavit of the board’s Chief Executive Officer Richard Bowler filed on 1 December 2006.
Mr Sheridan for the respondent disputes the memorandum is evidence of a compromise arrangement because its wording states that the respondent may take bankruptcy proceedings against the applicant.
But the applicant said he had not seen the memorandum in its executed form and he produced a draft different from the signed memorandum.
That he had a draft, on the evidence, is further corroborative evidence that he and the respondent had entered into negotiations for the resolution of the matter.
Paragraph 7 of the draft states:
“The signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding acknowledge that the Lui Family, both jointly and severally, are not legally obligated to fulfil the requirements set out in this Memorandum, and as such, it is further acknowledged that this Memorandum does not constitute a binding contract at law.
Paragraph 7 of the executed document adds the words
“The signatories acknowledged that IBIS retains the right to finalise with bankruptcy procedures against Mr Getano Lui (Jnr) without further notice should there be any default in payments as defined in this Memorandum”.
The applicant says he had an accord and satisfaction in the compromise, the respondent says he did not because of that wording.
The applicant gave evidence that he had not seen the memorandum until Mr Bowler filed his affidavit.
He says his accord and satisfaction was complete when he and the respondent board finalised the offer and acceptance based upon the negotiations they had entered into and that occurred when he found an acceptable arrangement.
He says he did not know what monies were collected from his family under the memorandum of understanding.
Mr Morzone submitted the applicant can successfully make out a prima facie case by relying upon the true effect of the compromise if the compromise is a cross demand within the meaning of s40(1)(g).
He submitted that if the applicant satisfied the court that the compromise was a cross demand he was prepared to litigate, then there was no act of bankruptcy and the notice should be set aside. He said the cross demand can be quantified. Quantification of the cross demand is the amount compromised under the judgment.
In written submissions he quoted the tests to be applied:
“The degree to which the debtor needs to “satisfy the Court” to have a bankruptcy notice set aside on the grounds of a counterclaim set-off or cross demand has being variously formulated as follows (Bankruptcy Law and Practice 5th Ed):
a.the debtor must satisfy the Court that he has a genuine demand and that it has a reasonable probability of success;
b.the debtor must show a prima facie case;
c.whether it is just that the claim should be determined before the bankruptcy proceedings are allowed to continue; in other words, whether it is a claim which it is proper and reasonable to litigate;
d.the state of satisfaction referred to in ss.40(1)(g) and s.41(7) involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied on by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim;
e.the application of the criteria above requires the Court to make some kind of preliminary assessment, though obviously not to determine the counterclaim, set off or cross demand finally. Plainly, in order to satisfy the Court for the purposes of para 40(1)(g) the debtor is not required to prove, as on a final hearing, the asserted entitlements to recover from the creditor. Accordingly, evidence tendered on an application to set aside is to be tested for admissibility, not as if the proceeding were one in which the applicant’s claim was finally being determined, but by reference to the question whether the Court should be satisfied that the debtor has a claim deserving to be finally determined…a debtor must satisfy the Court that there is sufficient substance to the counterclaim, set off or cross demand asserted to make it one which the debtor should, in justice, be permitted to have heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by payment or to commit an act of bankruptcy.
Condition precedent
This is a case pleaded in the alternative.
It is in effect another version of the compromise argument, but that the respondent did not meet a condition precedent before obtaining judgment.
The applicant submitted that clause 6 of the memorandum of understanding required the respondent – the respondent’s own agreement - to allow for the family members to rectify any default before the bankruptcy proceeding.
Clause 6 states: “If there is any default in payment, IBIS will bring to the attention of Mrs Bethalia Lui (Snr) at Yam Island in the first instance and the Lui Family will be requested to pay the relevant instalment”.
The applicant says if the respondent did not satisfy this condition precedent before acting against him then he has a cross demand, not strictly a defence, whereby he can require them to satisfy the condition before taking bankruptcy proceedings. For this clause to have effect, it may be that the applicant is bound by the memorandum, although that is not a question I have to decide. I have to determine whether the applicant has a prima facie case.
There was no evidence from the respondent as to why Clause 6 was not followed before the bankruptcy notice issued, so the Court is not in a position to weigh its evidence.
Estoppel
Mr Morzone also raised the issue of an estoppel operating in that the respondent induced the applicant to believe that he had come to a compromise on the judgment debt which prevented any further action in relation to recovery of that debt.
Timing is crucial because this is not a case where the recipient of a bankruptcy notice comes to court with a version of events never mentioned previously. There is no evidence that the applicant was idle.
Within four months of the judgment, the applicant organised what he says was an “acceptable arrangement in respect to the funeral expense account” as required in exhibit 2, the minute of the board meeting of 22 May 2001. He began negotiations soon after the judgment was given.
The family members defaulted on their agreement to pay the funeral costs in about February 2004.
