Liristis v White

[2025] NSWCA 205

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Liristis v White [2025] NSWCA 205

Hearing dates:

22 August 2025

Date of orders:

5 September 2025

Decision date:

05 September 2025

Before:

McHugh JA, Ball JA

Decision:

Leave to appeal refused with costs.

Catchwords:

APPEALS – application for leave to appeal – no issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice identified – leave refused

Legislation Cited:

District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 127

Supreme Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 101(2)(e)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.19(2)

Cases Cited:

Arsalan v Rixon (2021) 274 CLR 606; [2021] HCA 40

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Liristis & Anor v White [2024] NSWDC 557

Liristis v White [2024] NSWSC 1654

McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 104

PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Tony Liristis (First Applicant)
Infinity Group of Companies t/as Austral Agistment and Animal Shelter (Second Applicant)
Brian Leslie White (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
Self-Represented (Applicant)
J Sukkar (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Self-Represented (Applicant)
Hall & Wilcox (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2025/72892

Publication restriction:

Nil

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of NSW;
Supreme Court of NSW

Jurisdiction:

Civil;
Equity

Citation:

Not available – ex tempore 24 October 2024

Liristis & Anor v White [2024] NSWDC 557

Liristis v White [2024] NSWSC 1654

Date of Decision:

24 October 2024;
28 November 2024; and
16 December 2024

Before:

Newlinds SC DCJ;
Abadee DCJ;
Meek J

File Number(s):

2024/400930;
2024/286433

JUDGMENT

1. THE COURT: The first applicant (incorrectly described in the amended summons seeking leave to appeal as the “First Appellant”), Mr Antonio Liristis, and the second applicant, Infinity Group of Companies Pty Ltd t/a Austral Agistment and Animal Shelter (IGC), a company apparently controlled by Mr Liristis, seek leave to appeal against the following orders:

1. Orders made by Newlinds SC DCJ on 24 October 2024 in proceeding 2024/00286433 for summary dismissal of that proceeding and for Mr Liristis to pay costs fixed as a gross sum of $15,000 (DC1);

2. Orders made on 26 November 2024 by Abadee DCJ in proceeding 2024/00400930 that Mr Liristis have leave to discontinue that proceeding on the basis that he paid the defendant’s costs as assessed (or agreed): see Liristis & Anor v White [2024] NSWDC 557 (DC2);

3. Orders made on 20 November 2024 by Meek J dismissing a summons filed by Mr Liristis in the Supreme Court on 16 December 2024 and ordering that Mr Liristis pay the defendant’s costs: see Liristis v White [2024] NSWSC 1654 (SC1).

2. The orders sought by the applicants include the following:

“1   The Local Court Proceedings file 2024/00286433 be transferred to the Parramatta District Court.

2   Orders made by Newlinds J, on 24 October 2024, be dismissed.

3   Orders made by Abadee J, on 28 November 2024, be dismissed.

4   Orders made by Meek J, of 16 December 2024, be dismissed.”

3. Mr Liristis was self-represented at the hearing of the matter. He also appeared, with leave, on behalf of IGC. The application for leave to appeal was filed out of time. In an affidavit filed on 18 August 2025, Mr Liristis explained the reasons for the delay, which included the death of his mother on 25 October 2024 and various other issues that he has had to deal with. The hearing proceeded on the basis that if Mr Liristis otherwise satisfied the Court that leave should be given, the Court would grant the necessary extension of time.

4. Each of the proceedings relates to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 26 October 2023 when a motor vehicle driven by the defendant in all three proceedings, Mr White, collided with a motor vehicle driven by Mr Liristis (the Accident). Mr Liristis says that at the time he was using the motor vehicle to pick up food for animals at an animal centre apparently operated by IGC.

Background

5. On 3 November 2023, Mr Liristis commenced a proceeding solely in his own name against Mr White in the Penrith Local Court claiming damages in the sum of $12,600 in respect of the Accident. By an amended document filed in February 2024, that claim was increased to $22,380. Mr White filed a defence that was amended on 28 February 2024 in which he admitted liability but disputed the quantum of damages as well as contesting Mr Liristis’s asserted right to bring a claim for damages for personal injury.

