Levick v Attorney-General

Case [2018] FCA 1609


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Levick v Attorney-General [2018] FCA 1609

File number: NSD 1147 of 2018
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 24 October 2018
Date of publication of reasons: 25 October 2018
Catchwords: PRIVILEGE – whether respondent waived legal professional privilege over redacted portions of documents served upon applicant – held: applicant has not established wavier of legal professional privilege – interlocutory application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 7, 11, 19(2)(c), 22

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Extradition (United States of America) Regulations

Cases cited:

Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto [2006] FCAFC 86; 151 FCR 341

NSW Council for Civil Liberties v Classification Review Board [2006] FCA 1409; 236 ALR 313

O’Connor v Adamas [2013] FCAFC 14; 210 FCR 364

Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice [2008] HCA 37; 234 CLR 275

Zentai v O'Connor (No 2) [2010] FCA 252; 183 FCR 180

Date of hearing: 24 October 2018
Registry: Sydney
Division: General
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Jackson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hearn Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr T Glover
Solicitor for the Respondent: Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department

ORDERS

NSD 1147 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DAVID RUSSELL LEVICK
Applicant

AND: ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH
Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s interlocutory application dated and filed 23 August 2018 be dismissed,

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J:

  1. This is an interlocutory application seeking the production of unredacted copies of documents, the redactions being the subject of a claim of legal professional privilege.  The live issue is whether a waiver of privilege has taken place.  I heard the interlocutory application on the morning of 24 October 2018 and made orders and gave oral reasons later that day.  These are the reasons for the orders that I made, with minor revisions.

  2. In the substantive proceeding, the applicant, Mr David Russell Levick, challenges, by way of judicial review, a decision made on 8 June 2018 by the respondent, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, to surrender him to the United States of America (USA). That surrender decision was made under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). Mr Levick’s application is brought by way of an originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The judicial review application has been set down for a final hearing on 30 November 2018, with a timetable fixed for any amended originating application, any further evidence and submissions to be filed and served.

  3. By way of procedural orders made by consent on 2 August 2018, the Attorney-General was required to serve on…

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Levick v Attorney-General [2018] FCA 1609
Case
[2018] FCA 1609
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Levick v Attorney-General involved the applicant, Mr Levick, seeking to obtain certain documents from the respondent, the Attorney-General, which were subject to legal professional privilege. The dispute centred around the redacted portions of these documents and whether the respondent had waived the privilege over them. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue was whether the respondent had waived the legal professional privilege over the redacted portions of the documents served upon the applicant. This required the court to examine the circumstances surrounding the disclosure of the documents, including any actions or statements by the respondent that could be interpreted as a waiver of privilege.

The court found that the applicant had not established that the respondent had waived the privilege over the redacted portions of the documents. The reasoning was grounded in the understanding that privilege is a qualified right and not an absolute one. The court held that there was no evidence to suggest that the respondent had intentionally or otherwise waived the privilege. Consequently, the interlocutory application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated and filed 23 August 2018 be dismissed,

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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