Lendlease Communities (Australia) Ltd v Juric
[2018] VSC 107
•8 March 2018
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PRACTICE COURT
S CI 2018 00791
| LENDLEASE COMMUNITIES (AUSTRALIA) LTD | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| SIME JURIC | First Defendant |
| and | |
| REGISTRAR OF TITLES | Second Defendant |
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JUDGE: | T FORREST J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATES OF HEARING: | 7 & 8 March 2018 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 8 March 2018 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Lendlease Communities (Australia) Ltd v Juric & Anor |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2018] VSC 107 |
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PROPERTY LAW – Application to remove caveat – Claim of adverse possession – No substance to claim – No prima facie case – Caveat removed – First defendant restrained from lodging caveat in respect of relevant land for five years – Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 90(3).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr M. McKillop | Minter Ellison |
| For the Defendant | Self-represented |
HIS HONOUR:
By originating motion between the parties, the plaintiff seeks that the second defendant, the Registrar of Titles, be ordered pursuant to s 90(3) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) to remove a caveat dated 17 January 2018 in dealing number AQ643360V from the land described in the following certificates of title (‘the titles’):
(a) Volume 11888 folio 498; and
(b) Volume 11934 folio 959; and
(c) Volume 11339 folio 923;
and any titles derived from the titles. I shall refer to these properties as ‘the land’.
The plaintiff also seeks that the first defendant, Sime Juric, be restrained from lodging any further caveat in respect of the land, any titles derived from the titles and any other land registered in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not persist in seeking further orders that were foreshadowed in the Originating Motion.
The plaintiff was represented on this application. The application is supported by two affidavits:
(a) Affidavit of Mr Thomas Trevaskis, affirmed 5 March 2018. Mr Trevaskis is the Victorian General Manager of Lendlease Communities (Australia) Ltd (‘Lendlease’).
(b) Affidavit of Ms Michelle Power, partner Minter Ellison solicitors, solicitor for the plaintiff and who has the conduct of the application.
The first defendant represented himself on the application. He filed a diverse range of materials that in various ways related to his dealings with the plaintiff, National Australia Bank Ltd, various arms of government, the Victoria Police Force and the judiciary. In oral submissions, he accused each of these institutions of corruption, terrorism and more general criminality. He also accused various prominent individuals and the banking community of endemic criminality. He did not address any caveatable interest he claimed to have in the land.
On the basis of the evidence in this matter, including exhibits, I am satisfied of the following:
(a) The caveat on the land was lodged by the first defendant on 17 January 2018. It came to the attention of the plaintiff on 13 February when title searches for contracts were performed. There is some urgency to this application. 130 home lots have been sold to buyers across three stages of development. The plaintiffs intend to lodge a plan of subdivision on 16 March 2018. If the caveat is not removed, it will prevent registration of the plan and therefore settlement of the lots.
(b) The asserted interest claimed by Mr Juric is described in the caveat as ‘adverse possession by exclusive occupation’.
(c) Mr Juric has never been in occupation of the land and has no connection with it. He was asked to withdraw the caveat in a letter from Minter Ellison dated 26 February 2018.
(d) In a letter delivered by Mr Juric to the offices of Minter Ellison dated 1 March 2018, Mr Juric, as best I can understand it, asserted inter alia that Lendlease, along with other Melbourne businesses, were big criminals, terrorists, guilty of robbery and fraud upon him, and members of a corrupt cartel indebted to him in the sum of one trillion dollars. He appeared to be saying that he would not withdraw the caveat.
(e) Mr Juric delivered this letter personally at the offices of Minter Ellison on 1 March 2018. Prior to this, he had made similar demands orally. On 27 February 2018, to a Minter Ellison solicitor, he said that he would only remove the caveat if he were given what this terrorist company owed him, namely the registered title of 500 Bourke Street, 471 Collins Street and one trillion dollars.
