Lillas and Loel Lawyers v Odlin

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lillas & Loel Lawyers v Odlin [2022] QDC 107

PARTIES:

LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD

(appellant)

v
CHRISTOPHER BRIAN CHARLES ODLIN

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D2375/21

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

District Court at Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 February 2021

JUDGES:

Sheridan DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   The decision in the Magistrates Court dated 13 August 2021 be set aside.

3. The appellant be granted leave under r 389(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to take a further step in the proceedings.

4.   The appellant file and serve any submissions as to costs of no more than four pages in length by 23 May 2022.

5.   The respondent file and serve any submissions as to costs of no more than four pages in length by 30 May 2022.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES – APPEAL – LEAVE TO TAKE A STEP IN THE PROCEEDING – where there was a greater than two year delay during which no action was taken in the proceedings – where the appellant sought leave in the Magistrates Court under r 389 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to take a step in the proceedings – where leave was refused – where the appellant submits that the Magistrate acted on wrong principles, took into account irrelevant considerations and failed to take into account material considerations – whether the appeal should be allowed

LEGISLATION:

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 308(c), s 315, s 316(1), s 316(2), s 341
Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld), s 45(1)(a)
Uniform Civil and Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 149, r 157, r 165, r 166, r 167, r 168, r 169, r 389, r 765, r 766

CASES:

Australia Abalone World Pty Ltd v Yin [2020] QDC 190 followed
Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124 cited
Fox v Percy [2003] 214 CLR 118 cited
Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198 followed
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178 followed
Scrivener v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] QCA 454 cited
Allesch v Maunz [2000] 203 CLR 172 cited
The President’s Club Ltd v Palmer Coolum Resort Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 209 followed
Warren v Coombes [1979] 142 CLR 531 cited

COUNSEL:

P Sams for the appellant
A Moriarty for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Lillas & Loel Lawyers for the appellant
AXM Law for the respondent

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Magistrate refusing an application for leave to proceed pursuant to r 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules1999 (Qld) (UCPR).

    Background

  2. The appellant was engaged by the respondent initially to act on his behalf in a claim against the Coordinator General (Qld). The appointment was extended to acting in a claim against his former lawyers and then to…

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Details
Case
[2022] QDC 107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lillas and Loel Lawyers v Odlin concerns an appeal from a decision of the Magistrates Court, where the appellant sought leave to take a further step in the proceedings under rule 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). The appeal was against the refusal of the Magistrate to grant leave. The legal issues in the appeal focused on whether the Magistrate had erred in his approach to the determination of prejudice and whether he had taken into account all relevant considerations in making his decision.

The court examined whether the Magistrate had considered the critical issue of whether the delay would prevent a fair trial, which is an important consideration under rule 389. The Magistrate did not explicitly address this issue, focusing instead on the prejudice to the respondent due to the delay. The court found that had this issue been properly considered, it would likely have led to a different outcome, as the proceedings were not so old as to make a fair trial impossible. The court also considered whether the Magistrate had failed to take into account relevant considerations, such as the respondent’s inaction and conduct in dispersing settlement funds. The court determined that these factors were not significant enough to warrant interference with the Magistrate’s decision.

The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Magistrates Court was set aside. The appellant was granted leave to take a further step in the proceedings. The parties were directed to file submissions on the appropriate costs orders, both for the appeal and the proceedings below. The final costs orders were to be determined by the court without a further hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. The decision in the Magistrates Court dated 13 August 2021 be set aside.

3. The appellant be granted leave under r 389(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to take a further step in the proceedings.

4. The appellant file and serve any submissions as to costs of no more than four pages in length by 23 May 2022.

5. The respondent file and serve any submissions as to costs of no more than four pages in length by 30 May 2022.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