6. On 5 August 2024, Mr Liristis commenced DC1 by statement of claim solely in his own name. He filed an amended statement of claim on 30 August 2024. That document is lengthy. It sought to join IGC as a second plaintiff. Paragraph 25 stated:

“This matter is currently before the Liverpool Local Court (file # 2023/00349463) but due to the increase and continuous damages, Pain and Suffering, increased costs, increased hire car costs, loan and loan costs of this matter has now exceeded the Local Court Jurisdiction.”

7. Despite that paragraph, Mr Liristis both in the document and in the hearing before Newlinds DCJ disavowed any suggestion that by that document he was making a claim for personal injuries. For example, paras 32 and 33 of the document assert:

“32.   As the Plaintiff does not want to delay this matter any further or delay these proceedings before the Parramatta District Court the Plaintiff (Regrettably, and against the advice from Counsel) has removed the Personal Injury Claim from this Amended Statement of Claim, as the Plaintiff believes he will have no chance before Judicial Registrar Howard to have a fair hearing of the Defendant’s Notice of Motion which has not been filed or served yet.

33.   The Personal Injury Claim is now being sought in another Claim that will be conducted by Experienced Personal Injury Lawyers.”

8. Mr White filed a notice of motion on 6 September 2024 seeking summary dismissal of the claim. That application, was listed before Newlinds DCJ on 24 October 2024.

9. In the meantime, on 18 October 2024, Mr Liristis “dropped off” (to use the language Mr Liristis used in an email he sent to the District Court on 19 October 2024) a summons at the Paramatta Registry of the District Court seeking the following orders:

“1. Matter at Liverpool Local Court file # 2023/00349463 to be transferred to the Parramatta District Court under section 140(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, (As the matter now exceeds the jurisdiction of the Local Court)

2.    The Defendants’ notice of motion filed on 6 September 2024 be dismissed.

3.    Costs.”

10. The following day, Mr Liristis sent an email to the District Court registry seeking to withdraw that summons and instead seeking to rely on a notice of motion he apparently filed at the time he commenced the District Court proceeding, which it appears sought the same orders. A copy of that notice of motion was not in the material before the Court, and it is not entirely clear that it was ever filed. Mr Liristis said in his email that he wanted his notice of motion to be dealt with at the same time as the one filed by Mr White but said “as my document was filed before the Defendant Notice of Motion I wish for my Notice of Motion to be heard first” (emphasis in original).

11. In circumstances that are not clear from the evidence, the summons that Mr Liristis had “dropped off” to the District Court and had later sought to withdraw was in the file before Newlinds DCJ on 24 October 2024. His Honour asked Mr Sukkar, counsel appearing for Mr White, whether he had any objection to the Court dealing with the summons at the same time as Mr White’s notice of motion. Mr Sukkar indicated that he did not. Mr Liristis did not object to that course. It was entirely consistent with what he had sought in his email dated 19 October 2024, although, of course, Mr Liristis expected the issue of transfer to be addressed by reference to his notice of motion.

12. Newlinds DCJ delivered an ex tempore judgment. His Honour explained Mr Liristis’ claim as best he could understand it in the following terms:

“15.   As far as I can understand it, having listened very carefully to Mr Liristis’ submissions, and having read the three affidavits he has filed, it is something to the effect that after the motor vehicle accident, Mr White, or someone at his behest, approached ASIC, which caused ASIC to make inquiries into the second Plaintiff’s [IGC] affairs, which in turn has caused the second Plaintiff loss and damage, and also has caused some pain and distress i.e. personal injury to Mr Liristis. He also contends that there was a robbery at his home and documents stolen in that robbery have been improperly used in the Local Court proceedings by Mr White or Mr White’s lawyers, causing him emotional distress and damage. Mr Liristis says that conduct does not arise out of the motor vehicle accident, albeit it is part of a chain of events that started with the motor vehicle accident, and therefore he is allowed to bring that case, notwithstanding the provisions of the [Motor Accident Injury Act 2017 (NSW)].”

13. His Honour concluded that that claim satisfied the requirements for summary disposal set out by Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69. As his Honour explained at [17]:

“Putting the pleading to one side and focusing on the evidence and submissions of Mr Liristis, I do not think that there is any basis known to law that would allow damages of a non-property-damage kind, that Mr Liristis is seeking in these proceedings be the responsibility of the Defendant, Mr White. There is just no connection between Mr White and the acts that Mr Liristis says have caused him damage, other than the damage to the vehicle.”

