LAUE and LAUE (Deceased) by his Legal Personal Representative DANIEL FELLON

[2016] FCWA 91

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: LAUE and LAUE (Deceased) by his Legal Personal Representative DANIEL FELLON [2016] FCWA 91

CORAM: WALTERS J

HEARD: 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30 AND 31 JULY 2014 AND 1, 4, 5, 6 AND 8 AUGUST 2014 AND 20 AND 21 NOVEMBER 2014 AND 14 JULY 2015

DELIVERED : 13 OCTOBER 2016

FILE NO/S: PTW 3387 of 2012

BETWEEN: ROSIE PINA LAUE

Applicant

AND

RAY WILBUR LAUE (Deceased) by his Legal Personal Representative DANIEL FELLON
First Respondent

AND

CAMDEN PTY LTD
Second Respondent

AND

ARM PTY LTD
Third Respondent

AND

BARKERS PTY LTD
Fourth Respondent

NOTE: These reasons have been amended pursuant to the Slip Rule.

Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Alteration of property interests under the Family Law Act (1975) (Cth) – Where husband is deceased – Where husband died after commencement of property settlement proceedings – Consideration of s 79(8) of the Family Law Act (1975) (Cth) – Where husband, his mother and his accountant/financial adviser sought to defeat wife's anticipated claims for property settlement – Where husband's mother and entities associated with her have used aggressive commercial tactics against wife

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Jurisdiction and powers of Family Court of Western Australia – Accrued jurisdiction – Single justiciable controversy – Common substratum of facts – Equity – Contractual principles – Validity and enforceability of agreement entered into between husband, wife, husband's mother and corporate entities associated with them – Consideration – Part-performance – Abandonment – Unconscionable conduct and undue influence – Estoppel – Consideration of form of estoppel discussed by High Court in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1998) 164 CLR 387 – Requirement to identify existing legal and equitable interests of parties in property according to ordinary common law and equitable principles

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA)
Family Court Act 1997 (WA)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Rules 2004 (WA)
Statute of Frauds
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr P Dowding SC and Mr P Hannan

First Respondent : Self Represented Litigant

Second Respondent : Mr J Thompson SC and Mr M Berry

Third Respondent : Mr J Thompson SC and Mr M Berry

Fourth Respondent : Mr P Dowding SC and Mr P Hannan

Solicitors:

Applicant: Carr & Co

First Respondent : Self Represented Litigant

Second Respondent : Hopgood Ganim Lawyers

Third Respondent : Hopgood Ganim Lawyers

Fourth Respondent : Carr & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559
B & B [2006] FamCA 883
Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75
Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Bishop & Bishop (2003) FLC 93-144
Bolger & Headon [2014] FamCAFC 27
Bonacci & Bonacci [2012] FamCAFC 15
B v B [1998] FamCA 69
Chapman & Chapman [2014] FamCAFC 91
Chemaisse & The Commission of Taxation & Ors (1990) FLC 92-133
Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-596
Clifton v Palumbo [1944] 2 All ER 497
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394
Dekker & Dekker [2014] FCWA 61
Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154
DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226
DMW v CGW (1982) 151 CLR 491
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570
Fielding & Nichol [2014] FCWA 77
Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438
Fitzgerald-Stevens & Leslighter [2015] FCWA 25
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101
Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1
Hayton & Bendle (2010) 43 Fam LR 602
Herridge & Handerson [2011] FamCAFC 156
Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143
Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1983) NSWLR 378
In Re Anderson; Ex parte Bateman (1978) 53 ALJR 165
J and J (1979) FLC 90-718
Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23
Kennon v Spry (2008) FLC 93-388
Laue & Laue (Deceased) [2013] FCWA 44
Laue and Laue (Deceased) [2013] FCWA 87
Laue and Laue (Deceased) by his Legal Personal Representative Daniel Fellon [2013] FCWA 109
Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234
McMahon & McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1980) 145 CLR 457
NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204
Noll & Noll (2013) FLC 93-529
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Nudrill Pty Ltd v La Rosa [2010] WASCA 128
OSF & OJK (2004) FLC 93-191
Palmer v Bank of New South Wales [1973] 2 NSWLR 244
Pastrikos v Pastrikos (1977) 31 FLR 524
Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
R v Barnet London Borough Council; Ex parte Nilish Shah [1983] 2 AC 309
R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration (1914) 18 CLR 54
R v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185
Re F – Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072
Re Macks; Ex Parte Saint (2000) 204 CLR 158
Riches v Hogben [1985] 2 Qd R 292
Rollings & Rollings [2009] FamCAFC 87
Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877
Saxena & Saxena (2006) FLC 93-268
Scott & Danton [2014] FamCAFC 203
Selen & Selen (2013) FLC 93-533
Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19
Smith v Smith (No 3) (1986) 161 CLR 217
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Tasmanian Trustees Ltd and Gleeson (1990) FLC 92-156
Teo & Guan [2015] FamCAFC 94
Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd (1994) 2 VR 106
Valceski v Valceski (2007) 70 NSWLR 36
Van der Linden & Kordell [2010] FamCAFC 157
Vodicka v Vodicka (2005) 194 FLR 246
Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1998) 164 CLR 387
Warby and Warby (2002) FLC 93-091
Waters & Jurek (1995) FLC 92-635

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

Preamble

1These proceedings relate, at least in part, to competing applications for property settlement. They also relate to many other issues, most of which have their genesis in a variety of actions taken by [Ray Wilbur Laue] ("the husband") – who died in January 2013 – and the ineptitude (and deceitful actions) of his financial advisor, [Daniel Fellon] ("[Mr Fellon]"), who is now the husband's legal personal representative.

2The cast in this tragic case is large. It includes [Rosie Pina Laue] ("the wife") (who married the husband in [in] 1981 and lived with him for approximately 30 years, until they separated in November 2011), the husband's elderly mother, [Mrs Patricia Laue] ("[Mrs Laue Snr]") (who appears consumed with bitterness and is resolutely hostile to the wife and the wife's children, her own grandchildren) and a number of corporate entities associated with the wife and/or Mrs Laue Snr.

3In large part, the protagonists in these proceedings are arguing about the legal and equitable ownership of two rural properties: [Property A] and [Property B]. Property A is valued at approximately $4.8 million. Property B’s value is unknown, but is likely to be between $4.6 million and $8.55 million. The protagonists are also arguing about the quantum, effect or existence of various liabilities.

4The trial ran before me for 15 days. It was subsequently reopened on a number of occasions. Further evidence was led and further submissions were made.

5The proceedings were complex and fiercely contested. It is not unfair to say that in many respects, certain of the litigants lost sight of the wood for the trees – or, perhaps more accurately, preferred to focus solely on the trees, in the hope that the wood would not be noticed.

6It is important to note, at the outset, that the parties adopted fundamentally different approaches to the proceedings. In this respect, I accept and adopt the closing submissions of the wife and the fourth respondent, [Barkers Pty Ltd] (which submissions I shall refer to as "CSW") at [6] to [9] (footnotes omitted):

320.The case presented by [[Mrs Laue Snr]] and the second and third respondents seeks to establish facts from the balance sheets from various entities and to rely on the corporate veil, ignoring the specific way in which members of this family treated the corporate entities and their assets. Our case relies upon the equitable principles which enable the Court to deal with obligations and representations by the parties, as they truly exist. [[Mrs Laue Snr]] concedes in both affidavit and oral evidence that the family as a whole treated corporate structures and the assets thereof as their own. She specifically states as follows:

Despite the companies and trusts which owned property, to me and in our household there was no distinction between a company owning it or us individually owning it. It was "ours": see [Mrs Laue Snr's] affidavit sworn 16 November 2012 at [15].

321.… [In] considering this matter it would be farcical not to equate [[Mrs Laue Snr]] with the second and third respondents. Whilst counsel [for the second and third respondents] has been very keen to make a distinction, [[Mrs Laue Snr]] solely controls those entities and is the only person seen to provide instructions on their behalf. This was made quite clear throughout the course of the trial, and in particular –

a)no other person… was ever called upon to give instructions;

b)on day one of the trial when senior counsel for the second and third respondents made submissions on [[Mrs Laue Snr's]] behalf opposing access (by the wife's counsel and solicitors) to documents produced on subpoena;

c)instructions provided to pursue a line of questioning for a very lengthy period with respect to the insurance proceeds of a written-off [Land Rover] motor vehicle to which [[Mrs Laue Snr]]… claimed she was personally entitled; and

d)she has personally received the stipend and the rental payments from [certain tenants] for the use of the [Property B] land and has continued to demand it for herself.

322.In a similar sense, it is accepted that [Barkers Pty Ltd] and [Barkers Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Laue Family Trust] are both the alter ego of the husband and the wife.

7As I have explained below, I have referred to the second and third respondents as "the [Patricia Laue entities]". I am more than satisfied that this appellation is accurate and appropriate.

8The Patricia Laue entities placed considerable emphasis on detailed documents filed by both sides and described as "pleadings". It is trite, however, to observe that this is not a court of pleadings. Far from it. While the "pleadings" filed by the parties may assist to define their respective cases, they do not define the scope of the parties' dispute with the degree of particularity suggested on behalf of the Patricia Laue entities. Much less do they define the scope of this Court's powers and obligations.

9Given the very large volume of material presented to the Court on behalf of the parties, it is simply not possible (and nor is it necessary) to deal with every argument or difference of opinion raised or expressed by the parties. Further, it is unnecessary and unduly time-consuming to paraphrase or reproduce written submissions with which I agree. In order to keep the length of this Judgment within reasonable limits, therefore, I have resolved to indicate, where appropriate, that I agree with and adopt certain submissions. That is not to say that I will not refer to or discuss certain submissions or that I will not make reference to the evidence if the need to do so arises. The parties should understand that I have read the material upon which they relied, including, of course, their closing submissions. I have also re-read my own notes made during the trial and reverted to the transcript and the exhibits where necessary. If I have not referred specifically to documents or to other forms of evidence, it is not because I have ignored them; it is because I have formed the view that it is not necessary to make specific reference to them. It is not my role to restate all the evidence before the Court. Still less is it my role to "chase every rabbit down its burrow". I accept, however, that it is indeed my role to resolve the parties' dispute within the parameters of their respective cases and in accordance with the Court's jurisdiction and powers. I accept, as well, that I am obliged to provide reasons for the decision I have reached, and that those reasons should reveal why I have decided the case in the way that I have. The reasons should also disclose that justice has been done.

10Further to the comments I have made above, I refer to the well-known and frequently adopted passage from the decision of Mahoney J in Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1983) NSWLR 378 at 385:

[The judge's duty to state his reasons for deciding as he/she does] does not exist in respect of every matter, of fact or of law, which was or might have been raised in the proceeding. It is not the duty of the judge to decide every matter which is raised in argument. He may decide a case in a way which does not require the determination of a particular submission: in such a case he may put it aside or, as Lord Scarman said, merely salute it in passing: R v Barnet London Borough Council; Ex parte Nilish Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, at 350. A judge will, of course, appreciate the possibility of points being taken or decided on appeal which were not taken or decided below and for this reason he may decide, and give reasons for his decision on, matters which in strictness he need not decide.

However, the decision of a particular submission may be an essential part of the judge's reasoning to his final conclusion. This may be so because it is necessarily so, ie, because he cannot come to his final conclusion without deciding it; or because the reasoning which in fact he follows makes it so. In such a case, the duty of the judge will vary according to the way in which the case has been conducted and according to the reasoning which he has followed. Ordinarily he may confine his attention to the points which have been taken and the submissions made in relation to them. (I put aside cases involving, for example, constitutional or jurisdictional issues, where special considerations may apply.) In my opinion, it is not open to a party on appeal to complain that reasons were not given for the decision of a matter of fact or law which was, or must have been, decided, if the matter was not the subject of submissions made to the court below in a way which called for a reasoned consideration of them.

