FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCA 1234
Citation: Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCA 1234 Parties: GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK File number VID 488 of 2008 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 20 November 2015 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review of decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink to restrict the applicant’s means of communication to telephone, fax or email – whether decision “made under an enactment” Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3(1), 5, 11(3)
Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) ss 3, 6, 6A, 7, 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), 7(3)(b), 7(3)(d), 7(5), 8(1)
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 180
DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 40, 78B
Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 7, 8Cases cited: Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 – cited
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2008] FCA 1879 – cited
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2014] FCA 345 – cited
Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2015] FCAFC 111 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2009) 176 FCR 268 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2014) 145 ALD 1 – cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland & Anor [2015] HCASL 136 – cited1 Date of hearing:
2 27 and 28 April 2015
3
4
Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Z Maud Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 488 of 2008
BETWEEN: GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK
ApplicantAND: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.
2.The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 488 of 2008
BETWEEN: GAYE ALEXANDRA LUCK
ApplicantAND: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CENTRELINK
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE:
20 NOVEMBER 2015
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 30 June 2008 the applicant, Ms Gaye Luck, filed an application for an order of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). The applicant sought review of certain decisions attributed to the Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink and the Secretary of the Department of Human Services or their delegates.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This proceeding has been pending in this Court since 30 June 2008. The reason that it was not heard until late April 2015 is because of other applications in related proceedings, which were made…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1234
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework governing Centrelink’s operations, particularly the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency Act 1997 (Cth) (CSDA Act). Centrelink’s functions were found to be governed by the CSDA Act, which allows the CEO of Centrelink to make arrangements for the provision of Commonwealth services, including determining eligibility for services. However, the court noted that the decision to restrict Ms Luck’s communication methods did not alter or affect her existing rights or obligations and was not authorized by the CSDA Act. The decision was made pursuant to a Centrelink Handbook, which did not have statutory force and did not impose any legal rights, duties, or liabilities.
The court found that the decision did not meet the threshold of being made “under an enactment” as required by the ADJR Act, referencing the High Court’s decision in Tang v Bond University Ltd. Consequently, the court upheld the respondent’s objection to competency and dismissed Ms Luck’s application for judicial review, ordering that the application be dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s objection to competency be upheld.
2. The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Luck submitted that the decision had been made under s 8 of the CSDA Act and that the decision “altered and otherwise affected [her] rights and obligations and was directly related to the Secretary’s determination to pay … her benefits”. CONSIDERATION Tang was decided under the Queensland equivalent of the ADJR Act. There were, however, no material differences between the two statutes: they both applied to decisions made “under” enactments. Griffith University had terminated Ms Tang’s enrolment on the ground that she had fabricated research results. Under the Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) the University was governed by a council and the council had power “to manage and control the university’s affairs and property.” The council had promulgated policies relating to academic misconduct which were reflected in a disciplinary code. The action had been taken against the student under that code. Although the code had been made and promulgated under the University’s governing statute, the decision to terminate her candidature was held to have been authorised by but not made under that Act. Nor did the Act give legal force or effect to the disciplinary decision. The relationship between Ms Tang and the university was consensual in nature and had ended when the university was no longer willing to allow her to continue her studies. The decision to terminate the student’s enrolment did not alter or otherwise affect any existing rights or obligations enjoyed by her. It followed that the decision to terminate Ms Tang’s candidature was not made under the Act in the necessary sense. It has been suggested that Tang gives rise to “doubts about the possibility of seeking judicial protection of any kind under relationships covered only by ‘soft law’ – guidelines, procedure manuals, internal disciplinary codes, and so forth”: see Aronson M, “Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court” (2007) 35 Fed L Rev 1 at 2 (emphasis added). The Handbook pursuant to which the decision impugned in this case was made, falls squarely within the genre of “soft law” to which Professor Aronson refers. Whether those doubts are warranted or not need not be determined. What can be said is that the Handbook did not have statutory force. Nor did any of its contents (including those relating to the means by which clients could communicate with Centrelink) create, alter or impose any legal rights, duties or liabilities on Centrelink officers or Ms Luck. Ms Luck had no right, either under statute or otherwise, to communicate with the Centrelink office in any particular manner. The decision which she seeks to have reviewed did not deprive her of the ability to claim or receive benefits or to raise queries relating to her social welfare entitlements. The decision about which Ms Luck complains is not a decision under an enactment for the purposes of the ADJR Act. The respondent’s objection to competency must, therefore, succeed.