14. His Honour also pointed out that it would be an abuse of process if the two proceedings were permitted to remain on foot: at [20].

15. In relation to the application for transfer, his Honour was not satisfied that the amount of the Local Court claim exceeded $100,000: at [28].

16. The orders made by his Honour included the following:

“(1) The proceedings be dismissed in their entirely pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

(2)   The Plaintiffs pay the Defendant’s costs of this motion filed on 6 September 2024, the Plaintiff’s summons of 18 October 2024, and of the proceedings.

(3)   Those costs are fixed as a gross fixed sum assessed at $15,000 inclusive of GST.”

17. Although it appears to be implicit in the orders his Honour made, his Honour did not make a specific order dismissing the application to transfer the Local Court proceedings.

18. On 12 November a summons filed on 29 October 2024 (that is, DC2) came before Abadee DCJ. The summons, which sought precisely the same relief as the summons considered by Newlinds DCJ, had a new action number. Judge Abadee treated the summons as having been filed by Mr Liristis on 29 October 2024. It is not entirely clear whether that is correct. It is apparent from correspondence between Mr Liristis and the District Court registry that the District Court adopts a practice of not permitting a self-represented litigant to file an initiating process unless the document has been approved by a judicial registrar and that that approval can take up to six weeks to be given. It is possible that the proceeding that came before Abadee DCJ was the summons that Mr Liristis had “dropped off” at the District Court and later sought to withdraw and that due to an administrative error it was subsequently processed by the registry and given a new action number and return date. However, on the material before us, the position is not clear.

19. In any event, Abadee DCJ heard the summons on 12 and 25 November 2024, and delivered judgment promptly on 26 November 2024.

20. A substantial part of his Honour’s judgment gave reasons for dismissing an oral application made on 25 November 2024 by Mr Liristis that his Honour recuse himself for actual or apprehended bias. We pause to note that we see no error in his Honour’s refusal to do so. However, it also emerges from that judgment that the substantive issue before the Court was whether Mr Liristis should be given leave to discontinue the summons and, if so, whether the court should make an order departing from the usual rule that Mr Liristis “pay such of the defendant’s costs as, at the date on which the notice of discontinuance was filed, had been incurred by the defendant in relation to each claim in respect of which the proceedings have been discontinued” in accordance with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.19(2).

21. In relation to that issue, it appears that Mr Liristis submitted relevantly that he had not filed DC2 because the correct characterisation of what had happened was that the District Court unilaterally took it upon itself to treat the summons filed by Mr Liristis as the commencement of a new proceeding. His Honour rejected that argument. His Honour also indicated that the transfer application had “virtually a certain probability of failure” (at [85]). For those reasons, his Honour concluded that he should not make an order disturbing the normal costs consequences of a discontinuance.

22. Undeterred, on 16 December 2024, Mr Liristis commenced SC1 in the duty list in the Equity Division seeking an order that the Local Court proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court. Mr Liristis advanced two reasons for that order. One was that his claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court. The other was that the complexity of the matter justified transfer to the Supreme Court. Meek J dismissed that application. In doing so, in relation to Mr Liristis’s first argument, his Honour said (at [37]):

“Even with the figures which Mr Liristis has provided in the table extracted above, I have little clarity around what amount is actually being claimed in the Local Court Proceedings without the ‘Unliquidated Statement of Claim’ or any other pleadings in the Local Court Proceedings before me. As I have noted above, my questioning of Mr Liristis on the hearing did not clarify the position. Without any underlying explanation as to precisely where those figures came from and how they relate to the pleaded claim in the Local Court Proceedings, I am inclined to give them little weight. In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the defendant maintains that the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, I am not satisfied on the materials before me that the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court would be exceeded.”