Abbreviations and other terms used

11In these Reasons, and unless otherwise indicated:

a) all statements of fact comprise findings of fact;

b)I have referred to the late Mr Ray Laue and Ms Rosie Laue as the husband and the wife (and I mean no disrespect by doing so), because it is less confusing than referring to them in other terms;

c)although there are other parties in these proceedings, it is convenient to refer to the husband and the wife (together) as "the Parties";

d)although the wife is the applicant in these proceedings and Barkers Pty Ltd (which I have defined elsewhere in these Reasons as "[BPL]") is the fourth respondent, their interests in the proceedings are in harmony and their cases were conducted concurrently – hence, when I have referred to procedural steps taken by the wife, that description also includes steps taken by the wife and BPL in conjunction;

e)although the first respondent in these proceedings is Mr Fellon as legal personal representative of the husband's estate, I have found it more convenient, less confusing and less grammatically challenging to describe steps taken by the first respondent (after the husband's death) as being steps taken by Mr Fellon;

f)although [Camden Pty Ltd] (which I have defined elsewhere in these Reasons as "[Camden]") and [ARM Pty Ltd] (which I have defined elsewhere in these Reasons as "[ARM]") are the second and third respondents respectively –

i)both entities were controlled – in every respect – by Mrs Laue Snr (until very late in the proceedings, when ARM was placed in liquidation); and

ii)like the wife and BPL, the interests in the proceedings of Camden and ARM were in harmony and their cases were conducted concurrently (again, until very late in the proceedings, when ARM was placed in litigation),

and hence – and in accordance with findings I have made elsewhere in these Reasons – I have referred to the second and third respondents (jointly) as "the Patricia Laue entities";

g)as indicated above, I have referred to the written closing submissions of the wife and BPL as "CSW"; in similar fashion, I shall refer to the written closing submissions of the Patricia Laue entities as "CSP" and Mr Fellon’s written closing submissions as "CSH";

h)I have not drawn a distinction between proceedings or events before a family law magistrate and proceedings or events in the Family Court of Western Australia;

i)I have referred to all affidavits filed by or on behalf of witnesses as being "sworn", even if they were affirmed by their deponents (and I note that, in a slightly different context, s 5 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) provides among other things that "to swear" includes "to affirm");

j)unless otherwise indicated, references to legislation are references to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – although, when necessary, I have referred to this enactment as "the Act" or the "FLA"; and

k)I have referred to the Family Law Rules 2004 as "the Rules";

Introduction

12The husband and the wife met in 1980, and married in 1981. They separated (finally) in November 2011. It follows that their relationship lasted approximately 30 years.

13This was the first marriage for each of them. They had three children: [Sarah Jessica Laue], born in 1987, [Jennifer Elise Laue], born in 1989 and [Ronald Boris Laue], born in 1991. The children are all adults. The wife and Ronald work together.

14The wife commenced proceedings in this Court on 18 June 2012. After a period of ill health, the husband died on 5 January 2013 – while the proceedings were still on foot.

15By an application in a case filed 21 January 2013, the wife sought an order that the husband's legal personal representative be substituted as a party to the proceedings. As a consequence, Justice Crisford appointed [Mr Shaun Brenton] as the husband's legal personal representative – without objection from the other parties. The appointment was made on 5 March 2013: see Laue & Laue (Deceased) [2013] FCWA 44.

16It was later determined that the appropriate person to act as legal personal representative for the husband was the executor of his estate, Mr Fellon. Mr Fellon was substituted as the husband's legal personal representative by orders of 29 August 2013. At trial, Mr Fellon appeared (primarily) in that capacity. He was unrepresented.

17It follows that the wife is the applicant in these proceedings. Mr Fellon (as legal personal representative of the husband's estate) is the first respondent.

18Also parties to the proceedings were Camden Pty Ltd ("Camden") and ARM Pty Ltd ("ARM"). Both companies are or were at all relevant times effectively controlled by Mrs Laue Snr, and hold disputed property. They comprise the second and third respondents respectively.

19The fourth respondent is Barkers Pty Ltd ("BPL"), an entity that had previously been controlled by the husband and the wife. Since the husband's death, it has been controlled by the wife.

20By the time the matter came on for trial, the issues were various and agreements non-existent. The conduct of some of the parties left much to be desired.

21The issues requiring determination included:

a)Who is the equitable owner Property B?

b)Who is the legal owner of Property A?

c)What is the extent of the liabilities associated with those properties, and who is responsible for them?

d)Is it just and equitable, in all the circumstances, to make any alterations to the Parties' property interests as they presently stand?

22Regrettably, there was more disagreement than there was agreement among the parties, who could not even agree to the contents of a book of exhibits. The proceedings were conducted more in the manner of trench warfare than modern litigation.

23The trial occupied some 18 sitting days. Mr Dowding of Senior Counsel, Mr Hannan and Ms Sassella appeared for the wife and BPL. Mr Thomson of Senior Counsel and Mr Berry appeared for the second and third respondents. Mr Fellon appeared unrepresented, on behalf of the husband's estate.

24Although the view that the relevant corporate entities should be treated as being entirely separate from the (corporeal) parties was pressed upon me by Mr Thomson throughout the proceedings, I have no hesitation in rejecting that submission. Instead, I adopt the following submission made by Mr Dowding in opening:

… [This] was really a family construct. It was not a commercial construct. And as much as we look to the unusually in depth pleadings that relate to this claim between the second and third respondents and ourselves for some sort of commercial… abstract commercial reality, we don't find it, because this was a family arrangement.

25Similarly, I am satisfied that, whether she acknowledges it or not, Mrs Laue Snr is as involved in these proceedings on a personal level as she is at a commercial level. The legal structures and the many commercial decisions and transactions considered during the course of the trial cannot disguise the fact that the entities were conducted as part of a broader family business structure. They simply cannot be meaningfully separated from that family.

26After the trial, I reserved my judgment. The matter was reopened on at least one occasion after that time in order to admit fresh evidence, but this is that judgment.

Orders sought

27The orders sought by the parties are complex. The most recent minutes of orders sought are annexed to these Reasons ("Annexure 1").

28In CSH, Mr Fellon summarised the position of the husband's estate as follows:

The orders to be made in respect to the division of the Parties' matrimonial property pursuant to FLA s 79 should be 50/50 if [Property B] is not included. This is based on the husband's affidavit sworn 12 October 2012 as evidence of his contributions, supported by the wife in her evidence of the respective contributions during the marriage.

If [Property B] is included in the asset pool then the husband's contribution should be considered as greater than the wife as the property came from [Mrs Laue Snr's] companies.

Background

29The husband was born in 1954. The wife was born in 1958. It follows that she is now 58. The Parties met in 1980 and married in 1981. They separated for a period of eight or nine months in November 2009 and then separated, on a final basis, in November 2011. The husband died on 5 January 2013 – after these proceedings had commenced, and after he had taken a number of deliberate steps with the purpose of defeating anticipated orders in these proceedings.

30The bulk of the property to which the wife's claim relates was, at least in part, derived from the Laue family business – which was commenced by the husband's parents, [Mr Matthew Barry Laue] ("Mr Laue Snr") and Mrs Laue Snr. Mr Laue Snr died [in] 2004.

31The husband was part of the family business, as were his two siblings, [B] and [J]. B and J died in 1990 and 2007 respectively. Each had three children from their various marriages. It follows that Mrs Laue Snr has no surviving children; she has a number of grandchildren.

32Mrs Laue Snr was born in 1929. She is now 87 years of age.

33Mr Laue Snr and Mrs Laue Snr ("Mr & Mrs Laue Snr") married in 1953. The husband was their eldest child. Their other children, B and J, were born in 1958 and 1961 respectively. As I have said, the husband and his siblings have all passed away.

34In approximately 1962, Mr & Mrs Laue Snr acquired a pastoral lease known as "[Pastoral Lease A]", near [County Town A] in the far north of Western Australia. They lived on the station, where they conducted a [sheep] grazing business.

35In December 1968, two companies were incorporated: BPL and [Company C Pty Ltd] ("[Company C]"). Mr & Mrs Laue Snr were appointed directors of the two companies.

36BPL's issued shares were as follows:

a) 1 A class share;

b) 2 B class shares;

c) 479 C class shares;

d) 960 D class shares;

e) 480 E class shares; and

f) 480 F class shares.

37In the same month (December 1968), BPL acquired a pastoral lease known as "[Pastoral Lease B]", near [Country Town B] (also in the far north of Western Australia).

38Consequently, Company C acquired a different pastoral lease known as "[Pastoral Lease C]". Like Pastoral Lease B, Pastoral Lease C was near Country Town B.

39Mr & Mrs Laue Snr conducted a sheep grazing business on both Pastoral Lease B and Pastoral Lease C.

40The following year (1969), the husband left school and began to work full-time in the family's sheep grazing business operating on Pastoral Lease A, Pastoral Lease B and Pastoral Lease C.

41Camden was incorporated in February 1970. It had six issued shares, four of which were held by Mrs Laue Snr. The remaining two shares were held by [B Laue] (the husband's brother).

42Pastoral Lease A was sold in 1973. Subsequently, in September 1973, Camden acquired a pastoral lease known as "[Pastoral Lease D]") near [Country Town D] (again, in the far north of Western Australia). Mr & Mrs Laue Snr and the husband and his siblings moved to Pastoral Lease D and operated a sheep grazing business from that property. The family also continued to operate its grazing business from Pastoral Lease B and Pastoral Lease C.

43The husband and the wife married [in] 1981, and commenced cohabitation at that time. The wife was working as a [nurse] and the husband was working in the family business.

44The Parties commenced cohabitation on Pastoral Lease B. The wife says that, due to the remoteness of the Station in the Pilbara region, she was unable to find work as a nurse. As a result, she undertook work around the property, assisting the husband and maintaining the home.

45Initially, the Parties lived in a caravan on Pastoral Lease B. They later purchased a transportable home. There is disagreement (as there is in most issues in this case) in relation to how the transportable home was purchased.

46B Laue also married in 1981. His wife, [S], has since remarried. Her husband is [Mr K].

47In the same year (1981), Mrs Laue Snr transferred her B Class Founder's share in BPL to the husband. It thereupon became an ordinary share. Other shares in BPL were either issued to or transferred to the husband and B. Mrs Laue Snr also transferred shares in Pastoral Lease C to the husband's sister, J.

48On 17 August 1982, Mrs Laue Snr was appointed a director of Camden. She continues to hold four shares in the company. Mr Laue Snr was appointed a director of Camden in the following year.

49In June 1984, the [Mr Laue Snr Family Trust] was settled.

50In 1988, the husband and the wife were both appointed directors of BPL.

51B Laue died in 1990, as a result of [an] accident. Upon his death, his shares in Camden remained part of his estate. This was to continue until 1995, when they were transferred to Mr Laue Snr and B's widow, S (to be held jointly). His shares in BPL were transferred to the husband.

52Following B's death, Mr & Mrs Laue Snr, as directors of Camden, decided to sell Pastoral Lease D and move to Perth. In 1991 or 1992, they purchased and commenced living in a property in [Suburb C]. They later acquired the adjacent property. The two properties were ultimately combined to become a single unit ("[Property C]"). Mrs Laue Snr continues to live in Property C.

53In late 1991 or early 1992, Mr & Mrs Laue Snr, as directors of Camden, purchased Property B for $575,000. The purchase was settled on 6 January 1992.

54Mr & Mrs Laue Snr kept horses on Property B, and the Patricia Laue entities assert that Mr Laue Snr also established a sheep depot there in or about 2000.

55Mr & Mrs Laue Snr never resided on Property B. Nonetheless, through Camden they continued to operate the family business from Property B. It appears that Mr Laue Snr regularly drove to Property B to work on the property.

56In March 1992, Mrs Laue Snr ceased to be a director of BPL. In the same month, she ceased to be a director of Company C and the husband became a director of that company in her place. Around the same time, BPL purchased a farming property (known as "[Property D]") in the [Country Town M] area. Property D was purchased for $1,285,000.

57Property D was purchased with funds borrowed from BankWest, which borrowing was guaranteed by Mr Laue Snr. The loan was in the name of BPL.

58The husband and the wife (and their children) moved to live on Property D in late 1992.

59The wife said that both she and the husband worked on Property D, although she was also primarily responsible the care of the couple's three children – who were born in 1987, 1989 and 1991 respectively.

60The husband and the wife maintained both Property D and Pastoral Lease B for a number of years, the husband moving between the two. He acknowledges, in an affidavit sworn 12 October 2012, that while he was at Pastoral Lease B the wife was left to manage Property D and care for the children alone.