No error of principle in relation to the Magistrate’s view about the absence of the reply is demonstrated. Admission of new evidence At the commencement of the appeal, the respondent sought leave to file and serve an affidavit which exhibited the two costs agreements referred to in the statement of claim and a third costs agreement which was referred to in the defence, another copy of a letter which had been exhibited in an affidavit in the proceedings below and a copy of an e-courts file summary of the proceedings, the subject of one of the cost letters. The respondent also swore that he had received and returned both of the costs agreements referred to in the statement of claim, and recited parts of the contents of all of the documents. Extensive written and oral submissions were made as to the receivability given the interplay between r 766(1)(c) and r 766(2); the ambit of which provisions McPherson JA in Scrivener v DPP regarded as “perhaps not all together clear.”[12] The respondent submitted that the affidavit was relevant to prove the truth of the factual allegations in the defence that the claim could not be maintained (implicitly absent a costs assessment) and to prove the facts the subject of the deemed admissions. [12][2011] QCA 454, [10] In my view, these matters are not relevant to the appeal against the Magistrate’s decision; particularly having regard to my conclusions on the subject of the deemed admissions and prospects. It is accordingly not necessary to decide whether or not the Court should receive the evidence on special grounds (as referred to in r 766(1)(c)), or whether it could be received without special leave unless the appeal could be regarded as one from a final judgment (as referred to in r 766(2)). The application to adduce the further evidence is refused. Prejudice and Fair Trial The focus of the oral submissions on appeal was the learned Magistrate’s approach to the determination of the question of prejudice. It was submitted by the appellant that the Magistrate failed to address the question of whether the prejudice which he identified was of a kind that would lead to an inability to ensure a fair trial. The evidence of prejudice asserted by the respondent, and relied on by the Magistrate, was that the respondent is old and retired with proceedings hanging over his head, the proceedings have caused him stress, anxiety and sleepless nights and he is suffering financial and emotional strain. The Magistrate considered that this was the prejudice suffered by the respondent as a result of the appellant’s failure to progress the claim. The Magistrate did say that the real issue here to consider was whether it would be possible notwithstanding the delays to conduct a fair trial, but said that this substantially depended on the prejudice to the respondent. The Magistrate found that there is substantial prejudice to the respondent if the matter was to proceed and that prejudice is greater than that which will be suffered by the appellant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 May 2021, the appellant filed an application seeking an order for the assessment of its costs. Prior to the filing of the application, the last step taken in the proceedings was on 23 May 2019, with the filing of the amended defence. On the hearing of the application, given the failure for any step to have been taken, the appellant accepted that an adjournment of the application was necessary in order for it to bring an application for leave to proceed.Decision at First Instance In considering an application for leave to proceed under r 389 of the UCPR, the learned Magistrate said that it had long been held that the principle authority was that of Atkinson J in Tyler v Custom Credit Corp and Ors[1] where her Honour set out the 12 criteria for consideration of the court. [1][2000] QCA178 [Tyler]. In her judgment, Atkinson J stated that there were a number of factors to be included in considering whether leave to proceed should be granted. Her Honour stated:“These include:1) how long ago the events alleged in the statement of claim occurred and what delay there was before the litigation was commenced; 2) how long ago the litigation was commenced or cause of action added;3) what prospects the plaintiff has of success in the action; 4) whether or not there has been disobedience of Court orders or directions;5) whether or not the litigation has been characterised by periods of delay;6) whether the delay is attributable to the plaintiff, the defendant or both the plaintiff and the defendant;7) whether or not the impecuniosity of the plaintiff has been responsible for the pace of the litigation and whether the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s impecuniosity;8) whether the litigation between the parties would be concluded by the striking out of the plaintiff’s claim; 9) how far the litigation has progressed;10) whether or not the delay has been caused by the plaintiff’s lawyer being dilatory. Such dilatoriness will not necessarily be sheeted home to the client but it may be. Delay for which an applicant for leave to proceed is responsible is regarded as more difficult to explain than belay by his or her legal advisors;11) whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay; and 12) whether or not the delay has resulted in prejudice to the defendant leading to an inability to ensure a fair trial.” The Magistrate stated that, before going to the 12 criteria, there were two more recent authorities, The President’s Club Limited & Anor v Palmer Coolum Resort Pty Ltd[2] and Australia Abalone World Pty Ltd v Yin,[3] to be noted. In referring to the recent authorities, the Magistrate quoted the comments made by Wilson J in The President’s Club where her Honour said:“The court has a discretion which is not fettered by rigid rules but rather should take into account all relevant circumstances. It is noted that the relevant circumstances of some cases may require consideration of factors additional to the above twelve factors and/or render some of the twelve factors of such neutral significance as to not require discussion of them.It is recognised that reasonable excuse for the delay is not a condition precedent to a grant of leave to proceed and a greater focus is placed upon the existence of material prejudice to the other party by permitting the action to proceed.The first plaintiff, in this application for leave to proceed, must “show that there is good reason for excepting the particular proceedings from the general prohibition” in a case in which nearly six years have elapsed from the time when the last step was taken.”[2][2019] QSC 209 [President’s Club].[3][2020] QDC 190 [Abalone].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The second ground fails.Material Considerations The third ground of appeal is that the learned Magistrate failed to take into account five material considerations. I have already dealt with three of these: the appellant’s prospects of success, the prejudice to the appellant if leave were not granted and whether the delay would mean a fair trial could not be conducted. That leaves two remaining matters: the respondent’s inaction in the proceedings and the respondent’s conduct in dispersing settlement funds without attending to the payment of fees. Except making the finding that the whole of the delay was attributable to the appellant, the Magistrate did not mention either of these matters in his reasons. In the appellant’s submissions, reliance was placed upon the respondent foreshadowing in his defence that he would apply to dismiss or stay the proceedings and then did nothing. There will be circumstances where inaction on the part of a defendant, or where the defendant’s delay in doing nothing, will be important considerations in the context of r 389. Apart from the item mentioned in the submissions, however, nothing else was said in support of the proposition that the Magistrate’s discretion erred in his failing to take into account delay by the respondent. In my view, the matter mentioned is not significant enough to warrant interference with the decision; even if I had concluded that it was relevant. There may be occasions when the court should consider the general conduct of a defendant in a leave application and it is arguable the issue is relevant to the attitude which the court should adopt generally to a plaintiff’s claim, but in my view the conduct of the respondent in relation to the settlement payment is not relevant to the issue of whether leave should be granted. Other than to the extent already dealt with, this ground of appeal fails. Conclusion The position overall is that the learned Magistrate’s discretion miscarried by his failing to consider whether the extent of the delay would lead to the inability to ensure a fair trial, and the fact that, if it had been considered, the result would have been in the negative. This is one of the important considerations in deciding whether leave to proceed should be granted, and it was not submitted otherwise. Although there has been delay and the delay has been attributable to the appellant and there is no real explanation for much of it, the proceedings are not that old and if not for some late dilatoriness and the court list, the application may not have been necessary. The claim is for money for services done; albeit that the quality of those services is in issue. A proper exercise of the discretion would have allowed the appellant to take another step in the proceedings. Costs The usual result of a decision to this effect is that costs should follow the event, which in this case would result in an order that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal. Different considerations apply to the costs below. Subject to what the parties have to say, my preliminary view is that the costs order of the Magistrate should not be disturbed. In the circumstances, I will make provision in the orders for the parties to deliver submissions as to the appropriate costs orders both on appeal and below. The submissions should be no more than four pages in length. I would propose to make my decision as to costs in chambers without any further oral hearing.Orders