Lesi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lesi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 209

MIGRATION – whether a subclass 831 visa issued to the applicant is still in effect – whether visa ceased to have effect because when he left Australia applicant did so because of a deportation order – deportation order set aside by Administrative Appeals Tribunal after applicant had been removed from Australia in execution of the order – effect of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 82(4), 200, 201, 206, 253, 500, 502

Lesi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1882 referred to
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1426; (2000) 105 FCR 453, discussed
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220 distinguished
Wattmaster Alco Pty Ltd v Button (1986) 70 ALR 330 distinguished
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 187 ALR 117 distinguished
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 cited

BERNARD LESI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

No S 245 of 2002

von DOUSSA J
ADELAIDE
19 MARCH 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 245 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

BERNARD LESI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Application dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 245 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

BERNARD LESI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE:

19 MARCH 2003

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. These proceedings were commenced by application seeking judicial review of a decision made by the Honourable Gary Hardgrave MP as a delegate of the respondent on 8 October 2002 to refuse to reinstate or re-issue the applicant’s residence visa. The application was made under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and also under ss 5 and 6 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). However, in the circumstances described below at [14] – [17], the application was amended at the hearing to seek only a declaration “that the grant by the respondent to the applicant of permission to remain indefinitely in Australia made 24 October 1996 remains in force”. On 24 October 1996 the applicant had been granted a prospective marriage spouse visa, subclass 831, which permitted him to remain in Australia indefinitely, and permitted multiple travel.

  2. The parties tendered a statement of agreed facts as follows:

    “1.      Mr Lesi is an Albanian national born in Velipoj, Albania on the 2nd September 1968.

    2.In 1994 Mr Lesi formed a relationship with a Ms Mema who is an Australian resident.  Ms Mema sponsored…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 209
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lesi brought an application against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, challenging the validity of a deportation order against him. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the legality of the deportation order and its implications under section 82(4) of the relevant Act. The central legal issue revolved around whether the deportation order remained valid until explicitly set aside, and if the applicant's departure from Australia was due to this order. The respondent's counsel argued that the deportation order remained valid until it was set aside, meaning the applicant left Australia because of the order, even though it was later quashed. They contended that the applicant's assertion that only a valid deportation order could be referenced in section 82(4) did not negate the fact that a valid order was in force when he departed.

The Court considered the arguments and concluded that the respondent's position should be upheld. It drew a parallel with the case of Cavanough, where the High Court determined that the quashing of a conviction rendered the respondent never to have been convicted in the first place. Applying this reasoning, the Court held that if the deportation order was set aside, it was as though it had never existed. Consequently, the Court found that during the time the applicant was outside Australia, there was a valid deportation order in place. This interpretation aligned with the statutory framework and the legislative intent behind the appeal process, ensuring that the scope and effect of an appeal were governed by the terms of the enactment creating it.

The Court dismissed the application, ruling that the applicant's departure from Australia was indeed due to a valid deportation order, as per section 82(4). The Court awarded costs to the respondent, reflecting its decision on the matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the respondent contended to the contrary, submitting that the deportation order was valid until set aside with the consequence that, within the meaning of s 82(4) “when the holder [left] Australia [he did so] because of a deportation order made under section 200”. Counsel did not dispute the applicant’s assertion that a reference to a deportation order in s 82(4) means reference to a valid deportation order. However, he submitted, when the applicant left Australia there was a valid deportation order in force.Consideration In my opinion the submissions of counsel for the respondent should be accepted. At first sight there is some similarity between the situation of the applicant and that of the respondent in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220 (Cavanough). That case concerned a claim for salary by an officer of the Commissioner for Railways who had been summarily convicted of larceny. From the conviction he appealed to a Court of Quarter Sessions which upheld his appeal and set aside the conviction. During the period which elapsed from his conviction until its reversal he received no salary. The Commissioner relied on s 80 of the Government Railways Act 1912 (NSW) which provided that an officer convicted of felony shall be deemed to have vacated his office. The High Court upheld a judgment in favour of the respondent for his unpaid salary. Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 224-225 said:“In our opinion he [the respondent] is so entitled because, his conviction having been quashed, he cannot be considered ever to have been convicted and he cannot be deemed to have vacated his office.An appeal is not a common law proceeding. It is a remedy given by statute (Attorney-General v. Sillem; Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. and Meakes v. Dignan).The scope and effect of an appeal must in the end be governed by the terms of the enactment creating it. But the power given to the Quarter Sessions includes authority to quash and set aside convictions. These are familiar expressions and describe a jurisdiction exercisable at common law by Courts of error. The effect of the reversal of a conviction by proceedings in error has long been settled, and the same effect is produced by quashing it, or setting it aside upon a statutory appeal. The conviction is avoided ab initio. ‘The judgment reversed is the same as no judgment’ (per Coleridge J., R. v. Drury).If the conviction were alleged in a pleading, it would be a good answer that there was no such record (Dr Drury’s Case). It is ‘utterly defeated and annulled’ (Lord Sanchar’s Case). Acts done according to the exigency of a judicial order afterwards reversed are protected: they are ‘acts done in the execution of justice, which are compulsive’ (Dr Drury’s Case). And proceedings which, although based upon a judgment, are brought to completion before its reversal are not avoided. For ‘collateral acts executory are barred, but not collateral acts executed’ (Dr Drury’s Case). But ‘upon the reversal of a judgment against any person convicted of any offence, the judgment, execution and all former proceedings become thereby absolutely null and void. If living, he (or if dead, his heir or personal representative, as the case may be) will be entitled to be restored to all things which he may have lost by such erroneous judgment and proceedings, and shall stand in every respect as if he had never been charged with the offence in respect of which judgment was pronounced against him’ (Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 21st ed. (1893), pp. 226, 227).As the respondent in contemplation of law was never out of office, he is entitled to the salary attached to it.” [Case citations omitted.]