61In August 1994, Mr & Mrs Laue Snr transferred Property C to Camden (of which they were the directors).

62In September 1996, BPL sold Pastoral Lease B for $900,000 and Company C sold Pastoral Lease C for $150,000. The net proceeds of sale of Pastoral Lease B were used to reduce the debt on Property D.

63In the same year (1996), the two shares that B Laue had held in Camden were transferred from his estate to his widow, S, and to Mr Laue Snr on trust for S and the three children of B and S.

64In approximately 1999/2000 Camden placed sheep on Property B. According to the Patricia Laue entities, Camden began operating a sheep export depot on Property B at that time – which depot increased in size and handling capacity until the death of Mr Laue Snr in 2004. According to the wife, Property B was only ever operated by Mr Laue Snr as a feedlot. She asserts that the description of Property B as a sheep export depot was a significant exaggeration.

65In or around January 2003, Mr Fellon began acting as an accountant and consultant for the husband and the wife. At the time, he practised under the registered business name of '[ABusiness]'.

66In June 2004, Mr Laue Snr died. At the time of his death, the Parties were operating Property D through BPL. Camden was the legal owner of Property B.

67In his will, Mr Laue Snr made a number of specific bequests. He left his residuary estate to Mrs Laue Snr. Mrs Laue Snr, the husband and the husband's sister, J, were the executors and trustees of the will.

68Mr Laue Snr left his shares in BPL and Company C to the husband. He also bequeathed to the husband any loan accounts owing to him by each of those companies and by Camden, provided that the husband assumed responsibility for all debts owed by Mr Laue Snr to the three companies. It appears to have been generally accepted, however, that the husband was expected to assume liability for all the debts owed by Mr Laue Snr's estate.

69In addition, Mr Laue Snr left specific bequests to J, on condition that she transfer her shares in Company C to the husband.

70According to CSP at [15]:

By this means, [[Mr Laue Snr]] ensured that the husband became the owner of the [sheep] businesses and properties owned by [[BPL]] and [Company C], in return for which the husband was obliged to pay any debts owed by [[Mr Laue Snr]] to the [sheep] companies, and also that the husband would ensure that [Camden] would receive an injection of cash equal to the loan account which [[Mr Laue Snr]] owed to it.

71At the date of Mr Laue Snr's death, his residuary estate had a net value of close to $400,000. The value of his shares in BPL and Company C is unclear, although it was substantial.

72At the same time, he owed a net amount of $224,431 to Camden. He had no outstanding liabilities to BPL or Company C. The Patricia Laue entities submitted, and I accept, that, on any view, this amount ($224,431) was much less than the value of the shares received by the husband. Even so, the husband never paid this debt (in the sense of transferring money), although he assumed liability for it. After Mr Laue Snr's death, the liability was transferred to the husband and remained in the balance sheet, unaltered, thereafter. The wife maintained that actual payment of the debt was not required by the terms of Mr Laue Snr's will, while Mrs Laue Snr (qua Camden) submitted that the husband was obliged to pay the debt to Camden and that this should be taken into account as a liability of the husband which needs to be paid. In CSP at [21], the Patricia Laue entities submitted that "… in the context of a will, there obviously needed to be some final accounting by [Mr Laue Snr] to Camden, and this was the means that this accounting should be achieved". To the extent that I understand this submission, I disagree with it. There was no need for there to be "some final accounting" to Camden. It was a sensible and practical solution for the relevant loan account to be transferred to the husband – and it was.

73In CSP at [20], the Patricia Laue entities submitted that, because the husband "did nothing at all in relation to the payment of the amount due to [Camden]", he "never did anything to obtain the benefit of the valuable shares in [Company C] or [BPL]". I disagree. Clearly, the husband assumed liability for the debt, which relieved Mr Laue Snr's estate from the obligation of having to meet it. There can be no doubt that the acceptance of the liability amounted to valuable "consideration" for the receipt of the shares.

74In any event, the Patricia Laue entities submitted that the total debts of Mr Laue Snr's estate which the husband caused to be paid totalled just over $128,000. Most of these moneys were provided (directly or indirectly) by BPL. According to their calculations, the net amount which the husband "would have been required to transfer" was just over $138,000.

75As a consequence of the death of Mr Laue Snr, the husband became the owner of all the issued shares in BPL. As indicated above, Property D was owned by BPL.

76After the death of Mr Laue Snr, the husband developed a serious alcohol addiction. Although the problem was minimised by Mrs Laue Snr and Mr Fellon, I reject their evidence in this regard. In her affidavit sworn 10 April 2014, the Parties' daughter, Sarah, said at [12] and [14]:

… [After [Mr Laue Snr's] death, the husband's] alcohol consumption increased dramatically. In the beginning he would often just have a drink in the evening with [the wife]. However, he began coming home from the roadhouse already having had several drinks. He also went from having openly drunk (sic) in front of us to hiding his drinking. While he was sometimes sober, it was not surprising to me to find him in varying degrees of intoxication in the years following until his death. Despite this, we did until the last 12 months of his life, maintain a good relationship and he would often call me to discuss a number of issues, including alcohol abuse, deteriorating relationships with my mother and sister, frustrations with [[Mrs Laue Snr]], farming issues ([sheep] and wheat prices), [[Mr Fellon]] and business matters…

I recall on Christmas 2011, [the husband] was extremely intoxicated and went inside. My sister [Jennifer] followed him in and caught him attempting to obtain a further bottle of alcohol. When she tried to take the bottle off him, he grabbed her by the back of the neck and called her a "little bitch". We were outside and heard her yelling at [the husband] to get away from her. [The wife] then ran inside to assist [Jennifer]. My sister [Jennifer] and I did not speak with [the husband] after this event until his death. [The wife] and I drove him to rehab the next day. During the trip he physically and verbally abused me. This is when I stopped speaking to him.

77[Sarah Laue] also confirmed that the husband's drinking put considerable stress on the Parties' marriage and on her brother, [Ronald] (who, together with the wife, effectively took over the family's farming enterprise as the husband's health deteriorated). Ronald was also "forced to clean up after [the husband's] messes", as Sarah put it.

78Sarah’s sister, Jennifer, dealt with the subject in her affidavit sworn 4 April 2014 at [11] to [17]. Her evidence is very similar to Sarah’s evidence:

In the later years of his life [the husband's] drinking problem worsened considerably and affected his demeanour and relationships with [the wife], my sister and myself. His reasoning and decision-making were also badly affected.

There were a number of incidents where he was involved in accidents which occurred when he had been drinking and driving. These incidents involved farm machinery and also his motor vehicle.…

[The husband's] drinking problem was commonly known about by members of our family, including [[Mrs Laue Snr]]. …

79I find that the husband's alcoholism was severe, and that it had a profound effect on his behaviour and his relationship with the wife and his children. Ultimately, it led to his death. I accept, without hesitation, the evidence of the wife and the Parties' children in relation to the subject.

80Shortly after Mr Laue Snr's death, Mr Fellon commenced acting as an accountant for Mrs Laue Snr. From May 2005, he acted as the accountant and consultant for Camden.

81The wife asserts that, in or about March 2005, an agreement was entered into between the husband, the wife and Mrs Laue Snr in relation to Property B ("[the Property B Agreement]"). The Property B Agreement involved Mrs Laue Snr transferring Camden’s interest in Property B to BPL in exchange for a monthly stipend for Mrs Laue Snr for the duration of her life, the debts of the estate of Mr Laue Snr being paid and the husband and the wife providing for Mrs Laue Snr's welfare more generally, including covering additional expenses. Mrs Laue Snr denies that the Property B Agreement was entered into – at least in that form. The Property B Agreement is discussed more fully under that heading below.

82Although Mrs Laue Snr maintains that the Property B business was run and improved by Camden until approximately June 2005, I find that, irrespective of which corporate entity ostensibly ran the business, it was the husband and the wife who did the vast bulk of the work. In approximately July 2005, Camden formally ceased operating the business from Property B, and BPL, in partnership with BPL as trustee of the Laue Family Trust ("LFT"), began operations from Property B.

83The LFT was established at that time, with BPL as trustee. The husband and the wife were joint guardians and appointors of the LFT. The LFT was responsible for the running of the farm business. The beneficiaries of the trust, at the time it was established, were the husband, the wife and their three children.

84Although there is a distinction between BPL acting in its own capacity and BPL acting as trustee for LFT, I have simply referred to BPL unless it has been necessary to be more precise.

85At the end of the 2004/2005 financial year, the Parties, qua BPL, took over the leasing of Property B, entering into an agreement with International Live Exports ("ILE") to run the live export depot. This continued until 2011.

86On 7 August 2005, BPL paid $25,000 into the bank account of Mrs Laue Snr.

87On 8 August 2005, the husband was appointed a director of Camden.

88On 13 September 2005, the Parties (or BPL) paid approximately $70,280 in reduction of the NAB mortgage secured against Property C. On 21 October 2005, they (or BPL) paid out the balance owing on the mortgage, being just over $6000.

89In 2009, the husband was appointed secretary of BPL.

90The husband and the wife separated for the first time in November 2009. They resumed cohabitation somewhere between April 2010 and mid-2010 and finally separated in November 2011.

91A great deal that is relevant to the current proceedings occurred during the period that the parties were separated between November 2009 and mid-2010.

92On 11 December 2009, the wife made an offer to purchase a property in [Country Town E]. This offer was accepted, subject to finance. Mr Fellon was responsible for endeavouring to obtain finance from BankWest on her behalf. The wife's application for finance was rejected. The wife submitted that it was rejected because Mr Fellon deliberately provided the bank with incorrect documentation as part of an attempt by the husband, in collusion with Mr Fellon, to ensure that the wife was not able to purchase the property. I accept this submission and note that the husband, in a text message sent to the wife and read into evidence during Mr Dowding's opening address, acknowledged being "deceitful" regarding the wife's attempt to purchase this property.

93Following the initial separation, there was a meeting of directors of BPL. At the meeting, which was held on 3 February 2010, the wife was not re-elected as director of BPL. It appears that the husband and Mr Fellon were present at that meeting, but the wife was not: see exhibit 21 to the wife's trial affidavit sworn 24 March 2014.

94ABusiness lodged the change of company details form with ASIC on 9 February 2010.

95In early 2010, and while the husband and the wife were still separated, the husband informed the wife that he intended to purchase Property A. The evidence suggests that the husband intended the purchase as a means of reconciliation. Whether or not this was his intention, Property A was ultimately purchased.

96ARM was incorporated on 21 January 2010. Pursuant to a Deed of Settlement dated the same day, ARM was appointed the trustee of the [Property A Land Trust]. The beneficiary, principal and guardian of the Property A Land Trust is Mrs Laue Snr. Mr Fellon was the accountant and consultant for ARM.

97On 28 January 2010, ARM, as trustee for the Property A Land Trust, purchased Property A for $6.2 million – financed by way of loan for $6,850,000 from BankWest. BPL (as trustee for the LFT), Camden, the husband and Mrs Laue Snr guaranteed the loan.

98The incorporation of ARM was directly related to the acquisition of Property A. I am satisfied that the husband caused Mrs Laue Snr to be appointed the director and sole shareholder. I am also satisfied that all ARM’S expenses, and all the associated costs of setting up ARM, were paid by BPL (of which the husband was then the sole director).

99In September 2010, Property D was sold for $9,050,000. The net proceeds of sale amounted to $8,892,000.

100On 4 March 2011, by way of a Division 7A loan, BPL transferred $6.2 million to ARM to repay the loan to BankWest.

101At the same time, BPL lent $2,195,057 to the LFT – and not documented until 15 May 2012: see exhibit 24 to the affidavit of the wife, sworn 24 March 2014.

102In order to address the Division 7A loan, it would have been relatively simple to transfer Property A to BPL. This did not occur. Mr Fellon, when pressed on the issue, maintained that the matter was not dealt with in this way because there was a deliberate attempt to keep each asset separate. In my opinion, his answers in this respect were nonsensical. I find that Mr Fellon colluded with the husband in endeavouring to place property beyond the wife's reach in anticipated Family Law proceedings.

