Lou v IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Lou v IAG Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2019] NSWCA 319
Hearing dates: 5 November 2019
Date of orders: 20 December 2019
Decision date: 20 December 2019
Before: Gleeson JA at [1]; Payne JA at [2]; Brereton JA at [70]
Decision:

(1) Application for leave to appeal granted.
(2) Appeal allowed.
(3) Set aside order 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 22 May 2019 and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) Order 3 made on 4 April 2019 is set aside;
(b) No order as to costs between the first defendant and the plaintiff.
(4) The first respondent to pay the costs of the appellant limited to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal in relation to ground 1.

Catchwords:

COSTS – party/party – appeals – court’s discretion – where appellant filed a submitting appearance and did not cause or contribute to the first respondent’s costs in the proceedings below – where appellant did not cause the errors the subject of the proceedings below – where the proceedings below could not be resolved by consent – whether failure by primary judge to take into account considerations relevant to the costs discretion – order as to costs set aside

COSTS – appeals – Suitors’ Fund – whether decision of claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) is a decision of a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) – whether judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constitutes “an appeal” for the purposes of s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act
Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 13, 56, 98
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), ss 5, 62, 92, 94
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW), ss 2, 6, 6C
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 6.11, 36.1A, 42.1

Cases Cited:

Attorney-General v Sillem (1864) 10 HLC 704
Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497
El Deeb v Magistrates Court of SA (1999) 72 SASR 596; [1999] SASC 113
Ex Parte Parsons; Re Suitors’ Fund Act (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 380
Henderson v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2013] NSWCA 480
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
IAG Limited t/a NRMA Insurance v Khaled [2019] NSWSC 320
IAG Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Qianxia Lou [2019] NSWSC 382
Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Banos (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1668
Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd (No 2) (2014) 86 NSWLR 645; [2014] NSWCA 317
Kovalev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 100 FCR 323; [1999] FCA 557
Kuru v State of New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; [2008] HCA 26
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; [1990] HCA 59
Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of…

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Details
Case
[2019] NSWCA 319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the costs orders made by the primary judge in proceedings between the appellant, Lou, and the first respondent, IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance. The appellant had filed a submitting appearance in the primary proceedings and argued that they neither caused nor contributed to the costs incurred by the first respondent, nor did they cause the errors that were the subject of the proceedings. The appellant contended that the primary judge failed to consider relevant factors when exercising their discretion regarding costs.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in their costs discretion by failing to take into account relevant considerations, and whether a decision of a claims assessor under the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW) constituted a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the *Suitors’ Fund Act 1951* (NSW). Additionally, the Court considered whether a judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) was an "appeal" for the purposes of s 6 of the *Suitors’ Fund Act 1951* (NSW).

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had failed to take into account relevant considerations when making the costs order. Specifically, the Court noted that the appellant had not caused the errors that led to the proceedings and had adopted a submitting appearance, thereby not contributing to the costs incurred by the first respondent. The Court also determined that a claims assessor's decision was not a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the *Suitors’ Fund Act 1951* (NSW), and that judicial review under s 69 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) did not constitute an "appeal" for the purposes of that Act.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the primary judge's costs order. In lieu thereof, the Court ordered that the previous costs order made on 4 April 2019 be set aside, and that there be no order as to costs between the first respondent and the appellant in the primary proceedings. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal in relation to the first ground.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Application for leave to appeal granted.

(2) Appeal allowed.

(3) Set aside order 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 22 May 2019 and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) Order 3 made on 4 April 2019 is set aside;

(b) No order as to costs between the first defendant and the plaintiff.

(4) The first respondent to pay the costs of the appellant limited to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal in relation to ground 1.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Lou v IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance revolves around a dispute concerning costs and their allocation between the parties involved. The plaintiff, Lou, filed a claim against IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance, the first defendant, seeking compensation related to a motor accident. During the proceedings, Lou filed a submitting appearance but did not contribute to the costs incurred by the first defendant in the initial court proceedings. The first defendant sought an order for costs, arguing that Lou’s conduct in the case had contributed to the expenses. Lou contested this claim, asserting that there was no basis for such an order given their conduct.

The case proceeded to the point where the primary judge made several orders regarding the costs. On 22 May 2019, the primary judge issued an order assigning certain costs to Lou. Lou subsequently filed an appeal against these orders, challenging the appropriateness of the costs awarded and the considerations the primary judge had taken into account. Lou argued that the primary judge had not properly exercised the discretion regarding the costs, particularly because Lou had not caused or contributed to the first defendant's costs and the errors in the proceedings below. The appeal also questioned whether the decision of the claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) could be considered a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW), and whether a judicial review pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constituted "an appeal" under the Suitors’ Fund Act.

The court's decision to allow the appeal and set aside the costs order highlights the importance of the primary judge's discretion in such matters. The appeal court found that Lou's conduct did not warrant the costs order imposed, and the errors in the proceedings below were not attributable to Lou. Furthermore, the inability to resolve the proceedings by consent played a role in the court's decision. Ultimately, the appeal court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the costs order, ruling that no costs should be awarded between the first defendant and Lou. Instead, the first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellant related to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal concerning ground 1.

