Legal Services Commissioner v O'Reilly

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Legal Services Commissioner v O’Reilly [2019] QCAT 28

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(applicant)

v

MARK JOSEPH O’REILLY

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR107/17

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

28 February 2019

HEARING DATE:

13 July 2018; 17 September 2018

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Hon Peter Lyons QC, Judicial Member

Assisted by:
Mr Michael Meadows
Dr Margaret Steinberg

ORDERS:

1.   The respondent is publicly reprimanded;

2.   The respondent is suspended from practising as a legal practitioner for a period of three years;

3.   The respondent’s next application for a practising certificate must be accompanied by a copy of these reasons, and the reports of two practising psychiatrists, who have been provided with a copy of these reasons and who have reported independently of each other, on the respondent’s mental condition and its effect on his ability to engage in legal practice, the reports to be obtained within six months prior to the application; and

4.   The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT – GENERALLY – where respondent misappropriated funds while acting under a power of attorney – where respondent misappropriated funds while acting as executor of deceased client’s estate – where respondent was suffering from mental illness – whether respondent was permanently unfit for practice warranting a recommendation of removal from the roll of practitioners

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 53, s 456, s 656C

Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750
Attorney-General v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2017] QCAT 159
New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P [2003] NSWCA 320
Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64
Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; [1957] HCA 46

  1. The Commissioner has alleged that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct (‘conduct allegations’) and has sought disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (‘LP Act’).

    Facts

  2. At relevant times, the respondent was an Australian Legal Practitioner, practising as a partner of a law practice.

  3. Mr Farah Saba was a client of the respondent. Mr Saba appointed the respondent as his attorney by a power of attorney executed in 2007. The power of attorney was activated on about 18 December 2012, on Mr Saba’s incapacity. At that time, Mr Saba owned a company, of which he had been the sole director, called Farah Saba Investments Pty Ltd (FSI

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Details
Case
[2019] QCAT 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Services Commissioner brought proceedings against the respondent, a legal practitioner, alleging professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct under the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). The respondent was accused of misappropriating funds while acting as an attorney under a power of attorney and as the executor of a deceased client's estate. The Commissioner sought disciplinary orders, including a recommendation for the respondent's removal from the roll of practitioners. The central legal issues were whether the respondent's conduct constituted professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct, and if his mental health condition rendered him permanently unfit for practice.

The court accepted that the respondent suffered from a major depressive disorder and alcohol dependency during the relevant period, which significantly impaired his judgment. The respondent's conduct involved unauthorised withdrawals and transfers of funds from the client's accounts to settle personal debts. Despite this, the court found that the respondent did not have an antisocial personality and showed genuine remorse. The evidence from Dr Apel, a psychiatrist, indicated that the respondent's condition was well-managed, with a very low risk of recurrence. The court concluded that while the respondent's conduct was serious, his character was not "indelibly marked" as unfit for practice. Consequently, the court ordered a public reprimand, a three-year suspension from practice, and conditions for future practising certificates.

In summary, the court found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct but did not deem him permanently unfit for practice. The orders included a public reprimand, a three-year suspension, and specific conditions for future practising certificates.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent is publicly reprimanded;

2. The respondent is suspended from practising as a legal practitioner for a period of three years;

3. The respondent’s next application for a practising certificate must be accompanied by a copy of these reasons, and the reports of two practising psychiatrists, who have been provided with a copy of these reasons and who have reported independently of each other, on the respondent’s mental condition and its effect on his ability to engage in legal practice, the reports to be obtained within six months prior to the application; and

4. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Commissioner has alleged that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct (‘conduct allegations’) and has sought disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (‘LP Act’).Facts At relevant times, the respondent was an Australian Legal Practitioner, practising as a partner of a law practice. Mr Farah Saba was a client of the respondent. Mr Saba appointed the respondent as his attorney by a power of attorney executed in 2007. The power of attorney was activated on about 18 December 2012, on Mr Saba’s incapacity. At that time, Mr Saba owned a company, of which he had been the sole director, called Farah Saba Investments Pty Ltd (FSI). On about 18 March 2013, pursuant to the power of attorney, the respondent appointed himself the sole director of FSI, in place of Mr Saba. At least from 1 July 2013 to 31 May 2015, FSI operated a bank account with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA account), which was under the sole control of the respondent. On 22 August 2013, the respondent cashed a cheque for $5,445 on the CBA account. He had no legitimate reason to do so. Mr Saba died on 27 November 2014. The respondent and the other partners in the law practice were appointed executors of Mr Saba’s estate. By about 2 February 2015, the other partners had renounced their executorships, leaving the respondent as sole executor. The beneficiaries of the estate were Mr Saba’s family members. On 9 February 2015, the respondent drew a cheque on the CBA account for $20,000, which he deposited to his own account. He paid the proceeds to Bluedice Pty Ltd, a company associated with the respondent and another partner of the practice, to discharge a debt which the respondent owed to Bluedice. On 13 February 2015, the respondent opened an account with Bank of Queensland in the name of FSI (BOQ account). It is an agreed fact between the parties that this occurred in the ordinary course of the respondent’s executorship. The account was under the sole control of the respondent. The respondent caused all funds then in the CBA account to be transferred to the BOQ account. On 19 March 2015, the respondent caused payments of $128,000 and $15,000 to be made from the BOQ account to Bluedice, to discharge debts of the respondent to that company which had then become due, but which the respondent could not pay. Neither the respondent nor Bluedice had any entitlement (as against FSI or Mr Saba’s estate) to the moneys which came from FSI and went ultimately to Bluedice. On 25 March 2015, the respondent caused $50,000 to be transferred from the BOQ account to an entity described as “Normarddy Staffsuper”, to discharge debts the respondent then owed to that entity. On the same day, he caused a further sum of $50,000 to be transferred to an entity described as “Taylor Super Fund” for a similar purpose. No allegation has been made about the circumstances in which those debts were incurred. Neither of the entities, nor the respondent, had any entitlement (as against FSI or Mr Saba’s estate) to the moneys so transferred.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent has not been the subject of any other disciplinary proceedings. He has been an active participant in a number of community organisations.Dr Apel’s evidence Dr Apel is aware of the conduct which is the subject of these proceedings; though he only became aware of the full extent of it at about the time of the hearing. His report records that the respondent had told him that the conduct involved drawing a cheque of about $5,000 and a transfer of about $120,000. He said that his view did not change when he learnt the actual amounts involved. Dr Apel considered that, in May 2015, the respondent was suffering from a depressive illness of marked severity, which he also described as a major depressive disorder. As a separate diagnosis, he considered that the respondent suffered from alcohol dependency, to the point of physiological dependence with withdrawal symptoms on detoxification. The respondent’s judgment “would have been markedly affected by his psychiatric condition” over the year or so prior to May 2015. His condition was not of a delusional severity and he was not deprived of the capacity to know what he was doing, or to control his actions. Dr Apel said that the respondent’s condition would have resulted in a significant impairment of his judgment over the period during which the conduct occurred. Dr Apel considered that the respondent was not of antisocial personality, and did not display antisocial traits. He did not engage in denial, but sought to identify and resolve his problems. With management of his depressive illness and alcohol use, Dr Apel considered that the respondent displayed the capacity for reflection and judgment that would make transgressions of social rules highly unlikely. He considered the respondent’s family situation “supportive”, including support from his first wife. Dr Apel reported that the respondent has remained almost completely abstinent from alcohol, apart from what Dr Apel described as “a couple of very minor slippages, without consequences”. In his oral evidence, he said that the respondent had become grossly intoxicated a couple of times in the first few months of treatment. Thereafter, he had one to four drinks on occasion, but not to the point of becoming intoxicated or losing control. These occurred initially every two to three months, but the occasions have become less frequent. The most recent appears to have been in the couple of months prior to Dr Apel’s oral evidence. However, there has been no occasion to admit the respondent to a hospital for his intake of alcohol since September 2015. Dr Apel also reported that the respondent had ceased gambling completely. Nevertheless, the respondent’s depressive illness has persisted, to the point of recurrent suicidal ideas. His response to treatment has been “excellent”, the respondent having displayed “an extraordinary degree of engagement in treatment”. Dr Apel thought that “the degree of personal commitment involved, has led to success in managing severely depressed mood and excesses of alcohol and gambling”. The respondent “has consistently presented as genuinely remorseful”. Dr Apel considered that the risk of the respondent engaging again in the offending conduct to be very low (elsewhere described as minimal).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s submissions correctly accepted that the question in the present case is whether the respondent is a fit and proper person to remain on the local Roll at the time of this Tribunal’s determination; and that a recommendation for the removal of the respondent’s name from the Roll should only be made when the probability is that the respondent is permanently unfit for practice. These propositions emerge from Watts, which has some similarities with the present case in that it involved the unauthorised use of trust moneys by a practitioner who had problems relating to his mental health. Inevitably there are differences between the two cases, but the principles just stated are applicable in the present case.Conclusions relating to the respondent’s mental health There is no reason to doubt Dr Apel’s evidence that the respondent at the time of the relevant conduct was suffering from a major depressive disorder, complicated by his extreme degree of alcohol dependence. The evidence demonstrates that the latter led to the respondent’s very heavy consumption of alcohol on a daily basis. Nor is there any reason to doubt Dr Apel’s view that the respondent’s condition had the consequence that his judgment was markedly impaired. Much has been done to address both aspects of his condition. The respondent has been treated by Dr Apel for a long time now. He remains compliant with his medication regime. He has also undertaken regular group therapy at Damascus. Although his depressive illness has persisted, it seems to be adequately managed. He has remained substantially free of alcohol for a period of the order of three years. Dr Apel considers that the appellant does not have an antisocial personality, nor does he display antisocial traits. He is in a supportive family situation. Dr Apel considers that he shows a capacity for reflection and judgment, and that the risk of a recurrence of the misconduct is very low. This evidence was not challenged, and there is no reason not to accept it.Is the respondent’s character “indelibly marked” as unfit for practice? In view of the submissions made on behalf of the applicant, it is appropriate to consider whether the respondent’s character is so indelibly marked by the misconduct that he cannot be regarded as a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll. The applicant submitted that such a finding should be made, consistent with the finding in Shand. It appeared from Ms Holliday’s oral argument that she submitted that the reference to character in the judgment in Shand was a reference to reputation, which had been indelibly marked by the respondent’s conduct. The point is neatly identified by some definitions of the word “character” from the Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary[9]. They are as follows:-1 The collective qualities or characteristics, esp. mental and moral, that distinguish a person or thing. 2 a moral strength (has a weak character). b reputation, esp. good reputation.[9] 3rd ed 1997.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.