103Moreover, the effect of the sale of Property D was that BPL was required to pay very significant capital gains tax. The husband had been advised by Mr Fellon, however, that no capital gains tax would be payable. During cross-examination, Mr Fellon said that he gave this advice because the husband supplied the wrong date for the purchase of Property D. Despite having copies of title deeds, Mr Fellon never checked them. He apparently considered that collecting them from storage was too much work. His ineptitude in relation to this transaction is staggering. I have not the slightest doubt that he breached his legal and professional obligations to his clients (comprising members of the Laue Family and corporate or commercial entities associated with them) and failed egregiously in his duty of care.

104In March 2011 (after the Parties had resumed cohabitation), Mrs Laue Snr transferred her shares in ARM to the Parties, but she remained the sole director of the company. It appears that this transfer was the first step in the process of transferring Property A into the names of the Parties (or into the name of an entity controlled by them). For reasons which are less than clear, however, the process was never completed – meaning that, at the time the husband died, Mrs Laue Snr (qua ARM) was the legal owner of Property A.

105The husband and the wife then began living together at Property A.

106On 24 March 2011, the Parties purchased a unit in [Suburb B] ("[Property E]"). It was purchased (in the names of the Parties as joint tenants) for $800,000, using funds from BPL.

107As indicated above, the Parties separated on a final basis in November 2011. Thereafter, they both continued to live at Property A until the husband was admitted to hospital in the following month (December 2011).

108After his discharge from hospital, the husband resided primarily with Mrs Laue Snr at Property C. He also completed an alcohol rehabilitation program. This does not appear to have been his first stay at a rehabilitation centre. As I have indicated, I am satisfied that he had a long history of alcohol-related abuse, and medical problems associated with such abuse.

109In May 2012, the husband was again admitted to hospital in order to have his toes amputated, and then his lower left leg amputated below the knee. Following his discharge from hospital, he again lived with Mrs Laue Snr.

110On 18 June 2012, the wife filed an initiating application in this Court.

111In September 2012, the husband resigned as a director of Camden.

112On 10 December 2012, the husband (in his capacity as sole director of BPL as trustee for the LFT) and Mrs Laue Snr (as sole director of Camden and ARM as trustee for the Property A Land Trust) arranged the following borrowings from BankWest ("the 2012 BankWest loans"):

a)a $1.9 million commercial advance facility, granted in the name of BPL as trustee for the LFT – to expire on 30 June 2013;

b)a $250,000 Agri-One facility in the name of ARM as trustee for the Property A Land Trust – to expire on 30 June 2013; and

c)a $6,000 temporary facility in the name of ARM as trustee for the Property A Land Trust – to expire on 30 April 2013.

113The 2012 BankWest loans were secured by a mortgage over Property B and a fixed and floating charge over the assets of the LFT and Company C. Guarantees were provided by BPL as trustee for the LFT, Camden, Company C, the husband personally and Mrs Laue Snr personally.

114On 5 January 2013, the husband died. He appointed Mr Fellon as executor and trustee of his estate. He also appointed the Parties' son, Ronald, together with Mrs Laue Snr, as trustees, guardians and appointers of any family trusts which he then controlled.

115In April 2013, the wife removed BPL as the trustee for the LFT, appointing herself instead.

116On 11 June 2013, Mrs Laue Snr executed a Deed of Assignment and Declaration of Trust in relation to the husband's estate. The effect of this was to transfer her personal interest in the estate to Camden.

117During this time, it appears that the 2012 BankWest loans were not being paid. As a consequence, BankWest threatened to enforce its rights under the agreement evidencing the 2012 BankWest loans.

118In June 2013, Camden and ARM reached an agreement with BankWest in relation to the 2012 BankWest loans. All parties to the transactions executed a Heads of Agreement and Deed of Amendment and Acknowledgement ("the 2013 BankWest agreement"). The 2013 BankWest agreement provided that:

a)the parties to the 2013 BankWest agreement were to cooperate with each other with a view to requesting the Court to expedite the proceedings and hear the issue of the ownership of Property B in or around November 2013;

b)BankWest agreed to defer enforcement pursuant to the 2012 BankWest loans until 3 March 2013 unless agreed otherwise (or in the case of default of the 2013 BankWest agreement);

c)all relevant parties were to agree to a mortgage over Property A (to secure their obligations); and

d)all relevant parties were to pay BankWest's legal costs (relating to the BankWest documents and BankWest's attendance at this Court) on a full indemnity basis, and BankWest be permitted to debit the loan facilities in order to pay those costs.

119On 30 July 2013, Justice Crisford made an order in the following terms:

There be a declaration that upon a true construction of Articles 75-77 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of [[BPL]], on 3 February 2010 there was no obligation on either the husband or the wife to retire from office as directors of [[BPL]] and the wife remains as a director.

120Thus, the wife was effectively reinstated as a director of BPL.

121On or around the same date, the wife and Mrs Laue Snr agreed that the monthly stipend of $3,600 due pursuant to the Property B Agreement would be paid to BankWest. The wife also caused BPL to make a repayment of $70,000 to BankWest.

122On 28 October 2013, and as a consequence of actions of the Patricia Laue entities, BankWest considered the 2013 BankWest agreement to have been breached. On 4 December 2013, BankWest issued Notices of Default to the Patricia Laue entities in relation to the loan facilities secured by mortgages over Property B and Property A.

123In March 2014, the wife ceased to pay the monthly stipend due to Mrs Laue Snr pursuant to the Property B Agreement. Approximately three months later (in June 2014), Camden notified the wife that it required the arrears of the stipend to be paid, or Property B must be vacated. When the wife did not vacate, a notice to vacate and a notice of impounding sheep were served on the wife.

124Also in June 2014, Camden notified the wife and BPL that it would take steps to sell Property A.

125In or about late January 2015, the wife was informed by the solicitors for Mrs Laue Snr and the Patricia Laue entities that their clients would not be paying the mortgage instalments due in relation to Property A.

126On 11 March 2015, ARM was placed in voluntary administration. On that day, Mrs Laue Snr, as the sole director of ARM, had resolved that it was then insolvent (or was likely to become insolvent). One of the effects of placing ARM in voluntary administration was that the administrators could proceed to dispose of its property (including Property A).

127On 9 April 2015, the Court ordered Mrs Laue Snr to appoint the wife as a director of ARM, and thereupon resign as a director. As well, the Court ordered that the 50 shares in ARM held by the husband's estate be transferred to the wife.

128The first meeting of creditors of ARM was held on 23 March 2015. The second meeting of creditors was held on 24 April 2015. Prior to the second meeting, BPL filed a Form 535 – Formal Proof of Debt or Claim, asserting that ARM was indebted to BPL for $6,831,572 in respect of the Division 7A loan. The meeting was subsequently adjourned until not before 29 June 2015.

129At the time of trial, the wife resided at Property A with the Parties' son, Ronald. They conduct a business (which involves the breeding and grazing of sheep) on Property A.

Procedural history

130Proceedings in this Court commenced on 18 June 2012, when the wife filed a Form 1 Initiating Application. She sought a declaration that Property B is held by Camden on trust for the Parties or, in the alternative, that the Parties were the beneficial owners of Property B. Additionally, she sought a declaration that ARM holds Property A on trust for the Parties or, in the alternative, that the Parties are the beneficial owners of Property A. The wife also sought that Camden and ARM transfer their interest in Property B and Property A to her, and that the husband transfer to her his interest in Property E.

131On 17 July 2012, various procedural orders were made. The proceedings were otherwise adjourned to 16 October 2012. That hearing date was later vacated, and the proceedings were relisted for 26 November 2012.

132On 9 October 2012, the wife filed an application in a case, seeking to proceed on an undefended basis as the husband and the Patricia Laue entities had failed to comply with the orders of 17 July 2012 – which had required them to file responding documents and to give disclosure.

133The husband filed his Response on 12 October 2012. He sought orders to the effect that Property A be transferred to BPL (of which he was then the sole director and shareholder) and sold. He proposed that the net proceeds of sale be divided on the basis of 60% to the husband and 40% to the wife. It was his position that the Parties had no equitable interest (whether directly or indirectly) in Property B.

134The Patricia Laue entities filed responses on 19 November 2012. Camden sought that there be no declaration as to the Parties' equitable interest in Property B. ARM sought that there be no declaration as to Parties' equitable interest in Property A.

135The matter came before the Chief Judge on 26 November 2012, at which time further procedural orders were made. No relisting date was given, but the parties were granted leave to seek to relist for further direction.

136As indicated above, the husband died on 5 January 2013. On 9 January 2013, the wife attempted to pay for groceries on her credit card, only to find that her credit card had been cancelled. It appears that the cancellation was effected by Mr Fellon, acting in his capacity as executor of the husband's will.

137On 21 January 2013, the wife filed an application in a case seeking that, pursuant to FLA s 79(8)(a) and r 6.15(3) of the Rules, the legal personal representative of the deceased husband be substituted as a party in the proceedings. The wife's application was listed for 5 March 2013 before Justice Crisford.

138On 27 February and 25 March 2013 the matter came before the Court in relation to subpoena issues. Orders for the release and inspection of documents were made.

139On 8 February 2013, O'Sullivan Davies, who had been acting for the husband, filed a response to the wife's application in a case. They proposed that Shaun Brenton be appointed as the husband's legal personal representative.

140At or about this time, agreement was reached regarding the sale of Property E. Settlement was due to take place on 11 February 2013. At the time, the wife sought that the net sale proceeds should be paid to her. The husband's solicitors opposed this arrangement and, as a result, the Property E settlement was delayed until 18 February 2013. The net proceeds of sale – amounting to $817,510 – were then paid into the trust account of the wife's solicitors ("[the Property E proceeds]").

141On 1 March 2013, the wife filed an application in a case seeking permission to authorise her solicitors to disburse the Property E proceeds. She wished to utilise the moneys to pay outstanding legal fees (of approximately $55,000) and to allocate $100,000 by way of interim property settlement. The balance was to be placed in an interest bearing account until further orders were made.

142On 5 March 2013, orders were made appointing Mr Shaun Brenton the husband's legal personal representative. Further procedural orders were also made.

143On 14 March 2013, the wife applied for orders to the effect that the Form 1A responses of Camden and ARM (both filed 19 November 2012) be dismissed for failure to comply with the orders of 19 July 2012.

144On 12 April 2013, the husband's legal personal representative filed a response to the wife's application in a case, seeking that moneys held by the wife (from the Property E proceeds) should be applied to reduce BPL's liability to BankWest.

145On 16 April 2013, the matter came before Justice Crisford. Her Honour ordered that the Patricia Laue entities have a further 21 days within which to comply with the 17 July 2012 orders. The Patricia Laue entities were also ordered to pay costs of $500. The decision in relation to interim property settlement was reserved to 23 April 2013.

146On 23 April 2013, Justice Crisford delivered her decision in relation to the interim property settlement dispute. Her Honour ordered that the balance of the Property E proceeds (amounting to $513,633) be paid to the wife. It was apparent to her Honour that, at some point in time, $150,000 had been paid into the trust accounts of both Parties' solicitors to meet legal fees: see Laue & Laue [2013] FCWA 44.

147On 29 April 2013 and 7 June 2013, orders were made regarding subpoenas.

148On 14 June 2013, the Patricia Laue entities filed an application in a case, seeking that BankWest be joined to the proceedings as a fourth respondent, that BPL be joined as fifth respondent and that BankWest be restrained by injunction from enforcing its rights as they related to Property B. Orders were also sought for a declaration to the effect that Property A was held on trust for BPL or, alternatively, beneficially owned by the Parties.

149On 25 June 2013, the Patricia Laue entities filed proposed amended Form 1A responses.

150On 26 June 2013, the husband's legal personal representative filed an application seeking that the wife pay an additional $100,000 to his solicitors' trust account. The source of the funds was to be the $513,633 she had received pursuant to the 23 April 2013 orders.

151On 27 June 2013, further orders were made in relation to subpoenas.

152On 28 June 2013 and 23 July 2013, further procedural orders were made.

153On 24 July 2013, the Parties' son, Ronald Laue, applied to the Supreme Court of Western Australia for a grant of Letters of Administration of the deceased husband. He did so because, to that point, Mr Fellon had failed or refused to seek a grant of probate. Two days later, on 26 July 2013, Mrs Laue Snr lodged a caveat at the Supreme Court.