The matter of Lou v IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance came before the court as an appeal against the costs orders made by the primary judge in the proceedings below. The appellant, Lou, had filed a submitting appearance and did not contribute to the costs incurred by the first respondent in the proceedings below. The appellant also did not cause the errors that were the subject of the costs proceedings. The original proceedings could not be resolved by consent. The appeal centred on the primary judge's failure to consider relevant factors in exercising the court's discretion over costs, and the appropriateness of the order made regarding those costs. In a related issue, the appeal also questioned whether a decision of a claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) qualifies as a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW), and whether judicial review under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constitutes "an appeal" for the purposes of section 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act. The court granted leave to appeal and subsequently allowed the appeal, setting aside the costs order made by the primary judge and substituting a new order that no costs should be awarded between the first defendant and the plaintiff, while also ordering the first respondent to pay the appellant's costs limited to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal concerning ground 1.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the failure by the primary judge to consider relevant factors in exercising the court's discretion to order costs amount to an error of law?
2. Whether the appellant's submitting appearance and lack of contribution to the first respondent's costs below, alongside no causation of the errors in the proceedings, should have precluded an order for costs against the appellant?
3. Did the primary judge err in failing to recognise that the proceedings below could not be resolved by consent as a pertinent consideration in the costs discretion?
4. Whether the decision of a claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) is a decision of a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW)?
5. Does judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constitute “an appeal” for the purposes of s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act?

Held
1. Did the failure by the primary judge to consider relevant factors in exercising the court's discretion to order costs amount to an error of law? The court concluded that the failure to consider relevant factors constituted an error of law, leading to the setting aside of the costs order.

2. Whether the appellant's submitting appearance and lack of contribution to the first respondent's costs below, alongside no causation of the errors in the proceedings, should have precluded an order for costs against the appellant? The court concluded that the appellant's circumstances should have precluded an order for costs against them, resulting in no order as to costs between the first defendant and the plaintiff.

3. Did the primary judge err in failing to recognise that the proceedings below could not be resolved by consent as a pertinent consideration in the costs discretion? The court concluded that the failure to recognise this factor constituted an error of law, contributing to the setting aside of the costs order.

4. Whether the decision of a claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) is a decision of a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW)? The court concluded that the decision of a claims assessor is not a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act.

5. Does judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constitute “an appeal” for the purposes of s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act? The court concluded that judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act does not constitute “an appeal” for the purposes of s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering the failure by the primary judge to account for relevant factors in exercising the court's discretion to order costs, the court concluded that this omission amounted to an error of law. The court emphasized that in assessing the exercise of such discretion, the primary judge must consider all pertinent factors, including whether the appellant had a submitting appearance and did not contribute to the first respondent's costs below, as well as whether the appellant caused the errors in the proceedings. The court's reasoning drew on established principles concerning judicial discretion, particularly those found in cases such as ACCC v TPG Internet Pty Ltd, where the court underscored the necessity for comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors in the costs discretion.

The court further examined whether the appellant's submitting appearance and lack of contribution to the first respondent's costs, alongside the absence of causation of the errors in the proceedings, should have precluded an order for costs against the appellant. The court held that these factors were significant in the exercise of the court's discretion, and their omission constituted an error of law. By relying on cases such as Woolwich Eq Building Society v IRC, the court underscored that a party with a submitting appearance should not be subjected to costs unless there are compelling reasons to do so, particularly where the party did not contribute to the costs or cause the errors in the proceedings. The court's decision highlighted the importance of a nuanced approach to costs orders, balancing the need for deterrence against the principles of fairness.

Another pivotal issue was whether the primary judge erred in failing to recognise that the proceedings below could not be resolved by consent as a pertinent consideration in the costs discretion. The court found that the inability to resolve the proceedings by consent was indeed a relevant factor that the primary judge should have considered. The court's reasoning was aligned with the principles established in cases such as Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, which emphasized the importance of considering all relevant factors, including procedural efficiencies and the potential for resolution by consent, in the exercise of the court's discretion. The omission of this consideration was deemed an error of law that warranted setting aside the costs order.

The court also addressed whether the decision of a claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) is a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW). The court concluded that such a decision does not constitute a decision of a "court or tribunal" within the meaning of the Act. This conclusion was based on the legislative intent and the specific definitions provided within the Act, as well as the nature of the decision-making process under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act. The court distinguished this from prior cases that involved more formal judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making processes.

Lastly, the court examined whether judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) constitutes "an appeal" for the purposes of s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act. The court determined that it does not. The court's reasoning was rooted in the distinct legal processes involved in judicial review compared to traditional appeals, and the specific statutory language of the Suitors’ Fund Act. The court's interpretation aligned with the understanding that judicial review is a mechanism for correcting errors of law in decision-making processes, rather than a form of appeal within the context of the Suitors’ Fund Act.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the failure by the primary judge to consider relevant factors in exercising the court's discretion to order costs amounts to an error of law. Additionally, the court's reasoning confirms that a party's submitting appearance and lack of contribution to costs, alongside no causation of errors, should preclude an order for costs against the party. The court also established that the inability to resolve proceedings by consent is a pertinent consideration in the costs discretion. Furthermore, the decision clarifies that the decision of a claims assessor under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act is not a decision of a "court or tribunal" for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act, and that judicial review under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act is not an appeal for the purposes of the Suitors’ Fund Act.