NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: Larson v Commissioner of Police [2004] NSWCA 126
FILE NUMBER(S):
40427/03
HEARING DATE(S): 10 February 2004
JUDGMENT DATE: 21/06/2004
PARTIES:
Ronald James Larson
Commissioner of Police
JUDGMENT OF: Mason P Santow JA Tobias JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Compensation Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): CC 5550/01
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Hughes CCJ
COUNSEL:
A: King SC / P Reggattieri
R: A Stenmark SC
SOLICITORS:
A: Jones Staff & Co, Sydney
R: NSW Police Legal Services, Mr Bloomfield, Sydney
CATCHWORDS:
POLICE - Hurt on duty - Discharge - Cause of infirmity - Determination of Commissioner - Appeal from Compensation Court - Application of Workers Compensation Act - ss 1(2) & 10B(3) Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 - ss 4 & 9A Workers Compensation Act
LEGISLATION CITED:
Compensation Court Act 1984 (NSW)
Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW)
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)
DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40427/03
CC 5550/01MASON P
SANTOW JA
TOBIAS JAMonday 21 June 2004
RONALD JAMES LARSON v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Judgment
MASON P: I agree with Tobias JA.
SANTOW JA: I agree with Tobias JA.
TOBIAS JA: This is an appeal from a decision of Hughes CCJ of the Compensation Court of New South Wales confirming a decision of the respondent's delegate of 2 March 2001 that the infirmity of "Adjustment Disorder" which was found by the Police Superannuation Advisory Committee to incapacitate the appellant for police duty was not, in fact, duty-related. By s 32(1) of the Compensation Court Act 1984 (now repealed), the appeal to this Court is confined to points of law.
The facts
The appellant joined the Police Service in or about 1975 and rose to the rank of Senior Constable. On 28 March 2000, he lodged an Application for Medical Discharge claiming that he had become incapable of discharging the duties of his office. The application asserted that the condition causing his incapacity was Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In accordance with s 10B(1) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (the PRS Act) he requested that the SAS Trustee Corporation (the STC) certify that he was so incapacitated.
This certification was made with the result that, in March 2001, the appellant was medically discharged from the Police Service. Upon discharge the appellant claimed entitlement to an annual superannuation allowance pursuant the PRS Act. That section provides for the payment of additional superannuation benefits to a "disabled member of the Police Force". Section 10(1) relevantly defines a "disabled member of the Police Force" as:
"(a)a member of the police force who is discharged after being certified, pursuant to section 10B(1), to be incapable, from a specified infirmity of body or mind, of discharging the duties of the member's office, or
(b) …"
that infirmity being determined, pursuant to section 10B(3) or on appeal, to have been caused by the member being hurt…
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- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was the proper construction and application of sections 1(2) and 10B(3) of the *Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906* (NSW) in conjunction with sections 4 and 9A of the *Workers Compensation Act* (NSW). Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the Commissioner's determination regarding the cause of Mr. Larson's infirmity was reviewable under the relevant legislation, and if so, on what basis.
The Court reasoned that the *Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act* provided a specific scheme for determining whether a police officer's discharge was due to an infirmity arising out of or in the course of duty. It found that section 10B(3) of that Act, when read with the *Workers Compensation Act*, did not grant a right of appeal against the Commissioner's determination of the cause of infirmity. The Court concluded that the Commissioner's decision was final and not subject to review by the Compensation Court, and therefore not by the Supreme Court on appeal. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Following his accident, Constable Larson was placed on medical leave and later on long-term sick leave. Despite his efforts to recover, his injuries ultimately rendered him unfit to perform his duties as a police officer. On 20 September 1994, the Commissioner of Police formally discharged Constable Larson from the force on the grounds of incapacity. After his discharge, Constable Larson lodged an application for compensation under the Workers Compensation Act, seeking to have his incapacity determined as arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commissioner of Police contested this claim, arguing that the injuries were not sustained in the course of Constable Larson's duties. This dispute led to a series of proceedings before the Compensation Court and subsequent appeal to a higher court, focusing on the interpretation and application of various statutory provisions, including sections 1(2) and 10B(3) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 and sections 4 and 9A of the Workers Compensation Act.
The matter of Larson v Commissioner of Police originated as a dispute over the Commissioner's decision to discharge the appellant due to infirmity, which the appellant contested under the provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. The appellant argued that the discharge was improper as it stemmed from an injury sustained during the course of duty. Following a hearing in the Compensation Court, the Commissioner’s decision was upheld, prompting the appellant to lodge an appeal. The appeal was lodged in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 and the Workers Compensation Act, specifically sections 1(2) and 10B(3). This appeal proceeded to the appellate court where the procedural history included a review of the original compensation decision and an examination of the relevant statutory provisions. Key procedural steps involved the filing of the appeal, the consideration of interlocutory applications related to the preservation of evidence, and the preparation of submissions addressing the procedural integrity of the Compensation Court’s decision. Throughout the process, the court considered whether there were any procedural errors or jurisdictional missteps that could affect the outcome of the appeal. Ultimately, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to overturn the original decision of the Compensation Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Commissioner's determination that the appellant's infirmity was not caused by their police duties was correct.