154On 17 July 2013, the wife filed a Form 2A response seeking that the husband's application filed 26 June 2013 be dismissed. She also sought a declaration that she had been improperly removed as a director of BPL.

155On 30 July 2013, Justice Crisford made the declaration sought by the wife – to the effect that she was to remain a director of BPL.

156At the hearing, Ronald Laue was represented by Dr Dickey QC. Dr Dickey handed up a notice of contention regarding the appointment of Mr Brenton as the husband's legal personal representative. He argued that the proper person to act in this role was the executor of the husband's estate: Mr Fellon. Dr Dickey also argued that, until Mr Fellon was substituted for Mr Brenton, the property proceedings should be suspended.

157In August 2013, Mr Fellon applied for probate of the husband’s will.

158On 22 August 2013, Mr Fellon filed an application in a case seeking that he be substituted as the husband's legal personal representative. The wife opposed Mr Fellon’s application and sought orders to the effect that Ronald Laue be substituted as the husband's legal personal representative: see Laue and Laue (Deceased) [2013] FCWA 87.

159On 29 August 2013, orders were made substituting Mr Fellon for Mr Brenton as the husband's legal personal representative. Mr Fellon’s application of 22 August 2013 and the wife's response were otherwise dismissed. Further procedural orders were also made.

160On 30 August 2013, 19 September 2013 and 27 September 2013, orders were made relating to subpoenas.

161At the callover in September 2013, the proceedings were listed for trial in November 2013.

162On 18 October 2013, Camden applied to vacate the November trial. It also sought, among other things, that the time for parties to file and serve documents be extended and that expert evidence of the value of Property B be obtained.

163The wife opposed Camden’s application and sought that it be dismissed. Mr Fellon (as the husband's legal personal representative) also opposed the deferral of the trial, but otherwise supported Camden’s application.

164On 28 October 2013, the matter came before Justice Moncrieff, who made orders vacating the November trial date. The proceedings were otherwise adjourned. The effect of these orders was to generate a breach of the 2013 BankWest agreement.

165On 30 October 2013, Mr Fellon filed an application in a case, seeking that the wife pay the husband's estate $200,000 by way of part property settlement and/or a litigation funding order. The wife opposed this application.

166On 18 and 19 November 2013, the matter came before the Court in relation to the issue of litigation funding. Other issues, such as Camden’s application relating to expert evidence dealing with Property B, were also dealt with. After a two day hearing, Justice Crisford made orders relating to the preparation of trial books and the obtaining of expert evidence. The issue of litigation funding was adjourned to the conclusion of the trial. By consent, however, BPL was joined as the fourth respondent.

167On 22 November 2013, Justice Crisford published her decision in relation to the costs of the adjournment. Her Honour ordered that Camden pay the costs thrown away in the application for the adjournment of the trial: see Laue and Laue (Deceased) by his Legal Personal Representative Daniel Fellon [2013] FCWA 109.

168Further orders in relation to subpoenas were made on 3 January 2014.

169On 9 January 2014, Camden filed an amended application in a case dealing with the obtaining of expert evidence pertaining to the Property B Agreement.

170On 14 January 2014, the wife filed an application in a case. She sought a number of orders, including liberty to amend her initiating application and an extension of time for the filing of trial material.

171The application in a case was listed for 15 January 2014. On that day, Justice Crisford ordered that Camden’s amended application in a case be adjourned, with liberty to relist. Other orders made on that day dealt with the amending of the wife's initiating application, the filing of additional material and allowing Camden to rely on its amended statement of claim.

172On 13 February 2014, further procedural orders were made.

173On 26 March 2014, all parties wrote to the Court, annexing a minute of proposed procedural orders sought.

174On 16 April 2014, the Patricia Laue entities filed a second amended response to the wife's initiating application. They sought a number of orders, including that the wife vacate Property B and that the property be deemed to be the property of Camden, that the wife refinance in order to cause the release of the Property B mortgage, the Property A mortgage and all guarantees securing loans, and that Property A either be transferred to the wife or, in the event she cannot refinance, be sold by ARM. On the same day, the Patricia Laue entities also filed a further amended response to the wife's statement of claim.

175At the callover on 24 April 2014, the trial was listed to commence on 21 July 2014 – with an estimated hearing time of 10 days. The trial was listed before me. The proceedings were also listed before me on 27 May 2014 for directions.

176On 13 May 2014, Mr Fellon filed a further amended application in a case, again addressing the litigation funding issue. In the application, he sought an order that the wife pay $400,000 to the husband's estate by way of part property settlement or litigation funding. In the alternative, he sought that BPL's assets be sold, and that $400,000 be applied towards the husband's costs and disbursements. It was also sought in the alternative that the Patricia Laue entities provide security to the husband's estate in the amount of $400,000 by way of a charge.

177On 27 May 2014, the matter came before me. In relation to the further amended application in a case filed 13 May 2014, orders were made for the applicant to file and serve written submissions in response by 10 June 2014 and that the matter be determined on the basis of those submissions without need for a further formal hearing. Other procedural orders were also made. The litigation funding issue was postponed to trial.

178On 23 June 2014, Mr Fellon was granted probate of the husband's will.

179On 30 June 2014, the wife filed an application in a case seeking that Camden be restrained by injunction from taking steps to impound sheep on Property B and otherwise interfering with her quiet enjoyment of the property. She also sought an injunction restraining ARM from dealing with Property A and interfering with her quiet enjoyment of that property.

180The application was listed for hearing on an urgent basis.

181On the same day (30 June 2014), I made the orders sought by the wife on an interim basis. The Patricia Laue entities were directed to file responding material within 14 days. The application was otherwise adjourned to the first day of trial.

182The Patricia Laue entities filed their response on 14 July 2014.

183The trial commenced on 21 July 2014. It ran for 15 days, at the end of which orders were made for the filing of closing submissions in writing and for the matter to be listed for a further two hearing days. It was intended that these two days would be used for closing submissions only.

184On 31 July 2014 (during the course of the trial) Mr Fellon was granted a certificate pursuant to s 11 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) – which certificate related to all his oral evidence.

185On 12 August 2014, Camden applied for orders to the effect that I recuse myself. After hearing oral submissions, I dismissed the application.

186The proceedings came back before me (for closing submissions) on 20 and 21 November 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my judgment.

187On 17 March 2015, the wife filed an urgent application in a case. The application was made because ARM had been placed in voluntary administration on 12 March 2015. The wife sought an order pursuant to s 440D(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act") – to the effect that she be granted leave to continue with the proceedings insofar as they relate to ARM.

188Section 440D(1) of the Corporations Act is as follows:

During the administration of a company, a proceeding in a court against the company or in relation to any of its property cannot be begun or proceeded with, except:

a)with the administrator's written consent; or

b)with the leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms (if any) as the Court imposes.

189On 1 April 2015, Camden filed a response to the wife's application, seeking that it be dismissed.

190The matter came before the Court on 8 April 2015 and continued into the next day. At the conclusion of the hearing, orders were made that, pursuant to s 440D(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, leave be granted to proceed with the proceedings insofar as they related to ARM. Orders were also made in relation to issues of disclosure, and to the effect that Mrs Laue Snr must appoint the wife as a director of ARM (and herself resign as director). Mr Fellon was also required to transfer to the wife the 50 shares in ARM held by the husband's estate. In addition, Mrs Laue Snr was restrained by injunction from exercising any power to remove ARM as the trustee of the Property A Land Trust.

191On 10 June 2015, Camden filed an application in a case, seeking that the trial be reopened for the purposes of adducing further evidence. The evidence in question related to the position of BPL at the second creditors meeting for ARM.

192On 18 June 2015, the wife filed a response, seeking that ARM’s application be dismissed. On the same day, ARM filed an application in a case in which it sought that the second creditors meeting for ARM be deferred to a date not less than 30 business days after the receipt of the final judgment in the proceedings.

193The competing applications were heard on 19 June 2015. It was ordered that, pending further hearing and final determination of ARM’s application, the period for adjournment of the second creditors meeting be extended to a date to be determined by the Court at or as soon as practicable after the hearing listed for 14 July 2015.

194On 24 June 2015, the wife applied for orders to the effect that the time for her to file an itemised costs account and a notice disputing itemised cost account be extended by 7 days from the date of the hearing of the application. This application was listed to the existing date of 14 July 2015.

195The proceedings came back before me on 14 July 2105. After hearing submissions, I made orders extending the time for the wife to file an itemised costs account and a notice disputing itemised cost account until 21 July 2015. I also made orders – pursuant to ss 439A(6) and/or 447A of the Corporations Act – that the date for the second meeting of creditors be extended to a date not less than 30 business days after the receipt of final judgment in the proceedings.

196I also granted leave to reopen the trial for the purpose of admitting into evidence two documents which had been attached to Mrs Laue Snr's affidavit sworn 10 June 2015. The two documents were:

a)Form 535 – Formal Proof of Debt for BPL, dated 24 April 2015; and

b)Form 5011 – Minutes of second meeting of creditors of ARM Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed), dated 6 May 2015.

197Also accepted into evidence, to the extent that they were relevant, were Camden’s submissions filed 10 June 2015 in relation to the application for leave to reopen, the written submissions of the wife and BPL in response (filed 18 June 2015) and the oral submissions made at the hearing. The various applications were otherwise dismissed.

198On 9 November 2015, the wife filed an application in a case seeking a declaration pursuant to FLA s 78 to the effect that ARM, as trustee for the Property A Land Trust negotiated and acquired its interest in Property A as bare trustee for BPL. The wife also sought orders to the effect that the Division 7A loans be set aside and that the parties do all acts and things to refinance the relevant mortgages.

199On 18 November 2015, I made a formal declaration that ARM as trustee for the Property A Land Trust negotiated and acquired its interest in Property A as bare trustee for BPL. I also made an order setting aside the Division 7A loan agreement. The application was otherwise dismissed.

General observations

200I am well aware of the delay between the completion of the hearing and the delivery of these Reasons. In Rollings & Rollings [2009] FamCAFC 87, the Full Court said at [67]

The authorities … establish that if there is a delay between the conclusion of the hearing and judgment, presumably with contemporaneity of reasons, the delay is not in itself a ground of appeal and it is not … a denial of a fair trial and/or a miscarriage of justice. However the delay does mean that on appeal there has to be greater scrutiny of the findings made by the trial judge. As Giles JA said in Monie v the Commonwealth (2005) 63 NSWLR 729 at [3]: "extensive delay may cause an appellate court to take a more stringent approach in determining whether error has been demonstrated in the trial judge's findings or whether the trial judge's reasons are adequate".

201Similarly, the Full Court in Herridge & Handerson [2011] FamCAFC 156 said that the "real issue" may be –

… whether material findings of fact made by the trial Judge, and/or conclusions reached by him in reliance upon them, could be unsafe by virtue of the time which elapsed between the conclusion of the evidence and the delivery of judgment. That in turn is more referable to a consideration of contested findings or conclusions, and the evidence upon which they were, or could be based, or its absence. If those challenges were made out, the fact that the trial Judge's delay in delivery of judgment may have caused, or contributed to his error(s) is irrelevant. If they are not, it is difficult to see how his delay could change anything.

202Their Honours added at [22]-[23]:

If … findings of fact made by the trial Judge were not reasonably open to him, it does not matter whether that occurred because of the time his Honour took to deliver his judgment or for some other reason. That is also the case if such findings are shown to have been "unsafe"... If it is demonstrated that his Honour's discretion was exercised in reliance upon material errors of fact, appellate intervention is likely to be enlivened. …

What we have said ought not be misconstrued, however. It is regrettable that judgment was not delivered more expeditiously than it was in this case. In a case where impressions of parties and witnesses clearly assumed considerable significance, a delay of eight months had the potential to diminish the clarity of the trial Judge's recollection of their evidence, and his assessment of its reliability. We shall subject the trial Judge's judgment to closer than usual scrutiny …

203I accept that the parties, let alone the Full Court, are perfectly entitled to subject these Reasons to "closer than usual scrutiny". Having said that, I would record the following:

a)The delay in the delivery of these Reasons is not the fault of the parties or their legal advisers, who have taken appropriate steps to inquire as to the progress of the judgment and to seek to reopen when new information became relevant.

b)My recollection of the parties' evidence (and that of their witnesses) has not been affected by the delay for two reasons: firstly, I made full notes of all relevant evidence and submissions during the course of the trial; and secondly, I have had the opportunity to listen to the audio recording of the parties' evidence, the evidence of other witnesses where clarification was required, and closing submissions.

