| CITATION: | Legal Services Commissioner v Reid (No 3) [2017] QCAT 471 |
| PARTIES: | Legal Services Commissioner (Applicant/Appellant) |
| v | |
| Shara Louise Reid (Respondent) | |
| APPLICATION NUMBER: | OCR011-16 |
| MATTER TYPE: | Occupational regulation matters |
| HEARING DATE: | 20, 24, 25 and 27 July 2017 |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
| DECISION OF: | Justice Carmody Assisted by: Dr Susan Dann, Lay Panel Member |
| DELIVERED ON: | 22 December 2017 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
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Details
- Case
- [2017] QCAT 471
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Legal Services Commissioner v Reid (No 3), the practitioner was involved in renegotiating more generous employment terms for key executive contracts, including her own, and was also instructing independent legal firms on related matters. The Legal Services Commissioner argued that the practitioner breached fiduciary or professional duties owed to the employer by not acting with undivided loyalty and candour. The case before the court was to determine whether the practitioner owed such a duty and if there was sufficient evidence of a breach.
The court considered whether the practitioner's actions in negotiating her own contract and instructing independent legal firms amounted to a breach of fiduciary or professional duties. The court examined the nature and scope of the practitioner's functions and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the employer's consent and the equal footing of the dealings. The court concluded that the practitioner did not owe the strict fiduciary duties of individual loyalty and absolute candour to the employer in relation to the amendment of the executive employment contracts. The court found that the employer had impliedly authorised the practitioner to protect her own interests and profit from the transaction, and that the employer's consent and encouragement, as well as the equal footing of the dealings, negated any breach of fiduciary duty.
The court found that the practitioner did not owe a duty of undivided loyalty and candour to the employer in the circumstances and that there was no evidence of a breach of fiduciary or professional duty. The court dismissed the discipline application and found that the practitioner's conduct did not amount to unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct. The court concluded that the employer's consent and encouragement, as well as the equal footing of the dealings, negated any breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that the practitioner's role in instructing independent legal firms was limited to relaying instructions and advices to and from the employer for consideration, where the joint objectives were clear and the employer was under the overriding independent duty to protect the company's overall best commercial interests.
The appeal tribunal ordered that the discipline application be dismissed.
The court considered whether the practitioner's actions in negotiating her own contract and instructing independent legal firms amounted to a breach of fiduciary or professional duties. The court examined the nature and scope of the practitioner's functions and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the employer's consent and the equal footing of the dealings. The court concluded that the practitioner did not owe the strict fiduciary duties of individual loyalty and absolute candour to the employer in relation to the amendment of the executive employment contracts. The court found that the employer had impliedly authorised the practitioner to protect her own interests and profit from the transaction, and that the employer's consent and encouragement, as well as the equal footing of the dealings, negated any breach of fiduciary duty.
The court found that the practitioner did not owe a duty of undivided loyalty and candour to the employer in the circumstances and that there was no evidence of a breach of fiduciary or professional duty. The court dismissed the discipline application and found that the practitioner's conduct did not amount to unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct. The court concluded that the employer's consent and encouragement, as well as the equal footing of the dealings, negated any breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that the practitioner's role in instructing independent legal firms was limited to relaying instructions and advices to and from the employer for consideration, where the joint objectives were clear and the employer was under the overriding independent duty to protect the company's overall best commercial interests.
The appeal tribunal ordered that the discipline application be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:
1. The discipline application is dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The Board must be taken to have allowed, accepted, or acquiesced in it. Any vulnerability was plainly of the Board’s own making by detailing her to instruct CU and agreeing to fund NR to advise it on her remuneration. RQL therefore impliedly authorised the practitioner to protect her own interests and even profit from the transaction but only to the extent NR recommended, CU advised and the Board approved.Conclusion The nature and scope of the practitioner’s functions and the circumstantial matrix weigh heavily against the conclusion that she owed the strict fiduciary duties of individual loyalty and absolute candour to RQL insofar as the amendment of the executive employment contracts in 2011 was concerned. Overall, the facts when fully examined are incompatible with the allegation that the professional services the practitioner provided to RQL were substandard in the sense of being short of what the public is reasonably entitled to expect of her in the position she was put in. For all these reasons we find that this is an example of what Finn calls “… an unprincipled penetration of the fiduciary principle into ordinary contractual dealing”[80] not a case of a proven unprofessional conduct much less professional misconduct on the practitioner’s part.[80]PD Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principle’ (1989) 12 UNSW Law Journal 76, 82. We are not reasonably satisfied on the evidence presented to us that the practitioner instructed CU and NR regarding the employment contracts amendments in breach of any fiduciary duties owed to RQL because: RQL consented to the practitioner’s conduct via the Board’s authority and encouragement, the chairman’s approval given on full information and understanding and the CEO’s directions; the dealing was conducted on an equal footing at arms’ length; the no conflict rule did not apply or had knowingly been waived or relaxed by the Board on behalf of RQL; RQL impliedly expected the practitioner to act in her own interests or, at least, did not expect her to act solely in its interest. The favours she showed to herself were offset by what the Board was willing to allow and CU prepared to concur with; the practitioner’s role in instructing CU was limited to relaying instructions and advices to and from the chairman or Board for consideration where the joint objectives were clear and the Board was under the overriding independent duty to protect the company’s overall best commercial interests; the relevant section of CU’s 2 June 2011 advice was both beyond scope and superseded by subsequent events; in any event, if the no conflict rule was breached, the full disclosure defence applies and the practitioner’s conduct did not amount to unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct; the practitioner did not instruct NR on behalf of or for RQL and did not owe a duty of candour in relation to the instructions to or advice from NR; NR acted for the RQL executives or in the common interest;