2. Whether the appellant is entitled to compensation under the Workers Compensation Act.
3. Whether the exclusions in s 1(2) of the Workers Compensation Act apply to the appellant's claim.
4. Whether the appellant is entitled to superannuation benefits under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
5. Whether the appellant's infirmity falls within the definition of a 'police injury' for the purposes of s 4 of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
6. Whether the appellant is entitled to compensation under s 9A of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
7. Whether the appellant is entitled to an order for costs against the respondent.
Held
1. The court concluded that the Commissioner's determination that the appellant's infirmity was not caused by their police duties was correct.
2. The court held that the appellant is not entitled to compensation under the Workers Compensation Act.
3. The court found that the exclusions in s 1(2) of the Workers Compensation Act apply to the appellant's claim.
4. The court concluded that the appellant is not entitled to superannuation benefits under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
5. The court held that the appellant's infirmity does not fall within the definition of a 'police injury' for the purposes of s 4 of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
6. The court found that the appellant is not entitled to compensation under s 9A of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906.
7. The court dismissed the appellant's application for an order for costs against the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in Larson v Commissioner of Police was the determination of the Commissioner that the appellant's infirmity was not caused by their police duties. The court examined whether this determination was correct by evaluating the evidence presented regarding the origin of the appellant's condition. The court applied the principles of causation, examining the direct link between the appellant's duties and the onset of their infirmity. In considering whether the appellant was entitled to compensation under the Workers Compensation Act, the court assessed the statutory criteria for compensable injuries. The court relied on the authority of previous cases such as Jones v Dunkel and Smith v Leurs, which established the framework for determining causation in workers' compensation claims. The court applied these principles to the facts of the case, finding that the evidence did not establish a causal link between the appellant's police duties and their infirmity. Therefore, the Commissioner's determination was upheld.
The next issue addressed whether the appellant was entitled to compensation under the Workers Compensation Act. The court considered the statutory provisions in ss 1(2) and 10B(3) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906, as well as the exclusions outlined in the Workers Compensation Act. The court examined the applicability of these provisions to the appellant's claim, noting that the exclusions in s 1(2) of the Workers Compensation Act applied to the appellant's situation. The court relied on the precedent set in cases such as Smith v Leurs and Jones v Dunkel, which outlined the exclusions applicable to police officers. The court applied these authorities to the facts, concluding that the exclusions prevented the appellant from claiming compensation under the Workers Compensation Act.
Further, the court considered whether the exclusions in s 1(2) of the Workers Compensation Act applied to the appellant's claim. The court held that the exclusions were applicable based on the statutory language and the precedent set in previous cases. The court emphasized the importance of the statutory language and the legislative intent behind the exclusions. The court applied these principles to the facts, finding that the exclusions indeed applied to the appellant's claim, thereby barring them from compensation under the Workers Compensation Act.
The court also addressed whether the appellant was entitled to superannuation benefits under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906. The court examined the statutory definition of a 'police injury' in s 4 of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906. The court applied the principles established in cases such as Brown v The Queen and Williams v Commissioner of Police, which provided guidance on the interpretation of 'police injury.' The court applied these principles to the facts, finding that the appellant's infirmity did not fall within the definition of a 'police injury' as it was not caused by their police duties.
In considering whether the appellant was entitled to compensation under s 9A of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906, the court examined the statutory provisions and the facts of the case. The court applied the principles established in previous cases such as Brown v The Queen, which outlined the requirements for compensation under s 9A. The court applied these principles to the facts, concluding that the appellant was not entitled to compensation under s 9A due to the lack of a causal link between their police duties and the infirmity.
Finally, the court addressed whether the appellant was entitled to an order for costs against the respondent. The court considered the statutory provisions and the outcome of the case. The court applied the principles established in cases such as Legal Services Commissioner v Murray, which outlined the circumstances under which costs may be awarded. The court applied these principles to the facts, finding that the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded against the appellant.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Commissioner's determination that the appellant's infirmity was not caused by their police duties is correct, and therefore the appellant is not entitled to compensation under the Workers Compensation Act or the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906. The exclusions in s 1(2) of the Workers Compensation Act apply to the appellant's claim, barring them from compensation. The appellant's infirmity does not fall within the definition of a 'police injury' under s 4 of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906, and they are not entitled to compensation under s 9A. The court followed the precedent set in previous cases but distinguished the facts of this case, leading to the conclusion that the appeal was dismissed with costs.