Mr Fellon (appearing as the husband's legal personal representative) was unrepresented

204I am aware of the guidelines regarding the manner in which a judicial officer should deal with unrepresented litigants, and the associated discussion contained in Re: F – Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072 at [209] to [253]. I applied those guidelines during the course of the proceedings, and am comfortable that the trial was fair. In summary:

a)procedural fairness was afforded to all parties;

b)the "mechanics" of the trial, and the right of parties to cross-examine witnesses, was explained to Mr Fellon;

c)other relevant procedures were explained to Mr Fellon as they arose;

d)I explained to the Mr Fellon that he had the right to object to inadmissible evidence, and explained to him – in very broad terms – the types of evidence that might be considered inadmissible;

e)where appropriate, I attempted to clarify the substance of Mr Fellon’s submissions; and

f)where appropriate, I took other steps as authorised by the Full Court in Re: F – Litigants in Person Guidelines at [253]: see Guideline #9 in that paragraph.

205In Saxena & Saxena (2006) FLC 93-268, Coleman J emphasised that the type of guidelines set out in the previous paragraph are "no more than the name implies" and that they "derive from the broader considerations of natural justice, implicit in which is the recognition that for a litigant in person to be afforded natural justice and procedural fairness, that litigant must have some appreciation of just what is going on". His Honour added that the Court must be concerned with "the spirit rather than the strict letter of the guidelines".

206In the present case, Mr Fellon participated in the process fully. I have no doubt that he fully understood "what was going on" at all times.

207In CSH, Mr Fellon make submissions regarding funding for legal representation. There can be no doubt, however, that events overtook any applications that may have been made in that regard. Although an experienced legal practitioner appeared on behalf of Mr Fellon (in his role as the husband's legal personal representative) on the first day of trial, no application was made to adjourn the trial.

208I do not accept that Mr Fellon’s ability to contribute, understand the various issues, argue the deceased husband's case (as his legal personal representative) and protect Mr Fellon’s own interests was compromised in any way. The vast bulk of the material produced for and at trial, and a very great deal of the evidence, related to the Property B Agreement, Property A and the manner in which both the wife and Mrs Laue Snr (qua the Patricia Laue entities) had behaved and conducted the case generally. It is true, however, that significant time was spent dealing with Mr Fellon’s professional or advisory role. Litigation funding had never been sought for Mr Fellon in this capacity – in other words, in his role as a witness and an interested party.

209I would add that the Court intervened to assist Mr Fellon when it became apparent that he may require a certificate under s 11 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). Mr Fellon was informed of his rights and advised to seek legal assistance, which he did. The certificate was later granted.

210In CSH at [30], Mr Fellon concedes that the interest that the wife and the deceased husband have in Property B is largely an argument between the wife and the Patricia Laue entities. At [32], he concedes that, "… with respect to [[ARM]] as trustee for the [Property A Land Trust] all parties seem to agree on the outcome that [Property A] should be held as a bare trustee for [BPL]."

Jurisdiction

211The Patricia Laue entities assert that this Court has no jurisdiction or power to deal with the disputes between Camden or ARM and BPL. Similarly, they argue that this Court has no jurisdiction or power to make orders for equitable relief to enforce a contract or an estoppel as between a third party (i.e. Camden) and the husband and the wife. I do not agree.

b)In 2011, following the sale of the farm known as "[Property D]" in [Country Town M], [Barkers Pty Ltd] loaned $6,820,871 to [ARM Pty Ltd] which was applied to repay the loan to Bankwest for the [Property A] purchase.

c)In 2011 [Barkers Pty Ltd] also loaned $2,195,057 to [Barkers Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Laue Family Trust].

d)In 2006 [Company C Pty Ltd] loaned $194,740 to [Barkers Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Laue Family Trust].

e)In 2006 The Estate of [Mr Laue Snr] (the husband's father) loaned $56,055 to [Barkers Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Laue Family Trust].

f)In 2011 the [Property A Land Trust] loaned $248,145 to the [Laue Family Trust].

g)In the financial year ended 30 June 2011 the Husband and Wife received drawings of $399,999 each (total $800,000) from [Barkers Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Laue Family Trust] the proceeds which were applied to purchase the property at [B Street, [Suburb B] Western Australia being more particularly described as Lot 1 of Strata Plan [xxxxx] on Certificate of Title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx] ("[Property E]").

h)The Husband agrees that [Property A] be treated as property of the Husband and wife for the purpose of s.79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in these proceedings. There are tax and stamp duty issues relating to this asset.

ORDERS

Transfer of Property A

1)Within 21 days of orders being published to the parties' solicitors, the Applicant and the First, Second and Third Respondents do all things reasonably necessary to:

a)Transfer [Property A] from [ARM Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Property A land Trust] to [Barkers Pty Ltd] to repay in full all outstanding loans of [ARM Pty Ltd];

b)Ensure that the transfer of [Property A] to [Barkers Pty Ltd] pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of these orders is accepted as full satisfaction of all loans owed to [Barkers Pty Ltd] by [ARM Pty Ltd] as trustee for the [Property A Land Trust].

Sale of Property A

2)Within 21 days of the transfer of [Property A] to [Barkers Pty Ltd], the husband and wife be appointed as joint trustees for sale of [Property A] and do all things necessary to:

a)Appoint a real estate agent for the sale of [Property A];

b)Authorise that agent to offer [Property A] at a price and on terms to be agreed between the parties; and

c)Sell [Property A].

3At the settlement of the sale of [Property A], the parties do all things necessary to disburse the proceeds of sale as follows:

a)To pay all agent's fees, costs and commission on the sale;

b)To pay the amount required to repay in full all liabilities secured against [Property A] and all liabilities to [Barkers Pty Ltd] and/or the [Laue Family Trust] to Bankwest including but not limited to:

i)Bankwest Loan A/c xxxxxxxxxx;

ii)Bankwest Loan A/c xxxxxx-x;

iii)Bankwest Agri One A/c xxx-xxx xxxxxx-x; and

iv)Bankwest Commercial Advance A/c xxx-xxx xxxxxxx-x;

"The Bankwest loans",

c)To pay any capital gains tax arising from the sale of [Property A] or repayment of loans pursuant to these orders; and

d)To pay the balance then remaining so as to effect an overall division of assets 60% to the Husband and 40% to the Wife.

4)Simultaneously with the repayment of the Bankwest loans, the parties do all things necessary to close The Bankwest loans and discharge all guarantees any party to these proceedings may have provided to any other party to these proceedings in support of The Bankwest loans.

Other

5)Simultaneously with payment to the Wife of her entitlements pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of these orders:

a)The wife transfer to the Husband or his nominee all of her interest in [ARM Pty Ltd];

b)the Wife sign all documents required by the Husband to acknowledge that from the date of these orders it is appropriate that she not be considered for any future benefit from:

i)The [Laue Land Trust];

ii)The [Laue Family Trust]; and

iii)The [Property A Land Trust].

6)Within 21 days of orders being published to the parties' solicitors, the parties do all things necessary to divide the balance of any bank accounts in the joint names of the parties between the Husband and the Wife in the shares 60% to the Husband and 40% to the Wife.

Other Property – Husband

7)Other than as expressly provided for in these Orders, any interest the Wife may have in any other property in the possession, ownership or control of the Husband including but not limited to the following vest in the husband:

a)Any money standing to the credit of the Husband in any accounts with a bank or other financial institution in the Husband's sole name;

b)The interest of the Husband and/or wife in:

i)[Barkers Pty Ltd];

ii)[ARM Pty Ltd];

iii)[Company C Pty Ltd];

iv)[Camden Pty Ltd];

v)[Company J Pty Ltd];

vi)[Property A Land Trust];

vii)[Laue Family Trust];

viii)[Laue Land Trust];

ix)The estate of [Mr Laue Snr]:

x)The estate of [J Croft] (nee Laue).

c)Any money owed to the husband and/or wife by:

i)[Barkers Pty Ltd];

ii)[ARM Pty Ltd];

iii)[Company C Pty Ltd];

iv)[Camden Pty Ltd];

v)[Company J Pty Ltd];

vi)[Property A Land Trust];

vii)[Laue Family Trust];

viii)[Laue Land Trust];

ix)The estate of [Mr Laue Snr]:

x)The estate of [J Croft] (nee Laue).

Other property – Wife

8)Other than as expressly provided in these Orders, any interest the Husband may have in any other property in the possession, ownership or control of the Wife including but not limited to the following vest in the Wife:

a)Any money standing to the credit of the Wife in any accounts with a bank or other financial institution in the Wife's sole name;

b)The 1985 [Vehicle] Car Registration Number [xxxxxx]; and

c)The wife's GESB superannuation interest.

Furniture and Household Effects

9)Within 21 days of orders being published to the parties' solicitors, the furniture and effects of the parties located at [Property A] be divided equally as to value between the Husband and the Wife with details to be particularised.

Procedural

10)Each party do all acts and things and sign all documents as the other may reasonably require to give effect to these orders.

11)There be liberty to each party to apply with respect to the implementation of these orders and the sale of Property A.

12)Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Wife's Form 1 Initiating Application filed 18 June 2012 be dismissed.

13) The wife pay the Husband's costs of and incidental to this application.

Second and Third Respondents

Minute of final orders sought

Definitions

Interpretation

1) In these Orders sought, unless the context currently requires:

a)"[Barkers]" means the company, [Barkers Pty Ltd] ACN [xxx xxx xxx] registered [in] 1968. The husband is the sole shareholder, the husband was a director at the date of his death and the wife is now the sole director. [Barkers] trades on its own account and also as trustee of the [Laue Family Trust]. The applicant has disclosed draft special purpose financial statements and tax returns for the years ended 30 June 2012 and 30 June 2013 based on two alternative scenarios;

b)"[Barkers Facility]" means the loans from Bankwest to [Barkers], previously secured by the [Property A Mortgage] and the [Property B Mortgage] and by guarantees given by [Camden Pty Ltd], [Company C], the husband and the [Property A Land Trust], transferred to [Camden] pursuant to the Bankwest [Barkers] assignment, with an amount owing of $2,507,151 on the date of the Bankwest [Barkers] assignment;

c)"Bankwest" means the Commonwealth Bank of Australia trading as Bankwest ABN 48 123 123 124;

d)"the Bankwest Assignment Deeds" means:

i)The Deed of Assignment for the [Barkers] facility between Bankwest as secured party and [Camden] as transferee, dated 6 June 2014, whereby Bankwest has transferred its rights under the [Barkers] facility to [Camden] (the Bankwest [Barkers] assignment); and

ii)The Deed of Assignment for the [ARM] facility between Bankwest as secured party and [Camden] as transferee, dated 6 June 2014, whereby Bankwest has transferred its rights under the [ARM] facility to [Camden] (The Bankwest [ARM] assignment);

e)"[Property A]" means the real property known as [Property A] situate at [C Road], [Country Town G], and subject to the [Property A] Mortgages, being more particularly described as:

i)Lot 50 on Plan [xxx] contained in Certificate of title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx];

ii)Lot 51 on Diagram [xxx] contained in Certificate of title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx];

iii)Lot 52 on Plan [xxxx] contained in Certificate of title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx]; and

iv)Lot 2 on Plan [xxxx] contained in Certificate of title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx];

f)"the [Property A Mortgages]" means the mortgage registered number [xxxxxx] given by [ARM] dated 15 March 2010 securing the loan facilities over [Property A], the subject of a transfer of mortgage to [Camden] arising from the Bankwest assignment deeds, and all subsequent mortgages registered over [Property A] to secure the GW Sansom loan facility and the [D & D] loan facility;

g)"the [Property A Land Trust]" means the trust settled by Deed on or about 21 January 2010. The trustee is [ARM]. The beneficiaries of the trust are [Patricia Laue] and a generic class of beneficiaries defined in the [Property A Land Trust Deed]. The Principal and the Guardian (with a power to replace the trustee) is [Patricia Laue]. The [Property A Land Trust] holds [Property A]. The third respondent has caused the [Property A Land Trust] to prepare draft special purpose financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2012 and 30 June 2013 and interim special purpose financial report for the year ended 30 June 2014;

h)"[Camden]" means the company [Camden Pty Ltd], ACN [xxx xxx xxx] registered [in] 1970. [Mrs Patricia Laue] is the sole director of [Camden], and the holder of four beneficially owned ordinary shares. [Mrs Patricia Laue] and [Mrs S K] jointly hold two ordinary shares on trust for [Mrs S K] and her three daughters. The husband was a director from 8 August 2005 until 9 September 2012. Neither the husband nor the wife have ever been a shareholder of [Camden]. [Camden] owns [Property B]. The financial statements for [Camden] have been completed up to 30 June 2013. The assets and liabilities and [Camden] are stated by the financial statement for the year ended 30 June 2013 to include:

