Lincoln v Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania

Case [1991] TASSC 87


76/1991
List "A"

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:              Lincoln v Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania [1991] TASSC 87; A76/1991

PARTIES:  LINCOLN
  v
  ROYAL AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF TASMANIA

FILE NO/S:  WC 50/1987
DELIVERED ON:  19 September 1991
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford J

Judgment Number:  A76/1991
Number of paragraphs:  26

Serial No 76/1991
List "A"
File No WC 50/1987

LINCOLN v ROYAL AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  CRAWFORD J

19 September 1991

  1. The deceased was a road service patrolman employed by the defendant. His job was to drive his employer's service van in response to calls from the drivers of disabled vehicles and provide those drivers with assistance. On 2 February 1983 his duties required him to work the afternoon shift commencing at 4pm, and concluding at midnight. He lived with his wife, the plaintiff, at Austins Ferry and left from there for work that afternoon. During the shift he attended ten service calls within Hobart and at places which included Moonah, Kingston, Warrane and Hobart Airport.

  1. At 11.20pm, he was driving the van in Bay Road, New Town, which was within the area in which he was expected by his employer to make service calls. There was no evidence clearly establishing why he was driving the van at that time and place. It was consistent with his employment obligations for him to have been making his way towards his home, via New Town and the northern suburbs of Hobart, awaiting service calls. Whether he was doing so is not known. But I infer that he was either driving in the course of his employment for his employer's purposes, or he was driving home. The defendant's counsel did not argue to the contrary.

  1. The van crashed into a fence. The deceased was found dead at the wheel. The cause of death was a heart attack which was not induced by any particular activity, effort or strain. That it occurred while he was driving his employer's van during the shift was a coincidence. The plaintiff claims workers' compensation as his widow.

  1. Two matters were argued by counsel. The first was whether death resulted from personal injury by accident. The second was the amount of compensation which should be awarded, which depends upon the extent to which the plaintiff was dependent on her husband.

  1. The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 1927 relevant to the primary question of liability are:

"5–(1)  If in any employment a worker suffers personal injury by accident, or is disabled or dies as the result of a disease, arising out of and in the course of the employment, his employer shall, subject to this Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Schedule l:

(3A)     Without limiting the generality of the provisions of subsection (1) but subject to the provisions of subsection (2), an injury by accident to a worker shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment if the accident occurs –

(a)       while the worker…

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Lincoln v Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania [1991] TASSC 87
Case
[1991] TASSC 87
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lincoln v Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania involved a claim for workers' compensation by the plaintiff, the widow of a deceased road service patrolman, following the death of her husband. The deceased, employed by the defendant, died of a heart attack while driving the service van during his shift. The central legal issues were whether the death resulted from an "injury by accident" and whether it arose out of and in the course of the employment.

The court considered the statutory definition of "injury by accident" and whether the heart attack could be classified as such under the Workers' Compensation Act 1927. The medical evidence indicated that the heart attack was due to a natural progression of a pre-existing condition, specifically coronary artery disease, and not triggered by any specific incident or exertion. The court referenced High Court judgments, particularly The Commonwealth v Hornsby, to determine that where a death results from the natural progression of a pre-existing condition without any external incident contributing to the fatal event, it cannot be classified as an "injury by accident." The court also noted the deeming provisions of the Act, which established that the death occurred in the course of employment, but concluded that without an "injury by accident," compensation could not be awarded.

Given these findings, the court ruled that the deceased did not suffer an "injury by accident" and thus the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation was denied. The decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between natural progression of disease and accidental injury in the context of workers' compensation claims.

Orders

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Background

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