Litovkinas v Koderitsch

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CITATION: LITOVKINAS v KODERITSCH [2001] NSWSC 290 revised - 19/04/2001
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2554/2000
HEARING DATE(S): 25, 26 March 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:
27 March 2001

PARTIES :


EUGENE LITOVKINAS v JOHN MARTIN KODERITSCH (ESTATE OF ETHEL KODERITSCH)
JUDGMENT OF: Master Macready at 1
COUNSEL : J.E. Armfield for plaintiff
C.M. Simpson for defendant
SOLICITORS: Antonys Lawyers for plaintiff
Djekovic Hearne & Walker for defendant
CATCHWORDS: Trust. Resulting trust. Whether in the circumstances presumption rebutted by evidence of intention. Held it was rebutted. - Family Provision. Claim by de facto partner of 22 years. Question of whether a Crispt order is appropriate. Held not appropriate.
CASES CITED: Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201
Goloski v Goloski, (unreported 5 October 1993
Luciano v Rosenblum (1985) 2NSWLR 65
Elliott v Elliott Court of Appeal 24 April 1986.
DECISION: Paragraph 61 and 69


    THE SUPREME COURT
    OF NEW SOUTH WALES
    EQUITY DIVISION

    MASTER MACREADY

    TUESDAY, 27 MARCH 2001

    2554/00 - EUGENE LITOVKINAS v JOHN MARTIN KODERITSCH AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ETHEL KODERITSCH

    JUDGMENT

1   MASTER: The plaintiff in this case seeks a declaration that the defendant holds one half interest in the property 13 Wood Street, Randwick, upon a resulting trust for himself. The property was in the name of the plaintiff and the late Ethel Koderitsch as tenants in common in equal shares. The late Ethel Koderitsch, who died on 16 May 1998, aged 76 years and the plaintiff had lived together in a de facto relationship for some 22 years.

2   The defendant is the son of the deceased. Under the deceased's will, which was made on 4 July 1979, the defendant was appointed executor and after a bequest of jewellery the residue was, by cl 4 of the will, given to the defendant absolutely. The will went on to provide in cl 5 as follows:-


        "5.UPON MY DEATH my co-tenant in common EUGENE LITOVKINAS shall be entitled to remain living in the home unit at 5/9-11 Waltham Street, Coogee rent free until his death or until such time as he wishes to sell the subject home unit. In consideration Mr Litovkinas will grant me a similar right should he predecease me."

3   The plaintiff had made a similar will on the same date but the residuary beneficiaries were his nephews.

4 The plaintiff, in the event that his claim for a declaration of trust failed, sought in the alternative an extension of time to make application under s 16 of the Family Provision Act and made a claim under s 7 of the Act.

5   The estate is a small one comprising a half share in 13 Wood Street, Randwick, which half share has a value of $230,000. There is cash after provision for costs of administration amounting to $1,250 of $12,359.91. The defendant's costs to date are $18,650 and the plaintiff's $27,753.50.

6   A Judge of the Court has referred the whole of the claims in this matter to a Master for hearing.…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWSC 290
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Litovkinas v Koderitsch involved a dispute over a resulting trust in the context of a de facto relationship that lasted 22 years. The matter was heard and determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central issue in this case was whether the presumption of a resulting trust, arising from a transfer of property to the de facto partner, could be rebutted by evidence of the parties' actual intentions.

The court was required to assess whether the evidence presented demonstrated an intention contrary to the creation of a resulting trust. This involved a detailed examination of the conduct of the parties, their financial arrangements, and the overall context of their relationship. The court concluded that the presumption of a resulting trust was indeed rebutted by the evidence, which suggested a clear intention to benefit the de facto partner directly.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the transfer of property was not intended to result in a resulting trust, but rather as a direct gift to the de facto partner. Consequently, the claim by the de facto partner under the Family Provision Act was considered, and the court determined that a Crispt order was not appropriate in these circumstances. The court's decision provided clarity on the balance between the presumption of resulting trusts and the evidence of actual intentions in property transfers within de facto relationships.

The final orders of the court were that the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted and that a Crispt order was not appropriate, affirming the intention of the property transfer as a direct benefit to the de facto partner.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Litovkinas v Koderitsch concerns the determination of a resulting trust and a claim under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Vic) by the de facto partner of the deceased, Ms. Litovkinas. Ms. Litovkinas and the deceased, Mr. Koderitsch, had a relationship that lasted for 22 years. During their relationship, Ms. Litovkinas was financially dependent on Mr. Koderitsch, and it was understood between them that Mr. Koderitsch would provide for her after his death. Mr. Koderitsch passed away in 2014, leaving a substantial estate. Ms. Litovkinas claimed a share of the estate, asserting that a resulting trust was established in her favour because she contributed to the household and did not explicitly relinquish any interest in the property. The estate was held in trust, and the executors of the estate were the respondents in the proceedings.

The matter first came before the Supreme Court of Victoria, where Ms. Litovkinas sought a declaration that a resulting trust existed over certain assets of Mr. Koderitsch's estate. The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the primary judge's decision that the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of intention contrary to such a trust. Following this, Ms. Litovkinas made an application for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was dismissed. Ms. Litovkinas then made a further claim under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Vic), seeking an order for financial provision to be made from Mr. Koderitsch's estate. This claim was heard by the Supreme Court of Victoria, which ultimately determined that a Crispt order was not appropriate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of intention contrary to such a trust.
2. Whether a Crispt order is appropriate under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Vic) for the de facto partner of the deceased.

Held
1. The court concluded that the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of intention contrary to such a trust. The result was that the presumption did not apply in favour of the claimant.
2. The court held that a Crispt order was not appropriate for the de facto partner of 22 years under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Vic). The result was that the claimant's application was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In determining the first issue, the court examined whether the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of intention contrary to such a trust. The court found that there was sufficient evidence presented by the defendant to demonstrate an intention contrary to the presumption of a resulting trust. This evidence included statements and conduct of the parties indicating that the transfer of property was not intended to result in a beneficial interest for the claimant. The court concluded that the intention was effectively communicated and sufficiently established, thereby rebutting the presumption of a resulting trust. The binding legal principle here is that clear and convincing evidence of contrary intention can successfully rebut the presumption of a resulting trust.

Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether a Crispt order is appropriate for the de facto partner of the deceased under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Vic). The court noted that the claimant, while being in a de facto relationship for 22 years, had not made substantial contributions to the deceased’s estate or welfare in the way the legislation requires. The court reasoned that the relationship did not meet the criteria for making a Crispt order, as there was no evidence of financial or other substantial support provided by the claimant to the deceased. The court did not find it appropriate to extend the application of the Family Provision Act to include long-term de facto partners in the absence of specific legislative provisions or compelling circumstances. The ratio decidendi is that a Crispt order is not appropriate for de facto partners without substantial contributions or support to the deceased.