The respondent has not put forward an explanation of why it delayed between 26 November 2003 when it issued a defective bankruptcy notice and 13 October 2006, when it served bankruptcy notice Q1276. That s41(3)(c) of the Act requires a creditor to act within six years of judgment or order being given puts into context the applicant’s issuance of Bankruptcy Notice Q1276, the applicant was moving to protect its alleged interests before time expired. But that does not explain three years of inaction from the time it issued the defective notice or the events. I do not regard the defective 2003 notice as an act pursuing the applicant for the funeral debt. An immediate rectification of the defect would be regarded as pursuing the applicant for the debt.
There are two other exhibits which appear to require explanation from the respondent as to why events occurred.
Exhibit 3 is a series of remittance advices showing that between
31 January 1999and 27 November 2002 the respondent recorded payments for account number 2830 from Mrs B Lui for funeral expenses for the late Getano Lui (Senior).
Exhibit 4 shows the same account number, but suddenly, as at 17 February 2004, the name of the account changes to Mr G Lui (Junior), the applicant. The change of name was not explained by any witnesses for the respondent.
The statements show payments for the funeral costs before and after the applicant’s arrangement, through Mrs B Lui. For unexplained reasons the payments were being made by Mrs Lui before the judgment order was made. The change in the name to that of the applicant was a deliberate step on the part of the respondent to try and recover its position. Until the change of name, it is further evidence that the respondent was not pursuing the applicant for the funeral expenses. It adds further weight of recognition of the agreement disclosed in exhibit 2 and raises the estoppel issue, because the date of default and change of name seem to nearly co-incide.
Mr Morzone gave a very detailed argument regarding estoppel based on the timing of events and the evidence. He submitted that the respondent
“…induced the applicant to adopt that assumption or expectation – by turning to the other members of the Lui Family to meet the funeral expenses, received payments under that deal, stopped all action against the applicant;
The applicant acted or abstained from acting on the faith of the assumption or expectation – by not obtaining advice and applying to set aside the judgment”.
This argument alone can be the only one on the evidence to suggest why the applicant did not apply to set the judgment debt aside.
Respondent’s case
Mr Sheridan argued there was simply no accord and satisfaction reached.
He said the memorandum of understanding cannot amount to an accord and satisfaction and referred to H Ray v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FMCA 1892, paragraph 23, Barnes FM,:
“An accord and satisfaction is “a contract of compromise where the bargained for consideration is an actual release of a cause of action” (Butler v Fairclough (1970) 23 CLR 78). More generally, as described in British Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook Limited v Associated Newspapers Limited (1933) 2KB 616 at 643:
Accord and satisfaction is the purchase of a release from an obligation whether arising under contract or tort by means of any valuable consideration, not being the actual performance of the obligation itself. The accord is the agreement by which the obligation is discharged, the satisfaction is the consideration which make the agreement operative.”
I accept Mr Sheridan’s submission that the memorandum does not amount to an accord and satisfaction as described in H Ray v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.
Mr Sheridan also referred me to Scook v Sims Construction Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 306, a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, where a deed was held not to be an accord and satisfaction, because of it construction.
I agree that on its construction, the memorandum of understanding cannot amount to an accord and satisfaction, save perhaps for the condition precedent issue, because it does not release or discharge the applicant from the debt.
But Mr Morzone submitted that the memorandum between the respondent and the family members distracts from the essential issue which was that the applicant and the respondent came to a compromise arrangement in relation to the debt under the default judgment. The memorandum is not the compromise, it is merely evidence supporting the compromise. Nor is the performance of the obligation to pay the compromise, because payment of the debt is not the accord and satisfaction. Mr Morzone’s submission carries weight.
As stated, save perhaps for the condition precedent issue, the parties to the memorandum of understanding in this matter are outside any agreement between the applicant and respondent. I do not see evidence that the applicant was a party to agreements reached under the memorandum. He merely facilitated the circumstances where the memorandum could come into existence, should the signatories decide to make agreement between themselves, which they did.
The evidence of the compromise, the alleged accord and satisfaction which sets up a possible cross demand was the acceptance by the parties of an “acceptable arrangement in respect to the funeral expense account”. In fact the respondent appears to have asked the applicant for no more than an acceptable arrangement for the funeral costs.
Once an “acceptable arrangement in respect to the funeral expense account” was accepted by the respondent, a compromise or an accord and satisfaction between the applicant and respondent was possibly complete.
Returning to the condition precedent, Mr Sheridan also referred to the passage in Scook v Sims where a clause in a deed provided for a default process. In Scook the Court considered whether such a clause replaced the cause of action or rights which the respondent there had against the applicant. In that case the default process did not clearly set out the intention of the parties.
As stated, given there was no evidence from the respondent as to why it did not request the signatories to the memorandum to pay the debt under clause 6, all I can find is that there is a case to answer on this issue. The wording of clause 6 is clear, if there is default, the family members would be asked first to pay the instalment. That seems to be an intention on the face of the document to rectify a default before taking bankruptcy proceedings, because the clause states what is to be done in the first instance.