23. In relation to complexity, his Honour said this:

“39 As to the purported complexity of the Local Court Proceedings, I am not satisfied that the issues in Mr Liristis’ claim are of such complexity or are of a nature unfamiliar to a Local Court magistrate such that the proceedings would benefit from being heard in this Court. Mr Liristis’ submissions in this respect appeared to be based principally on the fact that the issue of recoverability of hire costs for a replacement vehicle had been the subject of decisions of the Court of Appeal (Lee) and the High Court (Arsalan v Rixon (2021) 274 CLR 606; [2021] HCA 40 (Arsalan)). That fact alone hardly demonstrates any inherent complexity in Mr Liristis’ claim such that it should be removed from the Local Court and transferred to this Court. Indeed, in Arsalan, the Court expressly recognised at [1] that ‘[t]he question is one that has arisen many times in a variety of different circumstances in local courts across Australia’.

40  Whilst Mr Liristis placed much emphasis upon Basten AJ’s decision in Brown, the circumstances of this application are clearly distinguishable from those before his Honour. In Brown, the three factors identified by his Honour (at [22]–[24]) as supporting a transfer to the Equity Division were that: (a) the Local Court would be required to construe a deed which had ‘unusual features’, of a kind with which a magistrate was most unlikely to be familiar, and which would benefit from consideration by an experienced commercial law judge; (b) the deed was the product of a mediation of proceedings which had been in the Equity Division; and (c) although the claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Local Court, the confined issues raised by the defence ought to have been determined expeditiously in accordance with Pt 6 of the CPA. In respect of the third factor, Basten AJ observed that, if the matter were to be left in the Local Court, there was at least a significant possibility that either party if unsuccessful might appeal the conclusions reached by the magistrate as to the proper construction of the deed: Brown at [24]. The possibility of an appeal to this Court militated against giving much weight to the fact that the costs regime in the Local Court might have made it cheaper to proceed in that Court. Importantly, his Honour noted that the proceedings had already been on foot for two years without the pleadings being completed.

41  There are no factors analogous to those in Brown which support a transfer of the Local Court Proceedings to this Court. Mr Liristis’ claim arises out of a motor vehicle accident and (as I have been told) only involves a claim for property damage. …”

Consideration

24. There is a question whether Mr Liristis was entitled to combine his appeal in respect of all three matters into one appeal. Leaving that point aside, it is plain that leave is required in respect of each of the three appeals. Leave was required in respect of DC1 and DC2 under s 127 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), since both decisions were interlocutory. Leave was required in respect of SC1 under the Supreme Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 101(2)(e), since that decision also was interlocutory.

25. Generally, a grant of leave to appeal requires there to be an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable: see McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 104 (McEvoy) at [35] and the cases cited there. Moreover, as the Court observed in McEvoy, referring to PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 at [5], discretionary decisions, such as those involving matters of practice or procedure, as the decisions in question were, attract the added restraint of the requirements of House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.

26. Mr Liristis, in documents which together comprise approximately 50 pages, purports to identify multiple grounds of appeal. Many of the grounds involve broad allegations of “Denial of Procedural Fairness”, a “Denial of Natural Justice” and an “Error of Law”. There is no utility in seeking to address each of Mr Liristis’s grounds, many of which are difficult to follow. The grounds essentially raise three issues. One is whether Mr Liristis actually filed the summons considered in DC1 and DC2. The second is whether Newlinds DCJ was right to dismiss the substantive claims in DC1. The third is whether the decision of Newlinds DCJ or that of Meek J in refusing to transfer the Local Court proceedings to the District Court or the Supreme Court respectively, involved an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable so as to justify a grant of leave to appeal against those decisions.

27. As to the first issue, that was dealt with in detail by Abadee DCJ in DC2: see [61]-[71]. As Abadee DCJ pointed out, the question whether Mr Liristis had filed the summons in DC1 was not strictly before him and was ultimately a matter before this Court. However, there is no merit in Mr Liristis’s complaints in relation to the summons that was considered by Newlinds DCJ. One thing is plain and that is that Mr Liristis wanted his application for transfer to be heard at the same time as Mr White’s application for summary dismissal. That is what happened. The fact that that occurred because Newlinds DCJ treated the issue as having been raised by a summons that Mr Liristis had sought to withdraw is irrelevant.

24. The position is perhaps not quite as clear in relation to DC2. It appears that Mr Liristis challenges factual findings made by Abadee DCJ. For the reasons we have given, there may be a question whether those factual findings are correct, although on the material before us, we are unable to form our own view on that question. Several points, however, should be made. First, it was open to Mr Liristis to put whatever material he considered relevant to that factual question before Abadee DCJ, and indeed Mr Liristis did tender some emails between him and the District Court registry. Abadee DCJ made factual findings about the filing of the summons in DC2 on the basis of that material. It is not clear to us that those factual findings were wrong. Mr Liristis should not be permitted to challenge those factual findings by reference to material that was not before Abadee DCJ, but even having regard to the material he put before us it is not possible to form a view.

