Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCA 1234

Citation: Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCA 1234
Parties: GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
File number VID 488 of 2008
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2015
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review of decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink to restrict the applicant’s means of communication to telephone, fax or email – whether decision “made under an enactment”  
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3(1), 5, 11(3)
Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) ss 3, 6, 6A, 7, 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), 7(3)(b), 7(3)(d), 7(5), 8(1)
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 180
DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 40, 78B
Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 7, 8
Cases cited: Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 – cited
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1879 – cited
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2014] FCA 345 – cited
Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2009) 176 FCR 268 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2014) 145 ALD 1 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2015] HCASL 136 – cited

1  Date of hearing:

2  27 and 28 April 2015

3  

4  

Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Z Maud
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 488 of 2008

BETWEEN:

GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK
Applicant

AND:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.

2.The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 488 of 2008

BETWEEN:

GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK
Applicant

AND:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

20 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 30 June 2008 the applicant, Ms Gaye Luck, filed an application for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). The applicant sought review of certain decisions attributed to the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink and the Secretary of the Department of Human Services or their delegates.

    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

  2. This proceeding has been pending in this Court since 30 June 2008.  The reason that it was not heard until late April 2015 is because of other applications in related proceedings, which were made…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink, the Federal Court of Australia addressed an application for judicial review brought by Ms Gaye Luck against decisions made by the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink, as well as the Secretary of the Department of Human Services or their delegates. Ms Luck sought to challenge decisions that restricted her means of communication with Centrelink to telephone, fax, or email, and she argued that the decisions were unlawful. The primary legal issue for the court was whether the decision to restrict Ms Luck’s means of communication was made “under an enactment” for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).

The court examined the statutory framework governing Centrelink’s operations, particularly the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) (CSDA Act). Centrelink’s functions were found to be governed by the CSDA Act, which allows the CEO of Centrelink to make arrangements for the provision of Commonwealth services, including determining eligibility for services. However, the court noted that the decision to restrict Ms Luck’s communication methods did not alter or affect her existing rights or obligations and was not authorized by the CSDA Act. The decision was made pursuant to a Centrelink Handbook, which did not have statutory force and did not impose any legal rights, duties, or liabilities.

The court found that the decision did not meet the threshold of being made “under an enactment” as required by the ADJR Act, referencing the High Court’s decision in Tang v Bond University Ltd. Consequently, the court upheld the respondent’s objection to competency and dismissed Ms Luck’s application for judicial review, ordering that the application be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.

2. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 30 June 2008 the applicant, Ms Gaye Luck, filed an application for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). The applicant sought review of certain decisions attributed to the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink and the Secretary of the Department of Human Services or their delegates.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This proceeding has been pending in this Court since 30 June 2008. The reason that it was not heard until late April 2015 is because of other applications in related proceedings, which were made by Ms Luck, to Full Courts and to the High Court, and which were not resolved until relatively recently. Once those matters were resolved and any obstacle for the hearing of this proceeding was removed, the matter was listed for hearing on 13 and 14 April 2015. Ms Luck was advised of the notice of listing on 10 October 2014. Ms Luck, therefore, had seven months’ notice of the pending hearing. On 28 November 2014 a timetable was arranged by way of consent order, which was designed to ensure that submissions on both sides were filed in good time for the scheduled hearing on 13 April 2015. For various reasons that timetable fell behind and, as a result, I listed this matter for mention on 7 April 2015. Because the timetable had fallen behind, and because there was some risk of prejudice to Ms Luck as a result of that, I extended the commencement date of the hearing until 27 April 2015. The estimate remained two days. By interlocutory application filed on 20 April 2015, Ms Luck sought an adjournment of the hearing pending the outcome of an application to the High Court in this proceeding under s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (“the Judiciary Act”). That application was made on 17 April 2015, and it identified certain constitutional issues, which it was said would arise, and in respect of which notices, given under s 78B of that Act, had earlier issued. No mention was made in the course of the directions hearing on 7 April 2015 of any proposal on Ms Luck’s part to make application to the High Court for removal of the proceeding into that court. At the hearing Ms Luck made an oral application that I should disqualify myself from conducting the trial of the proceeding on the ground of ostensible bias. One of the bases on which Ms Luck advanced her ostensible bias argument was that my recusal was warranted because of my appointment as Judge Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force which, she said, made me “answerable” to members of the Executive Branch of the Commonwealth Government including the Minister for Defence. Ms Luck had made a similar application during an earlier directions hearing on 4 April 2014. During that directions hearing I ruled that I would not recuse myself on the ground of ostensible bias in this proceeding: see Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2014] FCA 345. The reasons for my decision included that none of the statutory provisions relating to my appointment made me “answerable” to the Executive Government or could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Luck relied on a number of grounds of review under s 5 of the ADJR Act, including that there had been a breach of natural justice, that procedures required by law were not observed, that persons who made the decision did not have jurisdiction to make it, that the decision was not authorized by an enactment and that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of power. Despite the number of grounds advanced by Ms Luck, her principal complaint was that the decision had been based on what she claimed were inaccurate notations, made by Centrelink call centre operators, of conversations which occurred when she telephoned Centrelink. Ms Luck did not agree with the call centre operators’ descriptions of her manner towards them during these conversations. In particular, she disputed statements made by the operators that she was “unwilling to listen” to them and that she had been “yelling” at them.DECISION UNDER AN ENACTMENT The respondent contended that its decision in June 2008 was not a decision made “under an enactment” for the purpose of the definition of “decision to which this Act applies” in s 3(1) of the ADJR Act. Accordingly, it submitted that the decision was not susceptible to review under the ADJR Act. In order to deal with the respondent’s objection to competency it is necessary first to examine the complicated statutory framework under which Centrelink operates. The Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency, known as Centrelink, was established by s 6 of the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) (“the CSDA Act”). The function of Centrelink is to assist the respondent in the performance of his or her functions: see s 6A of the CSDA Act. Section 7 of the CSDA Act provides that the CEO of Centrelink “may enter into arrangements with the principal officer of a Commonwealth authority for the provision of the Commonwealth services specified in the arrangements, subject to the conditions specified in the arrangements”. “Commonwealth service” is defined in s 3 as “a service, benefit, program or facility for some or all members of the public that is provided for by the Commonwealth, whether under an enactment or otherwise.” Section 7(2) provides that “arrangements for the provision of Commonwealth services may include arrangements for doing anything incidental, conducive or related to the provision of the services.” Section 7(3) provides a list of arrangements for the provision of Commonwealth services which includes, without limitation, arrangements for “determining a person’s eligibility for, or entitlement to receive or have access to, the services” and “providing Commonwealth authorities and other persons with information related to the provision of the services”: see ss 7(3)(b) and 7(3)(d) of the CSDA Act. Section 7(5) provides that “an approval given by the Minister under this section is not a legislative instrument”. Section 8(1) of the CSDA Act provides that the functions of the CEO are, inter alia, the provision of Commonwealth services in accordance with service arrangements and doing anything incidental, conducive or related to the performance of any of his or her other functions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Luck submitted that the decision had been made under s 8 of the CSDA Act and that the decision “altered and otherwise affected [her] rights and obligations and was directly related to the Secretary’s determination to pay … her benefits”. CONSIDERATION Tang was decided under the Queensland equivalent of the ADJR Act. There were, however, no material differences between the two statutes: they both applied to decisions made “under” enactments. Griffith University had terminated Ms Tang’s enrolment on the ground that she had fabricated research results. Under the Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) the University was governed by a council and the council had power “to manage and control the university’s affairs and property.” The council had promulgated policies relating to academic misconduct which were reflected in a disciplinary code. The action had been taken against the student under that code. Although the code had been made and promulgated under the University’s governing statute, the decision to terminate her candidature was held to have been authorised by but not made under that Act. Nor did the Act give legal force or effect to the disciplinary decision. The relationship between Ms Tang and the university was consensual in nature and had ended when the university was no longer willing to allow her to continue her studies. The decision to terminate the student’s enrolment did not alter or otherwise affect any existing rights or obligations enjoyed by her. It followed that the decision to terminate Ms Tang’s candidature was not made under the Act in the necessary sense. It has been suggested that Tang gives rise to “doubts about the possibility of seeking judicial protection of any kind under relationships covered only by ‘soft law’ – guidelines, procedure manuals, internal disciplinary codes, and so forth”: see Aronson M, “Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court” (2007) 35 Fed L Rev 1 at 2 (emphasis added). The Handbook pursuant to which the decision impugned in this case was made, falls squarely within the genre of “soft law” to which Professor Aronson refers. Whether those doubts are warranted or not need not be determined. What can be said is that the Handbook did not have statutory force. Nor did any of its contents (including those relating to the means by which clients could communicate with Centrelink) create, alter or impose any legal rights, duties or liabilities on Centrelink officers or Ms Luck. Ms Luck had no right, either under statute or otherwise, to communicate with the Centrelink office in any particular manner. The decision which she seeks to have reviewed did not deprive her of the ability to claim or receive benefits or to raise queries relating to her social welfare entitlements. The decision about which Ms Luck complains is not a decision under an enactment for the purposes of the ADJR Act. The respondent’s objection to competency must, therefore, succeed.