Legal Services Commissioner v O'Reilly

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Legal Services Commissioner v O’Reilly [2019] QCA 251

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(appellant)
v
MARK JOSEPH O’REILLY
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2790 of 2019
QCAT No 107 of 2017

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2019] QCAT 28 (Judicial Member Lyons QC)

DELIVERED ON:

15 November 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 August 2019

JUDGES:

Gotterson and Philippides and McMurdo JJA

ORDER:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS – FIT AND PROPER PERSONS – where the respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct concerning defalcations of $268,455 – where the Tribunal held that the respondent was not permanently unfit to practise law and, as such, did not remove his name from the Roll – where the Tribunal instead made orders that the respondent be publicly reprimanded, suspended from practising for three years and that his next application for a practising certificate be made subject to specified conditions – where the Legal Services Commissioner appealed and seeks that the respondent should be removed from the Roll – where the respondent suffered from a major depressive order and physiological dependency on alcohol at the time of offending – where, upon the defalcations being discovered, the respondent cooperated with the investigation and audit and promptly repaid the money – whether the respondent should be removed from the Roll

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 452, s 456

Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand[2018] QCA 66, considered
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P
[2003] NSWCA 320, considered
Watts v Legal Services Commissioner[2016] QCA 224, considered
Ziems v Prothonotary of Supreme Court (NSW) (1957) 97 CLR 279; [1957] HCA 46, considered

COUNSEL:

J M Horton QC for the appellant
G R Rice QC for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Services Commission for the appellant
Gilshenan & Luton for the respondent

  1. GOTTERSON JA:  I agree with the orders proposed by Philippides JA and with the reasons given by her Honour.

  2. PHILIPPIDES JA: On 28 February 2019, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) determined an application referred by the Legal Services Commissioner (the LSC) under s 452 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (the Act) in relation to Mark O’Reilly, the respondent, who practiced as an Australian legal practitioner practising as a partner of a law practice in Brisbane. The LSC alleged that the respondent was guilty of professional misconduct and, or, unsatisfactory professional conduct and sought disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the Act.

  3. The Tribunal found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct in relation to the two charges brought concerning defalcations amounting to $268,445. That was not in dispute before the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that no order pursuant to s 456(2)(a) of the Act recommending the removal of…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Services Commissioner initiated disciplinary proceedings against O'Reilly, a lawyer found guilty of professional misconduct involving defalcations amounting to $268,455. The Legal Services Commissioner sought the removal of O'Reilly from the Roll of Legal Practitioners, contending that O'Reilly's misconduct warranted such a severe penalty. The Tribunal, however, held that O'Reilly was not permanently unfit to practise law and decided against removing his name from the Roll. Instead, the Tribunal ordered a public reprimand, a three-year suspension from practising law, and specified conditions for O'Reilly's future applications for a practising certificate. The Legal Services Commissioner appealed this decision, arguing that the Tribunal's ruling was flawed and that O'Reilly should indeed be removed from the Roll.

The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion under the Legal Profession Uniform Law and whether it had properly considered the relevant statutory objectives and principles. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision to not remove O'Reilly from the Roll was an error of law, and whether the Tribunal had misapplied the principles established in Shand v Legal Services Commissioner. The court also had to consider the appropriate weight given to O'Reilly's mental health issues and his cooperation in repaying the stolen funds.

The court found that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion and had not erred in law. The Tribunal's reasons demonstrated a thorough consideration of the statutory objectives and the principles established in Shand. The court held that the Tribunal's observation about the relevance of broader considerations, such as the protection of the public and the integrity of the legal profession, did not reflect a misapprehension of Shand. Instead, it was a factual observation that did not indicate a misunderstanding of the law. The Tribunal had distinguished Shand and Watts v Legal Services Commissioner, rightly concluding that O'Reilly's situation was different enough to warrant a different outcome. The court found that the Tribunal had appropriately weighed the psychological evidence and O'Reilly's cooperation in addressing his misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no error in its assessment of O'Reilly's fitness to practise law. The Tribunal's decision to impose a public reprimand, a three-year suspension, and specified conditions for future practising certificates was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, it was submitted that it was apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons that it had close regard to Shand and expressly noted the reliance by counsel for the LSC on that decision.[29] The Tribunal noted that the passages in Shand “stress the importance of the community being confident that only fit and proper persons are able to practise as lawyers and the need to preserve the good standing of the legal profession”. In those circumstances, it was highly unlikely that consideration of those matters was overlooked or misunderstood.[29]Shand at [56] and [58].Consideration I do not consider that the statement in the Tribunal’s reasons relied upon evidenced error as contended for on behalf of the LSC. The statement did not reflect a misapprehension as to the decision in Shand, nor did the Tribunal fail to have regard to the wider purposes of s 456 of the Act. As the respondent submitted, the Tribunal’s observation to the effect that the wider considerations identified in Shand became relevant “because the practitioner had no intention to return to practise”, was no more than a factual observation that, in Shand, the relevance of the wider considerations was brought into sharper focus because of the practitioner’s disavowal of any intention to engage in legal practice. However, as McMurdo JA stated in Shand, that “was not the end of the matter”.[30] The fact that there might be no operative element of protection of the public did not eliminate a consideration of the broader interests of the public that were served by the removal of the name of an unfit practitioner. Nothing said by the Tribunal in this case indicated a mistaken view of Shand.[30]Shand at [56]. In Shand, the Tribunal’s finding was one of current, but not permanent, unfitness. McMurdo JA observed that, if the practitioner was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice, the wider purposes required that his name be removed from the Roll, absent something which indicated that he was likely to become a person who was fit to be a legal practitioner”.[31] It was in that context that his Honour articulated the test of probable permanent unfitness as a way of identifying that “the character of the practitioner is so indelibly marked by the misconduct that he cannot be regarded as a fit and proper person to be upon the Roll”.[32][31]Shand at [56].[32]Shand at [57]. In the present case, the Tribunal[33] distinguished Shand and, while it considered that neither that case nor the more analogous discussion of Watts v Legal Services Commissioner[34] was determinative of the outcome, it observed that the differences with Watts were not sufficiently significant to point to a different result.[35] In Watts, the practitioner misappropriated funds from his trust account to meet the needs of his practice and replaced the funds before his wrongdoing was discovered. He had also falsified documents in an attempt to avoid detection. In setting aside the order that Mr Watts’ name be removed from the Roll, the error identified by the Court was the failure to have regard to the significant psychological evidence. In particular, no proper regard was had to unchallenged evidence that the practitioner had developed resilience, capacity to cope under pressure and that he was functioning effectively and making good decisions.[36][33]Reasons at [57] and [58].[34][2016] QCA 224.[35]Reasons at [57].[36]Watts at [48].