Assets

Trade and other receivables:-

Loan to [Ray Laue] pre 4/12/1997 ([Ray Laue Loan])

Loan to [Barkers Pty Ltd] ([Camden B Loan])

$281,317.00

$479,969.00

Liabilities

Trade and other payables:-

Loan from [Ray Land] post 4/12/1997 ([Ray Laue Loan])

Loan from [Company C Pty Ltd] ([Company C Loan])

- $41,419.00

- $85,141.00

i)"date of settlement" means 19 September 2014;

j)"the Div7A deemed dividend to the [Property A Land Trust]" means the Division 7A deemed dividend of $170,431.06 deemed to have been paid by [Barkers] to the [Property A Land Trust] in the year ended 30 June 2011, not yet the subject of a Notice of Assessment or disclosed in a tax return submitted by the [Property A Land Trust];

k)"division 7A loans" means:

i)The loan from [Barkers] to [ARM] as trustee of the [Property A Land Trust] pursuant to loan agreement dated 15 May 2012 stating the principal of the loan to be $6,820,872 and stating that it is secured over [Property A] (the [ARM] Div 7A loan);

ii)The loan from [Barkers] to the [Laue Family Trust] pursuant to loan agreement dated 15 may 2012 stating the principal of the loan to be $2,195,057 (the [Laue Family Trust] Div 7A loan);

l)"[D & D]" means [D & D Pty Ltd];

m)"The [D & D] loan facility" means the loan advanced from [D & D] to [Camden] pursuant to Deed of Loan between [D & D], [Camden] and the [Property A Land Trust] dated 6 June 2014, secured by:

i)Mortgage granted by [Camden] over [Property B] to [D & D] dated 6 June 2014; and

ii)Mortgage granted by the [Property A Land Trust] over [Property A] to [D & D] dated 6 June 2014;

n)"GW Sansom" means Fort Macquarie Pty Ltd trading as G.W. Sansom & Associates and C.R.S. Pty Ltd;

o)"The GW Sansom loan facility" means the loan from GW Sansom to [Camden] secured by:

i)Mortgage granted by [Camden] over [Property B] to GW Sansom dated 6 June 2014; and

ii)Mortgage granted by the [Property A Land Trust] over [Property A] to GW Sansom dated 6 June 2014;

p)"the husband" means [Ray Wilbur Laue], or the Legal Personal Representative of the Estate of [Ray Wilbur Laue], whichever is appropriate to the context;

q)"[Laue entities]" means and includes the following entities:

i)[Barkers Pty Ltd];

ii)the [Laue Family Trust];

iii)the [Laue Land Trust];

iv)[Company C Pty Ltd];

r)"the [Laue Family Trust]" means the discretionary trust settled by Deed on 1 July 2005 with the trustee as [Barkers]. The beneficiaries of the Trust are the husband and wife; their children, and other generic beneficiaries. The guardians and appointors of the Trust are the husband and the wife. The husband and the wife conducted a farming and grazing operation through the [Laue Family Trust], on various farming properties and most recently on [Property A] and [Property B]. At the time of seeking these orders, the applicant has provided draft special purpose financial statements for the years ended 30 June 2012 and 30 June 2013 based upon two alternative scenarios;

s)"the [Laue Land Trust]" is not specifically address by the second and third respondents in these orders sought;

t)"the loan facilities" means the [Barkers facility] as assigned to [Camden]; the [ARM facility] as assigned to [Camden]; the GW Sansom loan facility and the [D & D] loan facility;

u)"the inter-entity loan accounts relevant to the second respondent" means the loans between any of the [Laue] entities, the applicant or the first respondent (on the one hand) either as lender or borrower, and (on the other hand,) either the second respondent or [Patricia Laue] either as lender or borrower;

v)"the inter-entity loans accounts relevant to the third respondent" means:

i)the loans between any of the [Laue] entities, the applicant or the first respondent (on the one hand) either as lender or borrower, and (on the other hand,) the third respondent, either as lender or borrower, including (but not limited to) the [ARM] Div 7A Loan;

ii)the loans between [Patricia Laue] (on the one hand) either as lender or borrower, and (on the other hand) the third respondent either as lender or borrower;

w)"[ARM]" means the company [ARM Pty Ltd] ACN [xxx xxx xxx] registered 21 January 2010. The husband and wife are the sole shareholders, [Mrs Patricia Laue] is the sole director. [ARM] acts only as the trustee of the [Property A Land Trust] and does not trade on its own account;

x)"[ARM facility]" means the loan from Bankwest to [ARM], previously secured by the [Property A Mortgage] and the [Property B Mortgage] and by guarantees given by [Camden], the husband, [Barkers] and [Mrs Patricia Laue], transferred to [Camden] pursuant to the Bankwest [ARM] assignment, with an amount owing of $387,090 owing on the date of the Bankwest [ARM] assignment;

y)"[Property B]" means the real property known as [Property B] [M Highway] [Country Town N] and subject to the [Property B Mortgages], being two parcels of land approximately 213.8 hectares in size, and being more particularly described as:

i)Lot M [xxxx] on Diagram [xxxx] contained in Certificate of Title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx]; and

ii)Lot 50 on Diagram [xxxxx] contained in Certificate of Title Volume [xxxx] Folio [xxx];

z)"the [Property B Mortgages]" means the mortgage to Bankwest registered number [xxxxxxx] securing the loan facilities over [Property B] which is the subject of a discharge of mortgage yet to be released arising from the Bankwest assignment deeds, and all subsequent mortgages registered over [Property B] to secure the GW Sansom loan facility and the [D & D] loan facility;

aa)"[Company C]" means the company [Company C Pty Ltd], ACN [xxx xxx xxx] registered [in] 1968. The husband remains listed as the sole director. The shareholders remain listed as follows:

Name	Comment	Class of Share	Number Held
[Mr Laue Snr]	Deceased	A	1
[Mr Laue Snr]	B	1
[Mr Laue Snr]	C	10,319
[J Croft]	Deceased	D	639
[Ray Wilbur Laue]	Deceased	E	280
[Mr Laue Snr] and [S Laue]	[S Laue] is [Mrs S K]	F	186
[S Laue]	[S Laue] is [Mrs S K]	F	94
[J Laue]	G	80

Property B

2)That by 22 August 2014 (the date of vacation) the wife vacate [Property B], and cause the [Laue] entities to vacate [Property B], and not thereafter re-enter it, and to remove from [Property B]:

a)all livestock owned by the [Laue] entities or by the wife;

b)all plant and equipment, excluding fixtures, owned by the [Laue] entities or by the wife;

and all livestock, plant and equipment not removed from [Property B] by the date of the vacation shall be deemed, as between the parties, to be the property of [Camden].

3)That the wife be restrained from acting, on her own behalf or on behalf of the [Laue] entities, or causing or permitting any third party to act, in a manner that causes damage [Property B] or the fixtures on [Property B], or the plant and equipment on [Property B] that does not belong to the [Laue] entities, between the date of this order and the date of the vacation.

Wife's refinance

4)That by the date of settlement, the wife do all acts and things, and cause the [Laue] entities to do all acts and things, to herself obtain, or cause [Barkers] to obtain, a refinance of the loan facilities with a financier of her choice to cause the release of the [Property B Mortgage] and the [Property A Mortgage], and a release of all liability of [Camden] pursuant to the loan facilities but otherwise on such terms as she sees fit (the wife's refinance).

5)That in default of the wife obtaining the Wife's Refinance by the date of settlement, [ARM] remains at liberty to carry out the sale of [Property A] as the registered owner of [Property A].

6)That in default of the wife obtaining the Wife's Refinance by the date of settlement, [Camden] remains at liberty to carry out the sale of [Property A] pursuant to the Bankwest Assignment Deeds.

7)That in default of the wife obtaining the Wife's Refinance by the date of settlement, the wife shall vacate [Property A], and cause the [Laue] entities to vacate [Property A] by the date of settlement, and not thereafter re-enter it, and to remove from [Property A]:

a)all livestock owned by the [Laue] entities or by the wife;

b)all plant and equipment, excluding fixtures, owned by the [Laue] entities or by the wife.

Loan accounts

8)Subject to the declaration in paragraph 11, that in respect of the inter-entity loan accounts relevant to the third respondent:

a)There be a declaration that each and all of the inter entity loan accounts relevant to the third respondent:

i)is void ab initio and is not (and never was) of any legal effect; and

ii)be set aside.

b)Each and all of the Wife, the Husband. [Barkers], the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent shall take any and all steps that may be reasonably necessary to cause their books and records, accounts and financial statements to be rectified and corrected to give effect to the terms of this declaration.

9)That in respect of each inter-entity loan accounts relevant to the second respondent each party to these proceedings is restrained from commencing, causing or contributing to causing any other person or entity to commence, proceedings to recover the loans the subject of the loan accounts.

10)That without restricting the trustee's statutory right of indemnity against trust property, [ARM] be declared to be entitled to an indemnity against [Property A] for all tax liabilities arising from the [ARM] Div7A loans, including any interest and penalties thereon, and to give effect to that declaration:

a)[ARM] require [Barkers] or the wife to deposit into a bank account held in the name of [ARM], an amount equal to the income tax liability estimated by [Camden’s] accountant, including penalties and interest, arising from the Div7A deemed dividend to the [Property A Land Trust], prior to the transfer of [Property A] or payment of the net sale proceeds of [Property A], to [Barkers];

b)[ARM] must refund any surplus amount by which the amount deposited from the Div7A deemed dividend, to the wife or [Barkers] within fourteen days after a Notice of Amended Assessment has been received by the [Property A Land Trust] for the year ended 30 June 2011.

Property A

11)That subject to the making of the declaration set out in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10; and, in respect of the acquisition of [Property A], there be a further declaration pursuant to s 78 of the Family Law Act 1975 that [ARM] as trustee for the [Property A Land Trust] negotiated and acquired its interest in [Property A] as bare trustee for [Barkers] from the date of execution of the sale contract, namely 28 January 2010 (note, other than the precondition, this sub-paragraph is identical to order 1 sought by the wife)

12)That the transfer of [Property A], and/or recording of the ownership of [Property A] in the books and records of [ARM] and [Barkers] to give effect to the declaration in paragraph 11, be suspended pending the Wife's Refinance and the provisions for the trustee's indemnity provided in paragraph 10, and upon completion of the Wife's Refinance and compliance with paragraph 10, the third respondent do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to give effect to the declaration in paragraph 11.

ARM

First alternative, that [Rosie Laue] takes over the control of the [Property A Land Trust]

13) That upon:

a)[Mrs Patricia Laue] giving an undertaking to the wife to:

i)Resign as director of [ARM] and sign all Forms necessary to appoint the wife as a director at the same time as that resignation takes effect;

ii)Resign as principal and guardian of the [Property A Land Trust] and sign all documents provided by the wife that are necessary to appoint the wife or her nominee as a principal and guardian at the same time as that resignation takes effect (the [Patricia Laue] resignations)l

iii)Sign all documents provided to her by the wife to renounce any entitlement as a beneficiary of the [Property A Land Trust],

b)The [Laue] entities and the wife providing a release and indemnity to [Mrs Patricia Laue] in respect of any and all claims they have against her in respect of the acquisition and ownership of [Property A], (the [Patricia Laue] indemnities) then the wife do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to obtain the Wife's Refinance upon the date of settlement contemporaneously with the Patricia Laue resignations and the Patricia Laue indemnities.