25. Second, issues concerning the filing of the summons were raised on the first return date on 12 November 2024. At that time, Abadee DCJ set the matter down for hearing on 25 November 2024. At the time the matter was set down for hearing, Abadee DCJ made it clear that he anticipated that the substantial issues raised by the summons (whether the Local Court proceedings should be transferred) would be dealt with at that time. It was open to Mr Liristis to indicate at that time that the summons had been filed in error and that he wished to discontinue the proceeding. He did not do so.

26. Third, the issue is only relevant to the question whether Abadee DCJ was incorrect not to make an order departing from the usual position that a plaintiff which seeks to discontinue proceedings must bear the defendant’s costs. That is plainly a matter that must satisfy the requirements of House v The King. Abadee DCJ did not act on a wrong principle or take account of irrelevant matters or fail to take account of relevant matters drawn to his attention in reaching a decision on that question. His Honour’s decision was not plainly unjust. The position was that if the summons came before Abadee DCJ as a result of an error by the registry, Mr Liristis could have corrected it on the first return date of the summons. He did not do so.

27. As to the second issue, two points should be made. First, Newlinds DCJ examined the proposed claim and set out cogent reasons why in its current form it had no prospect of success. We can see no error in those conclusions. Second, in circumstances where Mr Liristis had already made a claim in the Local Court for damages arising from the Accident, it was plainly an abuse of process for him to commence fresh proceedings claiming damages arising out of the same accident in the District Court.

28. As to the third issue, both Newlinds DCJ and Meek J considered the evidence filed by Mr Liristis in support of his contention that his claim (and that of IGC) exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court. The claim of IGC can be put to one side. It appears to be entirely misconceived. As best we can understand it, the claim appears to be that IGC somehow suffered loss because the Accident caused events to occur that had adverse consequences for it. Even accepting that that is the case, it is plain that Mr White owed IGC no duty of care in respect of that loss.

29. It appears from the judgment of Newlinds DCJ that Mr Liristis’s contention that the $100,000 threshold would be exceeded was based on two matters. One was that Mr Liristis estimated that legal costs would exceed $100,000. The other was a bare assertion by Mr Liristis in an affidavit that the amount claimed in the Local Court “has now passed the Local Court jurisdiction of $100,000”: quoted by Judge Newlinds at [27]. Legal costs are irrelevant to the jurisdictional limit, and Newlinds DCJ was correct to place no weight on the bare assertion by Mr Liristis that the claim had “now passed $100,000”. We can see no error in the approach taken by Newlinds DCJ, let alone one that would justify a grant of leave.

30. In SC1, Mr Liristis relied on more extensive evidence concerning the value of his claim. Meek J considered that evidence, which was not before us. He reached the following conclusion in relation to it (at [37]):

“Even with the figures which Mr Liristis has provided in the table extracted above, I have little clarity around what amount is actually being claimed in the Local Court Proceedings without the ‘Unliquidated Statement of Claim’ or any other pleadings in the Local Court Proceedings before me. As I have noted above, my questioning of Mr Liristis on the hearing did not clarify the position. Without any underlying explanation as to precisely where those figures came from and how they relate to the pleaded claim in the Local Court Proceedings, I am inclined to give them little weight. In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the defendant maintains that the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, I am not satisfied on the materials before me that the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court would be exceeded.”

35. Again, we can see no error in the approach taken by Meek J, let alone one that would justify a grant of leave.

36. Mr Liristis also submitted that because of the complexities raised by the case, it was more appropriate to be heard by the Supreme Court (or, inferentially, the District Court). We have already set out above how his Honour dealt with that argument. We can see no error in the approach taken by his Honour. We might add that to the extent that Mr Liristis points to delays in having his case heard in the Local Court, that has been largely brought about by his own applications to the District Court, the Supreme Court and this Court.

37. For these reasons, leave to appeal is refused with costs.

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Decision last updated: 05 September 2025