Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2022] QCA 184

PARTIES:

ROBERT ANDREW CORWIN LEGAT
(applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 3710 of 2022
QCAT No 339 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2022] QCAT 57 (Judicial Member Lyons QC)

DELIVERED ON:

23 September 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 August 2022

JUDGES:

Bowskill CJ, Bond JA and Beech AJA

ORDERS:

1.   Leave to appeal is refused.

2.   The appellant’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal is refused.

3.   The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – QUALIFICATIONS AND ADMISSION – FIT AND PROPER PERSONS – Where Tribunal upheld the respondent’s refusal to grant a renewal of the appellant’s practising certificate - Where as solicitor for a group of companies providing microfinance to consumers, appellant designed and implemented ‘diamond model’ - Where Tribunal found that transactions under the ‘diamond model’ were a pretence or sham - Where Tribunal found there was no reasonable basis for any belief, and the appellant did not hold a belief, that transactions the subject of the diamond model genuinely involved the sale and purchase of diamonds or that such transactions were legal - Whether Tribunal’s reasons revealed unlawful discrimination on the basis of the appellant’s disability - Whether Tribunal failed to make sufficient allowance for the appellant’s autism spectrum disorder - Whether the Tribunal erred in making various findings of fact - Whether Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate

Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 6, s 7, s 9, s 10, s 11
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 9, s 51
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 149, s 154

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Teleloans Pty Ltd (2015) 234 FCR 261; [2015] FCA 648, cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1055, cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 243, cited
Carter v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 525, cited
Commissioner of State Revenue v Harrison[2019] QCA 50, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 35 FCR 359; [1992] FCA 184

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
D G Clothier QC, with S C Russell, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Queensland Law Society for the respondent

  1. THE COURT:  On 14 May 2019, the appellant, a legal practitioner, applied to the respondent (the Law Society) to renew his practising certificate.  The Law Society refused the application.  The appellant applied to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) to review that decision.  The Tribunal refused the application, finding that the…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 184
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated arose from the refusal of the respondent to renew the appellant's practising certificate. The appellant, a solicitor, had designed and implemented the so-called 'diamond model' as a means to circumvent legislative changes that limited the maximum annual percentage rate for credit contracts. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal had upheld the respondent's decision to refuse the renewal, finding that the transactions under the 'diamond model' were a pretence or sham and that the appellant lacked a reasonable belief that the transactions were lawful. The appellant challenged this decision on several grounds, including the Tribunal's handling of his autism spectrum disorder, the sufficiency of its factual findings, and the conclusion that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's reasons revealed unlawful discrimination on the basis of the appellant's disability, whether it failed to make sufficient allowance for his autism spectrum disorder, whether it erred in making various findings of fact, and whether it erred in finding that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. The court found that none of the grounds of appeal had merit. It held that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and that it had not erred in its findings or in concluding that the appellant was not a fit and proper person. The appellant's decision not to give evidence on oath and to rely instead on an unsworn statement did not undermine the Tribunal's conclusions. The court was satisfied that the Tribunal had considered the relevant factors and reached a decision that was supported by the evidence.

The court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs. It found that the application to adduce further evidence was also without merit as the evidence sought was available at the time of the original hearing and was unlikely to have influenced the outcome. The orders made were that leave to appeal was refused, the application to adduce further evidence was refused, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal is refused.

