LBJ v Commissioner of Police

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Criminal: Application)

LBJ v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

[2023] SASC 129

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stein  

12 September 2023

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER - REGISTRATION, REPORTING AND LIKE MATTERS

In 2000, the applicant was sentenced to four counts of indecent assault.  He was registered on the Australian National Child Offenders Register and is required to comply with reporting obligations under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). The applicant applied to the Court pursuant to s 37(2) of the Act seeking an order to suspend those reporting obligations.

The applicant meets the threshold requirements of a registrable offender entitled to apply for such an order. The primary question arising on the application is whether the Court can be satisfied, as required by s 38(2) of the Act, that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children.

Held:

1.      Application allowed.

Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) ss 37, 38, referred to.
C, M v Commissioner of Police (2014) 121 SASR 106; L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181; Holland v Commissioner of Police [2019] SASC 141; Attorney-General v Grosser [2016] SASC 49, considered.

LBJ v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2023] SASC 129

Criminal: Application

  1. STEIN J:  The applicant was registered on the Australian National Child Offenders Register (“ANCOR”) pursuant to the provisions of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) (“the Act”) following his conviction in May 2000 for four counts of indecent assault. The applicant is required to comply with the reporting obligations imposed by the Act and seeks an order pursuant to s 37(2) and s 38 of the Act suspending those reporting obligations.

  2. The respondent, the Commissioner of Police, does not take a position on the application. 

    The Act

  3. Sections 37 and 38 of the Act provide as follows:

    37—Supreme Court may exempt certain registrable offenders

    (1)This Division applies to a registrable offender who is required to continue to comply with the reporting obligations imposed by this Part for the remainder of his or her life.

    (2)If—

    (a)     a period of 15 years has passed since he or she was last sentenced or released from government custody in respect of a registrable offence or a foreign registrable offence, whichever is later; and

    (b)     he or she did not become the subject of a life-long reporting period under a corresponding law whilst in a foreign jurisdiction before becoming the subject of such a period in South Australia; and

    (c)     he or she is not on parole in respect of a registrable offence,

    the registrable offender may apply to the Supreme Court for an order suspending his or her reporting obligations.

    38—Order for suspension

    (1)On an application under section 37(2), the Supreme Court may make an order suspending the registrable offender's reporting…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of LBJ v Commissioner of Police involves the applicant, LBJ, who seeks a suspension of his reporting obligations under the Sex Offender Registration Act. LBJ, a former teacher's assistant, had previously been convicted of indecent assault involving a 14-year-old student at his school. The court had suspended his sentence and imposed various conditions, which LBJ successfully fulfilled. The primary issue before the court was whether LBJ, who has not been convicted of any further offences since his original sentence, poses a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. This determination hinges on the interpretation of the phrase "does not pose a risk" in s 38(2) of the Act, which requires consideration of both present and future risks. The court must decide if LBJ's past conduct and current circumstances indicate an appreciable risk of reoffending.

The court's reasoning centred on the interpretation of the statutory phrase "does not pose a risk" as requiring a nuanced assessment rather than a literal or absolute finding. The court acknowledged that determining the absence of risk indefinitely is rare and that the focus should be on whether there is an appreciable risk, which is grounded in evidence and perceptible. The judge considered several factors, including LBJ's age, health issues, the significant time elapsed since the offending, his remorse, lack of further offending, and his motivation to avoid jeopardizing his family relationships. The court concluded that these factors collectively indicated that LBJ did not pose a risk to children, thus satisfying the requirements of s 38(2).

Based on the evidence and factors considered, the court decided to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the application. The judge was prepared to rely on the opinion of a relevant expert and was satisfied that LBJ did not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. Consequently, the court ordered a suspension of LBJ's reporting obligations under s 38(1) of the Act. The terms of the order would be determined after hearing from the parties involved. This decision reflects a balanced approach, taking into account both the statutory requirements and the specific circumstances of the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The material before me does not raise any other matters which may militate against the making of an order in accordance with s 38(3)(g). Conclusion I have determined that I ought to exercise the discretion in favour of granting the application. I am prepared to act on Mr Balfour’s opinion. I have considered the matters referred to by Mr Balfour including the applicant’s age, his health issues, the length of time since the offending, his attitude to the offending, the lack of any further sexual offending and the applicant’s strong motivation not to re-offend to, among other things, avoid jeopardising his family relationships. Taking into account those matters, I am satisfied that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. Orders I will make an order pursuant to s 38(1) of the Act suspending the applicant’s reporting obligations. I will hear the parties as to the terms of the order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The phrase “does not pose a risk” in s 38(2) requires consideration of present and future risk and should be read in this sense: does not pose a risk and will not pose a risk in the future.[4] It will rarely be the case that a court could make an unqualified finding into the indefinite future that a person poses no risk.[5] Accordingly, the requirement that a registrable offender “does not pose a risk” is not construed literally and the focus is on whether there is appreciable risk.[6] An appreciable risk is a risk that is not purely speculative but is founded in evidence, is perceptible and capable of being estimated.[7] The fundamental question for the Court is whether or not the Court is or is not satisfied of the requirements contained in s 38(2). Speaking in terms of onus of proof may not be apposite.[8] [4] L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181 at [11] per Nicholson J; Holland v Commissioner of Police [2019] SASC 141 at [7] per Lovell J.[5] L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181 at [13]-[14] per Nicholson J.[6] L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181 at [13]-[15] per Nicholson J; Holland v Commissioner of Police [2019] SASC 141 at [7] per Lovell J.[7] L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181 at [15] per Nicholson J adapting the observations of Stanley J in Attorney-General v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [29]; Holland v Commissioner of Police [2019] SASC 141 at [7] per Lovell J.[8] L, R v Commissioner of Police [2018] SASC 181 at [12] per Nicholson J; Holland v Commissioner of Police [2019] SASC 141 at [7] per Lovell J.Factual considerations relevant to the application The offending comprised four counts of indecent assault of a 14 year old female victim, a student attending the high school at which the applicant was employed as a teacher’s assistant. All four incidents occurred on school grounds in the technical studies area. Three incidents involved the applicant touching the victim on her clothing or underwear. The last involved the applicant taking the victim’s hand and placing it on his groin on the outside of his trousers. This occurred after other contact between the victim and the applicant. The victim acknowledged she enjoyed the affection shown by the applicant to her, but she reported the conduct after she considered it got out of hand. The applicant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court and was sentenced to four months imprisonment which was suspended upon him entering into a bond for a period of two years in the amount of $200. The bond contained conditions including that the applicant be of good behaviour, be under the supervision of a probation officer for 12 months and attend counselling programs as directed. The applicant completed the bond successfully in 2002. The applicant did not have any similar convictions at the time. Twenty four years has passed since the offending and the applicant has not been convicted of any other offences in that period. In 2023, the applicant was charged with a breach of reporting obligations, but the charge was withdrawn. I accept counsel’s submission that the Court should not take into consideration the discontinued charge.