SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2022] QCA 184
PARTIES:
ROBERT ANDREW CORWIN LEGAT
(applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 3710 of 2022
QCAT No 339 of 2020DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
ORIGINATING COURT:
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2022] QCAT 57 (Judicial Member Lyons QC)
DELIVERED ON:
23 September 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
16 August 2022
JUDGES:
Bowskill CJ, Bond JA and Beech AJA
ORDERS:
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The appellant’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal is refused.
3. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.
CATCHWORDS:
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – QUALIFICATIONS AND ADMISSION – FIT AND PROPER PERSONS – Where Tribunal upheld the respondent’s refusal to grant a renewal of the appellant’s practising certificate - Where as solicitor for a group of companies providing microfinance to consumers, appellant designed and implemented ‘diamond model’ - Where Tribunal found that transactions under the ‘diamond model’ were a pretence or sham - Where Tribunal found there was no reasonable basis for any belief, and the appellant did not hold a belief, that transactions the subject of the diamond model genuinely involved the sale and purchase of diamonds or that such transactions were legal - Whether Tribunal’s reasons revealed unlawful discrimination on the basis of the appellant’s disability - Whether Tribunal failed to make sufficient allowance for the appellant’s autism spectrum disorder - Whether the Tribunal erred in making various findings of fact - Whether Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate
Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 6, s 7, s 9, s 10, s 11
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 9, s 51
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 149, s 154Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Teleloans Pty Ltd (2015) 234 FCR 261; [2015] FCA 648, cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1055, cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 243, cited
Carter v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 525, cited
Commissioner of State Revenue v Harrison[2019] QCA 50, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 35 FCR 359; [1992] FCA 184COUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
D G Clothier QC, with S C Russell, for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Queensland Law Society for the respondent
THE COURT: On 14 May 2019, the appellant, a legal practitioner, applied to the respondent (the Law Society) to renew his practising certificate. The Law Society refused the application. The appellant applied to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) to review that decision. The Tribunal refused the application, finding that the…
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- Case
- [2022] QCA 184
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's reasons revealed unlawful discrimination on the basis of the appellant's disability, whether it failed to make sufficient allowance for his autism spectrum disorder, whether it erred in making various findings of fact, and whether it erred in finding that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. The court found that none of the grounds of appeal had merit. It held that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and that it had not erred in its findings or in concluding that the appellant was not a fit and proper person. The appellant's decision not to give evidence on oath and to rely instead on an unsworn statement did not undermine the Tribunal's conclusions. The court was satisfied that the Tribunal had considered the relevant factors and reached a decision that was supported by the evidence.
The court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs. It found that the application to adduce further evidence was also without merit as the evidence sought was available at the time of the original hearing and was unlikely to have influenced the outcome. The orders made were that leave to appeal was refused, the application to adduce further evidence was refused, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The appellant’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal is refused.
3. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In circumstances where no witnesses gave oral evidence, the Tribunal did not enjoy the same advantages over this Court, as an appellate court, as exists in cases where a court or tribunal makes findings of fact informed in part by an assessment of a witness. In determining the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or found, an appellate court is, generally speaking, in as good a position as the trial court or tribunal to decide on the proper inference.[85] However, even where the appeal concerns the inferences to be drawn from established primary facts, it remains necessary for the appellant to demonstrate error. As Beaumont and Lee JJ observed in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher,[86] in a passage that has been adopted in other intermediate appellate courts:[87]“[T]he court is not obliged to proceed to make new findings of fact on all relevant issues and discharge the judgment appealed from if those findings differ from those of the trial judge and do not support the judgment. The court must be satisfied that the judgment of the trial judge is erroneous and it may be so satisfied if it reaches the conclusion that the trial judge failed to draw inferences that should have been drawn from the facts established by the evidence. The court is unlikely to be satisfied if all that is shown is that the trial judge made a choice between competing inferences, being a choice the court may not have been inclined to make but not a choice the trial judge should not have made. Where the majority judgment in Warren v Coombes (at CLR 552–3; ALR 423–5) states that an appellate court must not shrink from giving effect to its own conclusion, it is speaking of a conclusion that the decision of the trial judge is wrong and that it should be corrected.”[85]Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, at 551-552.[86](1992) 35 FCR 359, at 369.[87]See, for example, Williams v Minister for Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 [2000] NSWCA 255 [60]; Proudlove v Burridge (2017) 79 MVR 257; [2017] WASCA 6 [127]. For the reasons that follow, the appellant has not demonstrated any error on the part of the Tribunal. The appellant chose not to give evidence on oath before the Tribunal. Rather, he relied on the unsworn statement that he had provided to the Law Society in support of his application to renew his practising certificate. We agree, with respect, with the Tribunal’s observation that it was both significant and undesirable that the appellant had declined to give evidence on oath, and thereby to be exposed to cross-examination. That is particularly so given the central subject matter of the proceeding focused on the appellant’s character, namely whether he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Pivotal to the appellant’s case before the Tribunal was his asserted state of mind as to the diamond model. He claimed that at all relevant times he believed that transactions under the model genuinely involved the sale and purchase of diamonds. Relatedly, he claimed to have had an honest belief as to the lawfulness of the diamond model.[88][88]ARB 247-248, items 19, 24 and 27.