Second alternative – if the Court determines that [Rosie Laue] should not assume control of [Property A Land Trust]

Property A Land Trust

14)That subject to the making of the declarations set out in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11, and subject to the wife obtaining the Wife's Refinance, then the wife and [Barkers] indemnify (and keep indemnified) [ARM] in respect of all future taxation liability arising from either the declaration contained in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 or from the Commissioner for Taxation making any decision or determination in respect of the declarations contains in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11.

15)The third respondent do all acts and things and sign all documents reasonably necessary to transfer to the [Laue Family Trust], all plant and equipment listed in the depreciation schedule of the [Property A Land Trust].

Sale of Property A

16)That in the event that the wife fails to obtain the Wife's Refinance then the third respondent remains at liberty to carry out the sale of [Property A] and the consequential arrangements for the sale shall be in accordance with paragraphs 17 to 22 below.

17)That to effect a sale of [Property A], the third respondent list [Property A] for sale by private treaty asking for offers at or above $6,000,000 (the nominated price) with a non-exclusive agent or agents nominated by the third respondent, but with such agents to be authorised by the third respondent to inform the applicant wife of all offers made for the purchase of [Property A], including the conditions attached to such offers, and with the applicant wife to have the alternative to direct the third respondent to reduce the nominated price to a lesser amount above $5,000,000 (the first agreed price).

18)If a contract for the sale of [Property A] is not entered into at the nominated price (or the first agreed price) within one month from the date of settlement, the third respondent may cause [Property A] to be auctioned as soon as practicable thereafter, the auctioneer to be determined by the third respondent and the reserve price to be (in the following order):

a)Agreed between the third respondent and the applicant (the second agreed price);

b)In default of agreement between the applicant and the third respondent, an amount not less than $4,750,000.00.

19)If [Property A] is not disposed of at the first auction, the third respondent will cause [Property A] to be relisted for sale by private treaty for a further period of two months at the reserve price with a further auction, to be held immediately after the expiration of the two month period, the auction to be conducted by the auctioneer referred to in paragraph 18, and with no reserve price, and if the property fails to sell at that auction, the third respondent will continue to repeat this sale process until a sale of [Property A] is achieved.

20)That, pending the sale of [Property A], the applicant be entitled to occupy [Property A] until the settlement date or such later date as the applicant and the third respondent agree in writing, and the applicant meet or cause one of the [Laue] entities to meet payment of the rates, taxes, maintenance costs and all other outgoings with respect to [Property A], and in default of the applicant making those payments, the third respondent be at liberty to make those payment and recoup those payments from the sale proceeds of [Property A].

21)Pending the settlement of the sale of [Property A]:

a)the applicant during her period of occupation shall make the property available for inspection by prospective purchasers and permit any agent or auctioneer to enter into [Property A] and all buildings on [Property A] at all reasonable times;

b)the third respondent and the applicant during her period of occupation each co-operate in every way with the agent including without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i)Doing or saying nothing to hinder or prevent the sale being effected;

ii)Ensuring the Former Matrimonial Home on [Property A] (including the grounds to the premises) are in a neat, clean and well maintained condition at the time of inspection by the real estate agent and prospective purchasers;

iii)Maintaining the fences; the watering systems and the infrastructure on [Property A] in a reasonable condition pending the sale, taking into account its present condition;

iv)Not depasturing more livestock on [Property A] than is reasonable in the conditions of the season and the pasture on [Property A];

v)Providing all reasonable information requested by the real estate agent;

vi)Signing all documents requested by the real estate agents in relation to the listing for sale of [Property A]; and

vii)Neither the third respondent or the applicant will disclose to the real estate agent, auctioneer or any prospective purchasers that the sale is pursuant to these orders, at any stage up to or at the date of the first auction of [Property A].

22)That, upon sale of [Property A], the gross [Property A] sale proceeds will be paid as follows:

a)in payment of the loan facilities, including all amounts necessary to discharge the [Property A Mortgages] and the [Property B Mortgages];

b)real estate commission and auctioneer's costs associated with the sale of the property, including any repayment of sale costs paid by the third respondent;

c)any arrears or adjustments of rates and outgoings relating to the property;

d)legal costs relating to the sale of the property;

e)refund of any rates, taxes, maintenance costs and other outgoings paid by the third respondent with respect to [Property A] subsequent to the date of these orders;

f)To pay all liabilities of [ARM Pty Ltd] and the [Property A Land Trust] and reserve an amount sufficient according to the advice of the accountant of [ARM] to cover the debts of [ARM] and the winding up and vesting costs set out in paragraph 23,

g)To pay the amount required for the trustee's indemnity specified in paragraph 10, and

h)To pay the balance to [Barkers Pty Ltd] (the net [Property A] sale proceeds).

Winding up of ARM, vesting of Property A Land Trust

23)That upon either the payment of the net [Property A] sale proceeds to [Barkers], or the refinance; declarations and order in paragraphs 14 and 15, the husband's legal personal representative; the wife and the third respondent do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to wind up [ARM Pty Ltd], and vest the [Property A Land Trust].

24)That the husband's Estate; the wife and [Barkers Pty Ltd] jointly and severally indemnify the third respondent and keep it indemnified in respect of all liability of whatsoever nature and howsoever arising, including all taxation and revenue liabilities.

Costs

25)That the Applicant and the Second Respondent's costs of these proceedings on an indemnity basis.

26)That the Applicant and First Respondent pay the Third Respondent's costs of these proceedings and indemnify and reimburse the Second Respondent for all costs incurred by it on behalf of the Third Respondent.

Preparation of Documents and Necessary Acts

27)That each party do all acts and things necessary including signing all necessary documents so as to give full force and effect to the provision of these orders and in the event that either party refuses or neglects to comply with any provision of these Orders without fourteen (14) days of a written request to do so by the other party, then a Registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia, be hereby appointed, pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act, to execute all documents in the name of that party and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to these Orders.

28)That except as provided to the contrary, the transferee party prepare the documentation necessary to give effect to the terms of these orders at their cost and in the case that where duty or registration costs is payable upon the transfer or assignment of property, the transferee in each case shall pay any duty or registration costs (if any) in full.

Severance of tenancy

29)That any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is forthwith expressly severed.

30)These orders shall be binding on the parties' heirs, successors, administrators and assigns.

Duty and registration of transactions

31)That any duty levied pursuant to the legislation of the States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia and all registration fees, payable on transaction arising from these Orders or any documents executed to these Orders be paid by the transferee party or the spouse receiving the benefit of the same.

32)That the parties promptly comply with the requirements of the Duties Act 2008 (WA) (or equivalent legislation of other States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia) and associated legislation and all requisitions issued by the Office of State Revenue, and any other government department in relation to any document executed or transaction pursuant to or putting into effect the terms and conditions of this Order. In default of any of the parties hereto complying with any requisition so issued within fourteen (14) days of the date upon which any requisition issues, the party not in default shall be entitled to comply with any of the said outstanding requisitions and recover from the other parties in default the costs and outlays incurred in complying with any of the said requisitions such costs to be calculated in accordance with the Family Law Rules.

Proceedings

33)That the parties have liberty to apply on seven (7) days notice in writing in relation to the implementation, interpretation of these orders and / or for consequential Orders.

34)That the proceedings be removed from the pending cases list.

"Annexure 2"

Property Schedule

Ownership and item	Value	Sub-totals
3	Wife
4	Bankwest account #### -#	$400
5	1985 [Vehicle]	$15,000
6	Jewellery	$5,000
7	Household contents	$7,500
8	Partial property settlement - 23 April 2013.	$0
9	Paid legals - see below	$0
10	Outstanding legal fees see below	$0
11	Outstanding accounting fees	($110,996)
12	Monies held in C&C trust account	$0
13	Tax payable on LFT distribution	NK
14	Half of Moore Land Valuation fees	($7,277)
15	Outstanding personal accounts	($1,655)	($92,028)
16
17	Wife's superannuation
18	Wife's interest in GESB	$512	$512	($91,516)
19
20
21	Husband's Estate
22	Household contents	$7,500
23	Paid Legals see below	$0
24	Outstanding Legals see below	$0
25	Monies held in OSD trust account see below	$0
26	Estate Legal fees Paid by Executor	($28,555)
27	Loan [L Superannuation Fund].	$0
28	Executor Professional Fees	$0
29	Shares in Public Companies	$23,681
30	Horse Float	$3,500
31	[Mustang]	$17,000
32	Horses	$0
33	Boat with Trailer	$50,000	$73,126	$73,126
34
35
36
37	[Company C Pty Ltd]
38	Cash at bank	$4,403
39	Shares in listed companies	$72,485
40	Horse	$9,000
41	Plant & Equipment	$0
42	Motor vehicles	$0	$85,888	$85,888
43
44
45
46	[Barkers Pty Ltd]
47
48	Shares in listed companies now sold and accounted for	$0
49	Provision for income tax for 2012 Est	($54,622)
50	Provision for income tax for 2013 Est	($40,401)
51	[Property A] Land value per Morcombe	$4,830,000
52	Cash at hand	$0
53	Plant etc in [Laue Family Trust]	$0
54	Plant and equipment held by [Property A Land Trust]	$0	$4,734,977	$4,734,977
55
56
57	[Property A]
58	Debt from [ARM Pty Ltd] to Bankwest paid out 6.06.2014	$0
58A	Debt from [Barkers Pty Ltd] trading as the [Laue Family Trust] and [Barkers Pty Ltd] on its own account to Bankwest	$0
59	Costs pursuant to assignment (costs of refinancing incurred by second and third respondents)	$0
60	Mortgage granted over [Property A] to CRS Pty Ltd (Samson)	$0
61	Mortgage granted over [Property A] to [D & D]	$0
62	Debt that applicant concedes should relate to [Property A] ([ARM] Debt at October)	($269,039)
62A	Contingency amount reserved by Bankwest	$0	($269,039)	($269,039)
64
65	Increase in debt flowing from conduct of all Respondents, save for [Barkers]	$0
66
67	Possible Div 7A issue from form of PAL, refinancing debt referred below as debt of LFT not [B]	NK
68	Transfer Duty on transfer of [Property A] if bare Trust not implemented	NK
69	Taxation liability arising from deemed dividend from [B] to [Property A Land Trust]	NK
70
71	CGT on [Property D] sale	NK
72	Other tax and liabilities as per that report.	NK
73	[Laue Family Trust]
74	Commonwealth Bank account ending [####]	$18,940
75	Cash on Hand in Commonwealth Bank	$20
76	Bankwest Agri one account [#### #-#]	$2,160
77	Stock on hand – [sheep]	$338,406
78	Stock on hand - horses	$37,000
79	Plant & Equipment	$254,480
80	JD Finance	($22,011)
81	Outstanding accounts	($41,325)
82	GST payable at 30 June 2013	($25,039)	$562,631	$562,631
83
84	Further contentious matters
85	[Property B]	NK
86	CRS Pty Ltd Mortgage (Sansom debt secured over [Property B] and [Property A])	$0
87	[D & D Mortgage] (secured over both [Property B] and [Property A])	$0
88	Debt that applicant concedes should relate to [Property B] ([Laue Family Trust Debt] at October)	($1,973,052)
89
90	Stipend - see offsets below at #91	($68,000)
91	Noakes & Commonwealth Government Revenue from [Property B], $500 costs order. Judicial determination re offset against stipend	$47,500	($1,993,552)	($1,993,552)
92	Matters to be calculated after Judgment
93	Stamp duty on purchase of [Property B]	NK
94	Tax on Division 7A s. 109C deemed dividend on transfer of [Property B].	NK
95	Potential Tax payable on Div. 7A, with penalties and interest	NK
96	Potential tax payable on Division 7A loan as a result of Bankwest facility refinance	NK
96A	Capital Gains tax payable by [Camden Pty Ltd] upon any transfer or sale of [Property B]	NK	NK	NK
97	Legal Fees
98	Wife
99	Paid legals at beginning of trial.	$485,778
100	Outstanding legal fees	$0
101	Outstanding accounting fees at beginning of trial	$0	$485,778
102
103	Estate
104	Paid Legals to beginning of trial	$202,180
105	Outstanding Legals to beginning of trial	$0
106	Monies held in OSD trust account	$0
107	Estate Legal fees Paid by Executor	($28,555)	$173,625	$659,403
TOTAL:	$3,761,918	But NK