2. The appellant’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal is refused.

3. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, none of the grounds of appeal has any merit. Consequently, leave to appeal must be refused and the appeal dismissed.Background The appellant was admitted to practice in Queensland in 1998. He worked as a solicitor between 1999 and 2002, joining the Fast Access Finance group (the Group) as in-house counsel in 2001.[2] The controlling entity in the Group was Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (FAF). The appellant, his brother and an acquaintance were the three shareholders of FAF. The appellant was appointed company secretary in 1997, and director in 2011.[3] FAF, through a ‘franchise network’, provided small loans for personal use to those in financial difficulty.[4] That network included Fast Access Finance (Burleigh) Pty Ltd, Fast Access Finance (Beenleigh) Pty Ltd, and Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd (together, the franchisees).[5][2]Primary reasons [3].[3]Primary reasons [3].[4]Primary reasons [4].[5]Primary reasons [4]. With effect from 31 July 2008, legislative changes limited the maximum annual percentage rate for a credit contract to 48%.[6] It is not in contention that in response to those restrictions, the appellant devised what is referred to as the ‘diamond model’. We will detail the diamond model in the course of outlining the Tribunal’s reasons. Broadly summarised, a person seeking funds, to be repaid in the short term, would sign two contracts: a contract with the franchisee to purchase a quantity of diamonds, and a contract to sell those diamonds to a different company for an amount one‑half of the amount the customer had contracted to pay the franchisee for the diamonds. The customer’s sale price would be paid to the customer in cash, with the customer being obliged to pay their purchase price to the franchisee over time.[6]See generally Consumer Credit (Queensland) Special Provisions Regulation 2008 (Qld) cl 3 and cl 4. The diamond model was the subject of various legal proceedings, culminating in two decisions of the Tribunal in 2011 and 2012, and two decisions by Dowsett J in the Federal Court in 2015 and 2017. We will detail those proceedings later in these reasons. On 27 September 2017, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) took action against the appellant personally, prohibiting him from engaging in credit activities for a period of three years and finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a credit licence (the ASIC decision). On 4 May 2018, the appellant applied to renew his practising certificate for the 2018 ‑ 2019 year. The appellant did not disclose the ASIC decision.[7][7]Primary reasons [15]. The appellant sought a review of the ASIC decision. On 9 April 2019, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) handed down its decision (the AAT decision).[8] The AAT decision increased the prohibition from three years to five years and otherwise did not disturb the ASIC decision.[8]Legat v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 685.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For these reasons, there is no merit in ground (o).Application to adduce additional evidence As already noted, the appellant applies for leave to adduce further evidence on appeal. The appellant seeks leave to adduce, as further evidence, documents in three categories: first, the Finance Application and Privacy Act Consent Form referred to in [127] above; secondly, a media article and ASIC media release, each dated 6 October 2017, about the ban imposed by ASIC on the appellant; and thirdly, a document directed to demonstrating that compliance with the interest cap in the legislation would have made the Group’s business unviable. The principles governing the reception of further evidence on appeal are well established. Evidence will be admitted if (i) it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing, (ii) the evidence is such that if given it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, and (iii) the evidence is apparently credible.[147][147]Brisbane City Council v Mainsell Investments Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 204, 215; Jonathan v Mangera [2016] QCA 86; (2016) 75 MVR 143 [12]. The application fails to satisfy both the first and the second criteria. All of the material that the appellant now seeks to adduce was in existence and was available to him at the time of the hearing. With reasonable diligence on his part, he could have adduced it. We do not accept the appellant’s submission that the first requirement is satisfied because he could not have anticipated the need for such evidence. There is no, and could not reasonably be, complaint of procedural unfairness on the part of the Tribunal. In those circumstances, and in the circumstances in which the Tribunal was deciding the review by way of a fresh hearing on the merits, it was for the appellant to adduce such evidence as he chose to make the case he wished to advance to the Tribunal. In any event, none of the further evidence is likely to have had any material influence on the result of the case. The reasons that is so in relation to the first group of documents are explained in [128]‑[130] above. The appellant seeks to adduce the second group of documents to demonstrate that there was publicity, of which he would have been aware, before he made his application in May 2018 (when he did not disclose). Given the absence of any evidence from the appellant explaining the reason for his disclosure in May 2019, and for the reasons in [161]‑[164] above, the second group of documents would not be material to the outcome. The third class of document, seeking to demonstrate the unviability of the business when operated in compliance with the interest cap, is immaterial for the reasons in [134] above. For these reasons, we would refuse the appellant’s application for leave to adduce further evidence in the appeal.Conclusion For the above reasons, we would make orders to the following effect:1.Leave to appeal is refused.2.The appellant’s application to adduce further evidence on appeal is refused.3.The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant sought a review of the ASIC decision. On 9 April 2019, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) handed down its decision (the AAT decision).[8] The AAT decision increased the prohibition from three years to five years and otherwise did not disturb the ASIC decision.[8]Legat v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 685. On 16 April 2019, The Courier Mail published a story about the AAT decision which was highly critical of the appellant.