I am further satisfied Mr Juric has a long history of making claims against National Australia Bank Ltd, Lendlease and other listed companies. He has been imprisoned for contempt of court. He has previously lodged a caveat over land owned by entities within the Lendlease group. This was removed by order of this Court in 2015. The caveat concerned the Stud Park shopping centre and the grounds were stated to be ‘grounds of adverse possession by exclusive occupation’. On this occasion, Mr Juric told Mr Ip, a solicitor at King & Wood Mallesons (the solicitors for LendLease IMT (SM) Pty Ltd) that he would not remove the caveat unless he were paid one trillion dollars. There was no substance to the 2015 claim.
Analysis
There is no substance to the first defendant’s adverse possession claim. He has no caveatable interest, nor interest of any sort in the land. It is unnecessary to consider the balance of convenience, save to say that there is no balance to consider insofar as the removal of the caveat is concerned.
The plaintiff applies that the Court should restrain by injunction Mr Juric from lodging further caveats in respect of the land, either in its current titled form or in any reconfigured titled form, and also in respect of any land over which Lendlease has an interest. This court has granted injunctions of this general sort in the past (see Andrews Family Holdings Pty Ltd v Yellow Tractor Pty Ltd[1]; Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Velissaris[2]), although those injunctions seemed to relate to future caveats in respect of the impugned land, rather than more generally. Having said that, I have a general statutory power to grant an injunction if it is just and convenient to do so (see s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)). Another source of power to grant injunctive relief has been held to lie in the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The court has the inherent power to make orders for the purpose of preventing the abuse of its processes or for the purpose of enhancing the administration of justice (see Talacko v Talacko (No 2)[3]; Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd[4]; Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd[5]).
[1][2017] VSC 682.
[2][2008] VSC 19.
[3](2009) 25 VR 613.
[4](1987) 162 CLR 612.
[5](1999) 198 CLR 380.
I am comfortably satisfied that I ought restrain Mr Juric from lodging any further caveat in respect of the land or any titles derived from the land. He has no caveatable interest in the land and never has had. It is overwhelmingly unlikely that he ever will have. I consider that the impugned caveat was lodged as some type of pre-emptive bargaining strike in his claim for one trillion dollars plus prime city real estate. As I have observed, in 2015, Mr Juric lodged a caveat on land controlled by a Lendlease company for effectively the same purpose – to further his claim for one trillion dollars. I consider that it is both just and convenient to restrain him in this manner. To the extent that restraint of this sort avoids the need for further hearings of this sort, then the system of justice is enhanced.
I am also satisfied that it is just and convenient to restrain Mr Juric from lodging a caveat on other land registered in the name of the plaintiff. Mr Juric has demonstrated himself to be an aggressive and provocative combatant of the plaintiff and other commercial institutions. He is no stranger to litigation and, as I have noted, he has been imprisoned for contempt of this Court. He had no sensible basis for lodging the impugned caveat and I cannot conceive of circumstances that might cause him legitimately to do so over Lendlease land in the future. Whilst the power to restrain a person from acting in a certain way ought be exercised with great caution, I am satisfied that such a course is warranted on this occasion, although I have imposed time limits on the operation of this particular order. Whether it will have any effect remains to be seen.
I shall make the following orders:
1. Pursuant to Rule 45.05, the plaintiff be authorised to commence this proceeding by Originating Motion in Form 5C and the requirements of Rules 5.03(1) and 8.02 be dispensed with.
2. Pursuant to section 90(3) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958, the second defendant remove Caveat No. AQ643360V from the land described in the following certificates of title:
(a) Volume 11888 folio 498;
(b) Volume 11934 folio 959; and
(c) Volume 11339 folio 923;
and any titles derived from the titles.
3. The first defendant be restrained for the next five years from lodging any further caveat in respect of the land, any titles derived from the titles, and any other land registered in the name of the plaintiff.
4. The first defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to this proceeding.
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