LSA v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

LSA v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 61

PARTIES:

LSA

v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8126 of 2024
SC No 1253 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2024] QSC 102 (Cooper J)

DELIVERED ON:

2 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13 November 2024

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Flanagan JA and Bradley J

ORDERS:

1.   Applications for leave to adduce evidence refused.

2.   Appeal dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS – INTERFERENCE WITH THE PERSON – MISCELLANEOUS TORTS – where the decision of the primary judge to dismiss the appellant’s claim of false imprisonment is challenged – where the decision of the primary judge to dismiss the appellant’s claim of conspiracy to commit murder is challenged – where the decision of the primary judge to dismiss the appellant’s claim of negligence is challenged – where the appellant challenges general findings of the primary judge – whether the appeal should be allowed

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT – where, on appeal, the appellant alleged errors of law and errors of fact in the primary judgment – whether the findings of the primary judge were open on the evidence – whether the primary judge proceeded upon any wrong principle

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE – IN GENERAL – where the appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence – where part of the evidence subject to the application for leave was before the primary judge and already formed part of the appeal record – where the appellant’s further evidence appeared to have been available to him before the trial – whether the appellant could demonstrate that with reasonable diligence they could not have obtained the evidence for use at trial

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), s 32, s 44, s 112, s 169, s 177, s 178
Recording of Evidence Act 1962 (Qld), s 5
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 61, s 63

Carlson v King (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 65, cited
Colston v McMullen[2011] QCA 164, cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134; [1991] HCA 61, cited
Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549; [1908] HCA 84, cited
Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489; [1954] EWCA Civ 1, cited

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
D M Favell for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
C E Christensen, Crown Solicitor for the respondent

  1. THE COURT: On 29 May 2024, after a trial, the learned primary judge dismissed the appellant’s claim against the respondent and ordered him to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding. Reasons for judgment were published.[1]

  2. The appellant appealed against the judgment.

    The appeal

  3. In his…

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Details
Case
[2025] QCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, LSA, appealed against a decision of the primary judge in the Supreme Court of Queensland, which dismissed LSA's claims of false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit murder, and negligence against the State of Queensland. The primary judge also dismissed LSA's challenge to the general findings of the primary judge. The appeal raised several issues, including whether the primary judge erred in law or fact, and whether the appeal should be allowed. The appellant also sought leave to adduce further evidence, arguing that it was not available to them at the time of trial.

The court considered whether the appeal should be allowed, focusing on whether the primary judge's findings were open on the evidence and whether the primary judge proceeded upon any wrong principle. The court found that the primary judge's findings were open on the evidence and that there was no error of law or fact. The court also considered whether the appellant could demonstrate that with reasonable diligence they could not have obtained the evidence for use at trial, which is a requirement for admitting further evidence. The court found that the evidence appeared to have been available to the appellant before the trial and rejected the application to adduce further evidence.

The primary judge concluded that the respondent was not legally liable for any alleged conduct of RBG, as it was unlikely RBG was an undercover police officer. The primary judge also rejected the appellant's claim that he was falsely imprisoned during his time at the police station. The primary judge further rejected the appellant's claim of conspiracy to murder and found that the police officer's arrest of the appellant was reasonable. The primary judge also rejected the appellant's challenge to the validity of the PPN and the TPO.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the application for leave to adduce evidence was refused. The court found that the primary judge's findings were open on the evidence and that there was no error of law or fact. The court also found that the evidence appeared to have been available to the appellant before the trial and rejected the application to adduce further evidence. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Applications for leave to adduce evidence refused.

2. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the circumstances, it was not necessary to consider any further the appellant’s suggested other corrections or to “perfect” the transcript in the manner the appellant sought.Part 5: New evidence and additional evidence The appellant sought leave to adduce “new documentary evidence” and “additional evidence”. Some was set out in and exhibited to an affidavit the appellant swore on 28 June 2024. Most was in his affidavit filed on 13 September 2024. The appellant divided the 28 June 2024 affidavit by headings, which identified that each part related to one or more of the 20 matters the appellant sought to raise in the appeal. As noted above, only six of these matters remained to be decided. However, the appellant contended that “the entirety of this affidavit” was relevant to whether the judgment and the costs order should be set aside. The affidavit did not include evidence of any fact, matter or thing that occurred after the trial. Save for extracts of the reasons of the primary judge, it consisted of documents and extracts of documents that were tendered at the trial and commentary on those documents. These were included in the appeal record. In his affidavit filed on 13 September 2024, the appellant again quoted extensively from transcripts of hearings and other documents that were in evidence before the primary judge. The affidavit is argumentative. In it the appellant advances theories that were rejected by the primary judge. There is no purpose to allowing the appellant to tender evidence that is already before the Court in the appeal record. It is only necessary to consider whether to grant leave to adduce any other evidence. A person seeking leave to put fresh evidence before this Court in an appeal must show that with reasonable diligence they could not have obtained the evidence for use at the trial, that the evidence was likely to have an important influence on the result of the appeal, though it need not be decisive, and that the evidence was apparently credible.[34] This general rule serves the important public policy interest in the finality of litigation.[35] It has been said to apply in all but a truly exceptional case.[36][34]Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 at 1491.[35]See, e.g., Colston v McMullen [2011] QCA 164 at [10].[36]Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 at 141-142. The appellant’s new and additional evidence appeared to have been available to him before the trial. In one instance, a recording of voicemail messages, the appellant told the Court he decided not to put the recording into evidence at the trial. The appellant told the Court he did not adduce the new or additional evidence at the trial because he did not appreciate the nature of the allegations against him until he read the reasons of the primary judge. This is not a justification for the further material which the appellant seeks to adduce on the appeal. An appeal does not provide an opportunity for a litigant to re-litigate the same matters that were dealt with in the trial, unless error on the part of the primary judge is shown.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 14 April 2021, a QPS officer interviewed Bartlett, who was serving a term of imprisonment in custody. Bartlett told the officer he had not been a participant in the Facebook conversations and had been “locked out” of his Facebook account. He denied ever messaging the other person named in the Facebook conversations about the appellant. After this interview, the QPS confirmed no further action would be taken.Part 2: The findings in the reasons for the judgment In the reasons, the primary judge reached the following conclusions on matters relevant to the torts alleged against the respondent.Liability of the respondent for alleged conduct of RBG The primary judge found it unlikely RBG was an undercover police officer. He specifically rejected the appellant’s evidence that RBG had told him she was an undercover police officer. His Honour concluded there was no basis to find that RBG was an undercover police officer or a confidential police informant. His Honour rejected the appellant’s argument that RBG was connected in some way to the QPS. On this basis, his Honour found the respondent was not legally liable for any alleged conduct on the part of RBG. His Honour accepted the evidence of the QPS officers involved in dealing with the appellant in respect of each charge about the reasons for their conduct and the motives for their actions. No QPS officer was alleged to have been a party to the Facebook communications, on which the appellant relied as evidence of an alleged threat to murder him.Conspiracy to murder RBG was not a party to the proceeding before the primary judge. Neither party called her as a witness. Having found that the respondent was not legally liable for any of the alleged conduct of RBG, his Honour was not satisfied to the relevant standard that RBG had engaged in the conduct, which the appellant had alleged amounted to a conspiracy to murder him.False imprisonment The primary judge was satisfied the appellant voluntarily accompanied the QPS officers to the Fortitude Valley police station on 22 January 2019 and voluntarily remained there to give the officers his version of events relating to the domestic violence complaint by RBG. So, his Honour rejected the appellant’s claim that he was falsely imprisoned during the time he was at the police station that day. The primary judge was also satisfied that the police officer, who arrested the appellant on 28 January 2019 on charges of breaching the PPN, reasonably suspected the appellant had contravened the PPN on two occasions. His Honour was also satisfied it was reasonably necessary to arrest the appellant on that occasion to prevent the repetition of a breach of the PPN and because the alleged offence was against the DFVP Act.Misfeasance in public office The primary judge was satisfied on the evidence that the appellant and RBG were in an intimate personal relationship, within the meaning in s 14 of the DFVP Act, for about three months to January 2019, when RBG made her complaint of domestic violence against the appellant. His Honour rejected the appellant’s submission that their relationship was not of that kind. His Honour declined to make a finding that RBG had pretended to be in such a relationship with him in order to do the appellant harm. The appellant’s challenge to the validity of the PPN and the TPO on this basis failed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.