FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Latteria Holdings Pty Ltd v Corcoran Parker Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 1378
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 97 of 2014
BETWEEN: LATTERIA HOLDINGS PTY LTD
ApplicantAND: CORCORAN PARKER PTY LTD
First RespondentDARREN ASKEW
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondents have leave to file and serve an amended defence in the form annexed…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1378
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court pertain to the appropriateness of determining a separate question based on assumed facts and legal conclusions, and whether such a determination is "just and convenient" under the Federal Court Rules. The Court examined the precedents and observations that suggest that separate determination of questions is an exceptional course, fraught with difficulties, and should be adopted with caution. The Court highlighted the potential for time and expense savings to be illusory and the risk of further appeals. The respondents sought to determine whether the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act apply to the applicant’s claims, a matter left open for trial in a previous judgment.
The Court found that the respondents' application was not just and convenient. The determination of the scope and application of the Competition and Consumer Act, and its relationship to the Wrongs Act, was to be a central aspect of the respondents' defence at trial. The joinder judgment had already addressed the issue of whether a specific section of the Judiciary Act applied, leaving other matters for trial. The Court concluded that the application for a separate determination of the question was inappropriate and refused the application. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application. The Court also granted leave for the respondents to file and serve an amended defence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondents have leave to file and serve an amended defence in the form annexed to the affidavit of Mr Jonathan Shakenovsky sworn 11 December 2014.
2. The application for the determination of a separate question pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) is refused.
3. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Separate determination of questions remains, however, an “exceptional course” (Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 697 at [5] per Brereton J) that can be “fraught with difficulties” and is to be “adopted with caution”: Save the Ridge Inc v Commonwealth (2005) 147 FCR 97; [2005] FCAFC 203 at [15] per Black CJ and Moore J. In Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 19, Kirby and Callinan JJ observed (at [168]-[170]):…The attractions of trials of issues rather than of cases in their totality, are often more chimerical than real. Common experience demonstrates that savings in time and expense are often illusory, particularly when the parties have, as here, had the necessity of making full preparation and the factual matters relevant to one issue are relevant to others, and they all overlap. The second and related comment is this. A party whose whole case is knocked out on a trial of a preliminary or single issue, may suspect, however unjustifiably, that an abbreviated course was adopted and a decision reached in the court’s, rather than the parties’, interests. Thirdly, there is an additional potential for further appeals to which the course of the trial on separate issues may give rise. Indeed, that could occur here were this appeal to be allowed and a retrial had in which the remaining issues of causation and damages were decided. Single-issue trials should, in our opinion, only be embarked upon when their utility, economy, and fairness to the parties are beyond question. CONSIDERATION The respondents have identified the separate question in their application by reference to whether, given certain assumed facts and certain assumed legal conclusions, what they identify as the applicant’s “common law claim” is within the meaning of an “apportionable claim” for the purposes of s 87CB of the Competition and Consumer Act. In their written submissions, the respondents express the question as whether the provisions of Part VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act apply to the applicant’s contract, negligence and Fair Trading Act claims. Differently expressed, this was the matter which was left open in the joinder judgment as a matter to be determined at trial: see at [64] of the joinder judgment. All the respondents have done is to turn the issue expressed at [64] of the joinder judgment on its head, and articulate it by reference to the Competition and Consumer Act provisions rather than the Wrongs Act provisions. As I noted in that paragraph, whether Part IVAA of the Wrongs Act applies to the contractual, tortious and Fair Trading Act claims made by the applicant is factually and legally complicated. So much is obvious from Full Court decisions such as Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 64 and ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 309 ALR 445; [2014] FCAFC 65. Given the respondents have pleaded (and clarified in their amended defence) that their liability in respect of each and every of the applicant’s claims is apportionable under either the Wrongs Act or the Competition and Consumer Act, the scope and application of Part IVAA of the Wrongs Act, and Part VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act will be a central aspect of their defence at trial. Nothing in the joinder judgment precludes or impedes that occurring. The joinder judgment determined the confined issue of whether s 24AI(3) applied so as to require the joinder of Mr O’Brien. I found that provision was not “picked up” by s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The application of the remainder of Part IVAA of the Wrongs Act, and its relationship to the operation of Part VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act, were matters left for trial. It is implicit in the determination that s 24AI(3) is not “picked up” that Mr O’Brien is not required to be a party for the remainder of Part IVAA to have application, if the Court determines that to be the case.