[9][9]Primary reasons [14]. When the appellant applied to renew his practising certificate on 14 May 2019, he disclosed that he had been the subject of a previously undisclosed suitability matter, advising the Law Society by email as to the AAT decision. Specifically, the appellant referred to the finding in the AAT decision that he was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities and that he was the subject of a banning order for a period of five years.[10][10]Primary reasons [15]. On 13 August 2020, the Law Society resolved that the appellant was not a fit and proper person for the renewal of his practising certificate. The appellant was notified of this decision on 25 September 2020.[11][11]Primary reasons [16]. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision under s 51(9) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LP Act).The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal, constituted by the Hon Peter Lyons QC, judicial member, refused the appellant’s application to review the Law Society’s decision to refuse to renew the appellant’s practising certificate. In so deciding, the Tribunal relied principally on: the appellant’s role in, and state of mind regarding, the diamond model; his non‑disclosure in May 2018 of the banning order made by ASIC against him; the appellant’s comments regarding adverse findings made against him; and the appellant’s lack of insight into, and remorse in relation to, his conduct. The Tribunal expressed ‘grave reservations about [the appellant’s] credit’.[12][12]Primary reasons [40], [51]. In outlining the background, the Tribunal made the following findings concerning the diamond model.The diamond model As already noted, statutory changes in effect from 31 July 2008 limited the maximum annual percentage rate for a credit contract to 48%.[13] To avoid those restrictions, the appellant devised the diamond model.[14] The Tribunal found that the appellant was the person primarily responsible for drafting the documentation used in these transactions, and for the instructions to those who used it.[15][13]See generally Consumer Credit (Queensland) Special Provisions Regulation 2008 (Qld), cl 3 and cl 4.[14]Primary reasons [5].[15]Primary reasons [5], [6]. The model operated as follows. A customer, seeking short term finance, would approach a franchisee within the Group.[16] The first form the customer would sign, as part of a loan application, was a ‘Privacy Act Consent Form’, which recorded that the customer had applied ‘to borrow a certain amount of money’.[17] The customer would then sign, among various forms, a ‘Sale Agreement’; a contract purportedly for the customer to purchase diamonds. The purchase price ($250 per diamond) was payable to the franchisee over a period of months. The customer would sign a direct debit form against their bank account. If security was taken, it was typically over the customer’s vehicle in the form of a Collateral Security Agreement.[18] At the same time, the customer would sign a ‘Purchase Agreement’ to sell those same diamonds to another company, Diamond Clearing House Pty Ltd (DCH), for half the purchase price payable to the franchisee. The customer would be given cash representing the amount of the purchase price payable by DCH.[19][16]Primary reasons [6], [8].[17]Primary reasons [8].[18]Primary reasons [9].[19]Primary reasons [6], [8].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In circumstances where no witnesses gave oral evidence, the Tribunal did not enjoy the same advantages over this Court, as an appellate court, as exists in cases where a court or tribunal makes findings of fact informed in part by an assessment of a witness. In determining the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or found, an appellate court is, generally speaking, in as good a position as the trial court or tribunal to decide on the proper inference.[85] However, even where the appeal concerns the inferences to be drawn from established primary facts, it remains necessary for the appellant to demonstrate error. As Beaumont and Lee JJ observed in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher,[86] in a passage that has been adopted in other intermediate appellate courts:[87]“[T]he court is not obliged to proceed to make new findings of fact on all relevant issues and discharge the judgment appealed from if those findings differ from those of the trial judge and do not support the judgment. The court must be satisfied that the judgment of the trial judge is erroneous and it may be so satisfied if it reaches the conclusion that the trial judge failed to draw inferences that should have been drawn from the facts established by the evidence. The court is unlikely to be satisfied if all that is shown is that the trial judge made a choice between competing inferences, being a choice the court may not have been inclined to make but not a choice the trial judge should not have made. Where the majority judgment in Warren v Coombes (at CLR 552–3; ALR 423–5) states that an appellate court must not shrink from giving effect to its own conclusion, it is speaking of a conclusion that the decision of the trial judge is wrong and that it should be corrected.”[85]Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, at 551-552.[86](1992) 35 FCR 359, at 369.[87]See, for example, Williams v Minister for Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 [2000] NSWCA 255 [60]; Proudlove v Burridge (2017) 79 MVR 257; [2017] WASCA 6 [127]. For the reasons that follow, the appellant has not demonstrated any error on the part of the Tribunal. The appellant chose not to give evidence on oath before the Tribunal. Rather, he relied on the unsworn statement that he had provided to the Law Society in support of his application to renew his practising certificate. We agree, with respect, with the Tribunal’s observation that it was both significant and undesirable that the appellant had declined to give evidence on oath, and thereby to be exposed to cross-examination. That is particularly so given the central subject matter of the proceeding focused on the appellant’s character, namely whether he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Pivotal to the appellant’s case before the Tribunal was his asserted state of mind as to the diamond model. He claimed that at all relevant times he believed that transactions under the model genuinely involved the sale and purchase of diamonds. Relatedly, he claimed to have had an honest belief as to the lawfulness of the diamond model.[88][88]ARB 247-248, items 19, 24 and 27.