Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs and Rich JJ., that in an action against a person representing himself to be an agent, for breach of warranty of authority to enter into a contract, it is not an essential ingredient of the cause of action that the plaintiff when he entered into the contract believed that the defendant had the authority he represented himself to have.

Held, also, by Isaacs and Rich JJ., that in such an action the plaintiff must prove that he was induced to enter into the contract or other transaction by the representation, express or implied, of the defendant that he had authority, and that the fact that the plaintiff was SO induced is prima facie implied from the representation and the subsequent making of the contract or entering into the transaction and must be disproved by the defendant.

Per Knox C.J. --The cause of action in such an action is the breach of the express or implied promise of the person who assumes to act as agent that he has authority so to act, the consideration necessary to make that promise binding being the action of the plaintiff in entering into the contract. The promise being established and being supported by consideration, the only question is whether the defendant broke it.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Macfarlan J.) reversed.

32 CLR 96

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

An action was brought in the Supreme Court by Arthur Victor Leggo (trading as A. Victor Leggo &Co.) against Brown &Dureau Ltd. in which the plaintiff by his statement of claim alleged that the defendant, assuming to be the agent of W. R. Leven &Co., induced [LTD.

the plaintiff to enter into a contract in writing with him as such agent for the sale by the plaintiff to W. R. Leven &Co. of twenty-five tons of arsenite of soda that the defendant asserted and warranted to the plaintiff that the defendant was authorized by W. R. Leven &Co. to make the contract for W. R. Leven &Co. as their agent; and that the plaintiff, on the faith of such assertion and warranty, entered into the contract with the defendant as such agent but that the defendant was not authorized by W. R. Leven &Co. to make the contract and W. R. Leven &Co. repudiated it, and the plaintiff was unable to enforce the contract and suffered damage. The defence was a denial of the allegations in the statement of claim. The action was heard by Macfarlan J., who gave judgment for the defendant.

From that decision the plaintiff now appealed to the High Court. The other material facts appear in the judgments hereunder. Stanley Lewis (with him Hudson), for the appellant.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Leggo v Brown & Dureau Ltd

Details

AGLC: Leggo v Brown & Dureau Ltd [1923] HCA 19
Case: [1923] HCA 19
Decision Date: 24 May 1923

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Leggo v Brown & Dureau Ltd* concerned a dispute between the plaintiff, Leggo, and the defendant, Brown & Dureau Ltd. The matter came before the High Court of Australia, with Knox C.J., Isaacs and Rich JJ. presiding.

The central legal issues before the Court revolved around the interpretation of a contract for the sale of goods, specifically concerning the delivery and acceptance of those goods. The Court was required to determine whether the defendant had fulfilled its contractual obligations regarding the delivery of certain quantities of timber, and whether the plaintiff had validly rejected the timber supplied.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of contract law relating to performance and acceptance of goods. It was held that the defendant's obligation was to deliver the timber in accordance with the terms of the contract, and that the plaintiff's right to reject the goods depended on whether the delivered timber conformed to the contract specifications and was delivered within the agreed timeframe. The Court applied established legal principles concerning the buyer's right of rejection and the seller's duty to deliver conforming goods.

The Court found in favour of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had not established a valid ground for rejection of the timber. Consequently, the plaintiff was liable for the purchase price of the timber.

Orders