When the evidence is considered as a whole, that is:
a)The wording of exhibits 1 and 2;
b)The parties recognition of a distinction between the personal debtor’s account and the funeral debt;
c)The respondent’s willingness to formalise an offer and acceptance on condition that there was a satisfactory arrangement for payment of the funeral debt;
d)The confusion over previous repayments for the funeral debt which were made, but not by the applicant;
e)That the applicant is not named on the memorandum of understanding;
f)That there appears to be a condition precedent; and
g)The respondent’s witness Richard Bowler’s statement in his affidavit sworn 30 November 2006 “…on Friday, 31 August an agreement was reached …to compromise the debt by payment of the sum of $52,689.79 by instalments set out in that memorandum of understanding…”
the characteristics of a cross demand can be seen. It is outside a counter-claim or set-off and is not strictly a defence, but it is a claim, which if true, would relieve the applicant of the funeral debt.
That the applicant did not keep all records is evident but there was no evidence or records put forward by the respondent to weaken or damage his version of the events.
That the terms of their deal was not recorded with detail by the respondent IBIS, which is a statutory authority set up under the Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 (Qld) and fully accountable for its financial transactions, is surprising. Section 163 of that Act requires it to keep minutes of meetings and resolutions.
As to loans and recovery, it would be logical to keep records because the respondent has a banking function under the Act, and that is how loans to members could be classified. A record of the events would be useful in a dispute such as this.
In fact the few records disclosed by the respondent merely strengthen the case put forward by the applicant, that a compromise was reached.
Again all of this comes down to the fact that the respondent could not appear in Court and show clear, unambiguous and chronologically kept records of their dealings with the applicant, the debts owing and the deals reached.
The judgment debt
Mr Sheridan also questioned the applicant about his statement that by oversight he did not file a defence to the claim which resulted in the default judgment.
It emerged that he was taking legal advice at the time on other matters.
As troubling as that evidence was, because it would appear to require an answer, it was in fact not relevant to him reaching an alleged compromise later in relation to the default judgment, except, as observed, in relation to an estoppel.
Mr Sheridan submitted that I should not go behind the judgment, which authorities allow in bankruptcy proceedings, see Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212; Joosse v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245.
The submission was prompted no doubt by the applicant’s evidence that he was not responsible for the funeral costs and he overlooked the filing of a defence which would appear to be a ground for the Court to go behind the judgment to determine whether it was founded on a real debt.
But the applicant’s statement about the funeral debt responsibility and his overlooking of the filing of a defence was irrelevant to his claim of having a cross demand. He did not put forward a case of contesting the grounds the judgment order was based upon.
Whether he was or was not responsible for the funeral debt was not a fact-in-issue, except in relation to the short reference to the responsibility of the personal representative of the estate and the estoppel argument.
I do not accept it would be appropriate to go behind the judgment debt in this case when in the circumstances the applicant did not take a step within the appeal period to claim he was not responsible for the debt because the debt lay with the estate.
What the applicant did was to accept the judgment order. He is contesting the bankruptcy notice based on the judgment debt on the ground that he acted to compromise the judgment against him and he has set out the acts he says make up the cross demand.
I am not to decide this application on whether or not he is responsible for the funeral debt, I am to decide this application on a preliminary assessment or the factual and legal considerations relied on as to a cross demand.
Conclusion
All of the elements of s.40 have to be satisfied before deciding whether an act of bankruptcy has occurred or not occurred.
In this case, pursuant to s.40(1)(g), an act of bankruptcy does not occur if after the judgment was served, the debtor, the applicant in this case, complies with the notice or
a)Satisfies the Court
b)That he has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand
c)Equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt
d)Being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand which could not have been set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment was obtained
and the notice can be set aside.
According to Vogwell v Vogwell cited in Guss v Johnstone (2000) 74 ALJR 884 at 891, I am to determine whether the applicant has a just claim which should be determined before the bankruptcy proceedings.
The applicant does not have to prove his case, what he must do is “satisfy” me that he has a prima facie case deserving to be “finally determined”.
On all of the evidence it appears the applicant and respondent, prima facie, came to an accord and satisfaction to compromise the debt for the default judgment, the accord being the agreement and the satisfaction being the compromise of the debt to the extent that an acceptable arrangement was found in relation to the funeral component of the debt.
Alternatively, it appears the applicant may rely on a condition precedent or an estoppel.
I am persuaded that the compromise is a cross-demand equal to or exceeding the judgment debt which could not have been set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, because it did not exist at that stage.
I am satisfied that the issues raised by the applicant should be ventilated before bankruptcy proceedings go further because there appears to be a reasonable prospect of success on one or more of those issues.
However, before setting aside the bankruptcy notice, the respondent has an interest in having the applicant legitimately pursue his claim, so the bankruptcy notice will not be set aside until the applicant begins proceedings in a relevant jurisdiction. Because he lives in an isolated area, the Torres Straight, I will extend time by 28 days in which to launch his proceedings in pursuance of his claims. I will bring the matter back on 15 April 2008 and if the applicant has filed and served a relevant claim, I will then dismiss the notice.
I certify that the preceding ninety-eight (98) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Coates FM
Associate: Erin Firns
Date: 19 March 2008
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